A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States by Galvin, Charles O. & Devins, Neal
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 36 
Issue 6 Issue 6 - November 1983 Article 1 
11-1983 
A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States 
Charles O. Galvin 
Neal Devins 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles O. Galvin and Neal Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States, 36 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1353 (1983) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 36 NovEMBER 1983 NUMBER 6
A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob
Jones University v. United States
Charles 0. Galvin* and Neal Devins**
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 1354
II. TAx POLICY AND THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERN-
MENT ............................ ............. 1355
Ill. Bob Jones University v. United States ........... 1356
A. The Meaning of the Tax Exemption Provision 1359
1. Analysis of the Public Benefit Doctrine... 1365
2. Analysis of the Common Community Con-
science Requirement .................... 1366
3. Analysis of the Tax Exemption and the
"Tax Expenditure" Budget .............. 1368
B. The Scope of IRS Rulemaking Authority .... 1371
C. Issues That the Court Did Not Resolve ...... 1374
1. Is a Tax Exemption Government Aid? ... 1374
2. Can Some of a Tax-Exempt Organization's
Practices Violate Public Policy? . . . . . . . . . 1376
3. Does Granting Tax-Exempt Status Trigger
Constitutional Scrutiny? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1377
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................... 1379
* Centennial Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.S.C., Southern Methodist Uni-
versity, 1940; M.B.A., Northwestern University, 1941; J.D., 1947; S.J.D., Harvard, 1961. For-
mer member, Advisory Group on Exempt Organizations to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
** Director, Religious Liberty and Private Education Project, Institute for Public Pol-
icy Studies, Vanderbilt University. B.A., Georgetown University, 1978; J.D., Vanderbilt Uni-
versity, 1982. Mr. Devins' research is supported by a grant from the Institute for Educa-




In one of last term's most notable decisions, the United States
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States1 consid-
ered the meaning of the tax exemption provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code) and the relationships among the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), Congress, and the courts in formulating
tax policy. Affirming an IRS ruling2 that denied tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory private schools, the Court devised a model
for the interaction of the three branches of government in tax pol-
icy matters. This model assigns to the IRS primary authority to
develop rules governing the implementation of the tax exemption
laws and assigns to the courts and Congress secondary authority to
oversee the IRS. The decision seems to alter the earlier model in
which the courts had retained primary authority to determine stat-
utory intent and to review IRS actions in the tax exemption area.
Furthermore, the Court interpreted the applicable Code provisions
under which Bob Jones University claimed tax exemption as re-
quiring that the institution confer a "public benefit" and have a
purpose in harmony with a "common community conscience."'3
This Article questions the tax policy model that the Court ar-
ticulated in Bob Jones University. The authors believe that the
Court's recognition of the primacy of IRS rulemaking is undesir-
able because the IRS, as an executive agency, is susceptible to the
influence of the incumbent administration's policy objectives. Fur-
ther, even though the life-tenured status of judges insulates the
courts from external political pressures, significant problems are
also present in a model in which the courts occupy a primary role
in formulating tax policy. In sum, Congress is better suited than
either the courts or the IRS to determine tax policy because it is
institutionally organized to gather social and economic data, to de-
fine policy objectives, and to legislate to achieve these objectives,
which often have repercussions beyond the circumstances of a par-
ticular case.
This Article's criticism of Bob Jones University also extends
to the Court's "public benefit" and "common community con-
science" standards for charitable organizations seeking to qualify
for tax exemptions. Although restrictive standards suggest that a
tax exemption is a form of government aid, the Court declined to
1. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
2. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
3. 103 S. Ct. at 2028-29; see infra notes 33-56 and accompanying text.
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make this holding explicitly. 4 Moreover, the majority's recognition
of the IRS's broad rulemaking authority seems inconsistent with
the "community conscience" standard, for in the exercise of its
broad administrative discretion the IRS need not strictly follow
this standard. Finally and most significantly, the "public benefit"
and "community conscience" standards may discourage organiza-
tions that provide a healthy diversity of views in a pluralistic
society.
This Article begins with a general discussion in part IE of the
role of the courts in the development of federal tax policy.' A criti-
cal analysis of the Bob Jones University decision-focusing upon
both the specific tax exemption issue and the Court's general
model for tax policy decisionmaking-follows in part II." Part IV
concludes the Article with a recommendation that Congress act de-
finitively to take the lead in formulating tax policy.7
II. TAx POLICY AND THE THRF BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
Congress, the courts, and the executive branch-through the
IRS and the Treasury Department-historically have all interacted
in formulating tax policy. Congress, of course, has contributed tax
legislation-legislation that has evolved from the Revenue Act of
1913 to the extraordinarily complex rules of the present Internal
Revenue Code. The Treasury Department and the IRS have added
extensive regulations and rulings to the already unwieldy tax legis-
lation. Courts then have attempted to work their way through the
resulting murkiness-the "dank, miasmic, myxomycetous sump."8
Judge Learned Hand artfully described the difficulty confronting
the courts:
[T]he words of such an act as the Income Tax... merely dance before my
eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception
upon exception-couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold
of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but
successfully concealed, purport. ... I -Inow that these monsters are the re-
sult of fabulous industry and ingenuity ... ; one cannot help wondering
whether to the reader they have any significance save that the words are
4. See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 16-120 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
8. Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicali-
ties of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, in B. BnrvaR, C. GALviN, R. MUSGRAVE & J.
PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE INcoME TAX BASS? 89 (1968) (reprints articles and additional
remarks by these authors from 80 HARv. L. Rsv. 925 (1967) and 81 HARv. L. Rzv. 44, 63,
1016, and 1032 (1968)).
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strung together with syntactical correctness.'
Notwithstanding the difficulties of interpretation, the courts
profoundly have influenced the development of tax law. As one
commentator noted, "Congress has the first word in [tax formula-
tion] . . . but the courts have the last word."1 Similarly, as two
former Justice Department officers observed, "Frequently, a
phrase in a ruling, a court opinion, or even an argument in a gov-
ernment tax brief can have as much impact on tax policy as a new
federal tax statute." 1 A court's determination of tax policy gener-
ally serves to refine congressional legislation to fit contemporary
needs. Unlike tax legislation, which "prospectively formulates rules
with universal applicability[,] . .. tax litigation formulates rules
retrospectively, aiming principally at resolving disputes of immedi-
ate concern.
'1 2
Thus, under this traditional model the courts had primary au-
thority to shape the meaning of the Code, usually after a private
party's challenge of an IRS directive" or procedure, or the gov-
ernment's appeal of an unfavorable lower court decision.1 5 Bob
Jones University is significant because it alters the structure of
decisionmaking by placing primary supervisory authority in the
IRS.
III. Bob Jones University v. United States
Bob Jones University calls itself "the world's most unusual
university."' 6 Although unaffiliated with any established church,
the University is dedicated to the teaching and propagation of fun-
damentalist religious beliefs.17 In pursuit of these goals the Univer-
sity dictates strict rules of conduct for its students.1 8 To enforce
9. Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE, L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
10. R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 656 (1954 ed.).
11. Ferguson & Henzke, The Formulation of Federal Tax Policy Through Litigation,
1 VA. TAX Rav. 85, 85 (1981).
12. Id. at 86.
13. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2023 (1983) (discuss-
ing Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974)); see infra text accompanying note 22.
14. See, e.g., Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
3109 (1983); infra note 95.
15. See Ferguson & Henzke, supra note 11, at 91-98.
16. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 734 (1974).
17. Id.
18. For example,
The institution does not permit dancing, card playing, the use of tobacco, movie-going,
and other such forms of indulgences in which worldly young people often engage; no
student will release information of any kind to any local newspaper, radio station, or
1356 [Vol. 36:1353
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one such rule forbidding interracial dating and marriage, the Uni-
versity denies admission to applicants engaged in or known to ad-
vocate interracial dating and marriage.19
The Bob Jones University controversy began in November
1970 when the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia in Green v. Kennedy20 enjoined the IRS from according
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools in Mis-
sissippi. The Green court suggested that the IRS would not be per-
mitted to grant tax-exempt status to institutions that violate the
government's public policy of nondiscrimination. The IRS then re-
versed its position of granting tax exemptions to racially discrimi-
natory institutions and notified the University that it intended to
challenge the tax-exempt status of private schools with racially dis-
criminatory admissions policies.2 1 In response, the University in
1971 sought to enjoin the IRS from revoking its tax-exempt status.
television station without first checking with the University Public Relations Director;
students are expected to refrain from singing, playing, and, as far as possible, from
"tuning-in" on the radio or playing on the record player jazz, rock-and-roll, folk rock,
or any other types of questionable music; and, no young man may walk a girl on cam-
pus unless both of them have a legitimate reason for going in the same direction.
Note, The Internal Revenue Service's Treatment of Religiously Motivated Racial Discrimi-
nation by Tax Exempt Organizations, 54 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 925, 925 (1979) (quoting Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.S.C. 1978)).
19. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2023 (1983). The sponsors of
the University believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage. Id. at 2022.
20. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S.
956 (1970), appeal dismissed sub nom. Coit v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971). The IRS decision
to deny tax-exempt status to discriminatory private schools was in accord with plaintiffs'
argument in Green that to grant tax exemptions to schools that violate the important public
policy objectives established in Brown v. Board of Educ. and the Civil Rights Act of 1964
would be improper. See IRS News Release (July 10, 1970); N.Y. Times, July 11, 1970, at Al,
col. 8. The court made permanent the Green v. Kennedy temporary injunction in Green v.
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). Until the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Bob Jones University, the precedential effect of Green was unclear. In
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974), the Court claimed that since the IRS was no
longer maintaining an adversarial position against the plaintiffs in Green at the time of the
trial, "the [Supreme] Court's affirmance in Green lacks the precedential weight of a case
involving a truly adversary controversy." Id. at 740 n.11.
21. Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. at 2023. Prior to 1971, Bob Jones University com-
pletely excluded blacks. From 1971 to 1975, the University accepted applications from
blacks married within their race. Since May 1975, the University has permitted unmarried
blacks to enroll subject to this disciplinary rule prohibiting interracial dating and marriage.
See id. The Fourth Circuit's decision in McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975),
aff'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), influenced the University's decision to open its admissions to
blacks. McCrary held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited private schools from denying admis-
sions to students on the basis of race. 515 F.2d at 1086-87. McCrary, however, did not ad-
dress whether a private school can deny admissions on the basis of race as a matter of
religious belief.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1353
That suit culminated in a 1974 Supreme Court decision that "pro-
hibited the University from obtaining judicial review by way of in-
junctive action before the assessment or collection of any tax."22
The IRS in January 1976 formally revoked the University's
tax exemption. 3 After paying a portion of the federal unemploy-
ment taxes due, the University filed suit for a refund, contending
that it was statutorily and constitutionally entitled to reinstate-
ment of its tax exemption. 4 In April 1981 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the revocation of the ex-
emption.25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bob Jones
University and in Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United
States,26 a case presenting identical issues. On January 8, 1982, the
Justice Department petitioned the Court to vacate these cases as
moot in light of the Reagan administration's decision to reinstate
the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools.2
Because of a related court order that prevented the administration
22. Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. at 2023 (discussing Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416
U.S. 725 (1974)).
23. Revenue Ruling 71-447 formally established the policy of prohibiting the granting
of tax exemptions to private schools that maintained racially discriminatory policies. Rev.
Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. Revenue Procedure 72-54 required private schools to publicize
their nondiscriminatory policies, although it demanded no particular method of publication.
Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834. The IRS in 1975 updated its stipulations for private
schools seeking tax-exempt status. Revenue Procedure 75-50 provided guidelines and man-
dated recordkeeping to assess whether a private school's policies were racially nondiscrimi-
natory. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. The regulation mandates that tax-exempt institu-
tions: (a) adopt formally nondiscriminatory policies in their charters or bylaws, (b) refer to
such policies in their advertising brochures, and (c) publish annual notice of such policies in
a local newspaper of general circulation. Id. §§ 4.01-.03, 1975-2 C.B. 587-88. See Devins, Tax
Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: A Legislative Proposal, 20 HRv.
J. ON LEoxS. 153, 157 (1983). The IRS in 1975 also published a revenue ruling denying tax-
exempt status to any religious institution that maintained racially discriminatory policies,
even if sincere religious belief was the basis of that discrimination. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1
C.B. 158. Current IRS policies rely on those two 1975 rulings. For a general description of
federal governmental actions on this issue prior to the Reagan policy shift, see Devins,
supra, at 155-61.
24. Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. at 2023.
25. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1981). The district court
had concluded that the University was entitled to tax-exempt status on both statutory and
first amendment grounds. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 897-98
(D.S.C. 1978).
26. 454 U.S. 892 (1981). The Court heard both cases simultaneously.
27. Memorandum for the United States, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United
States and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). In addition, on January
8, 1982, the IRS announced that "without further guidance from Congress, the Internal
Revenue Service will no longer deny tax-exempt status for. . . organizations on the grounds
that they don't conform with certain fundamental public policies." IRS News Release (Jan.
8, 1982).
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from reinstating this status,2 8 however, the administration with-
drew its request that the Court declare the cases moot.2 9 The Su-
preme Court denied tax exemptions to the two petitioner schools
on May 24, 1983.30 In its decision the Court made certain general
pronouncements both on the meaning of the Code's tax exemption
provision and on the IRS's authority to issue rulings in accordance
with its own interpretation of the Code. 1 The majority held that a
tax-exempt institution must confer some "public benefit" and that
its purpose must not be at odds with the "common community
conscience. '"3 2 The Court further held that the IRS has broad au-
thority to interpret the Internal Revenue Code and to issue rulings
based on its interpretation.
A. The Meaning of the Tax Exemption Provision
Section 501(c)(3) of the Code provides that "[c]orporations
.. .organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
.. .or educational purposes" are entitled to tax-exempt status.33
28. Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982).
29. See Babcock, Administration Asks High Court to Settle School Exemption Issue,
Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1982, at A3, col. 4; Taylor, School Tax Issue Put to High Court in
Shift by Reagan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1982, at Al, col. 1. The government, however, did not
change its position that the IRS lacked authority to promulgate procedures denying tax-
exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. Thus, the Court felt compelled to
appoint "counsel adversary"-William T. Coleman, Jr.,-to argue the government's side of
the case. Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States and Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 50 U.S.L.W. 3837 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982). For a critique of this Court decision, see
Devins, Is the Supreme Court on the Reagan Team?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 3, 1982,
at 22; McCoy & Devins, Does the Bob Jones Case Meet the Case-or-Controversy Require-
ment?, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 18, col. 1.
30. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
31. The Court also ruled against Bob Jones University on its claim that the first
amendment's free-exercise-of-religion clause blocked the IRS from implementing its racial
nondiscrimination policy against the University. The Court held that "the Government has
a fundamental overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education ....
That governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits
places on [the University's] exercise of [its] religious beliefs." Id. at 2035. For a discussion of
the religious liberty issue raised in Bob Jones University, see Laycock, Tax Exemptions for
Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 Tax. L. REv. 259 (1982); Neuberger & Crum-
plar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack: Conflicting Goals of Religious Freedom
and Racial Integration, 48 FORDHAM L. Rav. 229, 258-75 (1979); Note, The Judicial Role in
Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARv. L. Rv. 378,
401-04 (1979). For a critique of the Court's ruling on the religious liberty issue, see Devins,
Did the High Court Go Too Far to Make a Politically Popular Ruling?, NAT'L L.J., June 20,
1983, at 13, col. 1.
32. 103 S. Ct. at 2028-29. The Court did not reach the issue of whether an organization
could receive tax-exempt status if it violated some public policy but also conferred some
public benefit. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
33. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976); see also id. § 501(a) (providing that an organization de-
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Applying this section, the IRS had ruled that to qualify for tax
exemption an institution must demonstrate that it falls within one
of the categories defined in that section and that its activity is not
contrary to settled public policy." The IRS felt that the settled
public policy was that the section 501(c)(3) tax exempt organiza-
tion-even if not qualifying as a "charitable" organization-must
be charitable in the common law sense. The common law notion of
charity includes an effort to further a public purpose.3 5 The Uni-
versity contested the Service's construction of the tax exemption
provision, arguing that the position of the IRS contradicted the
statute's plain language and legislative history and that the IRS
had adopted the faulty reasoning of the Green court.38
In its "plain language" argument the University emphasized
the absence of any statutory language that expressly required all
scribed in § 501(c) shall be exempt from taxation unless such exemption is denied under §
502 or § 503). The complete text of § 501(c)(3), specifying those organizations qualifying for
tax exemption, follows:
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equip-
ment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earn-
ings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substan-
tial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does
not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of state-
ments), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
Subchapter F of the Internal Revenue Code, §§ 501-28, is an elaborately detailed set of
statutory rules providing tax exemptions for various qualifying organizations. Section 501(a)
provides generally for exemption from tax for those organizations described in subsections
(c) and (d). Subsection (c) lists 22 organizations that enjoy tax exemption, and subsection
(d) describes certain religious or apostolic organizations. In particular, § 501(c)(3) describes
certain types of organizations that not only enjoy tax-exempt status but also afford gener-
ally deductible contributions under § 170. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
34. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. at 2025; see Brief of Amicus Curiae
William T. Coleman, Jr. at 11-44, Bob Jones Univ.
35. 103 S. Ct. at 2025-26.
36. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Bob Jones Univ. For a discussion of Green, see infra
notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc., concerned similar arguments. Goldsboro is a private
elementary and secondary school that denied admissions to blacks, supposedly for religious
reasons. Goldsboro challenged the denial of its tax-exempt status in much the same way
that Bob Jones University had done. The two cases were joined before the Supreme Court.
454 U.S. 892 (1981). Because the statutory and tax policy issues raised in Goldsboro are
identical to those issues in Bob Jones University, the two cases can be treated as identical
for the purposes of this Article. The two cases, however, do differ on the religious liberty
issue. The government has a stronger interest in preventing a school from denying admis-
sions to blacks than in limiting a school's interracial social relationships. See Weeks &
Devins, First Amendment Free Exercise Protections, 6 LEx. COLLEGII 1 (Summer 1982).
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exempt organizations to be "charitable" in the common law sense
of providing some public benefit. The University maintained that
the disjunctive "or" separating the categories in section 501(c)(3)
precluded this reading of the statute and that any organization
falling within the specified categories automatically qualified for an
exemption. This "plain language" argument relied on decisions in
which the Court refused to transfer the meaning of one statutory
term to another employed in the disjunctive.3 8 Similarly, the Uni-
versity condemned the IRS's attempt "to make 'religious' an adjec-
tive modifying 'charitable"' as equally untenable. 9
The majority, however, rejected the "plain language"
argument:
It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that a court
should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language
would defeat the plain purpose of the statute .. .. "[I]n interpreting a stat-
ute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general
words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute...
37. 103 S. Ct. at 2025; see also Brief for Petitioner at 10-23, Bob Jones Univ.
38. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). Defendants in Reiter con-
tended that Clayton Act coverage of" '[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property"' should extend only to "business activity or property related to one's business."
Id. at 337-38. The Court, however, disagreed:
That strained construction would have us ignore the disjunctive "or" and rob the
term "property" of its independent and ordinary significance; moreover, it would con-
vert the noun "business" into an adjective. In construing a statute we are obliged to
give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used .... Canons of construction ordi-
narily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless
the context dictates otherwise; here it does not. . . .Congress' use of the word "or"
makes plain that "business" was not intended to modify "property," nor was "prop-
erty" intended to modify "business".
Id. at 338-39 (citations omitted).
39. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Bob Jones Univ. The University also contended that
"where substantial constitutional issues under the Religion Clauses would arise by virtue of
the extension to religious institutions of a governmental requirement, this Court has held
that the extension may not be left to implication, but instead 'there must be present the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed."' Id. (relying upon NLRB v. Catho-
lic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979)). This contention is without merit. First, the
Catholic Bishop decision, upon which the University based this argument, presented the
Court with an opportunity to vindicate the Bishop's position on either statutory or constitu-
tional grounds. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977)
(NLRB cannot order representation elections for lay teachers in Catholic high schools on
both statutory and first amendment grounds). Bob Jones University did not present the
Court with such a choice because the Court viewed the school's religious liberty claim as
subsidiary to the government's interest in racial nondiscrimination. Second, the Court in
Catholic Bishop recognized that "the amendment may not be substituted for construction
and that a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict with
constitutional limitation." Yu Cong Eng. v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926). In short, the
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University did not address the Catholic Bishop issue.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
and the objects and policy of the law .... ,40
The majority adopted the view that the common law of charitable
trusts had guided the enactment of section 501(c)(3) 41 and that
Congress had expressly adopted the common law's public benefit
rationale for charitable exemptions:
"The exemption from taxation of money and property devoted to charitable
and other purposes is based on the theory that the Government is compen-
sated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public funds, and by
the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare. '4 2
In unusually sweeping language, the majority then articulated its
standards for exemptions:
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity con-
fers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or the community may not
itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the
work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues. . . . The insti-
tution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community con-
science as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be
conferred.43
The University was not entitled to tax-exempt status under
these standards because "an educational institution engaging in
practices affirmatively at odds with [the government's] declared
position [on racial nondiscrimination] . . . cannot be seen as exer-
cising a 'beneficial and stabilizing influence in community life.' ",44
Further, "In determining what purposes may benefit the commu-
nity and what organizations are therefore exempt, public benefit
must be measured by present social and governmental legal and
moral standards, rather than those in existence at the time section
501 was enacted. '45 Under such contemporary standards46 the
Court recognized that the "'legitimate educational function [of a
racially discriminatory private school] cannot be isolated from dis-
criminatory practices. . . . [Dfiscriminatory treatment exerts a
pervasive influence on the entire educational process.' 47 The
40. 103 S. Ct. at 2025-26 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194
(1857) (emphasis supplied by the Court).
41. 103 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of Racially Discrimina-
tory Religious Schools, 36 TAx L. REv. 477, 485-99 (1981)).
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938)).
43. 103 S. Ct. at 2028-29 (emphasis supplied).
44. Id. at 2032 (quoting Walz v. Tax Com'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
45. Simon, supra note 41, at 488; see 103 S. Ct. at 2029 n.20.
46. Racial discrimination in education officially did not become a public wrong until
the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. 103 S. Ct. at 2030 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468-69 (1973))
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majority thus concluded that "[ilt would be wholly incompatible
with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant the benefit of
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational entities."4
Justice Rehnquist, the sole dissenter, endorsed the Univer-
sity's argument that the legislative history militated against a find-
ing that section 501(c)(3) required common law charitability. His
dissent traced the evolution of the iax exemption provision and
rejected finding "some additional, undefined public policy require-
ment. 49 He concluded "that the legislative history of § 501(c)(3)
unmistakably makes clear that Congress has decided what organi-
zations are serving a public purpose and providing a public benefit
within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) and has clearly set forth in §
501(c)(3) the characteristics of such organizations." 50 Nonetheless,
Justice Rehnquist could not persuade the majority of the absence
of the common law notion of charity in the section.
Justice Powell, concurring, avoided making broad pronounce-
ments on the meaning and purpose of the tax exemption provision.
Instead, he confined his analysis to the narrow issue of whether
"there are now sufficient reasons for accepting the IRS's construc-
tion of the Code as proscribing tax exemptions for schools that dis-
criminate on the basis of race as a matter of policy. ' 51 In trying to
discern the legislative intent behind the provision, Justice Powell
attributed great weight to the refusal of Congress to act on propos-
als that would have overturned the IRS's nondiscrimination pol-
icy5 2 and to the amendment of the Code that denies tax exemp-
(emphasis supplied by the Court).
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2030.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2040 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 2041 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied by the dissent). Justice
Powell's concurring opinion also was sympathetic to this reading:
It also is clear that the language [of § 501(c)(3)] itself does not mandate refusal of tax-
exempt status to any private school that maintains a racially discriminatory admissions
policy. Accordingly, there is force in Justice Rehnquist's argument. . . . Indeed, were
we writing prior to the history detailed in the Court's opinion, this could well be the
construction that I would adopt.
Id. at 2036 (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2036 (Powell, J., concurring).
52. As the majority noted, "During the past 12 years there have been no fewer than 13
bills introduced to overturn the IRS interpretation of § 501(c)(3). Not one of these bills has
emerged from any committee, although Congress had enacted numerous other amendments
to § 501 during the same period .... ." Id. at 2033. Justice Rehnquist, however, thought
this evidence irrelevant: "[W]e have said before, and it is equally applicable here, that this
type of congressional inaction is of virtually no weight in determining legislative intent. ....
These bills and related hearings indicate little more than that a vigorous debate has existed
in Congress concerning the new IRS position." Id. at 2043 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (cita-
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tions to racially discriminatory private clubs.53 Consequently,
although he read the disjunctive "or" in the statute to indicate
that Congress did not intend a common law "charitable" gloss to
apply to each category, he concurred with the majority's result be-
cause "there has been a decade of acceptance [by Congress] that is
persuasive in the circumstances of this case.""
The majority did not address directly the University's argu-
ment that Green was a bad decision.55 Although the Court reached
its decision on the "public benefit" theory, it did suggest that the
Green "public policy" doctrine was good law.56
tions omitted). As it relates to the relevance of proposed legislation, this position does not
seem unreasonable. Still, these affirmative acts by Congress indicate that it both recognized
and supported the racial nondiscrimination requirement. See infra note 53.
53. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1976). Congress amended the Code in response to the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia's decision in McGlotten v. Connally, which held, in
part, that nonprofit private clubs that excluded nonwhites from membership were entitled
to tax-exempt status. 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-59 (D.D.C. 1972). This legislation indicates that
Congress supports nondiscrimination as a social policy, as the Senate Committee Report on
the amendment illustrates: "[Ilt is believed that it is inappropriate for a social club. . . to
be exempt from taxation if its written policy is to discriminate on account of race, color or
religion." S. REP. No. 1318, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. ConE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6051, 6058. Further, as the majority in Bob Jones University noted, Congress had
demonstrated its approval of racial nondiscrimination for tax-exempt private schools: "Con-
gress' awareness of the denial of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory schools when
enacting other and related legislation make out an unusually strong case of legislative acqui-
escence in and ratification by implication of the 1970 and 1971 rulings [including Rev. Rul.
41-477]." 103 S. Ct. at 2033. For a general discussion of Congress' recognition of the nondis-
crimination requirement, see Devins, supra note 23, at 161-63. See also Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 300 (1981) (Congress' failure to change an agency ruling is an implicit acceptance
of that ruling).
54. 103 S. Ct. at 2036 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. The University had contended that Green represented "an elaborate, but insup-
portable, effort to write a provision into the Internal Revenue Code which the Congress did
not write and did not imply." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 17-18. Although Green
discussed the public benefit theory, that decision's primary basis was the doctrine that the
tax exemption provision must be construed to avoid frustrations of public policy. See Green
v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1161 (D.D.C. 1971); Note, The Revocation of Tax Exemp-
tions and Tax Deductions for Donations to 501(c)(3) Organizations on Statutory and Con-
stitutional Grounds, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 156, 160, 164 (1982).
56. "A corollary to the public benefit principle is the requirement, long recognized in
the law of the trusts, that the purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate
established public policy." 103 S. Ct. at 2028.
The Green court's "public policy" rule relied on cases concerned with the deduction of
"ordinary and necessary" business expenses under § 162 of the Code, particularly on Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). In Tank Truck the Court disal-
lowed the deduction of fines paid by truck owners who had violated the state's maximum
weight laws. The Court declared that it would deny deductions that would "frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced
by some governmental declaration thereof." 356 U.S. at 33-34. Tank Truck, however, may
be of limited value in the tax exemption context. Its holding applies only to situations "in
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1. Analysis of the Public Benefit Doctrine
The legislative histories of tax laws throughout this century
support the majority's holding that tax exempt organizations must
provide some public benefit. In the floor debate over the Tariff Act
of 1894,57 which provided tax exemptions for organizations "organ-
ized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational
purposes,"58 Congress made clear that these tax benefits were
available because the organizations served desirable public pur-
poses. 59 The legislative histories of subsequent taxing acts have re-
affirmed this rationale,60 as the following excerpt from a 1938 Con-
gressional report illustrates.
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and
other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated
for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would other-
which an allowance of the deductions would amount to 'a device to avoid the consequence of
violations of a law.'" Simon, supra note 41, at 497 (quoting Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356
U.S. 28, 29 (1958)). See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 19.
In contrast, although tax-exempt status may be important to an organization's very
existence, "to the extent that the organization's alleged public policy violation violates a
federal or state statute, the granting of the exemption does not mitigate the consequence of
the violation." Note, supra note 55, at 168. See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at
19. But see Simon, supra note 41, at 497-500 (suggesting that the "public policy" doctrine
applies to tax-exempt private schools, despite the Tank Truck limitation). Moreover, what
would happen if an organization partially deviated from public policy? "[I]f the Green [pub-
lic policy] rationale is accepted, that if any organization, otherwise exempt under
§ 501(c)(3), were to discriminate on account of age, maintain unsafe or unhealthful working
conditions, create any financial barrier to education based on sex, or create any environmen-
tal disharmony, that organization's tax exemption would have to be denied." Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 36, at 20 (footnote omitted). See also Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note
31, at 272-73. Cf. Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1229 (1979)
(statement of Charles A. Bane, Co-Chairman, Lawyer's Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]; id. at 470 (statement of Bill Lann Lee, Assistant Counsel,
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund).
The Green court incorrectly relied on the business deduction cases to support the prop-
osition that tax-exempt organizations must conform with public policy before individuals
can take a deduction for their contributions to these organizations. These cases are relevant
only to the issue of defining "ordinary and necessary" expenses for purposes of determining
taxable income. It is pure conjecture to suggest that judicial rulings on what is a permissible
deduction for purposes of determining taxable income carry over to the charitable deduction
issue. Even more egregious than this reasoning by conjecture, the income tax deduction
cases do not support the Green public policy formulation. For a general discussion of the
Green ruling, see also McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness on the Issue of Tax
Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAm L. REV. - (1984)
(forthcoming).
57. Ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894).
58. Id. at 556.
59. 26 CoNG. REc. 585-86 (1894).
60. See, e.g., 50 CONG. REc. 1305 (1913); 44 CoNG. Rc. 4147, 4150 (1909).
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wise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.6 1
The same rationale-the service of desirable public pur-
poses-underlies the allowance of deductions for contributions to
charitable organizations. When Congress in 1917 enacted a com-
panion provision to section 501(c)(3) providing for these deduc-
tions (under what is now section 170(c)(2)), the debate emphasized
the requirement of a public benefit: "For every dollar that a man
contributes for these public charities, educational, scientific, or
otherwise, the public gets 100 per cent. '8 2 In a similar vein, the
legislative history included the following:
[The charitable deduction] would remove the absurdity of exacting a tax even
on that share of a man's income which he devotes not at all to himself, but to
the pressing needs of educational and charitable institutions which operate
without private profit. The exaction of such a tax is, at this time, worse than
an absurdity... It passes beyond individuals and strikes at America's
whole organization for social progress and education, the relief of distress,
and the remedy of evils.6 3
Relying on these legislative histories, the majority correctly con-
cluded that the IRS acted properly under its rulemaking authority
when it determined in 1971 to deny tax-exempt status unless an
organization both fell within one of the categories described in sec-
tion 501(c)(3) and did not engage in activities contrary to settled
public policy.6
2. Analysis of the Common Community Conscience
Requirement
Although a tax exemption standard properly may require that
an organization have a public purpose or confer a public benefit,
the majority's requirement of conformity to the common commu-
nity conscience goes too far. Even more significantly, this require-
ment could stifle the development of new ideas. 5 A common corn-
61. HousE CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE REVENUE BiLL OF 1938, H.R. REP. No.
1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938). For an excellent early analysis, see Reiling, Federal
Taxation: What is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A. J. 525 (1958) (in accord with Bob
Jones University).
62. 55 CONG. REC. 6714, 6728 (1917) (statement of Senator Holis).
63. Id. at 6729 (reprinting "Do Not Penalize Generosity," Boston Transcript, June 29,
1917) (emphasis supplied).
64. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
65. A good example is private schools. Private schools are often a desirable educa-
tional alternative precisely because they are free of many of the governmental constraints on
public schools. Private schools can impart values, teach religion, enforce different discipli-
nary standards, select and dismiss teachers, and insist on sustained academic achievement
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munity conscience may reflect an ever-changing set of values that
all exempt organizations continually and painstakingly would have
to satisfy. As Justice Powell argued in his concurrence, the Bob
Jones majority "ignores the important role played by tax exemp-
tions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, ac-
tivities and viewpoints."" Similarly, Justice Brennan observed in a
case upholding the constitutionality of property tax exemptions for
religious organizations that "private, nonprofit groups. . receive
tax exemptions. . . [because] each group contributes to the diver-
sity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigor-
ous, pluralistic society. '67 In short, the majority in Bob Jones Uni-
versity ignored the public benefits of a heterogeneous society.
The Court could have achieved its desired result by using the
public benefit test alone, without the common community con-
science element. An organization's racially discriminatory practices
may be so odious and contrary to the fundamental value of equal
treatment under the law that the organization could never assert
convincingly that it serves any public purpose. Regrettably, how-
ever, the vagueness of both the common community conscience
and the public benefit standards creates the danger that the IRS
may overzealously enforce the standards, resulting in unwanted so-
cial homogeneity.
in ways that public schools cannot. This freedom is the essence of their appeal. See Finn &
Devins, Reagan, Discrimination, and Private Schools, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1982, at 30, col. 3;
Finn, Public Support for Private Education, pt. 1, AM. EDuc. (May 1982). Tax exemptions
are essential to ensuring this diversity and autonomy. Private schools derive 23% of their
revenues from their tax-exempt status or the related charitable deduction. See Hearings,
supra note 56, at 400 (testimony of John Esty, Jr., President, National Association of Inde-
pendent Schools).
Mr. Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring opinion that over 106,000
organizations filed § 501(c)(3) returns in 1981. He found "it impossible to believe that all or
even most of those organizations could prove that they 'demonstrably serve and [are] in
harmony with the public interest' or that they are 'beneficial and stabilizing influences in
community life.'" 103 S. Ct. at 2038.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2038.
67. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). More-
over, the majority in Walz noted that "the use of a social welfare yardstick as a significant
element to qualify for tax exemption could conceivably give rise to confrontations that could
escalate to constitutional dimensions." Id. at 674. For a general discussion of constitutional
limitations on government in the promotion of behavior or ideology, see Kamenshine, The
First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1104 (1979).
If the function of tax exemptions in encouraging diversity and conflicting views cele-
brated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Walz now gives way to one of ensuring harmony with the
public interest and community conscience, then only a narrower range of organizations
likely will qualify for tax exemptions.
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3. Analysis of the Tax Exemption and the "Tax Expenditure"
Budget
The Bob Jones University decision revived the unsettled de-
bate over whether tax exemptions are really a form of government
aid.6 Because the sixteenth amendment authorizes the taxation of
all income "from whatever source derived,"6 9 Congress could have
constructed a comprehensive tax base,70 requiring organizations
that presently are exempt to conform to the same rules as taxable
entities. Instead, Congress from the outset has chosen not to tax all
possible entities but rather to tax selectively, often in pursuit of
various social objectives.
Not surprisingly, commentators have disagreed on the use of
exemptions, deductions, and credits to accomplish social goals. Ac-
cording to Professor Stanley Surrey,7 1 numerous tax incentive pro-
visions have evolved in the Internal Revenue Code to assist partic-
ular industries, business activities, and financial transactions, or to
encourage certain social activities, such as contributions to charity.
He contends that a tax incentive is a cost to the government of the
tax revenue that it would have collected if the law did not provide
for that particular deduction, exemption, or credit. 2 Therefore, a
tax incentive is an indirect expenditure of government funds to
support the particular purpose behind the incentive. 3 Professor
68. See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. A comprehensive tax base would conform to the classical
definition of income as the increase in net market value of assets between the beginning and
end of the taxable period, plus the market value of consumption (personal and living out-
lays) during the period, including gifts. For corporations with no consumption expenditures,
the measure would be the net accretion in asset values between the beginning and end of
the taxable period, without regard to distributions to shareholders.
70. HAIO, THE CONCEPT OF INcoME-ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS IN THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX (1921); H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 61-62 (1938).
71. See Surrey, Our Troubled Tax Policy: False Routes and Proper Paths to Change,
12 TAX NOTES 179 (1981); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Govern-
ment Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HA~v. L. REv. 705
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Surrey, Tax Incentives].
72. For the fiscal year 1983, the Office of Management and Budget estimates that the
deduction for charitable contributions to education results in a revenue loss to the Treasury
of $925 million and that the "outlay equivalent," which would be the amount required to be
spent by government to accomplish the same objective, would be $940 million. OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G 29, 35 (1983).
73. The following equation illustrates Surrey's position: if X represents what Congress
could tax as income, and if Y represents what in fact Congress taxes after allowing for exclu-
sions, exemptions, deductions and credits, then X-Y is the aggregate cost of these special
provisions, or the indirect expenditure by the Government attributable to these provisions.
The tax expenditure budget breaks out this aggregate cost into the cost of each exclusion,
exemption, deduction, or credit.
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Surrey argues that the government could administer these incen-
tives or subsidies more efficiently through direct governmental as-
sistance in the form of grants, loans, interest subsidies, loan guar-
antees, and the like.7 4 Moreover, direct governmental assistance
would relieve the present inequity of forcing taxpayers who do not
benefit from these tax incentives to bear a greater share of the tax
burden.7
On the other hand, Professor Boris Bittker argues that exemp-
tions, and credits are not necessarily costs to the government. In-
stead, they reflect a legislative choice to omit certain transactions,
entities, or activities from the tax base.76
There is no way to tax everything; a legislative body, no matter how avid for
revenue, can do no more than pick out from the universe of people, entities,
and events over which it has jurisdiction those that, in its view, are appropri-
ate objects of taxation. In specifying the ambit of any tax, the legislature
cannot avoid "exempting" those persons, events, activities, or entities that
are outside the territory of the proposed tax. In describing a tax's boundaries,
the draftsman may choose to make the exclusions explicit ("all property ex-
cept that owned by nonprofit organizations"), or implicit ("all property
owned by organizations operated for profit"), but either way, the result is the
Tax expenditures increased from 24.8% of federal revenues in 1971 to 40.8% in 1982.
See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAx EXPENDrrURES: BUDGET CONTROL OPTIONS AND
FIVE-YEAR BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1983-1987 12-13 (1982). In the 1984
budget the estimated total is $388.4 billion. See PECHMAN, SETrING NATIONAL PRIORITIES,
THE 1984 BUDGET 178 (Brookings Institution 1983). Whatever one's position on tax expendi-
tures, the enormity of the amount must be a factor in any discussion of tax policy. For a
discussion of the "tax exemption as aid" issue, see infra notes 96-110 and accompanying
text.
74. [T]he deduction for charitable contributions is sometimes cited as a method
of government assistance that promotes private decisionmaking-the taxpayer, and
not the Government, selects the charity and determines how much to give. But a
direct expenditure program under which the Government matched with its grants,
on a no-question-asked and no-second-thoughts basis, the gifts of private individuals
to the charities they selected, would equally preserve private decisionmaking.
Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 71, at 719.
75. See id. at 713-38.
In other words, Professor Surrey maintains that if the government taxed all income at a
given percentage, a taxpayer would retain his income less the tax. But if the government
selectively taxes only a part of a taxpayer's income, then it affords him preferential treat-
ment over other taxpayers who have income not so preferred. This result violates what econ-
omists call vertical and horizontal equity: all those with different levels of real economic
income should pay proportionately different taxes (vertical equity); all those with the same
levels of income should pay the same tax (horizontal equity). The Tax Expenditure Budget
proves that our present tax system has neither.
76. Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 1099,
1102-28 (1973); see also Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Sur-
rey & Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538, 539 (1969); Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as
a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HAv. L. REv. 925, 934-58 (1967).
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same-taxpayers are separated from non-taxpayers.7
Irving Kristol has criticized the tax expenditure concept of exemp-
tions for similar reasons:
You are implicitly asserting that all income covered by the general provisions
of the tax laws belongs of right to the government, and that what the govern-
ment decides, by exemptions or qualification, not to collect in taxes consti-
tutes a subsidy. Whereas a subsidy used to mean a governmental expenditure
for a certain purpose, it now acquires quite another meaning-i.e., a generous
decision by government not to take your money.78
Although the Bob Jones University Court did not explicitly adopt
Surrey's view that a tax exemption is government aid, its narrow
"common community conscience" standard could portend a tax
policy that would grant exemptions only to those organizations
that pander to community or majority sentiment. This system for
awarding tax exemptions would be much like the present system
for awarding federal grants, in that both would condition govern-
mental benefits on community assent. This system, however, could
stray far from past policies that have encouraged the diverse and
conflicting views of a pluralistic society because it would inhibit
thousands of presently exempt entities from venturing into ideo-
logically rough waters.
In sum, the majority opinion on tax exemptions-even though
the Court seems to favor Surrey's viewpoint-falls into a penum-
bra between the Surrey and Bittker positions. If the Court had
pursued its inclination and held that the tax exemption was gov-
ernment aid, then the IRS could develop a series of regulations,
similar to the system of rules associated with a government subsidy
program, to assure consistency and parity in the benefits granted.
By refusing to hold that a tax exemption is aid-a holding that
would have forced tax-exempt institutions to comply with a host of
government regulations associated with governmental subsidy pro-
grams"7 -while at the same time recognizing broad IRS authority
to develop rules governing tax-exempt status-an approach that
might result in the granting of tax exemptions on a toothless pro
forma basis8 -the Bob Jones University Court established a
77. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1288 (1969).
78. Kristol, Taxes, Property and Equality, 37 PuB. INT. 3, 14-15 (1974). The propo-
nents of the Tax Expenditure Budget would contend that income may be defined as annual
accretions (or decretions) in wealth, plus consumption. To whatever extent this base is re-
duced by a deduction, exclusion, or credit, this amount becomes an indirect expenditure.
See supra note 71. See also Galvin, It's VAT Time Again, 21 TAx NoTEs 275 (1983).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 96-110.
80. For example, current IRS enforcement procedures may not effectuate the goals
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rulemaking model that is inconsistent with its interpretation of the
tax exemption provision. In short, the majority failed to ensure the
enforcement of its view that tax-exempt institutions must reflect
community values because it failed to hold that tax exemptions are
government aid or that the IRS must enforce the public policy re-
quirement strictly.
B. The Scope of IRS Rulemaking Authority
The Bob Jones University Court recognized broad IRS au-
thority to determine what activities are "at odds with the common
community conscience.""1 The majority noted that "ever since the
inception of the tax code, Congress has seen fit to vest in those
administering the tax laws very broad authority to interpret those
laws. '8 2 The Court thus rejected petitioners' argument that IRS
rulemaking on tax exemptions is "a plain usurpation of Congres-
sional law-making powers by the non-elected public servants of the
Internal Revenue Service.""
An analysis of the proper scope of the Service's rulemaking
authority must begin with the principle that Congress enacts the
tax laws and the IRS has the responsibility of interpreting and en-
forcing them. The IRS cannot legislate.8 4 The issue, then, is to de-
termine the permissible boundaries of IRS rulemaking. In Man-
hattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner" the Court
described this power:
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal
statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power to
make law-for no such power can be delegated by Congress-but the power
to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by
underlying the Bob Jones University decision because some schools that have been adjudi-
cated as racially discriminatory under the 1964 Civil Rights Act have received tax exemp-
tions anyway. See Devins, The Bob Jones Case-Over to Congress, Christian Sci. Monitor,
June 29, 1983, at 23, col. 1.
81. 103 S. Ct. at 2029.
82. Id. at 2031.
83. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 22.
84. Congress has charged the Internal Revenue Service with the administration of the
tax laws. Because the language of this legislation is general, the Service issues regulations
and rulings to implement and explain its position on the law. Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Treasury gives notice of proposed rulemaking and publishes proposed
regulations in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982); Schmid, The Tax Regulations
Making Process-Then and Now, 24 TAx LAw. 541, 541-42 (1971). After a period of receiv-
ing written comments, the Treasury then promulgates the final regulations. The Service
issues revenue rulings, which usually deal with particular transactions or problems. See gen-
erally Note, Federal Tax Rulings: Procedure and Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 78 (1967).
85. 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
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the statute. . . . The statute defines the rights of the taxpayer and fixes a
standard by which such rights are to be measured."
In Bob Jones University the Court granted the Service almost
plenary rulemaking authority:
In the first instance . . the responsibility for construing the Code falls to
the IRS. Since Congress cannot be expected to anticipate every conceivable
problem that can arise or to carry out day-to-day oversight, it relies on the
administrators and on the courts to implement the legislative will. Adminis-
trators, like judges, are under oath to do so.8
The majority's interpretation, however, poses several problems.
First, the danger exists that the Service may selectively enforce its
regulations. s8 Justice Blackmun commented on this threat as
follows:
[W]here the philanthropic organization is concerned, there appears to be lit-
tle to circumscribe the almost unfettered power of the Commissioner. This
may be very well so long as one subscribes to the particular brand of social
policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating at the time. . . , but ap-
plication of our tax laws should not operate in so fickle a fashion."
86. Id. at 134-35. See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)
("There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting
rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.").
87. 103 S. Ct. at 2031. Curiously, in the first of the tax exemption cases, Green v.
Kennedy, the district court suggested that the IRS was blameless for not having changed
the policy of granting tax exemptions to discriminatory private schools. The court believed
that "[w]hat stops [the Commissioner of Internal Revenue] from extending disallowance to
the schools ... is not unawareness of the significance of deductions, but rather certain legal
conclusions, including conclusions as to the scope of his authority under the Code." 309 F.
Supp. 1127, 1135 (D.D.C. 1970). See supra notes 20, 55-56. The court apparently felt that
the Commissioner should act only on an explicit congressional directive or a binding court
determination. In other words, the court envisioned a scheme in which the judiciary-not
the Service-would have primary authority in interpreting the meaning of the congressio-
nally enacted Internal Revenue Code. Ironically, in Bob Jones University the Supreme
Court recognized the IRS's authority to promulgate regulations established through judicial
initiatives directed at the IRS. For a general discussion of the judiciary's usurpation of legis-
lative authority on the tax-exempt school issue, see McCoy & Devins, supra note 56.
88. See Note, supra note 55, at 172-74.
89. Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1974) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). The D.C. Circuit echoed Justice Blackmun's concerns in Big Mama Rag, Inc.
v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1980): "The standards [used by the IRS to
grant or deny tax exemptions] may not be so imprecise that they afford latitude to individ-
ual IRS officials to pass judgment on the content and quality of an applicant's views and
goals. . . ." Under this standard, the court held that the definition of "educational" con-
tained in the IRS regulations under § 501(c)(3) was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1037.
See also Center on Corp. Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973)
(politically motivated denial of educational exemption by IRS is null and void); Comment,
Tax Exemptions for Educational Institutions: Discretion and Discrimination, 128 U. PA.
L. REv. 849 (1980). But cf. National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(neither § 501(c)(3) nor the first amendment compels granting educational exemption to
organization whose publications could not be found "educational" under any reasonable in-
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Nonetheless, the Bob Jones University majority believed that the
Service could be trusted not to breach this authorityY' The Court
sought to minimize the danger of selective enforcement by
stressing that "these sensitive determinations should be made only
where there is no doubt that the organization's activities violate
fundamental public policy."91
Second, the IRS may go either too far or not far enough in
regulating the wide array of tax-exempt organizations. The Service
now may examine the tax-exempt status of many organizations
against the stricter Bob Jones standard of "harmony with the pub-
lic interest" and "common community conscience." This prospect
is disquieting because the standard, although strict, is open-ended
and beclouded. For example, the fate of an organization that does
not violate fundamental public policy but may not be clearly in
full compliance with the Bob Jones University standard is unclear.
Justice Blackmun's observation that too much administrative dis-
cretion may permit the IRS to administer tax laws in "so fickle a
fashion" continues to be a concern because the Internal Revenue
Code is so pervasive in its application and the opportunity for
abuse is so great. In the tax exemption area the stakes are too high
to tolerate a system that sometimes functions haphazardly or
desultorily.
Third, because of the pecuniary value of tax-exempt status, an
organization's survival may depend on the views of the particular
administration in office. For example, President Carter had sought
to impose racial quotas on tax-exempt private schools to further
terpretation of that term).
90. Contrary to this view, Justice Powell emphasized the following.
[T]he balancing of these substantial interests [of racial nondiscrimination in education
and of permitting unorthodox private behavior] is for Congress to perform. I am un-
willing to join any suggestion that the Internal Revenue Service is invested with au-
thority to decide which public policies are sufficiently "fundamental" to require denial
of tax exemptions. Its business is to administer laws designed to produce revenue for
the Government, not to promote "public policy."
103 S. Ct. at 2039 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). The majority responded by
contending that "The Court's opinion does not warrant that interpretation . . .[because]
the policy against racial discrimination in education. . . is sufficiently clear to warrant Jus-
tice Powell's . . . support [for] our finding of longstanding Congressional acquies-
cence. . . ." Id. at 2032 n.23. This contention, however, lacks any merit. Justice Powell's
concurrence addressed the narrow issue of whether § 501(c)(3) prohibited racial discrimina-
tion in education. The majority, on the other hand, made broad pronouncements as to both
the meaning of § 501(c)(3) and the authority of the IRS to determine that meaning. See
supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
91. 103 S. Ct. at 2032.
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the nondiscrimination requirement.9 2 In contrast, President Rea-
gan has attempted to lift nonstatutory regulations governing tax-
exempt private schools. 93 Although neither president succeeded,94
the threat remains that similar acts by the Executive branch could
bankrupt organizations whose existences depend on tax
exemptions.9 5
C. Issues That the Court Did Not Resolve
1. Is a Tax Exemption Government Aid?9"
Although the Court recognized that tax-exempt status was a
governmentally conferred benefit,9 7 it did not say that tax-exempt
status is public aid. Whether a tax exemption falls within this clas-
sification raises issues under both the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which forbids granting federal aid to institutions that discriminate
on the basis of "race, color or national origin," ' and under the
92. 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978). See Wilson, An Overview of
the IRS's Revised Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Schools as Tax-Exempt Organi-
zations, 57 TAxEs 515 (1979).
93. IRS News Release (Jan. 8, 1982).
94. Congress responded to the Carter proposal by passing riders to the Treasury Ap-
propriations Act of 1980 that prohibited the IRS from spending money to implement it. See
supra note 53. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enjoined the Reagan ad-
ministration from granting tax-exempt status to any school that discriminates on the basis
of race. Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982), order continued in force,
No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
95. Another troubling possibility of allowing the IRS this broad power is that the IRS
might be too deferential and grant tax exemptions to organizations that clearly violate fun-
damental public policy. This threat is particularly significant because civil rights proponents
might not be able to utilize the courts to ensure that IRS procedures are sufficient. Civil
rights advocates currently are seeking judicial adoption of stringent enforcement standards
through the Wright v. Regan case that is now before the Supreme Court. See supra note 94.
Wright, however, ultimately may prove that civil rights groups lack a sufficiently particular-
ized and identifiable harm to bring a lawsuit. See McCoy & Devins, supra note 56. The
Court's recognition of broad IRS rulemaking authority in Bob Jones University actually
suggests that the courts will limit their substantive intervention in this area. See Devins, A
Political Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States, - J. oF L. & POL. - ( )
(forthcoming). Congress likewise cannot be trusted for satisfactory guidance, as demon-
strated both by its failure to make any sort of response to President Reagan's policy shift
and by its inability to pass any affirmative legislation on this matter.
96. Portions of this section are adopted from Devins, supra note 23, at 163-65.
97. See 103 S. Ct. at 2026-28. "When the Government grants exemptions or allows
deductions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for the
donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious 'donors."' Id. at
2028. "It would be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant
the benefit of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational entities ...... Id. at
2030.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2001 (1964).
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establishment clause of the first amendment, which forbids govern-
ment establishment of religion and limits federal aid to religiously
affiliated private schools.9
The Civil Rights Act's total prohibition of governmental assis-
tance to discriminatory institutions suggests that its coverage
should extend to the granting of tax exemptions to private
schools.100 The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia reached this conclusion in McGlotten v. Connally,'° in
which it decided that a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory
fraternal order is federal aid for purposes of the Civil Rights Act.102
Part of the basis of this holding was the court's recognition that
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act recognized various
forms of indirect assistance as federal aid, such as the sale of gov-
ernment property at a reduced price.103 Furthermore, the court
found that the purpose of the Act "is clearly to eliminate discrimi-
nation in programs or activities benefitting from federal financial
assistance. °10 4 The McGlotten decision may contribute to what has
been described as a "constitutionalizing" of the Internal Revenue
Code because it subsumes the revenue collecting function of the
Code under broader social policies derived from the Constitu-
tion.105 Professors Bittker and Kaufman see an even broader im-
pact of the court's reasoning:
[T]he "tax-subsidy" rationale of the McGlotten case has implications be-
yond the area of racial restrictions. ... McGlotten's logic apparently prohib-
its the granting of tax allowances to a fraternal order that imposes such re-
strictions (based on its customers' religion, national or ethnic origin, political
allegiance, sex, and perhaps other characteristics).... Finally, nothing in
McGlotten limits its reach to income, estate and gift taxes; "subsidies" in the
form of exemptions, deductions, special rates, and similar allowances may be
found in other federal taxes, as well as in state and local taxes. 1 6
The establishment clause requires a different analysis of tax
exemptions. In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York,10 7 the Su-
preme Court held that a tax exemption is not governmental aid
99. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion... "). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14-8, -9 (1978).
100. Cf. Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
101. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
102. Id. at 461.
103. See id. at 461 & n.7.
104. Id.
105. See Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972).
106. Id. at 62; see supra note 56.
107. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
19831 1375
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
under the establishment clause. The majority opinion explained
that "[t]he grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but
simply abstains from demanding that the church support the
state.' ' 0 8 Although the majority's recognition in Walz that a reli-
gious institution benefits through a tax exemption seems inconsis-
tent with its principal holding,110 establishment clause analysis fo-
cuses upon whether the "primary effect" of the exemption is to aid
the institution, not upon whether some benefit might accrue to the
institution.110 Thus, a tax exemption might be permissible under
the establishment clause but impermissible under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
2. Can Some of a Tax-Exempt Organization's Practices Violate
Public Policy?
The Court in Bob Jones University avoided the question of
whether an organization providing a public benefit and satisfying
the other requirements of section 501(c)(3) could nevertheless be
denied tax-exempt status if certain of its activities violated a law
or public policy by holding that racially discriminatory private
schools confer no public benefit.1 By limiting its holding to racial
discrimination in education, the Court neither encouraged nor dis-
couraged the Service from adopting regulations to ensure compli-
ance with other fundamental public policies. Of course, a require-
ment that an organization desiring tax-exempt status must comply
with all laws and all public policies could make the attainment of
tax-exempt status incredibly difficult. The amicus curiae Indepen-
dent Sector"12 speculated on the burden of forcing tax-exempt or-
108. Id. at 675.
109. Id. at 674-75.
110. Supreme Court precedents before 1977 had suggested that almost no form of aid
from the state, either to nonpublic schools or to families of nonpublic school students, would
be constitutionally permissible. The Court, however, has relaxed this restriction in recent
years. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1973) (tuition
grants and deductions and maintenance reimbursements declared unconstitutional), and
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (broad range of direct and indirect aid declared
unconstitutional), with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (funding upheld for thera-
peutic and diagnostic tests but prohibited for field trips and instructional materials), and
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658-61 (1980) (direct reimbursement to
private schools for state mandated testing upheld).
111. 103 S. Ct. at 2031 n.21.
112. Independent Sector is a coalition of over 400 national voluntary organizations. Its
brief, which argued in favor of statutory affirmance of the Fourth Circuit decision in Bob
Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc., focused on the need for the Court
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ganizations to comply with all fundamental public policies:
And what about the exempt organizations themselves? Would they be-
come subject to myriad regulations and legal obligations... ? If so, retire-
ment homes operated by particular religious charities might be forced to ad-
mit persons of any creed; private schools or organizations for girls or boys
might have to become coeducational; senior citizens groups might be forbid-
den to discriminate on the basis of age; community centers designed to serve
particular ethnic groups might have to open their doors to all comers; and
any exempt organization might be required to modify its physical facilities to
provide access to the handicapped. Resolving these and similar questions that
might be raised by an overbroad holding in this case could occupy exempt
organizations, their benefactors, the courts, and Congress for years to come. 1 3
The Court's stated limitation of its holding to the racial discrimi-
nation issue is no satisfactory answer to these concerns.
3. Does Granting of Tax-Exempt Status Trigger Constitutional
Scrutiny?
Several amici in Bob Jones University urged the Supreme
Court to hold that granting tax-exempt status to racially discrimi-
natory private schools would violate the fifth amendment's equal
protection comeonent. 114 These amici argued that the govern-
ment's grant of a tax exemption is "state action" subject to consti-
tutional restraints that prohibit government from providing
tangible financial aid to racially discriminatory private schools.11
The Court did not address this issue because it was able to decide
the case on statutory grounds.16
Although the decisions on whether tax exemptions constitute
state action are inconsistent, at least some trends emerge. Courts
tend to find state action more often when racial discrimination is
at issue 17 and when the action sought to be stopped is the govern-
to limit its holding to the issue of racial discrimination in education. See infra note 113 and
accompanying text.
113. Brief for Independent Sector at 20, Bob Jones Univ.
114. See Brief of William T. Coleman, Jr. at 57-62; Brief for Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law at 30; Brief for American Civil Liberties Union at 17-32; Brief for
North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers at 5-7.
115. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (Mississippi statute that
would have provided textbook assistance to racially discriminatory private schools held un-
constitutional). In Norwood, the Court recognized that "discriminatory treatment exerts a
pervasive influence on the entire educational process." Id. at 469.
116. 103 S. Ct. at 2032 n.24.
117. Courts generally apply a less stringent test for state action in race discrimination
cases. See, e.g., Spark v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 510 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1000 (1975); Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975). This principle extends to tax exemption cases. For exam-
1983] 1377
1378 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1353
mental grant of tax-exempt status rather than private discrimina-
tory conduct.118 Existing doctrine thus suggests that the Constitu-
ple, in Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (three judge
court), a federal district court in Wisconsin held that "the 'state action' doctrine was devel-
oped in response to efforts to eliminate private racial discrimination .... Accordingly[,]
. . . there might be a less demanding standard of what constitutes sufficient state involve-
ment where there are allegations of racial discrimination." Id. at 667 (quoting Bright v.
Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1392-94 (N.D. Ind. 1970)). Similarly, in Jackson v. Statler
Found. the Second Circuit noted the following.
Where racial discrimination is involved, the courts have found "state action" to exist;
where other claims are at issue (due process, freedom of speech), the courts have gener-
ally concluded that no "state action" has occurred. . . . [Thus, there is] a less onerous
test for cases involving racial discrimination, and a more rigorous standard for other
claims.
496 F.2d 623, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted); see also Note, The Judicial Role in
Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARv. L. REv. 378,
399 (1979). Cf. Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note 31, at 246-48 (arguing that religious
schools might be judged under a different "state action" standard since an important pur-
pose of granting tax exemptions to such institutions is the avoidance of impermissible gov-
ernment entanglement with religion).
118. One commentator articulated the rationale for this approach as follows:
Because enjoining the private party necessarily will affect private interests, some
weight must be accorded these interests during the course of judicial inquiry. In such a
case, the court should inquire whether there is a sufficient nexus of governmental and
private action to transform the private actor into an agent of the government. When
the litigation is directed at the conduct of the government, however, the issue becomes
whether the government's actions encourage or support violations of constitutional
guarantees. Thus, the different implications of the remedies sought suggest that differ-
ent constitutional standards should be formulated for the two types of cases.
Comment, The Tax-Exempt Status of Sectarian Educational Institutions that Discrimi-
nate on the Basis of Race, 65 IowA L. REV. 258, 265-66 (1979). See also Brown, State Action
Analysis of Tax Expenditures, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 97, 116-22 (1976). Case law also
supports this view. Compare Falkenstein v. Dep't of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Or.
1972) (three judge court) (state tax exemptions for racially exclusive fraternal organization
held unconstitutional), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973), and
Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. at 662 (state tax exemptions for racially dis-
criminatory organizations enjoined), with New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States
Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975) (sex discrimination by exempt organization held
not state action); Junior Chamber of Com. v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974); and Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 394 F.
Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1975) (memorandum opinion) (sex discrimination by congressionally
chartered organization held not state action), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976).
Even if a court finds state action, it also must determine whether tax-exempt status is a
significant governmental benefit and whether the granting of tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory institutions constitutes intentional discrimination. This Article has adopted
the view that tax exemptions are government aid for purposes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
See supra notes 96-110; see also Comment, Tax Incentives as State Action, 122 U. PA. L.
REv. 414, 421-23, 453-55 (1973). But see Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 105, at 63-68; Note,
supra note 55, at 180-84. The intentional discrimination requirement poses no problem in
the context of tax exemptions to private schools with stated policies of racial discrimination,
such as Bob Jones University (interracial dating) and Goldsboro Christian Schools (admis-
sions). IRS knowledge of such policies satisfies the intent requirement established in Wash-
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tion may prevent the government from granting tax-exempt status
to racially discriminatory institutions.119 Fortunately, the Bob
Jones University Court was able to avoid this issue by deciding on
statutory grounds. Constitutional prohibitions are broader than
1964 Civil Rights Act standards. Consequently, "[a] broad holding
that tax exemptions are [state] action for constitutional purposes
could leave exempt organizations vulnerable to legal challenges on
a variety of theories having nothing to do with racial discrimina-
tion. That result would be contrary to the public interest in en-
couraging philanthropic activity ... ."120
IV. CONCLUSION
The Bob Jones University decision exemplifies the risks of
leaving tax policy determinations to the courts. On one hand, the
Court went too far in interposing into the Code its own standards
of "common community conscience" and "public purpose."'1 2 On
the other hand, the Court appeared to abdicate its supervisory
powers to the IRS."22 This Article recommends that in the formu-
lation of tax policy, courts should not supplant the role of Congress
as lawmaker by making broad tax policy pronouncements, but
should oversee the IRS to ensure that it properly implements and
enforces the tax laws.
Thus far Congress has relied on judicial and IRS initiatives to
define the tax exemption requirements and the parameters of the
IRS's rulemaking authority; it has interceded only when dissatis-
fied with the actions of the other branches."2" Congress, however,
must take the lead in resolving the tax-exemption issue, as Justice
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (qualifying test for police officers with racially dispro-
portionate impact held constitutional). If the IRS was unaware of a school's racially
discriminatory practices, however, under Washington that school would retain its tax-ex-
empt status. The solution here would be to impute to the IRS notice of all schools that fail
to satisfy racial nondiscrimination enforcement standards.
119. The Green decisions all but concluded that tax-exempt status constituted state
action. In Green v. Kennedy the court issued the injunction, in part, because "of the sub-
stantiality of the grave constitutional questions presented by plaintiffs." 309 F. Supp. at
1133. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. In Green v. Connally the court finalized
that temporary injunction in the form of a permanent injunction. 330 F. Supp. at 1150.
Although it based its holding on statutory grounds, the court noted: "We are fortified in our
view of the correctness of the IRS construction by the consideration that a contrary inter-
pretation of the tax laws would raise serious constitutional questions, such as those we ven-
tilated in [Green v. Kennedy]." Id. at 1164.
120. Brief for Independent Sector, supra note 113, at 27-28.
121. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
123. See generally McCoy & Devins, supra note 56.
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Powell emphasized in his concurrence in Bob Jones University:
There no longer is any justification for Congress to hesitate-as it apparently
has-in articulating and codifying its desired policy .... Many questions re-
main, such as whether organizations that violate other policies should receive
tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). These should be legislative policy
choices. It is not appropriate to leave the IRS "on the cutting edge of devel-
oping national policy." . . . The contours of public policy should be deter-
mined by Congress, not by judges or the IRS.12 4
Congress, as a more capable legislator than the courts or the IRS,
is better equipped to formulate a tax exemption policy. The com-
plexity of an indefinite and unidentified class of potential plaintiffs
with perhaps varying levels of grievance, an open-ended class of
defendant institutions neither entirely similar nor dissimilar to the
particular institutions in litigation, and the economic costs and
124. 103 S. Ct. at 2039 (Powell, J., concurring). According to Department of Justice
attorneys who have worked on this matter, Congress' passivity has been costly: "[T]he con-
tinued litigation of the issue in open-ended injunction suits, coupled with Congress' decision
to prohibit new policy shifts by the Treasury, has caused a paralysis among the three
branches of government. This paralysis has prevented the establishment of further guide-
lines to meet changing conditions." Ferguson & Henzken, supra note 11, at 103. Congress
should take the lead in resolving the tax exemption issue because Congress is a better legis-
lator than are the courts. In a Brookings Institution study of court efforts to develop and
implement social policy, Donald Horowitz drew this conclusion:
The distinctiveness of the judicial process-its expenditure of social resources on
individual complaints, one at a time-is what unfits the courts for much of the impor-
tant work of government. Retooling the judicial process to cope with the new responsi-
bilities of the courts means enhancing their capacity to function more systematically in
terms of general categories that transcend individual cases. Some such innovations are
required. And yet, it would seem, there is a limit to the changes of this kind that courts
can absorb and still remain courts. Heightened attention to recurrent patterns of be-
havior risks inattention to individual cases. Over the long run, augmenting judicial ca-
pacity may erode the distinctive contribution the courts make to the social order. The
danger is that courts, in developing a capacity to improve on the work of other institu-
tions, may become altogether too much like them.
D. HORowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 298 (1977). Professor Alexander Bickel simi-
larly noted that the Court's institutional survival hinged on its ability to abide by the con-
straints of our system of divided powers. A. BICKEL, TmE SUPREmE COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS (1970). Considering recent congressional efforts to limit federal court jurisdiction,
Professor Bickel's fears seem well founded. See generally Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Ju-
risdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17 (1981).
Many jurists, however, feel that the courts do have a place in the shaping of social
policy. As Justice Cardozo suggested, "[W]hen the social needs demand one settlement
rather than another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacri-
fice custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OP THE JUI-
cIA PROCESS 65 (1921). Similarly, Archibald Cox and James Hart Ely have suggested that
the Supreme Court has been at its best when it has introduced universalistic normative
principles in an effort to set the parameters of acceptable social behavior. A. Cox, THE RoLE




budgetary concerns affecting not only the parties but also others
demand that Congress glean and sift the social facts, weigh the
costs, and determine time periods for phasing in and phasing out
particular practices. 12 5
Given that Congress should take the lead in clarifying the re-
quirements private schools must meet to attain tax-exempt status,
the issue becomes how such legislation should be formulated. As a
starting point, Congress should assess current enforcement proce-
dures, which require that a tax-exempt private school "show af-
firmatively both that it has adopted a racially nondiscriminatory
policy as to students that is made known to the general public and
that since the adoption of that policy it has operated in a bona fide
manner in accordance therewith.""12 A school can comply with
these current requirements if it (1) adopts formally nondiscrimina-
tory policies in its charter or by-laws, (2) refers to these policies in
its advertising brochures, and (3) publishes annual notice of these
policies in a local newspaper of general circulation. 27 These proce-
dures are insufficient; private schools adjudicated as discriminatory
under the fourteenth amendment and thus ineligible to receive di-
rect government assistance often qualify for tax-exempt status.12 8
The tax exemption rules ought to conform with the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which prohibits government aid to private schools that
have no minority students or staff and that were formed or sub-
stantially expanded at or about the time of area-wide public school
desegregation. 12 9
Brown v. Board of Education"" is now almost thirty years old;
its call for due deliberate speed in the elimination of segregation in
the nation's school system still goes unheeded in many quarters.
The current emphasis on the need for educational excellence in
primary and secondary education is of no greater urgency than the
need to achieve equality of educational opportunity for every child.
Congress has the capability and the competency to act-and surely
125. See D. HoRowrrz, supra note 124, at 255-74.
126. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
127. Id. at 587-88.
128. Under 1964 Civil Rights Act standards, the government cannot grant aid to a
school if a judicial or administrative proceeding has determined that school to be discrimi-
natory, or if the school was established at a time when public schools in its area were deseg-
regating and the school cannot demonstrate that it was nondiscriminatory. See, e.g., Nor-
wood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
129. For a similar proposal, in the form of a Model Statute, see Devins, supra note 23,
at 176-78.
130. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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must act-in formulating effective national tax policy that incorpo-
rates Brown's objectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A specter is haunting the law of contracts. The doctrine of
promissory estoppel has evolved from relatively modest beginnings
as a "consideration substitute" in donative promise cases1 to a
force that threatens to engulf a major portion of contract law.2 In-
* Associate Professor and Chairman of Business Law, Indiana University Graduate
School of Business. B.A., 1966, Indiana University;, J.D., 1969, Indiana University School of
Law.
1. See infra notes 251-60 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 306-11 and accompanying text.
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deed, some commentators have suggested that promissory estoppel
is evolving into a separate theory of recovery, independent of con-
tract law.3 To the extent that this evolution continues, the future
of many traditional contract rules, such as the parol evidence rule,
is doubtful.4
Regardless of whether promissory estoppel ultimately achieves
the status of an independent theory or merely continues its evolu-
tion within the parameters of contract law, the historical course of
the reliance principle's expansion exhibits such significant momen-
tum that the thoughtful observer must speculate about likely fu-
ture candidates for the doctrine's debilitating ministrations.5 The
parol evidence rule, at first glance, seems to be such a candidate
for many reasons. The parol evidence rule has confused" and dis-
satisfied7 legal scholars for a long time; for example, Professor Wig-
more condemned the rule as "the most discouraging subject in the
whole field of evidence."' Bringing the rule within estoppel's do-
main could simplify the application of the rule,' and legal scholars
should appreciate anything that could clarify and rationalize its
application. Furthermore, that promissory estoppel already has
made substantial incursions into the province of the Statute of
Frauds 0 may portend a similar role for promissory estoppel in the
parol evidence context. Many similarities exist between the Statute
and the rule1" and many of the same arguments that justify the use
of estoppel to circumvent the Statute s are equally applicable to
justify the use of estoppel to bypass the parol evidence rule.13
Few cases to date have explored the possible interaction be-
tween promissory estoppel and the parol evidence rule.1 4 This Arti-
3. For an exhaustive discussion of this possibility, see Metzger & Phillips, The Emer-
gence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REv.
472 (1983). See also infra notes 295-308 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 434 and accompanying text.
5. One commentator describes promissory estoppel as "perhaps the most radical and
expansive development of this century in the law of promissory liability." Knapp, Reliance
in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. Rav.
52, 53 (1981).
6. See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 162-202 and accompanying text.
8. 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2400, at 3 (3d ed. 1940).
9. See infra notes 583-87 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 354-435 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 521-30 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 347-48 & 377-419 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 532-37 & 545-64 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 438-518 and accompanying text.
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cle attempts to explain why so few cases have explored this inter-
action, and discusses both the likelihood and the desirability of a
significant intrusion by promissory estoppel into the parol evidence
rule's domain. First, however, this Article necessarily focuses upon
the parol evidence rule itself, the evolution of the promissory es-
toppel doctrine in general, and the doctrine's development as a de-
vice for circumventing the strictures of the Statute of Frauds.
H. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The parol evidence rule long has been "the source of endless
confusion in contract law."' 5 As Thayer noted eight decades ago,
"[f]ew things are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties."' 6
Little has occurred in the ensuing years to gainsay the veracity of
Thayer's observation. Even the rule's name is somewhat mislead-
ing.17 "Parol" misleads because most formulations of the rule in-
clude within its scope written as well as oral terms.'8 While the use
of the word "evidence" in the rule's title and in some judicial
statements about the rule'9 may suggest that the rule is an eviden-
tiary rule, legal scholars generally agree that the parol evidence
rule is actually a rule of law. 20 Finally, some commentators have
questioned whether "a maze of conflicting tests, subrules, and ex-
ceptions" 2' is a "rule" at all, especially in light of the number of
exceptions to its operation 22 and the uncertainties surrounding
15. Note, The Parol Evidence Rule: Is It Necessary?, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 972, 972
(1969).
16. J. THAYER, A PRELMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 390 (1898).
17. "The term 'parol evidence rule' is something of a misnomer for it does not deal
exclusively with parol, is not a rule of evidence, and at least in the minds of some, is not
even a rule." Wallach, The Declining "Sanctity" of Written Contracts-The Impact of the
Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol Evidence Rule, 44 Mo. L. REv. 651, 651 (1979). See
also Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification, 4 DuQ. L. REv. 337, 343 (1965-
1966).
18. Murray, supra note 17, at 343. For a discussion of various formulations of the rule,
see infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
19. "Because judges, in reserving a question of fact to themselves couched the process
in rules which sounded like rules of evidence, the term 'evidence' is part of the title of the
rule which only serves to add to the mystery surrounding it." Murray, supra note 17, at 343.
20. See, e.g., J. CALAmAm & J. PERILLO, CoNTRAcTs § 3-5 (2d ed. 1977); 9 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 8, § 2400, at 4 (3d ed. 1940); Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 189 (1965).
21. Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick
Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1036, 1036 (1968).
22. The number of recognized exceptions to the rule "raises doubts about its status as
a 'rule' at all." See Note, supra note 15, at 972. For a discussion of the exceptions to the
rule, see infra notes 124-51 and accompanying text.
1983] 1385
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
both its definition and application.2"
The rule's appellation, the variance among the numerous for-
mulations of the rule, and the observed tendency of the courts to
manipulate the rule to avoid the harsh results that otherwise may
flow from its strict application2 all undoubtedly have contributed
to the fog of uncertainty surrounding the rule. The primary source
of confusion, however, lies with misapprehensions concerning both
the nature of the policies that the rule intends to serve and those
policies' relative merit.2 5 An inquiry into the rule's underlying pol-
icy bases necessarily must preface any explication of the rule in its
various forms. This inquiry is particularly important in assessing
the degree to which using promissory estoppel to circumvent the
rule may hinder attainment of the rule's underlying policy
objectives.
A. The Policy Bases of the Rule
Scholars have traced the historical origins of the parol evi-
dence rule to "a primitive formalism which attached mystical and
ceremonial effectiveness to the carta and the seal."2 The rule may
have survived the disappearance from our law of other vestiges of
formalism because a written contract furnishes more reliable evi-
dence of the terms of an agreement than does the parties' oral tes-
timony, which may be the product of faulty memory, wishful
thinking, or outright prevarication. A major function of the rule,
23. "Those who question whether the parol evidence rule is really a rule at all seem to
feel that certainty of definition and application are required before something can be la-
beled a 'rule,' and the parol evidence rule tends to lack both." Wallach, supra note 17, at
651. For a discussion of the rule's various formulations, see infra notes 61-69 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the inconsistencies in the application of the rule, see infra
text accompanying notes 120-23, 130, 149 & 153-61.
24. See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
25. Professors Calamari and Perillo attribute the mystery surrounding the rule to a
"basic disagreement as to the application of the . . . rule and as to the best method of
ascertaining the intention of the parties-the process of contractual interpretation." J.
CALAmARI & J. PEmLLO, supra note 20, § 3-1. They further observe that- "The cases and
treatises of the contract giants tend to conceal this conflict. While frequently masking disa-
greement by using the same terminology, Professors Williston and Corbin are often poles
apart in the meaning they attach to the same terms." Id. Calamari and Perillo attribute this
polarity of opinion to "conflicting value judgments as to policy issues that are as old as our
legal system and that are likely to continue as long as courts of law exist." Id.
26. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 211, at 430 n.4 (1954); see
also 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2426.
27. See, e.g., Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 833, 846 (1964) ("[T]he written instrument is a more reliable expression of the
meaning of their contract than one party's not disinterested memory of his or the other
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therefore, is the prevention of fraud or perjury. 28 This rationale,
however, does not explain the application of the rule to written
evidence of alleged terms that are not contained in the parties'
final written contract.29 This rationale also fails to explain the spe-
cial role that the judge plays in parol evidence cases. The judge
initially decides whether the rule excludes certain evidence. Why
should jurors, whom courts rely upon to determine truth in a wide
variety of legal contexts, lack the ability to determine truth relia-
bly in matters of parol evidence?
Thus, while special devotion to the written word may have
provided the origin of the parol evidence rule, the pervasive atti-
tude that judges provide the best protection against perjured testi-
monys° probably has been the reason for its continued viability.3 1
A distrust of the jury as a reliable mechanism for divining truth3 2
underlies the parol evidence rule. Left to their own devices, jurors
may favor underdogs by relying upon alleged oral terms,33 thereby
deciding the case in a manner calculated to avoid a perceived in-
justice.3 4 Jurors also may lack the sophistication needed to deal ef-
party's prior oral utterances."); see also Kupka v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740, 747-48 n.9 (Alaska
1975); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 210, at 428; J. WHn= & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-9 (2d ed. 1980); Sweet, supra note 21,
at 1036; Note, supra note 15, at 982.
28. See, e.g., Kupka v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740, 747-48 n.9 (Alaska 1975); Masterson v.
Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 227, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (1968); Patterson, supra
note 27, at 846; Note, supra note 15, at 982.
29. The rule "would seem to lose much of its force if the prior expression is written.
The prior writing is not unchanged [sic] at the time of trial any more than the subsequent
writing." Murray, supra note 17, at 342; see also Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of
Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 958 (1967). One scholar, however, notes that the vast majority
of decided cases involve alleged oral terms. Wallach, supra note 17, at 651.
30. "If the parol evidence doctrine is to be administered chiefly by juries and not by
judges, its special protection for written transactions fades." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26,
§ 216, at 441-42; see also Note, supra note 15, at 982-83.
31. Professor McCormick argued that the formalist attributes of the rule had "a spe-
cial survival value-the escape from the jury-which led the judges to retain for writings the
conception that they had a sort of magical effect of erasing all prior agreements." C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 26, § 211, at 430 n.4.
32. "[L]awyers have a strong distrust of the judicial process, especially the jury, as a
means of ascertaining the truth." Sweet, supra note 21, at 1049; see also Wallach, supra
note 17, at 653 n.9.
33. Professor Sweet notes that juries may "favor the underdog who rarely has the
writing on his side." Sweet, supra note 21, at 1050. See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26,
at § 210 ("[Wlhen an issue arises involving choice between a writing and an alleged oral
agreement, usually the one who sets up the spoken against the written word is economically
the underdog.").
34. "If the jury is directed to bring in a general verdict (i.e. for the plaintiff or for the
defendant), it may in doing so exercise its views of jury equity and thus impair the reliabil-
ity of written instruments." Patterson, supra note 27, at 837. Professor McCormick similarly
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fectively with complex commercial transactions involving numer-
ous alleged oral and written contract terms.3 5 Although under
modern rules of procedure a judge may either overrule a jury's de-
cision or decide the case himself when the proffered evidence rea-
sonably supports only one conclusion, a judge may be unwilling to
do so.36 According to this view, the major service that the rule per-
forms3 7 is to allow judges to "strike down at the outset claims of
oral variants on the writing, variants which the judge believes
never were entered into but are fabrications, designed or
unconscious. ' 'ss
Fears concerning the unreliability of oral testimony and the
inadequacies of the jury as a device for divining the truth, how-
ever, do not fully explain the sanctity that the parol evidence rule
affords written agreements. Legal scholars note that the parol evi-
dence rule is a rule of form,39 and, therefore, performs the "chan-
neling" function common to rules of form40 by encouraging con-
tracting parties to embody the terms of their agreement in a
proper writing. 1 Under this view, courts deny enforcement of parol
terms merely "because the parties have not used the proper
form."'1 2 Rules of form embody certain assumptions about the rela-
observed: "The average jury will, other things being equal, lean strongly in favor of the side
which is threatened with possible injustice and certain hardship by the enforcement of the
writing." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 210, at 428.
35. "At an early date it was felt (and the feeling strongly remains) that writings re-
quire the special protection that is afforded by removing this issue from the province of
unsophisticated jurors." J. CALAMARI & J. PERuO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 100. See also 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2426, at 86.
36. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 216, at 440.
37. Other services of the rule include allowing trial judges to avoid issues concerning
the agents' authority, the vagueness of oral agreements, and the relevance of oral conditions.
Sweet, supra note 21, at 1050.
38. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 216, at 440. As Professor Sweet noted, "[I]f a trial
judge doubts that an asserted agreement ever took place, ruling on the basis of the parol
evidence rule avoids commenting on the evidence, instructing on the weight and burden of
proof, or granting a new trial. It also avoids branding the witness a liar." Sweet, supra note
21, at 1051. See also Wallach, supra note 17, at 653 (Trial judges who exclude evidence
under the aegis of the rule do so either to protect the writing or to prevent less than credible
evidence from reaching the jury.).
39. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 108 ("Since (and even
before) the common law had its genesis, there has been a deeply-felt belief that transactions
will be more secure, litigation will be reduced, and the temptation to perjury will be re-
moved, if everyone will only use proper forms for his transactions.").
40. See infra notes 402-03 & 407-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
channeling function in the Statute of Frauds context.
41. See Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036; Wallach, supra note 17, at 653; Note, supra
note 15, at 982.
42. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1050.
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tive reliability of formal versus informal transactions;" perhaps
more importantly, however, the law perceives rules of form as ad-
ding stability to commercial transactions.'" Thus, by protecting the
integrity of written contracts the parol evidence rule may provide
the predictability and certainty necessary for the efficient conduct
of business.45 The special role that the judge plays in parol evi-
dence cases arguably is consistent with this view because jurors
may not appreciate sufficiently the need for stability and certainty
in commercial dealings. 4'6 A related subsidiary argument that com-
mentators often advance in conjunction with this business effi-
ciency rationale for the rule notes that the rule allows principals to
control unauthorized commitments by their agents through the use
of integration clauses in their contracts.47
Finally, another body of thought exists that attaches signifi-
cantly less importance to writings qua writings. Under this view,
the parol evidence rule is nothing more than a particularized ver-
sion of the basic contractual interpretation rule which stipulates
that later final expressions of intent prevail over earlier tentative
expressions of intent.4' Two major differences exist between the
parol evidence rule and the more general rule of interpretation.
43. On this point Sweet makes the following observation:
A rule of form assumes that parties generally follow formal rules. The absence of
proper form indicates it is unlikely that the agreement was made. Also, a rule of form
assumes that witnesses will lie or forget facts if it is to their advantage to do so. Such a
rule assumes people have poor memories and that litigation is an inefficient method of
ascertaining facts.
Id. at 1053.
44. See supra note 39.
45. The Minnesota Supreme Court in 1924 observed that
[w]ithout that rule there would be no assurance of the enforceability of a written con-
tract. If such assurance were removed today from our law, generally disaster would
result, because of the consequent destruction of confidence, for the tremendous but
closely adjusted machinery of modem business cannot function at all without confi-
dence in the enforceability of contracts. They must not be reduced to the innocuous
character of a mere "scrap of paper."
Cargill Comm'n Co. v. Swartwood, 159 Minn. 1, 7, 198 N.W. 536, 538 (1924). See also Hol-
ton v. Bivens, 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Callaghan) 836, 838 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971) ("Every per-
son should have the right to rely upon written contracts. Allowing testimony of oral agree-
ments in contradiction thereto can only result in confusion concerning reliability of the
writing.").
46. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036.
47. Id. at 1050, 1057. For a discussion of merger clauses and their effects, see infra
note 189 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., J. CALwmu & J. PERLLO, supra note 20, § 3-2; 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 574 (rev. ed. 1960); Farnsworth, supra note 29, at 958; Murray, supra note 17,
at 338; Comment, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Conservative View, 19 U. Cm. L. Rav. 348,
348 (1952).
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The parol evidence rule only applies when the parties' final expres-
sion of intent is in written form, while the general rule of interpre-
tation applies regardless of the final expression's form." Further-
more, under the general rule of interpretation the jury determines
whether the parties intended their last expression to supersede
prior expressions, while under the parol evidence rule the trial
judge makes this determination."
Under this view the primary purpose of the rule is to prevent
courts from interpreting earlier, tentative agreements or negotia-
tions as part of an integrated writing that the parties actually in-
tended as the final expression of their agreement.51 Thus, accord-
ing to this view the rule's justification is based upon the finality of
the parties' written agreement.5 2 Courts exclude oral or written 53
terms extraneous to such a writing not because doubt exists con-
cerning the terms' reliability, but rather because the terms are ir-
relevant, since the parties superseded them in the final integrated
writing. 4
This last view of the rule-the rule as insurer that the final
expression of intent governs-seems to be currently in vogue.55
49. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 99-100 (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 100.
51. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 210, at 428.
52. "[A]fter the parties have discussed and negotiated the terms of the transaction
and have agreed on the terms by signing an instrument embodying them, all prior utter-
ances have become discarded by the final act. . . which is the sole expression of their final
promises and expectations." Patterson, supra note 27, at 846.
53. The policy of "finality applies to prior written as well as oral utterances." Patter-
son, supra note 27, at 846 (emphasis in original). Professor Murray, however, expresses some
reservations on this issue:
The rule exists to afford special protection to subsequent written expressions of agree-
ment when the parties intend such expressions to be complete and final. Whether the
parties intended this result in a particular case is a question of fact which is decided by
the trial judge ...because juries cannot be trusted to accord proper weight to the
writing over prior oral expressions. Stating the purpose and operation of the rule in
this fashion, it is difficult to clearly apply it when the prior expression is written. If
juries would not accord proper weight to a final writing over a prior writing, perhaps
the reason for the rule remains even where both expressions are written. Otherwise, the
question of fact involved should be decided as are other questions of fact.
Murray, supra note 17, at 342-43.
54. Professor Wigmore observed that when a judge decides to apply the parol evidence
rule to the parties' agreement "he does not decide that the excluded negotiations did not
take place, but merely that if they did take place they are nevertheless legally immaterial."
9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2430, at 98 (emphasis in original). When the judge decides
that the rule does not apply "he does not decide that the negotiations did take place, but
merely that if they did, they are legally effective, and he leaves to the jury the determina-
tion of fact whether they did take place." Id. (emphasis in original).
55. See, e.g., id. § 2425, at 75-76; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036.
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This view has influenced both the Uniform Commercial Code's
version of the rule5 and the position of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts.57 Nonetheless, the other rationales, especially the
greater relative reliability of written versus oral expressions of in-
tent, remain important justifications for several reasons. First, the
major dispute in most parol evidence cases does not concern
whether the contracting parties intended the writing to supersede
alleged prior expressions of their intent, but whether the parties
ever actually agreed to the prior expressions.5 Second, although
many courts discuss the ascertainment of intent, they often use
language which suggests that they are barring parol evidence be-
cause of its unreliability.59 Last, the influence of ideas relating to
the special significance of writings is probably the best explanation
for those formulations of the rule that take a more restrictive view
of the critical process by which courts may ascertain best the par-
ties' intent to integrate their agreement into a final writing.60
B. The Parol Evidence Rule: Formulations, Exceptions, and
Applications
While the essence of the parol evidence rule is clear, signifi-
cant disagreement exists about the rule's various intricacies. Pro-
fessor Murray explains the gist of the rule as follows: "When the
parties to a contract embody the terms of their agreement in a
writing, intending that writing to be the final expression of their
agreement, the terms of the writing may not be contradicted by
56. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 107-15 & 131 and accompanying text.
58. As Professor McCormick noted:
Seldom from the case does one gain the impression that the dispute is really over
whether an admitted oral agreement was intended to be superseded by the writing.
Where the adversary's position is to be gleaned from the report, which is surprisingly
seldom, it appears most often that he denies that any such oral counter-agreement was
ever entered into.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 216, at 440. If Professor McCormick is correct, and intui-
tively he seems to be, then much of the recent concern with the rule as a device for effectu-
ating the intent of the parties, however laudable that objective may be in terms of avoiding
some of the obvious unfairness that results when courts treat the rule as a rule of form, may
be largely misplaced. If the true function of the rule remains one of helping determine
whether the parties ever entered into the alleged parol agreements, then conclusions about
the rule's utility as a device in aiding the truth-seeking process should influence opinions
about the desirability of the rule's continued viability.
59. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1048.
60. For a discussion of the polarity between Williston's and Corbin's views on this
subject, see infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
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evidence of any prior agreement."' Whether the rule applies to all
prior agreements, regardless of whether they are in written or oral
form is a topic of debate. Professors Corbin"' and Williston,e3 tak-
ing the majority position, answer in the affirmative. Statements of
the rule, however, exist that limit its application to prior oral
agreements." Furthermore, while scholars unanimously agree that
the rule applies to alleged agreements made prior to the writing,
but not to alleged agreements made subsequent thereto, 5 disagree-
ment exists about the proper treatment of agreements allegedly
made contemporaneously with the writing.6 Professor Williston 7
and the Uniform Commercial Code' treat contemporaneous oral
terms like prior terms, but treat contemporaneous written terms as
part of the integrated writing. Professor Corbin, on the other hand,
argues that terms are either prior or subsequent, and deems the
use of the word "contemporaneous" to be an obfuscation of the
integration issue.6 9
Further and more serious disagreement arises during actual
application of the rule to particular fact situations, and concerns
61. Murray, supra note 17, at 337.
62. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 48, § 573, at 357, for the following statement of the
rule:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which
they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract,
evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations
will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. "Briefly stated, this rule requires, in the absence of fraud, duress, mutual mistake,
or something of the kind, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or written, where the
parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing." 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 631, at 948-49 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961) (emphasis added).
64. See, e.g., Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036 ("The parol evidence rule determines the
provability of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement when the parties have assented to
a written agreement."). Professor McCormick premises the entire discussion of the rule on
its applicability only to prior oral agreements. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 26, §§ 210-22.
65. See, e.g., J. CALAMA1i & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-6, at 113-14; J. WHIrr & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 78; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1042.
66. J. CALAmAUi & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 100.
67. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 628, at 913-15, § 631, at 952-53; see also J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 100-01.
68. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977) provides in part:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which
are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted
by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement ....
Id. (emphasis added). See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-10, at 78-79;
Wallach, supra note 17, at 665.
69. 3 A. CoRBIN, supra note 48, § 577, at 400-01; see also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 20, § 3-2, at 101; Murray, supra note 17, at 337 n.3.
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the issues of the "finality" and "completeness" of a contract. Fre-
quently, the "overriding issue in parol evidence disputes" 70 is
whether the parties intended the written document to be a final
and complete statement of their agreement, or a final statement of
a part of their agreement, or perhaps nothing more than a memo-
randum not intended to be a final expression of their agreement at
all.' '71 The issue of "finality" is crucial because the rule does not
apply to tentative or preliminary writings.7 2 Scholars generally
agree that parties may introduce any relevant evidence on the
question of whether the parties intended the writing to be final.7 8
While the question of finality often is cast as a question of law
since the trial judge makes the determination, the question actu-
ally concerns an interpretation of intention, and thus is a question
of fact.1 4
The question of completeness is of paramount importance be-
cause courts generally draw a distinction between writings that are
a partial integration of the parties' agreement and writings that are
a total integration of the agreement. Courts characterize as total
integrations those writings that they determine to be both final
and complete. Thereafter, evidence of any prior agreements may
not contradict or supplement the totally integrated writing. 5
Courts characterize as partial integrations those writings that are
final but incomplete. Evidence of prior agreements may not contra-
dict such writings, although evidence of consistent additional
terms may supplement such incomplete writings.7 6 The issue of
completeness, like the issue of finality, is a question of law in the
sense that the trial judge decides the issue.
The method that courts employ in determining whether a
writing is complete is the subject of an intense conflict, with
Professors Williston and Corbin heading the two sides of debate.
Both scholars agree that the "intent" of the parties should be the
70. Wallach, supra note 17, at 655.
71. Id.
72. J. CALAmARI & J. PEmLo, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 101.
73. See, e.g., id.; 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 48, § 588, at 528-29.
74. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 101-02.
75. Id. § 3-2, at 101.
76. Id.; see also 4 S. WILISTON, supra note 63, § 636; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1038.
Corbin agrees in substance but would abandon the term "partial integration" on the ground
that parties rarely intend incomplete writings to be final. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 48, § 581,
at 441. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the confusion sur-
rounding the terms "contradict" and "consistent" in partial integration cases.
77. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 103.
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determinative element, 78 but the two use "intent" in very dissimi-
lar ways."9 Williston stresses the appearance of the writing as de-
terminative in discerning the parties' intent;80 he argues that the
consideration of extrinsic evidence in determining the parties' in-
tent emasculates the parol evidence rule."' According to Williston,
if the writing includes a merger clause (also called an "integration"
or "entire contract" clause),8 2 then the writing is per se a total in-
tegration unless (1) the writing is obviously incomplete, (2) the
merger clause is the product of fraud or mistake, or (3) other rea-
sons exist that justify setting the contract aside.8 s If no merger
clause exists and the writing is obviously incomplete on its face or
only addresses the obligations of one party, the parties may intro-
duce consistent additional terms.8 4 If, however, the writing is ap-
parently complete on its face, despite the absence of a merger
clause, a court will treat it as a total integration unless the prof-
fered additional terms are such as might "naturally and nor-
mally"85 be made but not included in a written contract by simi-
larly situated parties.8 8 Parties always may prove the existence of
"collateral" contracts, which are separate agreements supported by
separate consideration, despite the apparent completeness of a
particular writing.8 7 Scholars have criticized Williston's approach
78. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 48, §§ 573-96; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 633.
79. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3.
80. Wallach, supra note 17, at 659. In this respect the Williston approach resembles
the now-defunct "four corners" doctrine. Id. For a general discussion of the "four corners"
doctrine, see id. at 656-57.
81. See 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 633, at 1014. Determining the parties' intent
through consideration of extrinsic evidence emasculates the rule because the existence of a
collateral oral agreement conclusively indicates a partial integration, leaving as the only is-
sue whether the parties made the alleged agreement. This issue presents a question of fact
for the jury and, thus, eliminates the special protection that the trial judge should give the
writing. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 104.
82. For a discussion of merger clauses and their general operation in parol evidence
cases, see generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-12; Sweet, supra note 21, at
1037, 1045; Wallach, supra note 17, at 677-78; Comment, The "Merger Clause" and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 27 TEx. L. REv. 361 (1949).
83. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 633, at 1014, § 634, at 1017-20; see also J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 104.
84. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 633, at 1014-15, §§ 636, 645; see also J. CALAMARI
& J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 105.
85. See Wallach, supra note 17, at 658. This test also is known as the "reasonable
man" test. Id.; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 216, at 441.
86. See 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, 33 638-39; see also J. CALwAlI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 20, § 3-3, at 105.
87. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 105; C. MCCORMICK, supra note
26, § 211, at 431; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1038.
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and its emphasis on the writing because that approach treats the
parol evidence rule as a rule of form;"8 such treatment subordi-
nates the true intent of the parties to their legally presumed
intent.
Corbin argues that a court can never determine the true intent
of the parties by confining its attention to the parties' writing.89 He
clearly expressed his scorn for the Willistonian approach:
Since the very existence of an "integration" . . is dependent on what the
parties thereto say and do, (necessarily extrinsic to the paper instrument) at
the time they draw that instrument "in usual form," are we to continue like a
flock of sheep to beg the question at issue, even when its result is to "make a
contract for the parties," one that is vitally different from the one they made
for themselves?'"
Corbin thus plainly is concerned with ascertaining the true intent
of the parties to the writing:91 did the parties subjectively agree
that the writing was a complete statement or merely a partial
statement of their contract?9 2 A trial court adopting the Corbin
approach would look at all available extrinsic evidence to divine
the parties' true intent on the integration issue;93 it would test the
admissibility of a proffered parol term "solely by the credibility of
the party seeking to introduce the term. '94 Corbin's emphasis on
the true intent of the parties, however, "emasculates the tradi-
tional parol evidence rule"9 5 by depriving the trial judge of the "ju-
dicial trump card"' afforded by the more traditional approaches
that allow a judge to exclude suspect evidence from the jury with-
out appearing to rule on its credibility. 7 Consequently, the Corbin
approach largely eliminates the "rule of form" aspects of the rule
by denying writings the special treatment that the Willistonian ap-
proach affords them.98
88. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 108. Courts following the
Willistonian approach see the essential purpose of the parol evidence rule as protecting the
integrity of written contract. Id. § 3-3, at 107.
89. "[I]t can never be determined by mere interpretation of the words of a writing
whether it is an 'integration' of anything, whether it is 'the final and complete expression of
the agreement' or is a mere partial expression of 'the agreement.'" 3 A. CoRBIN, supra note
48, § 581, at 442.
90. Id. § 582, at 463.
91. See J. CALAMAM & J. PER LLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 106.
92. See Wallach, supra note 17, at 663.
93. See id. at 644.
94. Id.
95. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 106 n.45.
96. See Wallach, supra note 17, at 665.
97. See id.; see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
98. Wallach, supra note 17, at 664.
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Despite the criticism that the Corbin approach emasculates
the parol evidence rule, Corbin's arguments clearly have influenced
recent formulations of the rule and have resulted in a general shift
favoring attempts to ascertain the parties' true intent on the inte-
gration issue. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code's ver-
sion of the rule significantly increases the chances that the trier of
fact will consider evidence of extrinsic terms.9 9 The Code suggests
that partial integration is the norm100 by initially focusing on
whether the writing was "intended by the parties as a final expres-
sion of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein .... "101 A court will bar evidence of consistent additional
terms only when it "finds the writing to have been intended also as
a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agree-
ment. ' 10 2 Furthermore, a court will deem the writing "complete
and exclusive" and bar evidence of additional terms only if the
court finds that the purported additional terms "if agreed upon,
. . . would certainly have been included in the document."10 3 This
standard for a complete integration is much narrower than Willis-
ton's "naturally and normally" test.1 04 The Code also allows evi-
dence of course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of
trade to explain or supplement the terms included in the writ-
ing,105 even when this evidence appears to contradict apparently
unambiguous terms in the writing.106
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts likewise reflects the
influence of Corbin's ideas.10 7 It provides that "a writing which in
view of its completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a
complete agreement ... is taken to be an integrated agreement
unless it is established by other evidence that the writing did not
99. See id. at 666-67.
100. Id. at 666; see also J. CALYXAs & J. PERmLO, supra note 20, § 3-7.
101. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977) (emphasis added); see also Wallach, supra note 17, at 666.
Note also the Code's emphasis on the parties' intent. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 further
exemplifies this emphasis by stating that the object of the parol evidence process is to find
"the true understanding of the parties as to the agreement ...... Id. (emphasis added).
102. U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (1977).
103. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 3 (1977) (emphasis added); see also J. CALAMARIU & J.
PERLLO, supra note 20, § 3-7, at 115; J. WHrrE & R. SuMMRs, supra note 27, § 2-10, at 79-
80; Wallach, supra note 17, at 667-68.
104. Wallach, supra note 17, at 668.
105. U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (1977).
106. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-7, at 115; J. WHr= & R. SuM-
msan, supra note 27, § 2-10, at 85-87; Wallach, supra note 17, at 665-66.
107. J. CALAMAR & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 109.
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constitute a final expression."1 8 The Restatement rejects the no-
tion that the writihig itself can "prove its own completeness '"' 09 and
notes that "wide latitude must be allowed for inquiry into circum-
stances bearing on the intention of the parties." 110 A court must
determine the parties' intent to integrate by looking at "all rele-
vant evidence,"' including usages of trade, course of dealing, and
course of performance; 2 even the presence of a merger clause is
not conclusive on the integration issue.113 If the alleged omitted
term is one that "in the circumstances might naturally be omitted
from the writing," a court will deem the writing a partial integra-
tion. 4 That an omission "does not seem natural," however, will
not prevent its admission "unless the court finds that the writing
was intended as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms
of the agreement." 15
The clear thrust, then, of both the Restatement (Second)1 6
and the Code 17 is to add momentum to what Williston himself
perceived as the modern trend "toward increasing liberality in the
admission of parol agreements." 1 8 By increasing the likelihood
that courts will hold writings to be partial integrations rather than
complete integrations, these more liberal formulations of the rule
not only provide a formal rationale for the admission of terms
inadmissible under form-oriented versions of the rule but also pro-
vide an increased opportunity for sub rosa judicial behavior aimed
at producing "just" results at the expense of consistent application
of the rule. Judges confronted with alleged terms that they believe
are genuine may admit such terms by finding that the parties in-
tended their writing to be only a partial integration of their agree-
ment, regardless of the writing's facial completeness. 9 Of course,
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(3) (1981).
109. Id. § 210 comment b.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 209 comment c; see id. § 210 comment b.
112. Id. § 209 comment a.
113. Id. § 209 comment b; see id. § 216 comment e.
114. Id. § 216(2)(b). A comment to this section observes that if "the omission seems
natural in the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider further the questions whether
the agreement is completely integrated and whether the omitted term is within its scope,
although factual questions may remain." Id. at comment d.
115. Id. at comment d ("[T]here is no rule or policy penalizing a party merely because
his mode of agreement does not seem natural to others.").
116. See J. CALAmAm & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 111.
117. See Wallach, supra note 17, at 666-67.
118. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 638, at 1045.
119. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 212, at 432-33.
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only such terms as are "consistent" with the writing are admissi-
ble, and terms which "contradict" terms in a partial integration
are never admissible.120 Whether a proffered extraneous term con-
tradicts a term contained within the writing, hoviever, is a diffi-
cult 12 ' and perhaps misleading 22 question, which itself provides
fertile ground for judicial legerdemain. Courts in numerous recent
cases have admitted evidence of extraneous terms on the grounds
of "consistency" when any meaningful application of the consis-
tency standard would dictate a different result.123
A brief examination of the numerous judicially-created excep-
tions to the rule's operation gives further evidence of the modern
trend toward liberality in applying the parol evidence rule and of
the confusion and inconsistency surrounding its application. 24 For
example, courts generally agree 125 that the parol evidence rule does
not apply to proof that the contract which a writing represents is
subject to a condition precedent. 2 The courts, however, should
distinguish between conditions precedent to the formation of a
contract and conditions precedent to the performance of a con-
tract. 27 Courts should admit on its own merit, rather than as an
exception, evidence that the failure of a condition precedent pre-
vented the formation of a contract since the rule only applies when
a court determines that a complete or partial contract exists. 28 On
120. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
121. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-10, at 81-84; Sweet, supra note
21, at 1038.
122. Professor Wigmore suggested that the only sensible inquiry concerning this as-
pect of the integration question is whether the proferred term is "additional" to the writing
in the sense that it addresses issues not touched upon in the writing. Any additional term
arguably contradicts previous terms. Parties hardly would seek to introduce extraneous
terms that would have no effect on their obligations under the writing. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 8, § 2430.
123. See, e.g., Bunge Corp. v. Recker, 519 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1975); Hunt Foods &
Indus. v. Doliner, 26 A.D. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966); Recreatives, Inc. v. Travel-On
Motorcycles Co., 29 N.C. App. 727, 225 S.E.2d 637 (1976). See Wallach, supra note 17, at
669-70, 674-76, for a discussion of these cases.
124. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 110, for the allegation that
the genesis of at least some of these exceptions is "[d]issatifaction with rigid application" of
the rule.
125. Some courts, however, refuse to recognize the condition precedent exception on
the ground that such conditions "are a type of contract term and arguably should be subject
to some type of restriction on admissibility if not found in the written agreement." Wallach,
supra note 17, at 654.
126. See J. CALAmARi & J. PERmLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 111-12; C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 26, § 221, at 449-50.
127. See J. CALAMiAu & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112 n.4.
128. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 48, § 589, at 530-32; Broude, The Consumer and the
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the other hand, the parol evidence rule should apply to conditions
precedent to the performance of a contract; a party should be al-
lowed to prove such conditions only if the writing is a partial inte-
gration and the alleged conditions merely supplement, rather than
contradict, the writing.129 Of course, any condition precedent is ar-
guably inherently inconsistent with a facially unconditional writ-
ing. Nevertheless, cases exist in which courts have admitted as
consistent conditions that plainly were "contradictory" under any
reasonable construction of the term.130 In addition, the Restate-
ment (Second) plainly rejects the "consistency" standard as it ap-
plies to conditions.131
Parties also may avoid the strictures of the parol evidence rule
by raising a variety of defenses attacking the validity of the under-
lying agreement that the writing represents. These defenses in-
clude most traditional contract defenses and constitute "a complex
set of subrules and exceptions that equals the parol evidence rule
itself in unevenness of application and confusion."13 2 Courts may
admit evidence which shows that the contract lacks considera-
tion,13 is illegal,13 4 or is voidable due to fraud, duress, undue influ-
ence, or mistake.1 3 5 Of these exceptions, the most important--not
only because significant disagreement exists concerning the scope
of the exception, but also because the exception serves as a con-
venient entree for judicial manipulation of the rule"' 6-is the ex-
ception for fraud.137 Indeed, the fraud exception could become "an
Parol Evidence Rule: Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1970 DuKE L.J. 881,
891.
129. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112; Sweet, supra note 21,
at 1040.
130. See, e.g., Williams v. Johnson, 229 A.2d 163, 166 (D.C. 1967) (allowing admission
of a condition precedent in the face of a merger clause). For a discussion of Williams and
other similar cases, see Broude, supra note 128, at 891-99.
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 217 comment b (1981).
132. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1039.
133. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112; Sweet, supra note 21, at
1040.
134. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112; C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 26, § 221, at 451.
135. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112; C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 26, § 221, at 450-51; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1039.
136. Some scholars argue that "to circumvent the rule fraud has been found and refor-
mation has been granted in situations where these concepts are not ordinarily deemed appli-
cable." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 110. See also Childres & Spitz,
Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 26 n.118 (1972) (collecting cases in
which courts have expanded the fraud and mistake defenses to admit terms under the ex-
ception to the rule).
137. J. WHiTE & R. SUMMERs, supra note 27, § 2-11. But cf. Sweet, Promissory Fraud
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exception that swallows up the entire parol evidence rule."'3 8 Al-
though some authorities only allow proof of fraud in the execu-
tion 139 of a contract to contradict the writing, 40 a party generally
may show proof of fraud in the inducement' 4 ' even though such
proof contradicts an integration. 2 Authorities disagree about
whether to allow proof of promissory fraud141 to contradict an
integration.4
Finally, another means of access for parol evidence and source
of disagreement about the scope of the rule is the generally ac-
cepted principle that the rule does not apply to evidence aimed at
interpretation of a writing, as long as such evidence does not vary,
add to, or contradict the writing.145 This principle in effect stipu-
lates that such parol evidence is inadmissible only if the written
terms are plain, clear, and unambiguous. 4 Authorities have criti-
cized this corollary to the rule on the grounds that language is in-
herently ambiguous1 47 and that courts which profess to find the
language of a writing clear and unambiguous, of necessity, are en-
and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 877 (1961) (To term the admission of evi-
dence of fraud as an "exception" to the rule is erroneous because the rule only applies to
valid contracts.).
138. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-11.
139. Fraud in the execution of a contract relates to deception concerning the contents
of a writing. Sweet, supra note 137, at 888.
140. Id. at 887-88.
141. Fraud in the inducement exists when one party, by false representations, induces
the other party to enter the contract. Id. at 888.
142. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112 n.77; 3 A. CORBIN, supra
note 48, § 580.
143. Promissory fraud consists of making a promise without intending to perform. J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112 n.77.
144. Some jurisdictions have held that a party may not prove the existence of a prom-
ise which contradicts an integration on a theory of promissory fraud. Id. A majority of juris-
dictions, however, now treat the making of promises without intent to perform as the
equivalent of a misrepresentation of fact and, thus, treat such misrepresentations like fraud
in the inducement. Id. § 9-19, at 286-87; Sweet, supra note 137, at 888-89.
145. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, §§ 217-20; J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 27, § 2-11, at 89; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1041.
146. See Farnsworth, supra note 29, at 959.
147. "The very concept of plain meaning finds scant support in semantics, where one
of the cardinal teachings is the fallibility of language as a means of communication." Id. at
952. See Young, Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 619, 632
n.57 (1964), for this discussion:
Ambiguity in the sense of vagueness is the usual carte d' entrge for parol evidence, but
ambiguity in this sense is a matter of degree: "as all language will bear some different
meanings, some evidence is always admissible; the line of exclusion depends on how far
the words will stretch, and how alien is the intent they are asked to include."
Id. (quoting Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)).
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gaging in an exercise in interpretation. 148 Numerous examples of
judicial confusion about, and manipulation of, this corollary ex-
ist.149 Nonetheless, Corbin has argued that the parol evidence rule
should not apply to evidence aimed at issues of interpretation
since a court cannot know whether proffered evidence supplements
or contradicts a writing and, hence, is admissible under the rule
until it ascertains the meaning of the terms contained in the writ-
ing.1 50 Both the Restatement (Second)'5' and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code' 2 embrace Corbin's position and thereby signifi-
cantly broaden the admissibility of parol evidence offered under
the pretext of aiding the interpretive process.
Given the foregoing catalog of confusion, disagreement, and
judicial manipulation, some observers of the parol evidence rule
believe that a significant dichotomy often exists between the reali-
ties of the rule's operation and its various official formulations.
148. When a court makes the often repeated statement that the written words are
so plain and clear and unambiguous that they need no interpretation. . . it is making
an interpretation on the sole basis of the extrinsic evidence of its own linguistic experi-
ence and education, of which it merely takes judicial notice.
Corbin, supra note 20, at 189.
149. According to Corbin,
[tjhere are many court decisions, made by highly respected courts, that are inconsistent
with the repeated rule. If extrinsic evidence is admitted without objection, the trial
court is never reversed for considering it in the process of interpretation. There are
many cases, practically never subjected to criticism, in which the court has considered
extrinsic evidence as a basis for finding that the written words are ambiguous; instead
of ambiguity admitting the evidence, the evidence establishes the ambiguity. Learned
judges have often differed as to whether the written words are ambiguous, each one
sometimes asserting that his meaning is plain and clear. All that any court has to do in
order to admit relevant extrinsic evidence is to assert that the written words are ambig-
uous; this has been done in many cases in which the ordinary reader can perceive no
ambiguity until he sees the extrinsic evidence.
Id. at 161-62.
150. Id. at 188-90.
151. RESTATE zNT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 comment b (1981) provides:
It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence cannot change the plain meaning of a writ-
ing, but meaning can almost never be plain except in a context. Accordingly, the rule
stated in Subsection (1) (on interpretation of integrated agreements] is not limited to
cases where it is determined that the language used is ambiguous. Any determination
of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of the relevant evidence of
the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, prelimi-
nary negotiations and the statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of
dealing between the parties.
152. The actual Code provisions expressly consider only evidence relating to course of
performance, usage of trade, or course of dealing. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying
text. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 1(c) (1972), however, says that "[t]his section definitely re-
jects" any requirement that "a condition precedent to the admissibility" of such evidence
"is an original determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous."
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Professors Calamari and Perillo observe that: "It would ... be a
mistake to suppose that the courts follow any of these rules
blindly, literally or consistently. As often as not they choose the
standard or rule that they think will give rise to a just result in the
particular case." 153 A study of the application of the parol evidence
rule, then, must attempt to pinpoint the factors that influence ju-
dicial perception about the "justice" of a particular result. One
commentator avers that "the proponent of the oral agreement will
be permitted to prove it if the trial judge thinks it likely that the
agreement was made and if there are no cogent reasons why it
should not be enforced."'" Unfortunately, since judicial manipula-
tion of the rule varies from judge to judge, the outcome of any
particular parol evidence case remains difficult to predict:
Although the outcome of a case is often correct because courts, as a rule, have
a good sense of fairness, there are cases that simply come out wrong. There
are non-result-oriented judges who mechanically follow cases phrasing the
Rule in its traditional form. Other judges, believing the Rule expresses a
sound judicial policy, may refuse to admit the testimony of the oral agree-
ment even if they believe the agreement took place and was intended to
stand.155
Perhaps the most interesting suggestion about the realities of
the rule's operation-a suggestion that emerges from a study of
149 parol evidence cases'51e-is that an examination of the status of
the parties to the contract and the nature of their contract better
explains decisions in parol evidence cases than does the rule it-
self.1 57 The authors who conducted the study found that the
courts' application of the rule in cases concerning "informal" con-
tracts or contracts involving an abuse of the bargaining process va-
ried greatly from the application of the rule in cases involving "for-
mal" contracts.158 The authors classified as "formal" any contract
in which sophisticated parties "negotiated fairly and in detail"'
and deemed "informal" any contract between unsophisticated par-
153. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-14.
154. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1045.
155. Id. at 1046. For a discussion of a case in which a court excluded evidence of
extrinsic terms despite convincing proof of the terms' existence, see infra notes 437-39 and
accompanying text.
156. Professors Childres and Spitz conducted the study. See Childres & Spitz, supra
note 136.
157. See generally id.
158. "Precisely those factors regarded as decisive in excluding alleged oral understand-
ings in the formal contracts category were ignored by the courts when deciding cases involv-
ing informal contracts." Id. at 17.
159. Id. at 4.
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ties.160 The authors concluded that
the rule functions effectively, indeed one can almost say it only functions, in
cases assigned to the "formal contracts" category. In cases involving informal
contracts, the parol evidence rule was almost always avoided, and where the
court chose not to circumvent the rule, its decision was based on the credibil-
ity of proffered evidence, not its admissibility. As for cases in our third cate-
gory-those involving an abuse of the bargaining process-the cases indi-
cated that the parol evidence rule had no application at all with regard to the
aggrieved party.1 '
C. The Parol Evidence Rule: Criticisms and Suggestions for
Improvement.
Commentators frequently have assailed the inconsistency typi-
fying the parol evidence rule's application and the confusion and
disagreement about its underlying policy foundations. The parol
evidence rule, scholars note, is difficult to apply consistently be-
cause it is riddled with exceptions'62 and is not sufficiently self-
executing.03 The result is a rule that encourages litigation,6 "ad-
versely affect[s] both the counseling of clients and the litigation
process,"'6 5 and hurts the administratioA of justice. 6 6
Questions concerning the validity of the basic assumptions
upon which the rule obstensibly is premised have fueled the criti-
cal attack against the rule. Many feel that supporters of the rule
have exaggerated the extent to which courts would fall prey to per-
160. Id.
161. Id. at 7.
162. See Note, supra note 15, at 974.
163. The rule is not sufficiently self-executing because it does not contain any internal
test for determining the finality and completeness of a writing. Consequently, courts and
commentators are free to devise conflicting tests. Id. at 973.
164. "When any rule of law is riddled through with exceptions and applications diffi-
cult to reconcile, it is believed that litigation is stimulated rather than reduced." J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 110-11.
165. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036. Professor Sweet argues that "[t]he different poli-
cies behind the rule have varying degrees of persuasiveness in different fact situations. The
ceaseless flow of parol evidence opinions and the refusal of courts to give the real reasons for
their decisions contribute to litigation prediction difficulties." Id. at 1044.
166. As Sweet notes:
The administration of justice also suffers because of the parol evidence rule. Almost
every parol evidence case involves lengthy and often fruitless bickering on the part of
the attorneys. Much time is spent trying to unravel the intricacies of the rule. In addi-
tion, because the rule is phrased in admissibility terms, there is a substantial chance of
a reversal of trial court decisions because the rule is often as misunderstood by appel-
late courts as by trial courts.
Id. at 1047; see also Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule, 4 OR. L. REV. 91, 91 (1925) (describing
the rule as a "positive menace to the due administration of justice").
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jured testimony absent the rule. 6 " At any rate, fear of perjury does
not justify refusing to enforce the parties' entire agreement., De-
tractors of the rule further point out that modern juries are better
educated than their predecessors' 6 9 are subject to more significant
controls,170 play a lesser role in dispute settlement,' 7 ' and decide
issues of credibility in many important contexts. 72 Thus, a pri-
mary justification of the rule-the rule as a jury control de-
vice 17 -may be unsupportable.
Indeed, the merits of each of the myriad justifications offered
in support of the rule are debatable. Critics answer the argument
that the rule allows judges the convenience of excluding untrust-
worthy evidence without branding witnesses as liars,' 74 by arguing
that the price paid for this convenience is too high.1' 5 They
counter the assertion that the rule affords a degree of certainty to
written contracts which is necessary to the efficient conduct of bus-
iness,17 by observing that the assumption that businessmen need
such certainty is untested. 77 Besides, the critics note, the numer-
ous ways of avoiding the rule and the various ways in which courts
apply the rule operate to decrease the reliability of written con-
tracts."7 8 In any event, detractors feel that courts should
167. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
168. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 109-10.
169. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 216, at 441-42; J. WHirT & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 27, § 2-9, at 77-78.
170. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 77-78; Sweet, supra note 21,
at 1056; Note, supra note 15, at 987.
171. See Sweet, supra note 21, at 1054 & n.79.
172. Professor Sweet questioned whether parol evidence cases would prove any more
difficult for the jury to decide than cases concerning construction accidents, consumer inju-
ries, or gift tax cases-all areas in which the jury exercises great control. See Sweet, supra
note 21, at 1055; see also J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 75-76; Note,
supra note 15, at 985.
173. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
175. As Professor Sweet pointed out, "[p]roper issues may be missed or ignored, and
the real reasons for the decision may not be given" when judges exclude evidence from the
outset. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1057.
176. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
177. "Like most of the law's basic assumptions this one has never been tested by any
survey of the actual effects in business of the presence or absence of such assurance." See C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 210. Indeed, as Professor McCormick notes, "[p]erhaps the
special protection [afforded by the rule] is no longer needed. The telephone, and the urgent
call for high speed in certain types of important transactions, such as security trading, have
accustomed businessmen to rely upon word of mouth, and dispense with the safeguard of
writing." Id. § 216, at 441-42.
178. "Because it is impossible to forecast whether or not the facts of a given transac-
tion will come within one of the exceptions or various tests of the rule, the assumption that
1404
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subordinate the goal of certainty to the goal of effectuating the
parties' actual intentions in entering into their agreement. 17 9 Addi-
tionally, critics argue that the rule's emphasis on the reliability of
written evidence is misplaced because writings may be forgeries or
otherwise inaccurate.180 They further argue that viewing the rule as
a rule of form" 1 is an unsatisfactory justification for its existence,
since the rule really has not performed the "channeling" function
that rules of form supposedly accomplish. 8 2 Finally, critics note
that treating the parol evidence rule as a rule of form, in some
cases, can extend unjustifiably the scope of the Statute of
Frauds. 83
For the purposes of determining whether the parol evidence
rule is a likely candidate for the ministrations of promissory estop-
pel, the most significant criticisms of the rule attack the rule's po-
tential for working injustice. People do enter parol agreements that
they do not include in their written agreements. To the extent that
the rule operates to bar proof of such agreements, it frustrates the
true intentions of the parties8 4 and results in courts enforcing a
contract to which neither party agreed. 85 In many instances, a
the rule is indispensable to business stability is specious." Note, supra note 15, at 983.
179. For example, Professor Sweet questions the priority of the rule's objectives:
How clear is the need to protect writings from gullible or soft hearted juries or judges?
In an era dominated by adhesion contracts, inequality of bargaining power and the
pervasive use of liability limitations and exculpations, such commercial certainty
should be subordinate to the protection of reasonable expectations. The law should be
more concerned with protecting the actual agreement of the parties than with protect-
ing [a] written agreement that appears to constitute the entire agreement.
Sweet, supra note 21, at 1056.
180. See, e.g., J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 77-78.
181. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
182. Indeed, "[d]espite the long existence of the parol evidence rule, contracts which
are partially written and partially oral are not uncommon." Note, supra note 15, at 983. The
same author also observes that "informal business transactions between friends or long-time
business associates are likely to involve 'understandings' between the parties that are not
reduced to writing." Id.; see also Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036, 1047.
183. Since the Statute of Frauds never has required the entire agreement to be ex-
pressed in the memorandum, the treatment of the parol evidence rule as a rule of form
effectively extends the scope of the Statute. See Sweet, supra note 21, at 1054. On the
"channeling" function of rules of form, see infra notes 402-03 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text; see also Sweet, supra note 21, at
1058; Wallach, supra note 17, at 653; Note, supra note 15, at 974.
185. One observer notes that
[s]ince parties do make oral agreements outside their written contract and do use
words in other than the usual sense, the exclusion of this evidence by the parol evi-
dence rule may force upon the parties a contract that they never intended to make.
Thus, because the parol evidence rule may exclude as much truthful testimony as it
does perjurious testimony, the rule constitutes a major source of injustice in contract
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party may rely on oral assurances that the writing's failure to re-
flect accurately all the terms of the agreement is "no problem."186
The tendency of the rule to favor unduly the party relying on the
writing1 7 may operate particularly to the detriment of consumers,
who may be unable to understand the terms of the contract even if
they actually read them.18 In any event, consumers are unlikely to
understand the significance of technical devices such as merger
clauses that they are likely to encounter in standardized form
contracts.8 9
A plethora of proposed alternatives or modifications to the pa-
rol evidence rule has arisen from the stinging criticism surrounding
the rule. Some commentators conclude that the most expeditious
way of overcoming the numerous difficulties that the rule poses is
simply to discard the rule as a relic of the past that has outlived its
original purposes and causes more problems than it solves. 190
Given the rule's long existence, such a resolution is unlikely,1 91 al-
though as Justice Holmes once observed:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind limitation of the past.1 92
Others propose less drastic means than complete abrogation for re-
ducing the dilemmas associated with the rule's operation. They
suggest that the party standing on the writing bear the burden of
proving its completeness and finality, 98 or that the rule operate as
law.
Note, supra note 15, at 974-75 (emphasis added). See also supra note 90 and accompanying
text.
186. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 210, at 428 n.6.
187. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 770-78.
188. "In most [consumer] situations, it is unlikely that the buyer will understand the
terms of the writing even if he could and did read them." Broude, supra note 128, at 906.
189. Professor McCormick notes that
[i]n certain types of relatively standardized transactions, particularly in the sale to con-
sumers of appliances such an [sic] automobiles, air-conditioners, tractors, and televi-
sion sets, it is customary for the standard preprinted form of contract or order blank to
include a clause, frequently in fine print, providing that there are no promises, warran-
ties, conditions or representations not appearing in the writing. Seldom are these provi-
sions actually read by the purchaser and even less often would he understand their
effect upon the statements and promises made by the salesman.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 222.
190. See Note, supra note 15, at 976, 987-88.
191. "The rule ... has existed so long that its total abandonment is not likely even if
it could be shown that it is not needed." Sweet, supra note 21, at 1059.
192. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
193. See J. WHITE & R. SUMmErs, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 78.
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a rebuttable presumption that the writing is inclusive and final-a
presumption that a party may challenge by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. 1 4 Another alternative proposal is that
the rule only apply to truly integrated agreements'9" and that the
courts recognize that the number of such agreements is relatively
small.196 Some commentators have added further qualifications to
this proposal: that courts use the rule only to strike down prior
terms that directly contradict the writing,19 7 that they never use
the rule to strike down contemporaneous terms, 198 and that when
the Statute of Frauds requires written evidence of the parties'
agreement courts discard the rule entirely in favor of an inquiry
into whether a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute exists.
The last qualification would leave to the jury the issue of whether
the parties indeed made the proferred prior oral agreement.199 Fi-
nally, some authorities suggest that the manner of the rule's appli-
cation should vary depending upon whether the contract in ques-
tion is "formal,"200 "informal, ' '2°1 or involves an abuse of the
bargaining process. 202
The likelihood of the parol evidence rule's continued existence
in some form or other forces consideration of whether the doctrine
of promissory estoppel properly can play a part in ameliorating
194. See Hale, supra note 166, at 122; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1061; Note, supra note
15, at 986.
195. See Sweet, supra note 21, at 1059-60, 1063. Professor Sweet says that the hall-
mark of such a contract is that the parties wrote it carefully and methodically. Sweet offers
numerous criteria for determining the existence of such a contract. Id. at 1063-67.
196. See id. at 1064.
197. See id. at 1061.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 1054.
200. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. Professors Childres and Spitz
suggest that the rule should find its fullest application to "formal" contracts, but even in
such cases they feel that its application should vary depending upon the nature of the prof-
fered agreement. Childres & Spitz, supra note 136, at 7-12.
201. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. Regarding "informal" contracts, the
Childres and Spitz study concludes that
[t]he reasonable expectations of the parties at the time of entering these transactions
can be reached only by shaping the parol evidence rule to an informal model, not by
forcing the informal contract to abide by a rule designed for keenly negotiated, formal
transactions. And shaping the rule for informal transactions seems to us to require
ignoring it.
Childres & Spitz, supra note 136, at 17.
202. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. In situations in which one party has
abused the bargaining process, Childres and Spitz conclude that "[a]ny person who alleges
inferior bargaining position or an abuse of bargaining power should and usually does get his
evidence to the trier of fact." Childres & Spitz, supra note 136, at 24.
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both the confusion and the potential for injustice associated with
the rule. The resolution of this issue, however, first requires an ex-
ploration of the promissory estoppel doctrine's evolution in gen-
eral, and, in particular, its evolution as a device for circumventing
the Statute of Frauds.
I. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL-THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE
The "bargain" theory of consideration,203 which developed
during the nineteenth century20 served to limit a promisor's liabil-
ity by denying promisees recovery for detrimental, but unbar-
gained-for, reliance on a promise.205 Courts applying this doctrine
often reached seemingly unfair results.20 6 Early twentieth century
jurists, for a multiplicity of reasons, 207 afforded more protection to
a promisee's reliance interests than their predecessors were willing
to grant.208 These jurists countered the classic response that reli-
203. According to bargain theory, the consideration given on one side of a contractual
obligation must be the "price" of the consideration given on the other side of the agreement.
G. GILMoRE, Tim DEATH OF CoNTRACT 19-21 (1974). Justice Holmes formulated the classic
statement of the bargain idea:
[I]t is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given
and accepted as the motive or inducement of the promise. Conversely, the promise
must be made and accepted as the conventional motive or inducement for furnishing
the consideration. The root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal induce-
ment, each for the other, between consideration and promise.
0. HoLus, THE COMMON LAW 230 (1963).
204. The "bargain theory" arguably did not even exist prior to the nineteenth century.
See G. GLMmoRE, supra note 203, at 19-21; see also Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An
Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 576, 577 (1969). On the develop-
ment of "pure" or "classical" contract theory in the nineteenth century, see generally L.
FRImAN, A HISTORY OF AmUmcAN LAW 244 (1973) and M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMmCAN LAw 160 (1977).
205. G. GILMORE, supra note 203, at 19-21.
206. See, e.g., Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (denying the part-
owner of a sailing ship any recovery on the "gratuitous" promise of another part-owner to
secure insurance to cover the vessel on its ill-fated voyage).
207. For a detailed exposition of the socio-historical considerations relating to this
shift in judicial stance and their relevance to the evolution of "modern" contract law in
general and promissory estoppel in particular, see Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel
and the Evolution of Contract Law, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 139, 141-58 (1980).
208. See Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 79 U.
PA. L. Rxv. 440, 448 (1931). Professor Summers argued that "the analytical and historical
schools of the past century have given way to the philosophical and sociological schools of
the present and morality has re-asserted itself in the law." Id.; see also Note, C & K Engi-
neering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co.: Promissory Estoppel and the Right to Trial by
Jury in California, 31 HASTiNGS L.J. 697, 711-12 (1980) (Promissory estoppel's extension of
liability for promises that induce reliance is consistent with other changes in modern con-
tract law that also recognize fairness as a substantive basis of contractual liability.); infra
note 213.
1983] PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 1409
ance upon gratuitous promises is unreasonable by simply noting
the common occurrence of such reliance. 209 They argued, further-
more, that the bargain theory ignored the promisor's role in induc-
ing the reliance.21 0 Allowing individuals who had made promises to
avoid all responsibility even though the promisors knew the
promises likely would induce reliance by others would countenance
a manifest injustice. Their search for a flexible doctrinal device to
"do justice" in reliance cases led these early twentieth century ju-
rists to principles of equity in general,2 11 and equitable estoppe
212
in particular.1 3
209. See Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L.
Rav. 913, 924-25 (1951).
210. See Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78
YALE L.J. 343, 373 (1969); Seavey, supra note 209, at 925 ("[One who makes a promise
intending not to keep it misrepresents his intent and, as in other cases of deceitful misrepre-
sentation, it should not be a defense that the defendant succeeded in taking advantage of
the plaintiff's credulity.").
211. Chancellors of courts of equity traditionally had acted as the "keeper of the
king's conscience," and equity had long served to mitigate the sometimes harsh results that
otherwise would flow from the strict application of statutes or common law rules. L. FRIED-
MAN, supra note 204, at 22.
212. G. GILMORE, supra note 203, at 63-64. Equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, was
a well-established outgrowth of the familiar equitable maxim that "he who has committed
inequity shall not have equity." Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037, 1040-41 (1974). Professor Pome-
roy outlined the classic elements of equitable estoppel:
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a representation
or a concealment of material facts. 2. These facts must be known to the party estopped
at the time of his said conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowl-
edge of them is necessarily imputed to him. 3. The truth concerning these facts must
be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when
such conduct was done, and at the time when it was acted upon by him. 4. The con-
duct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will be
acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and
probable that it will be so acted upon .... 5. The conduct must be relied upon by the
other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in fact act
upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse ....
3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 805, at 191-92 (5th ed. 1941) (empha-
sis in original). Scholars also have expressed the equitable estoppel test in terms of whether
the promisor's conduct inducing reliance was "unconscionable." See L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF SALES § 15, at 93 & n.62 (2d ed. 1959).
213. As Professor Gilmore noted,
[rany judges . . . were not prepared to look with stony-eyed indifference on the
plight of a plaintiff who had, to his detriment, relied on a defendant's assurances with-
out the protection of a formal contract. However, the new doctrine [the bargain theory
of consideration] precluded the judges of the 1900 crop from saying, as their predeces-
sors would have said a half-century earlier, that the "detriment" itself was "considera-
tion." They had to find a new solution, or at least, a new terminology. In such a situa-
tion the word that comes instinctively to the mind of any judge is, of course, "estoppel"
G. GILMORE, supra note 203, at 63-64.
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By preventing a person "from denying or asserting anything to
the contrary of that which by the person's own deeds, acts, or rep-
resentations, has been set forward as the truth," equitable estoppel
protected individuals relying on that party's representations.214
Equitable estoppel in its original form, however, insufficiently pro-
tected reliance interests because of certain evidentiary require-
ments. Early statements of the doctrine required the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant had actual fraudulent intent.215 Although
courts had reduced this requirement by the end of the nineteenth
century and forced plaintiffs to prove only a misrepresentation
that would "work a fraud" on them,216 a more significant limitation
remained. Traditionally, equitable estoppel applied only to misrep-
resentations of present or past facts.217 Equitable estoppel, there-
fore, was theoretically inapplicable to cases in which the promisor's
representations consisted solely of a promise of some future per-
formance.2 18 This "fact/promise" distinction was patently artifi-
cial219 and undoubtedly produced unjust results.220 Therefore, that
"a rule of promissory estoppel would develop in recognition of the
applicability of the estoppel principle to promises" was
"inevitable. , 221
While Williston apparently was the first to use the designation
"promissory estoppel, '2 2 2 the historical origins of the doctrine lie
214. Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037, 1041 (1974).
215. See Note, Statute of Frauds-The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the Stat-
ute of Frauds, 66 MICH. L. REV. 170, 174 n.21 (1967).
216. See Note, Part Performance, Estoppel, and the California Statute of Frauds, 3
STAN. L. Rav. 281, 290 (1951).
217. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 210, at 376; Seavey, supra note 209, at 914.
218. See, e.g., Bank of America v. Pacific Ready-Cut Homes, Inc., 122 Cal. App. 554,
562-63, 10 P.2d 478, 482 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932); Fiers v. Jacobson, 123 Mont. 242, 251,
211 P.2d 968, 972-73 (1949); In re Estate of Watson, 177 Misc. 308, 317, 30 N.Y.S.2d 577,
586-87 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
219. Promises concerning the future are difficult to distinguish from statements of
present or past fact, since "every statement of the future includes some statement of present
facts." See Seavey, supra note 209, at 922-23. The difficulty arises because "statements con-
cerning the future and ... promises [both] involve representations as to the present state
of mind of the speaker." Id. at 914. As Lord Bowen noted: "[Tihe state of a man's mind is
as much of a fact as the state of his digestion." Edgington v. Fitzmaurise, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483
(1885).
220. Affording protection to promisees who rely on misrepresentations of fact while
denying protection to promisees who rely on promises seems inherently unjust. See Seavey,
supra note 209, at 914.
221. Henderson, supra note 210, at 376.
222. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98
U. PA. L. REv. 459, 459 n.1 (1950) (citing 1 S. WILLISTON, THE LAw OF CoNmArs § 139, at
308 (1st ed. 1920)).
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in a much earlier series of cases. Dean Boyer's masterful article on
the doctrine's origins223 pointed to several classes of cases in which
turn-of-the-century courts, by a variety of judicial devices-for in-
stance, by finding non-existent "bargains"--protected the promis-
ees' unbargained-for reliance, which they could not have protected
by strict application of classical contract principles. Dean Boyer
convincingly demonstrated that promissory estoppel principles af-
forded the clearest explanation for such judicial machinations.224
Dean Boyer also found historical support for promissory estoppel
principles in cases concerning gratuitous bailments,221 5 gratuitous
agency,2 2 6 waivers, 22 7 rent reductions, 228 and promises of bonuses
and pensions.229 Finally, he found numerous cases purporting to
apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel in instances in which the
doctrine's traditional elements simply were not present.230 The
223. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle From Precedents: Parts I & II, 50 MICH.
L. REv. 639, 873 (1952).
224. For example, Boyer noted that in charitable subscriptions cases many courts en-
forced promisors' pledges when charitable organizations acted in reliance upon the pledges.
Id. at 644-46. While courts did this under a variety of guises, most often by trying to trans-
form the parties' relationship into a "bargain" of some sort, no bargain actually existed in
these cases under traditional contract principles. Id. at 646-49. In cases concerning oral
promises to make gifts of land, numerous courts enforced such promises-despite the ab-
sence of bargained-for consideration and the promisor's failure to satisfy the Statute of
Fraud's writing requirement-when the promisee (who was often the promisor's child) had
taken possession and had made substantial improvements to the property. See, e.g., Greiner
v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930); Evenson v. Aamodt, 153 Minn. 14, 189 N.W. 584
(1922); Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393, 394 (1882); Reid v. Reid, 115 Okla. 58, 241 P. 797
(1925). In such cases courts surmounted the absence of bargained-for consideration problem
either by treating the promise as an executed gift or by finding that the promisee's expendi-
tures in reliance amounted to "consideration" for the promisor's promise. See Boyer, supra
note 223, at 657-62. In reliance situations courts circumvented the Statute of Frauds in the
same way they did situations involving the equitable doctrine of part performance, which
technically was applicable only to oral contracts to sell land and not to gratuitous oral
promises to deliver title. See id. at 656.
225. See, e.g., Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703); Wheatley v. Low, 79 Eng.
Rep. 578 (1623); see generally Boyer, supra note 223, at 665-74.
226. See, e.g., Maddock v. Riggs, 106 Kan. 808, 190 P. 12 (1920); Barile v. Wright, 256
N.Y. 1, 175 N.E. 351, 245 N.Y.S. 899 (1931); Elam v. Smithdeal Realty & Ins. Co., 182 N.C.
599, 109 S.E. 632 (1921); see generally Boyer, supra note 223, at 873-83.
227. See, e.g., Zarthar v. Saliba, 282 Mass. 558, 185 N.E. 367 (1933); Parish Mfg. Corp.
v. Martin-Parry Corp., 293 Pa. 422, 143 A. 103 (1928); see generally Boyer, supra note 223,
at 888-92.
228. See, e.g., William Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N.W. 650
(1934); see generally Boyer, supra note 223, at 892-98.
229. See, e.g., Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 A. 571 (1932),
rev'd on other grounds, 318 Pa. 490, 178 A. 490 (1935); see generally Boyer, supra note 223,
at 883-88.
230. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
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California Supreme Court significantly advanced this tendency to
broaden the application of equitable estoppel when in Seymour v.
Oelrichs231 the court barred an employer-promisor's Statute of
Frauds defense to a ten-year oral employment contract because of
the employer's oral promise to reduce the contract to written form.
Additional support for the promissory estoppel principle came
in a series of cases that the New York Court of Appeals decided
during Justice Cardozo's tenure. In these cases the court took an
"expansive" view of contract; 32 the court found "consideration"
when none really existed under "bargain" principles,233 supplied
missing contractual terms,23 4 implied promises in the absence of
express promises,23 5 and enforced charitable pledges in part on
promissory estoppel grounds.3 8 In each of these cases the court
protected the reliance interests of promisees in situations in which
strict application of classical contract principles would operate to
deny recovery.
The widespread de facto and de jure recognition of promis-
sory estoppel motivated the authors of the Restatement of Con-
tracts to grant the doctrine formal recognition in section 90:237 "A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce ac-
tion or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the
part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbear-
ance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise."28 The language of section 90 represents a clear de-
parture from the traditional elements of equitable estoppel.2 39 A
promisee's reliance on a "promise" triggers the operation of section
90 without the promisee showing any misrepresentation of fact.40
Nonetheless, the section covers only promises likely to induce reli-
231. 155 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909). For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 356-61
and accompanying text.
232. See G. GiLMoRE, supra note 203, at 62, for a discussion of these cases.
233. See, e.g., De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917).
234. See, e.g., Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. Lurie Woolen Co., 232 N.Y. 112, 133 N.E. 370
(1921).
235. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
236. See, e.g., Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E.
173 (1927).
237. See G. GiLmMoP, supra note 203, at 63-64, for an account of the incorporation of §
90 into the Restatement. Gilmore contends that Professor Corbin essentially forced the
other authors to include § 90 by citing the numerous cases in which the courts imposed
promissory liability in the absence of bargained-for consideration. Id.
238. RESTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
239. See supra note 212.
240. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
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ance of a "definite and substantial character." Courts determine
the definiteness and substantiality of reliance from the viewpoint
of the promisor's reasonable expectations at the time the promise
was made.24 1 Whether, given the circumstances then known to him,
the promisor reasonably should have expected the promise to in-
duce significant reliance is the issue for the court's determination.
While this objective test focuses on the promisor, section 90 analy-
sis also inherently involves an inquiry into the reasonableness of
the promisee's reliance.2"2 Even given the existence of such a prom-
ise, section 90 only applies when the promisor's statements result
in significant reliance. Furthermore, the reasonableness inquiry
necessarily includes a judgment about the fairness of the result the
promisee seeks.24 ' The section specifically articulates this latter
consideration in its insistence that enforcement of a promise is
proper only when "injustice" would result from nonenforcement.
While this element expressly focuses only on the effect that nonen-
forcement will have on the promisee,2 " the court impliedly consid-
ers the promisor's position in determining whether his promise was
likely to induce substantial reliance by the promisee.4 5
Express recognition of the promissory estoppel principle in
section 90, however, was not sufficient to effect an immediate in-
corporation of the newly articulated doctrine into the general body
of law. For example, a few relatively recent cases exist in which the
court required proof of elements properly associated with equitable
estoppel before applying promissory estoppel principles.24 6 Some of
these cases may result from judicial confusion2 47 or conserva-
241. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 461.
242. Plainly, the courts rarely, if ever, would hold a promisor to "reasonably expect"
unreasonable reliance by his promisee. A comment to the Restatement (Second) version of
§ 90 notes that "the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance" is a factor for courts to
consider in determining whether enforcement of the promisor's promise is necessary "to
avoid injustice." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment b (1981).
243. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 475. A court is unlikely to believe that enforcement
of a promise is necessary to avoid injustice if the reliance upon it has been insubstantial. Id.
244. See id. at 485.
245. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. Arguably, a court could justify any
hardship that it imposed on the promisor by enforcing his promise since the promisor
should have foreseen the promisee's reliance. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 461-62, 485.
246. See, e.g., Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 305 Minn. 324, 232
N.W.2d 921 (1975); Skillman v. Lynch, 74 S.D. 212, 50 N.W.2d 641 (1951); see also Hender-
son, supra note 210, at 377 n.192 (collecting cases).
247. See Note, Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 26 KAN. L. REv. 327, 329-30
(1978) ("The two doctrines [equitable and promissory estoppel] are . . . so similar that




tism,24s but many undoubtedly reflect legitimate judicial concerns
about the potential effects of the doctrine's application. After all,
in classical contract doctrine, gratuitous promises were among
those least deserving of judicial protection.249 Some of the judicial
resistance that promissory estoppel has encountered may stem
from judicial doubts concerning the reasonableness of unbar-
gained-for reliance in bargain situations. 50
This latter concern for the unbridled use of the reliance doc-
trine in bargain contexts played at least a sub rosa role in the first
major restraint that the courts imposed on the application of sec-
tion 90-the inapplicability of the section to cases involving "com-
mercial" (bargained for) promises. Judge Learned Hand's 1933
opinion in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc.2 51 firmly es-
tablished this restraint for the next quarter-century. Judge Hand
concluded that promissory estoppel did not apply to promises or
offers contemplating a bargained-for exchange; such promises
would become enforceable only when the promisee gave the bar-
gained-for consideration. Promissory estoppel, he reasoned, would
not apply in such situations because it applied only to purely
"donative" promises for which the promisor never had anticipated
receiving any exchange of consideration.52
While this restricted view of promissory estoppel found histor-
ical support in the gratuitous promise cases in which courts first
applied the doctrine's principles253 and in the knowledge that such
cases were apparently the sole concern of the authors of the Re-
statement when they drafted section 90,25 several considerations
conspired to extend promissory estoppel beyond its role as a "con-
248. "The failure of the courts to adequately distinguish promissory estoppel from ei-
ther equitable estoppel or part performance is due to the fact that equitable estoppel and
part performance are much more established in the law, and courts are loath to establish
new exceptions." Note, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of
Frauds, 44 FORDHAM L. RPv. 114, 120 n.53 (1975).
249. See Henderson, supra note 210, at 346.
250. See id. at 360.
251. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). The James Baird case concerned a subcontractor-
defendant seeking to revoke its bid to supply materials for a construction project on the
grounds of an alleged mistake after the plaintiff general contractor relied upon the subcon-
tractor's bid by incorporating it into the general contractor's own bid on the prime contract.
For a more complete discussion of James Baird, see Boyer, supra note 222, at 491-93.
252. 64 F.2d at 346.
253. • See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
254. See Henderson, supra note 210, at 345 ("The proceedings leading to the drafting
of Section 90... evidence concern solely with justifiable detrimental reliance on promises
for which no agreed equivalent has been asked or tendered.").
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sideration substitute" in donative promise cases.255 Section 90's
language e56 did not-either expressly257 or implicitly25 5-bar the
principle's application in the bargain context. Furthermore, and
perhaps most importantly, injustice was as predictable a conse-
quence of reliance in the bargain context as it was in situations
concerning donative promises.259 These factors, and the inherently
expansionist nature of the reliance principle,260 combined to make
the eventual extension of promissory estoppel into the bargain
context a foregone conclusion. Promissory estoppel finally entered
into the bargain context in another subcontractor bid case, Dren-
nan v. Star Paving Co.261 In Drennan, Chief Justice Traynor
bridged the gap between the donative promise and bargain realms
by first implying a promise on a subcontractor's part not to revoke
its bid due to the general contractor's foreseeable and unavoidable
reliance on it, and then by invoking section 90 to prevent the revo-
cation of this implied subsidiary promise.8 2 The result in Drennan
since has gained general acceptance in the courts63 and received
the official sanction of the Restatement (Second).2 "
Another major source of judicial resistance to promissory es-
255. See J. CAL~mu & J. PERmLO, supra note 20, § 6-7; see also Note, Promissory
Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 66 CALiF. L. Rav. 1219, 1222-23 (1978).
256. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
257. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 492.
258. See id.; see also Note, Promissory Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel and the Farmer
as a Merchant: The 1973 Grain Cases and the U.C.C. Statute of Frauds, 1977 UTAH L. Rv.
59, 82 ("To say that reliance can serve as a basis for enforcing gratuitous promises does not
exclude the use of reliance to enforce promises in other contexts.").
259. "Injustice can result where a gratuitous promise is given in connection with a
commercial transaction as easily as it can in the instance of a charitable subscription."
Boyer, supra note 222, at 492-93.
260. Observers have argued that the reliance principle and the bargain theory of con-
sideration are not only inherently contradictory, but also ultimately may be mutually exclu-
sive. See G. GIMoRE, supra note 203, at 61 ("The one thing that is clear is that these two
contradictory propositions cannot live comfortably together: in the end one must swallow
the other up.").
261. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958). A few cases prior to Drennan departed from
the James Baird rule, but without the influential effect of Justice Traynor's decision in
Drennan. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941);
Northwestern Eng'g Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943).
262. 51 Cal. 2d at 414, 333 P.2d at 760. For a fuller analysis of Drennan, see Hender-
son, supra note 210, at 355-56.
263. See, e.g., Lyon Metal Prods., Inc. v. Hagerman Constr. Corp., 391 N.E.2d 1152,
1154-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); E.A. Coronis Assocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super.
69, 216 A.2d 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966); see also Note, supra note 208, at 713
(Promissory estoppel "has grown from a rule which originally was thought to cover only
purely gratuitous promises to a rule potentially applicable in commercial dealings.").
264. See RzSTATEm&NT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTs § 87(2) & illustration 6 (1981).
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toppel stemmed from the fear that, in some cases, the doctrine
might work an unfair hardship on promisors. 6 5 This fear largely is
due to the uncertainty in determining the proper measure of dam-
ages in promissory estoppel cases. Courts generally agree that
promissory estoppel will not support recovery when quantum me-
ruit recovery of a promisee's restitution interest alone266 would
prevent injustice. The justification for this stance is attributable to
the traditional rule that equitable relief is available only when no
adequate remedy at law exists267 and to the notion that no further
enforcement of a promisor's promise is necessary to avoid injustice
if the court fairly can place the promisee in status quo.265 Often,
however, a restitutionary recovery will be inadequate because the
value to the promisor of the promisee's reliance will be signifi-
cantly less than the promisee's losses resulting from his reliance.2
In such situations courts generally fully enforce the promisor's
promise and award expectation damages 27 0 even though the raison
d'etre of promissory estoppel is to protect promisees' reliance in-
terests. 271 Section 90, which makes promises that meet its criteria
"binding" and tries to avoid injustice through the "enforcement of
the promise,"2 2predictably supports the award of expectation
damages. Fully enforcing the promisor's promise also is consonant
with the traditional view that promissory estoppel is essentially
contractual in nature, serving to provide the missing elements
needed to create a binding contract.27 3 Traditionally, courts view
265. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 489; Note, supra note 255, at 1245; infra notes 278-
81 and accompanying text.
266. A promisee's restitution interest is equal to the value his reliance has conferred
upon the promisor. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46
YALE L.J. 52, 53-54 (1936).
267. See Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 53 CALns.
L. REV. 590, 601 (1965).
268. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 485.
269. See id. at 486.
270. Expectation damages attempt to put plaintiffs in the position that they would be
in if the defaulting party had performed the contract. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 266,
at 54.
271. A promisee's reliance interest equals the value of his actual change in position in
anticipation of the promisor's performance. The objective that granting a reliance-based re-
covery serves is to return the promisee to the position he was in before the promisor made
his promise. Id.
272. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Note, supra note 248, at 126 (Promissory estoppel's role as a "considera-
tion substitute" theoretically justifies an expectation award.). Williston apparently believed
that an expectation award was the only proper measure of recovery in promissory estoppel
cases. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 266, at 64 & n.14.
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reliance damages as a creature of tort law27 4 while they view resti-
tutionary or expectation awards as contractual remedies.7 6 Finally,
in some cases a reliance-based award would not compensate ade-
quately the promisee for his injuries, '7  while full enforcement of
the promisor's promise "satisfies the expectations which have been
aroused justifiably. 127
The "all or nothing" approach to damages in promissory es-
toppel cases-granting full expectation recovery to promisees at
one end of the spectrum while restricting promisees at the other
end to a restitutionary recovery-undoubtedly can produce unjust
results.278 For example, if the value of the promisor's full perform-
ance greatly exceeds the promisee's reliance losses, then injustice
will result since the promisor experiences more harm from full en-
forcement than the promisee encounters from non-enforcement.7 9
This potential for injustice suggests that a reliance-based recovery
may be more appropriate in some promissory estoppel cases; s°
several courts that have disregarded the traditional damage theory
employ such a situation-sensitive approach.8 1
The conceptual difficulties associated with awarding full ex-
pectation damages in promissory estoppel cases are especially ap-
parent in the recent and highly controversial extension of promis-
sory estoppel into the context of contract • negotiations.
Traditionally, courts would enforce only genuine promises by using
promissory estoppel principles.282  Indefinite 2 8  or illusory284
promises, scholars felt, were improper subjects for the doctrine's
274. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 266, at 90 n.61. Fuller and Perdue conclude,
however, that reliance always has been an element of contract damages. Id. at 89-96.
275. See id.; see also Note, supra note 255, at 1245.
276. See Note, supra note 248, at 128-29.
277. Boyer, supra note 223, at 664.
278. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 487.
279. See id. at 489.
280. See id. at 497.
281. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Couit has concluded that "[w]here damages
are awarded in promissory estoppel instead of specifically enforcing the promisor's promise,
they should only be such as in the opinion of the court are necessary to prevent injustice.
Mechanical or rule-of-thumb approaches to the damage problem should be avoided." Hoff-
man v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 701, 133 N.W.2d 267, 276 (1965); see also
Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97
(Tex. 1965).
282. See Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 (1955); see
also Henderson, supra note 210, at 361.
283. See, e.g., Perlin v. Board of Educ., 86 IlM. App. 3d 108, 114, 407 N.E.2d 792, 798
(1980); Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm. v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 163 N.J.
Super. 463, 479, 395 A.2d 222, 230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Boddy v. Gray, 497
S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
284. See, e.g., 1A A. CoRBN, CORBmN ON CONTRACTS § 201 (1963) (Section 90 does not
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application because a promise capable of enforcement did not exist
in either situation. Clearly, application of promissory estoppel
principles to such cases would depart from promissory estoppel's
more traditional "consideration substitute" role. Furthermore,
such an extension of the doctrine would be inconsistent with the
traditional principles of offer and acceptance. The primary thrust
of these principles is "to guarantee parties seeking an exchange ex-
tensive freedom to express, or to refuse to express, a willingness to
be bound, 2 85 and "to insure that, in most instances, obligation at-
taches only when it has been deliberately undertaken. '2 26 Nonethe-
less, given the tendency of twentieth century jurists to seek "just"
results, 28 7 the general trend "toward a fuller and wider securing of
interests and hence toward a wider and fuller enforcement of
promises, "2' s and the ease of application of the broadly formulated
reliance principle of section 90,29 that courts ultimately applied
promissory estoppel principles in the negotiation context is not
surprising.
The most famous example2 90 of promissory estoppel's exten-
sion into the area of contract negotiations is the Wisconsin Su-
apply to illusory promises since reliance can not transform such a promise into a true
promise.).
285. Henderson, supra note 210, at 357.
286. Id. at 358.
287. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
288. See Pound, Consideration in Equity, 13 ILL. L. REV. 667, 679 (1918).
289. See Henderson, supra note 210, at 353-54. Professor Henderson notes that
[b]ecause of the flexibility which results from the generalized phrasing of the doctrine,
many courts have apparently concluded that cases can be decided more easily by the
use of promissory estoppel than by consideration rules .... The broad language of
Section 90 also enables courts to avoid struggling with the more unintelligible aspects
of consideration doctrine, such as the so-called requirement of 'mutuality of obligation.'
Id.
290. For another example of the doctrine's extension into the negotiation context, see
Wheeler v. White, 385 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), rev'd, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
In Wheeler the court allowed a plaintiff, who tore down an existing rental property in reli-
ance upon the defendant's promise either to secure financing for improvements upon the
plaintiff's real property or to provide the financing himself if none was availablo from third
parties, to recover damages based on his reliance losses. The court based its decision on
promissory estoppel despite the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's promise was too
indefinite to be enforceable-an argument that both the trial court and the intermediate
appellate court had accepted. See also Associated Tabulating Servs., Inc. v. Olympic Life
Ins. Co., 414 F.2d 1306, 1310-11 (5th Cir. 1969); Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952, 953 (Colo.




preme Court's Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.291 decision. The
plaintiff in Hoffman sought a Red Owl franchise store and, in reli-
ance on the defendant's promise that it ultimately would grant a
franchise, sold his bakery at a loss, bought a small grocery to gain
experience in the grocery business, moved his family, and bought
an option on a site for the franchised store. The parties never con-
summated the proposed deal. When Hoffman filed suit Red Owl
argued that no contract existed between the parties because the
parties never reached agreement on the essential terms governing
the proposed franchise relationship. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
concurred with Red Owl's argument that the parties had not cre-
ated a contract in the traditional sense of the term, but allowed
Hoffman to recover a reliance-based award 92 under the theory of
promissory estoppel. In the process, the court observed that "it
would be a mistake to regard an action grounded on promissory
estoppel as the equivalent of a breach-of-contract action," 93 and
noted that nothing in the language of section 90 required a prom-
ise serving as the basis of promissory estoppel to be "so compre-
hensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an offer."'
The above-quoted language from Hoffman certainly suggests
that promissory estoppel may be evolving into a theory of recovery
independent of contract 295-a proposition with profound implica-
tions for rules of form such as the parol evidence rule.2 ' Numerous
observers have argued that the reliance principle properly resides
outside the framework of contract; these observers have character-
ized it as a creature of tort law,297 as a separate theory of recovery
distinct from tort or contract,29 8 as a hybrid between tort and con-
291. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). For more extensive discussions of Hoff-
man, see Henderson, supra note 210, at 358-60, and Note, Contracts: Reliance Losses:
Promissory Estoppel as a Basis of Recovery of Breach for Agreement to Agree, Hoffman v.
Red Owl Stores, Inc., 51 CORNELL L.Q. 351 (1966).
292. See supra note 281.
293. 26 Wis. 2d at 698, 133 N.W.2d at 275.
294. Id.
295. See Henderson, supra note 210, at 359. Henderson, however, later concludes that
promissory estoppel is contractual in nature. Id. at 378.
296. See infra note 434 and accompanying text.
297. Professor Seavey notes that
[e]stoppel is basically a tort doctrine and the rationale of ... [§ 90] is that justice
requires the defendant to pay for the harm caused by foreseeable reliance upon the
performance of his promise. The wrong is not primarily in depriving the plaintiff of his
promised reward but in causing the plaintiff to change position to his detriment.
Seavey, supra note 209, at 926.
298. See Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 HARv. L. Rav. 222, 225 (1891); Note,
Promissory Estoppel-The Basis of a Cause of Action Which is Neither Contract, Tort or
1983] 1419
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tract,299 and as an "anti-contract"300 doctrine that "may ultimately
provide the doctrinal justification for the fusing of contract and
tort in a unified theory of civil obligation." ' 1 Other Hoffman ex-
planations, however, continue to place the promissory estoppel
doctrine within the traditional contract framework. Arguably,
Hoffman merely allows the reliance that promissory estoppel pro-
tects to "substitute for" the offer and acceptance which traditional
contract theory requires, in the same way that reliance substituted
for consideration in the early donative promise cases.302 Some com-
mentators have asserted that Hoffman represents an extension of
the concept of "good faith"303 beyond the performance and en-
forcement areas and into the context of contract negotiations.304
Allowing promissory estoppel to impose liability in the absence of
the definite expressions of mutual intent to contract, which have
been the sine qua non of classical contract liability, however,
weakens the argument that the situation involves contract law in
the traditional sense of that term.30 5 Furthermore, support for the
proposition that promissory estoppel is evolving into a non-con-
tractual theory of recovery appears in several post-Hoffman cases
that seem to treat estoppel as a basis of liability independent of
Quasi-Contract, 40 Mo. L. REv. 163 (1975).
299. See Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 MICH. L. REv. 908, 942
(1937).
300. See G. GILMORE, supra note 203, at 61.
301. Id. at 90.
302. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 207, at 173. Of course, since the application of
promissory estoppel to donative promise cases dispenses with the element of bargain, even
this limited application of promissory estoppel is a departure from traditional contract doc-
trine. See Annot., 115 A.L.R. 152, 154 (1938).
303. Authorities have recognized expressly the "good faith" requirement in § 1-203 of
the Uniform Commercial Code and in § 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
Both of these provisions, however, concern good faith in the performance or enforcement of
contracts; the provisions do not consider expressly good faith in contract formation. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 205 comment c (1981).
304. See Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 223 (1968); see also Fuller, Consider-
ation and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 811 (1941).
305. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 207, at 186. For a case in which promissory
estoppel serves as a substitute for a proper acceptance, see N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman
Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736, 738-40 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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contract laws "a and in the nontraditional approach to damages that
some promissory estoppel casess07 and the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts305take.
Regardless of the outcome on the independent theory debate,
two observations about the promissory estoppel doctrine seem un-
deniable. First, promissory estoppel has developed well beyond its
origins and, in doing so, has gone well beyond classical contract
theory. Second, the expansionist nature of the reliance principle
and the general tendency of modern courts to seek "just" results
suggest that further expansions of the promissory estoppel princi-
ple are likely. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts certainly
has encouraged wider acceptance of the various applications of
promissory estoppel. The new version of section 90,09 for example,
deletes the requirement that the reliance be of a "definite and sub-
stantial character."310 Instead, a comment to the new section 90
expressly directs courts to consider, among other things, the rea-
sonableness of the promisee's reliance,311 its substantiality in rela-
tion to the remedy he seeks, the formality surrounding the prom-
ise's formation, and the extant evidence of the promise's existence
306. See, e.g., Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 493 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.
1974). In Debron a contractor's acceptance varied the terms of a subcontractor's bid. The
contractor voluntarily dismissed the contract portion of its claim before trial and the court
allowed it to proceed solely on its estoppel claim. The court held that promissory estoppel
could serve as the basis for a separate cause of action in which proof of all of the elements
required in a breach of contract action would be unnecessary. See id. at 357; see also Allen
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 606 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 1979); Northwestern Bank of Com-
merce v. Employers' Life Ins. Co. of Am., 281 N.W.2d 164 (Minn. 1979).
307. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
308. See infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the drafters of the
Restatement (Second) apparently still view promissory estoppel as a contract law doctrine.
The drafters include § 90 under the heading "Contracts Without Consideration," and a
comment to the section notes that "[a] promise binding under this section is a contract.
." REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTAcTs § 90 comment d (1981).
309. RESTATEMENT (ScoNND) OF CONRACTS § 90 (1981) provides:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action to forbear-
ance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the prom-
ise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
Id. For a complete discussion of this new version of § 90, see generally Knapp, supra note 5.
310. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. One authority suggests that the
drafters deleted this language to accommodate partial enforcement of promises in promis-
sory estoppel cases. See Knapp, supra note 5, at 58.
311. This concern about the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance was already an
inherent part of the original section's requirement that the promisor foresee the likelihood
of definite and substantial reliance upon his promise. See supra note 242 and accompanying
text.
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in deciding whether to grant enforcement.312 In addition, the new
section 90 adds no requirement that the promise inducing reliance
be so definite as to be enforceable as a contract, despite the stir
that Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores created.13 Indeed, an illustration
accompanying the new section expressly sanctions the Hoffman re-
sult. 14 More importantly, by expressly stating that the remedy
under the section "may be limited as justice requires, ' 31 5 the draft-
ers specifically have sanctioned an award of reliance-based dam-
ages in promissory estoppel cases when such an award is necessary
to avoid injustice to promisors.318 The drafters thus have removed
a significant stumbling block to broader judicial acceptance of the
reliance principle.1 7
IV. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
A. The Statute of Frauds
The British Parliament passed the original Statute of
Frauds"" when the law of contract was in its infancyS 9 and when a
primitive law of evidence excluded the testimony of persons with
an interest in the outcome of the case.320 Since the evidentiary rule
prevented even parties to the case from testifying, a significant
danger existed that the courts would impose contract liability on
defendants for contractual obligations to which they never had as-
sented. 21 That courts of the era had minimal control over jury ver-
dicts and jurors were free to disregard the evidence and rule in
accordance with their own knowledge of the facts exacerbated this
danger.3 22 Thus, Parliament sought to achieve two goals when it
passed the original Statute in 1677:323 the protection of defendants
312. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment b (1981).
313. See supra notes 291-304 and accompanying text.
314. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment d, illustration 10 (1981).
315. See supra note 309.
316. See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text. A comment to the section, how-
ever, indicates that while "relief may sometimes be limited to restitution or to damages or
specific relief measured by the extent of the promisee's reliance," "full-scale enforcement by
normal remedies is often appropriate." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment
d (1981).
317. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
318. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch.3.
319. Summers, supra note 208, at 441.
320. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 387-89 (1924).
321. Summers, supra note 208, at 441; see also Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Le-
gal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427, 430 (1928).
322. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 320, at 388.
323. See generally Costigan, The Date and Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, 26
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from perjured testimony3 24 and the placement of a "curb [on] the
power of the juries. 3 25 The means that Parliament chose to attain
these ends was a writing requirement for certain classes of contrac-
tual obligations. 26
Almost from its inception, scholars have subjected the Statute
to virulent criticism. These detractors have argued that the Statute
generates as many "frauds and perjuries" as it prevents.32 7 They
also have castigated the Statute as the source of endless litiga-
tion. 28 Commentators also frequently suggest that modern devel-
opments in the law of contracts3 29 and evidence,330 when combined
with the substantial control that modern courts can exercise over
jury verdicts,3 31 have eclipsed the major reasons for the Statute's
enactment and have rendered it a proper subject for repeal.3 2
The most telling complaints about the Statute's operation,
however, have focused on its potential for working injustice. The
parties to an oral agreement within the ambit of the Statute may
be ignorant of the Statute's existence or of its relevance to their
transaction. 33 Their consequent failure to reduce their agreement
HARV. L. REV. 329 (1913) (noting the uncertainty surrounding the authorship and the date
of enactment of the Statute). For an amusing account of one of the early cases that reput-
edly moved Parliament to take action, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-1.
324. See Summers, supra note 208, at 441.
325. See id. at 458; see also Costigan, supra note 323, at 343.
326. The most important types of obligations requiring written evidence were con-
tracts concerning an interest in land (except leases not exceeding three years in length),
promises by an executor or administrator to answer for a decedent's debts out of his per-
sonal estate, promises by persons to pay for the debts of another, contracts made on consid-
eration of marriage, bilateral contracts not capable of execution within one year of their
making, and contracts for the sale of goods of a value exceeding ten pounds. See generally 6
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 320, at 384-87.
327. See, e.g., Child v. Godolphin, 21 Eng. Rep. 181 (1723); Stephen & Pollock, Sec-
tion Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds, 1 L.Q. REV. 1 (1885); Sunderland, A Statute for
Promoting Fraud, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 273 (1916).
328. "There is no other statute that has been the source of so much litigation." J.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FRAUDS 327 (1907).
329. See Willis, supra note 321, at 431.
330. Some authorities have characterized § 17 of the original Statute [the sale of goods
provision] as "a relic of times when the best evidence on such subjects was excluded on a
principle now exploded." Stephen & Pollock, supra note 327, at 6.
331. Professor Willis notes that "with the control exercised by the courts over juries in
modern times the danger that juries will hold people liable on promises they never made is
better protected by such court control than by a Statute of Frauds." Willis, supra note 321,
at 430. Cf. supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text (parol evidence context).
332. Justice Stephen, speaking of the sale of goods provision of the original Statute,
observed that "it should be thrown out of the window. . . the 17th section should be re-
pealed, and the cases upon it be consigned to oblivion." Stephen & Pollock, supra note 327,
at 5.
333. Justice Stephen noted that, despite the Statute's long tenure, "[i]n the great
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to written form, therefore, may operate to preclude proof of the
bona fide agreement that they actually made.334 Indeed, defen-
dants in modern times use the Statute to defend against agree-
ments that they voluntarily assumed much more frequently than
they use it to disprove fictitious agreements that perjurious plain-
tiffs fabricate.3 s5 These negative effects of the Statute have gener-
ated suggestions that the Statute's writing requirement is ill-suited
to its avowed purpose of preventing fraud336 and that courts should
utilize other, more satisfactory, devices in grappling with the evi-
dentiary problems inherent in oral agreements.37
The Statute, while it retains considerable vitality, has not
emerged unscathed in the face of such continuing criticism. Recent
versions of the Statute, in particular section 2-201 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, have made significant attempts at reducing its
potential for fraud," 8 and courts have reacted to the Statute's po-
tential for injustice by carving out numerous "exceptions" to its
operation 3 9 under the guise of statutory "interpretation." Such ju-
mass of cases the contracting party is as unconscious of the existence of the Statute of
Frauds as of the pressure of the atmosphere." Id. at 3.
334. See Willis, supra note 321, at 539; see also Stephen & Pollock, supra note 327, at
3.
335. Professors White and Summers note that
[t]he possibility that plaintiffs [might] conjure up forged writings and perjured oral
contracts out of whole cloth is unreal. These plaintiffs would be most unlikely to sur-
vive cross-examination, motions for directed verdict, and a jury's own scrutiny. But the
possibility that defendants might get out of actual contracts simply for lack of a signed
writing is not unreal at all.
J. WHTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-8, at 74; see also Note, supra note 267, at 591.
For a classic judicial response to such a use of the Statute, see Chief Judge Campbell's
statement in Sivewright v. Archibald, 20 L.J.Q.B. (n.s.) 529, 536 (1851):
I regret to say that the view which I take of the law in this case compels me to come to
the conclusion that the defendant is entitled to our judgement, although the merits are
entirely against him; although, believing that he had broke his contract, he could only
have defended the action in the hope of mitigating the damages, and although he was
not aware of the objection on which he now relies till within a few days before the trial.
336. "A true 'means to an end' surely should not serve commonly as a means to dis-
serve that end. . . . Yet, centuries of experience and tons of case law testify that a statute
of frauds can be an instrument of perjury and fraud." J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note
27, § 2-8, at 74.
337. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 208, at 464 (hold plaintiffs seeking to prove the
existence of oral contracts to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof); Note,
supra note 267, at 609 (require defendants to deny the existence of an oral contract under
oath as a precondition of raising the Statute as a defense).
338. Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE
L.J. 821, 829 (1950). For a detailed exposition of this aspect of § 2-201, see Metzger &
Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 ViLL.
L. REV. 63, 69-74 (1980-1981).
339. These exceptions include the part performance doctrine, quasi-contract, fraud,
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dicial incursions on the Statute's province have been so substantial
that one legal historian claimed that "[i]n one sense, the statute of
frauds [is] hardly a statute at all. It [is] so heavily warped by 'in-
terpretation' that it [has] become little more than a set of com-
mon-law rules, worked out in great detail by the common-law
courts. 8 40 The courts also have engaged in some rather questiona-
ble feats of judicial legerdemain when strict construction of the
Statute would produce injustice.34 1 Given this history of judicial
circumvention of the strictures of the Statute and the inexorable
advance of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, 42 courts' incorpo-
ration of promissory estoppel into the judicial arsenal of devices
designed to circumvent the Statute was inevitable.
B. Promissory Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds
The equitable doctrine of part performance was the first judi-
cially-created exception that courts employed to circumvent the
Statute of Frauds' operation.3 43 This initial equitable intrusion into
the Statute's domain was consistent with equity's traditional role
of preventing the harsh operation of statutes.34 4 Courts of equity
also commonly enforced oral contracts that were within the scope
of the Statute in cases involving outright fraud on the theory that
the supreme duty of equity was to prevent fraud.3 " When cases
arose that did not involve fraud, but in which denial of an oral
the imposition of constructive trusts, the "joint obligor" rule, the "main purpose" rule, equi-
table estoppel, and promissory estoppel. See Note, supra note 248, at 115-16.
340. L. FRDmAN, supra note 204, at 246-47.
341. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 208, at 442. Summers notes that
[h]ow many unjust suits have been prevented as a result of the statute cannot be esti-
mated, but the reports are filled with cases where just claims have been defeated by its
operation. This has resulted in a distorting of the statute, in order to prevent injustice,
into the most inconceivable meanings, so that cases might be ruled to fall without its
provisions.
Id.
342. See supra notes 203-317 and accompanying text.
343. See Costigan, supra note 323, at 344. According to Professor Costigan,
[t]he statute's framers were thoroughly familiar with the part-performance problem,
and the decisions which shortly after the passage of the Statute of Frauds settled the
law that part-performance would make the oral contract for the sale of land enforcea-
ble in chancery, notwithstanding the statute, are conclusive evidence that its framers
never intended the statute to prevent the giving of equitable relief in the part-perform-
ance cases.
344. Id. See Summers, supra note 208, at 447.
345. See, e.g., Wakeman v. Dodd, 27 N.J. Eq. 564 (1876). In such cases courts justified
the circumvention of the Statute by arguing: "relief is afforded in equity because of the
fraud, and not by virtue of the contract." Id. at 565 (dictum).
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promise's enforceability because of its failure to comply with the
Statute's writing requirement would impose severe hardships on
the promisee, equity courts began to employ the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel34e to defeat the Statute. Courts justified equitable
estoppel's use in Statute of Frauds cases by noting that "the invo-
cation of the statute would allow the perpetration of a moral
fraud, 3 47 and that the prevention of such an inequitable use of the
Statute would "be an aid in the ultimate function of the statute in
preventing fraud."' 4
8
Equitable estoppel's utility as a device for protecting a prom-
isee's reliance interests stemming from promises within the scope
of the Statute suffered because of the doctrine's application only to
misrepresentations of fact.4 " This limitation confined early appli-
cations of estoppel in the Statute of Frauds context to situations in
which the promisor either had made misrepresentations concerning
facts that would obviate the need for a writing, 50 or had repre-
sented that the promisor had executed a writing sufficient to sat-
isfy the Statute. 51 The artificiality of the fact/promise distinc-
tion3 52 and the manifest injustice that often flowed from its
operation3 53 eventually would cause courts to apply the emerging
doctrine of promissory estoppel to Statute of Frauds cases.
At the turn of the century Statute of Frauds cases began to
appear in which courts that purported to apply equitable estop-
pel3 54 deviated significantly from that doctrine's traditional ele-
ments.3 55 Perhaps the most important of these cases was the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision in Seymour v. Oelrichs.356
346. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of equitable
estoppel.
347. See Summers, supra note 208, at 446.
348. Id. at 447. Summers and others have argued that the part-performance doctrine,
in reality, was nothing more than a limited variant of equitable estoppel. Id. The two doc-
trines clearly overlap and numerous examples exist of judicial confusion concerning their
proper application. See Note, supra note 216, at 282-83 & nn.11-15.
349. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
350. See Note, supra note 267, at 595.
351. See Edwards, The Statute of Frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Doctrine of Estoppel, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 205, 215 (1978).
352. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
354. See, e.g., Kingston v. Waiters, 16 N.M. 59, 113 P. 594 (1911) (seller orally prom-
ised to extend future payment date of debt); Perkiomen Brick Co. v. Dyer, 187 Pa. 470, 41
A. 326 (1898) (purchaser orally agreed to subscribe to stock).
355. See supra note 212 for the traditional elements of equitable estoppel.
356. 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909). The plaintiff in Seymour, a police captain, gave up
secure employment, including pension rights and the right to a "good cause" discharge, in
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Although purporting to base its decision on equitable estoppel, 57
the Seymour court actually estopped the surviving defendants
from asserting their Statute of Frauds defense because of their an-
cillary promise to reduce the parties' agreement to writing.35 8
Promissory, rather than equitable estoppel, more appropriately ex-
plains the Seymour result, based as it is upon plaintiff's reliance
on the defendant's promise and not upon any misrepresentation of
fact.35 9 Nonetheless, the court in Seymour understandably attrib-
uted its holding to equitable estoppel since the legal community
neither formally nor informally had recognized the doctrine of
promissory estoppel 60
Courts subsequently broadened the Seymour "ancillary prom-
ise" exception to equitable estoppel's misrepresentation of fact re-
quirement to include, among other things, promises by the defen-
dant not to use the Statute as a defense. 81 Courts justified the
circumvention of the Statute of Frauds in "ancillary" promise situ-
ations on two theoretical grounds. First, the courts wanted to pre-
vent "frauds" upon promisees who relied upon oral promises.3 2
Second, the courts defeated the Statute only indirectly since they
used estoppel to enforce the ancillary promise, which was not
within the Statute's scope, rather than the underlying promise,
which was within the Statute's ambit.3 63 However circuitous their
logic, the courts ultimately were able to enforce promises that the
Statute otherwise rendered unenforceable. Appropriate attribution
of the Seymour result to promissory estoppel principles would not
occur until the holding of the case gained official sanction of the
Restatement of Contracts in 1932.64
reliance upon a ten-year oral contract to serve as a property manager for the defendants. He
alleged that one of the defendants, who later died while traveling in Europe, orally had
promised to reduce the agreement to writing upon his return. Id. at 792, 106 P. at 93. Since
the parties could not perform the contract within one year of its making, it fell within the
ambit of the California Statute of Frauds. Id. at 786, 106 P. at 90.
357. See id. at 800, 106 P. at 96.
358. Id. at 799-800, 106 P. at 96.
359. See Summers, supra note 208, at 454.
360. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
361. See, e.g., Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 86-87, 193 P. 84, 87 (1920).
362. See, e.g., Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. at 797-800, 106 P. at 94-96.
363. See Note, supra note 248, at 117; Note, supra note 258, at 74.
364. See RzSTATEMENT OF CONRACTS § 178 comment f (1932). Comment f provides:
Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute, an estoppel may preclude objec-
tion on that ground in the same way that objection to the non-existence of other facts
essential for the establishment of a right or a defense may be precluded. A misrepre-
sentation that there has been such satisfaction if substantial action is taken in reliance
on the representation, precludes proof by the party who made the representation that
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Nothing in the language of section 90 of the original Restate-
mentas"-the general section sanctioning promissory estop-
pel-suggested that promissory estoppel should enjoy any broader
application in Statute of Frauds cases. Some modern courts ac-
cordingly continue to limit the use of promissory estoppel in Stat-
ute of Frauds cases to factual situations concerning ancillary
promises.s66 Commentators have suggested that the reluctance of
such courts to extend the application of promissory estoppel be-
yond cases involving ancillary promises may be attributable to
fears that such an extension could result in the complete abroga-
tion of the Statute.6 7 Exactly how much protection the Statute
affords promisors even in jurisdictions recognizing only the ancil-
lary promise exception remains in doubt. A perjurer attempting to
prove the existence of an oral agreement otherwise within the am-
bit of the Statute seemingly could assert the existence of a ficti-
tious promise to reduce the alleged agreement to written form and
thus vitiate any residual protection the Statute affords.
Nevertheless, limiting promissory estoppel to the ancillary
promise context potentially works great injustice upon the belea-
guered promisee. For one thing, such a limitation forgets that a
promisee who relies on an underlying promise to perform exper-
iences as great an injury if a court refuses to enforce the promise as
a promisee who relies on an ancillary promise to put the agreement
in writing.368 More importantly, in most ancillary promise cases the
promisee more likely is relying on performance of the underlying
agreement than upon the ancillary promise. Not until the Califor-
it was false; and a promise to make a memorandum, if similarly relied on, may give
rise to an effective promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise operate to
defraud.
Id. (emphasis added).
365. See supra note 238 and the accompanying text.
366. See, e.g., 21 Turtle Creek Square, Ltd. v. New York State Teachers' Retirement
Sys., 432 F.2d 64, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971) (applying Texas
law); Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 16 Ariz. App. 415, 420-21, 493 P.2d 1220,
1225-26 (1972).
367. See Note, supra note 255, at 1229.
368. Commentators have argued that the ancillary promise rubric often has served to
mask the true policy basis for circumventing the Statute's operation in such cases:
It is appropriate for modern courts to cast aside the raiments of conceptualism which
cloak the true policies underlying the reasoning behind the many decisions enforcing
contracts that violate the Statute of Frauds. There is certainly no need to resort to
legal rubrics or meticulous legal formulas when better explanations are available. The
policy behind enforcing an oral agreement which violated the Statute of Frauds [is] a
policy of avoiding unconscionable injury ....
McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 35, 469 P.2d 177, 180 (1970).
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nia Supreme Court's decision in Monarco v. Lo Greco,69 however,
did a court explicitly recognize this.3 70 Although the Monarco court
adhered to the precedent set in Seymour by purporting to base its
decision on equitable estoppel, 7 ' the doctrine they actually ap-
plied is promissory estoppel. 7 2 Several post-Monarco decisions
recognizing the general proposition that reliance on oral promises
can operate to circumvent the Statute regardless of the existence
of an ancillary promise correctly have characterized the animating
principle underlying their decisions as promissory estoppe 3 73
Courts also have used promissory estoppel to circumvent the Uni-
form Commercial Code's Statute of Frauds requirement, 3 7  al-
though the extant cases on point manifest considerable judicial
confusion on the subject. 7 5
Although the judicial tendency to circumvent the Statute of
Frauds via promissory estoppel is apparently well-established and,
indeed, seems to be gaining momentum, this Article would deceive
if it failed to acknowledge the considerable resistance that the doc-
trine has encountered in the Statute of Frauds context. One obsta-
369. 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950). In Monarco the court enforced an oral prom-
ise two parents made to their son that they would leave him the bulk of their property at
their death. In reliance on this promise the son remained at home and worked on the family
farm for twenty years. Although defendants made no ancillary promise to reduce the agree-
ment to written form or to refrain from raising the Statute as a defense, the court concluded
that estoppel appropriately could exist when a promisor induces the promisee's reliance by
promising to perform his part of their oral agreement. The court observed that "[in reality
it is not the representation that the contract will be put in writing or that the statute will
not be invoked, but the promise that the contract will be performed that a party relies upon
when he changes his position because of it." Id. at 626, 220 P.2d at 741. The court analyzed
prior decisions and concluded that whenever unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment
would result from enforcement of the Statute, "the doctrine of estoppel . . . applied
whether or not plaintiff relied upon representations going to the requirements of the statute
itself." Id. at 625, 220 P.2d at 741. The Monarco court characterized earlier cases refusing to
apply estoppel as doing so either because a restitutionary remedy would compensate ade-
quately the promisee or because no unconscionable injury would result from nonenforce-
ment of the agreement. Id. at 623-24, 220 P.2d at 740.
370. A few cases decided in the interim between Seymour and Monarco, however, evi-
denced some considerable judicial stretching of the ancillary promise requirement in the
quest for fair results. See Note, supra note 216, at 293-94.
371. 35 Cal. 2d at 625, 220 P.2d at 740.
372. See supra notes 359-60 and accompanying text. But see Note, supra note 255, at
1221-22 (describing Monarco as allowing proof of detrimental reliance sufficient to establish
promissory estoppel to serve as the basis for an equitable estoppel). The Note's contrary
position results from the author's view that promissory estoppel traditionally has functioned
only as a consideration substitute. See id. at 1222-23.
373. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 36-37, 469 P.2d 177, 181 (1970);
Alpark Distrib., Inc. v. Poole, 95 Nev. 605, 607-08, 600 P.2d 229, 230-31 (1979).
374. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1977).
375. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 338, at 91-96.
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cle to the recognition of promissory estoppel as a legitimate device
to circumvent the Statute has been judicial fears that observers
would charge courts with usurping legislative power.3 76 This con-
cern, however, ignores several important facts. First, equity always
has had the power to mitigate the harsh operation of statutes.3 7
Second, the Statute has from its inception been the object of equi-
table intervention;s7' indeed, one prominent historian of the Stat-
ute has argued that its authors never intended the Statute to apply
to the courts of equity. 7 9 Last, the usurpation argument fails to
consider the judiciary's primary role in shaping the Statute.35 0
The usurpation argument against recognition of promissory
estoppel as a legitimate means around the Statute recently has re-
surfaced with particular vigor in the discussion of section 2-201 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. In the discussion, opponents of the
widespread recognition of promissory estoppel in Statute of Frauds
cases have coupled the usurpation argument with arguments pre-
mised on the familiar, though often discounted, 8 ' maxim of statu-
tory construction: Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.3 82 The
major thrust of this combined attack is that, since the drafters of
the Code specifically enumerated several methods38 3 of avoiding
376. See, e.g., Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 So. 2d 777, 779
(Fla. 1966).
377. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 343 & 345-48 and accompanying text.
379. The judges who framed the Statute of Frauds were so anxious to tie the hands
of juries and so possessed by the idea that the statute would not apply ex proprio
vigore to chancery cases that they neglected to be as explicit in the wording of the
statute as they should have been.
Costigan, supra note 323, at 344-45.
380. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text.
381. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 873-74 (1930), for the
following observation:
The rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another is in direct contra-
diction to the habits of speech of most persons. To say that all men are mortal does not
mean that all women are not, or that all other animals are not. There is no such impli-
cation, either in usage or in logic, unless there is a very particular emphasis on the
word men. It is neither customary nor convenient to indicate such emphasis in statutes,
and without this indication, the first comment on the rule is that it is not true.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672,
676 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
382. Enumeration of specific items impliedly excludes all others. See United States v.
Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 58-59 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (interpreting wiretap authorization
statute).
383. See U.C.C. § 2-201(2)-(3) (1977). These methods include the use of merchants'
written confirmations, the manufacture of goods not suitable for sale to others in the regular
course of business, an admission by the party against whom enforcement is sought that a
contract for sale was made, and the prior acceptance of, coupled with either payment for or
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the section's writing requirement,1 4 the drafters impliedly pre-
cluded avoidance by any other manner, including estoppel. 5 ' This
view is incorrect for various reasons ss The most important of
these is that section 1-103 of the Code expressly provides that
"[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity, including ... the law relative to...
estoppel. . . shall supplement its provisions. "387 This section ap-
plies prospectively as well as retrospectively,38 8 and, therefore, can
serve as a vehicle for incorporating into Code decisions legal devel-
opments that occur after the Code's enactment.
3 8 9
Another, more important obstacle to the recognition of prom-
issory estoppel as a legitimate means of circumventing the Statute
is the fear of numerous courts that such recognition would result in
the Statute's complete abrogation.390 This fear, however, is un-
founded. While promissory estoppel would permit proof of some
oral agreements that the Statute otherwise would preclude the
Statute would remain applicable both to wholly executory
promises within its scope and to oral promises that have induced
reliance insufficient to trigger application of estoppel.3 91 Further-
more, although allowing estoppel to intrude into the Statute of
Frauds context certainly will diminish some protection that the
Statute otherwise affords contracting parties, substantial contro-
versy exists over whether the Statute truly offers any significant
protection. Given the Statute's numerous judicially created excep-
tions,a9 a dishonest plaintiff conceivably could "frame" a contract
receipt of, the goods in issue.
384. See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1977).
385. See C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Duniway, J., concurring); Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 111, 289 So. 2d 609, 613 (1974); C.G.
Campbell & Son, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); see also
Edwards, supra note 351, at 218.
386. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 338, at 97-99 (fully discussing why the Code's
enumeration does not preclude other methods of avoidance).
387. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977).
388. "What the section [1-103] invites is not limited to law which exists as of the date
of particular enactments of the Code." Summers, supra note 304, at 197 n.9.
389. Specifically, courts, under § 1-103, appropriately may incorporate the express rec-
ognition of promissory estoppel as a means of circumventing the Statute in Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 139.
390. This fear has been a strong 'consideration in those cases in which courts refused
to countenance the circumvention of the Statute under any circumstances. See, e.g., Kahn v.
Cecelia Co., 40 F. Supp. 878, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic
Hoasp., Inc., 173 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), aff'd, 190 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1966).
391. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 338, at 82.
392. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text.
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that was beyond the Statute's scope.3 93 Moreover, that a writing
satisfying the Statute exists does not indicate necessarily the true
existence of a contract between the parties. The writing might be a
forgery,39 4 or might be a draft that parties optimistically signed in
advance, looking forward to an agreement that failed to material-
ize.39  Finally, memoranda satisfying the Statute are often incom-
plete;396 thus, a perjurious promisee conceivably could convince a
judge or jury of the existence of contract terms to which the prom-
isor never actually assented.39 7 All of these possibilities have led
one commentator to observe that "there is a very serious doubt as
to what protection the statute really does afford. Despite the lofty
words about its glory that are so often pronounced, its protection,
in most cases, is more illusory than real.""9 "
Proponents of the expansion of promissory estoppel into the
Statute of Frauds context, in sum, have convincing responses to all
judicial fears concerning the abrogation of the Statute. Perhaps,
the chief fear concerns the loss of the evidentiary function that the
writing requirement serves. 99 The reliance that the promissory es-
toppel doctrine requires, however, likewise can serve this eviden-
tiary function. 40 0 As one author notes "it is almost inconceivable
that anyone should materially change his position, so as to satisfy
all the elements of an estoppel, on the expectation of recouping
himself on a 'framed' contract. 4 01 Another fear concerns the loss
of the channeling and cautionary functions that the Statute's writ-
ing requirement serves.40 ' The channeling function of the Statute
encourages knowledgeable parties to reduce their agreements to
393. See Summers, supra note 208, at 460.
394. J. WHIT & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-8, at 73.
395. Id.
396. Id. § 2-3, at 57 (sales contract context). The various incarnations of the Statute
never have required that a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute's writing require-
ment be a complete integration of the parties' agreement. J. CALAmARI & J. PERILLO, supra
note 20, § 19-27 & n.70.
397. J. WmT & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-8, at 72-73 (sales contract context).
398. Summers, supra note 208, at 460. See also J. WHIrr & R. SUMMERS, supra note
27, § 2-8, at 73 (The Uniform Commercial Code's writing requirement is "so far from any
kind of guarantee against successful perjury that it is inappropriate even to call it a means
to fraud prevention at all.").
399. See supra notes 319-24 and accompanying text.
400. See infra notes 423-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts' recognition of promissory estoppel's evidentiary function. See
also Note, supra note 208, at 710-11.
401. Summers, supra note 208, at 459-60.
402. See Note, supra note 215, at 182; see also J. CALAMARI & J. PERLLO, supra note
20, § 19-1, at 673.
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written form, and thus provides courts with a handy basis for dis-
tinguishing between enforceable and unenforceable agreements. 403
The cautionary function of the writing requirement discourages
parties from entering into ill-considered agreements by forcing
them to reduce their agreement to writing and impressing upon
them the seriousness of their actions. 4  While the promissory es-
toppel reliance requirement cannot serve either of these func-
tions,405 significant grounds exist for concluding that the writing
requirement also is inadequate as a channeling and cautionary
device.4 0
Before the Statute can serve the channeling and cautionary
functions, the parties must be aware of its existence and of its ap-
plicability to their agreement-a prerequisite often absent in eve-
ryday transactions.0 7 An empirical study of actual business prac-
tice relating to the reduction of oral agreements to written form
that the Yale Law Journal presented in 1957 indicated that the
Statute plays a relatively insignificant role in inducing business-
men to put their agreements in written form.40 8 Firms generally
put their agreements in writing because they consider such devo-
tion to the written word sound business policy.40 9 Parties often put
their agreements in writing simply to avoid problems of interpreta-
tion or to prevent each other from denying the existence of the
agreement.410 Even if the parties are aware of the Statute's writing
requirement, they may refrain from creating a writing because one
403. See Note, supra note 215, at 170-71; see also Fuller, supra note 304, at 800-01 (A
formality like the writing requirement can provide a simple, external test for
enforceability.).
404. See Fuller, supra note 304, at 800; Note, supra note 215, at 170.
405. But see Note, supra note 208, at 710. Since promissory estoppel only imposes
liability for promises on which the promisor should foresee injurious reliance it, therefore,
arguably fulfills a cautionary function because "[Il]iability thus is not imposed for breach of
impulsive promises made under circumstances in which legal consequences are, or should
be, unexpected." Id.
406. The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code apparently were not concerned
with the channeling and cautionary functions of the writing requirement, since the various
alternative methods they provided for satisfying the Statute in Code cases all concern the
evidentiary function of the Statute. See Edwards, supra note 351, at 218.
407. See supra note 333. For more recent evidence of the truth of this assertion, see
The Statute of Frauds and the Business Community: A Re-Appraisal in Light of Prevail-
ing Practices, 66 YALz L.J. 1038, 1057-58 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Yale Study], which
indicates that the Sales Act's requirement of written evidence of sales contracts for $500 or
more had very little to do with whether businessmen reduced their agreements to written
form.
408. See id.; see also Note, supra note 267, at 592.
409. Yale Study, supra note 407, at 1064.
410. See Note, supra note 267, at 593 n.16.
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of the parties relies on the other's promise either to put their
agreement in writing or to refrain from raising the Statute as a
defense, or because both mistakenly believe that they have satis-
fied the writing requirement."11
The Yale Study also raised significant questions concerning
the identity of the individuals or groups most likely to benefit from
the Statute's writing requirement. According to the study, large
manufacturers are more likely to demand written evidence of oral
agreements than their smaller competitors 412 because of the differ-
ence in the nature of large- and small-scale business operations413
and the comparatively lesser bargaining power that smaller compa-
nies enjoy. 41 4 Another reason that those operating smaller concerns
are less writing-conscious may be that the small firms are less
knowledgeable than their larger competitors about the Statute's
existence and its applicability. The Statute, therefore, may be most
likely to affect adversely those parties least likely to know of its
requirements, least able to secure compliance with the require-
ments of which they are aware, and least capable of absorbing any
losses associated with their reliance if others successfully use the
Statute to bar their claims.41 5
The foregoing discussion suggests that the channeling and
cautionary functions attributed to the Statute's writing require-
ment may be largely illusory since they are at odds with the reali-
ties of prevailing business practice; therefore, additional impetus
exists for protecting a party's reliance on an oral promise within
the ambit of the Statute. As Justice Stephen observed long ago,
"[laws ought to be adjusted to the habits of society, and not to
aim at remoulding them. '418 This observation seems particularly
true if actual experience with a rule indicates that it has had little
real effect in shaping human behavior despite over three centuries
of existence. The Statute's failure to fulfill its channeling and cau-
tionary functions, the possible elimination of the original justifica-
tions for the Statute by subsequent legal developments,4 17 and
courts' wide recognition of the Statute's potential for working in-
411. Id. at 597.
412. See Yale Study, supra note 407, at 1047.
413. Id. at 1051.
414. Id. at 1051-55.
415. Metzger & Phillips, supra note 338, at 103.
416. Stephen & Pollock, supra note 327, at 6.
417. See supra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
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justice 18 combine to present a compelling case for circumvention
of the Statute via promissory estoppel in appropriate cases, if not
its outright repeal.419
Two recent developments should serve to accelerate the grow-
ing judicial trend420 toward defeating the Statute's writing require-
ment via promissory estoppel. The first, and least controversial, is
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts' express recognition in sec-
tion 139421 that courts appropriately may utilize promissory estop-
pel to circumvent the Statute. The second development is the
emergence of the notion of promissory estoppel as a theory of re-
covery independent of contract.
In addition to the obvious "respectability" conferred by the
quasi-official sanction of the Restatement (Second), section 139 in-
cludes evidentiary and remedial provisions4 2 that should allay ju-
dicial fears concerning this use of promissory estoppel and should
enhance the possibility that the future development of the doctrine
will proceed in a more systematized, rational fashion. Subsection
139(2)(c) 42 3 of the Restatement (Second) expressly considers the
evidentiary value of reliance by directing courts to consider the ex-
tent to which the promisee's reliance or other evidence introduced
at trial corroborates the existence of the alleged oral promise. This
418. See supra notes 333-36 and accompanying text.
419. Parliament repealed the bulk of the original Statute in 1954, retaining the writing
requirement only for contracts for the sale of land and promises to answer for the debt,
default, or miscarriage of another. Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 3
Eliz. 2, ch. 34. See also supra note 192 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 354-64 & 369-75 and accompanying text.
421. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139, reads as follows:
Enforcement by Virtue of Action in Reliance
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forebearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the
action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is
to be limited as justice requires.
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the prom-
ise, the following circumstances are significant-
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation and
restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation to
the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence of the mak-
ing and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise established by
clear and convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor.
422. See infra notes 425-30 and accompanying text.
423. See supra note 421.
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provision should ensure wider acceptance of promissory estoppel in
the Statute of Frauds context by satisfying the evidentiary pur-
poses that the writing requirement ordinarily served and by obvi-
ating the possibility that courts will refuse to recognize an estoppel
because of fears that the alleged oral agreement may be ficti-
tious. 424 Section 139 also expressly treats the issue of the proper
measure of damages in promissory estoppel cases-a subject which
has generated considerable confusion and inconsistency since the
initial formal recognition of the doctrine.4 25 By stating that the
"remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires,' 2 6
section 139(1) expressly authorizes the use of reliance-based dam-
ages in promissory estoppel cases. 2 ' This not only provides for the
judicial discretion necessary to deal effectively with promissory es-
toppel's remedial dilemmas,428 but also should enable courts to re-
tain whatever measure of the channeling function the writing re-
quirement provides 42 9 by limiting recovery under oral promises to
reliance damages. The judicial position espoused in section 139(1)
should encourage knowledgeable parties to continue reducing their
agreements to written form and should represent a proper balance
between the abrogation of the Statute that complete enforcement
of oral promises would cause, and the injustice that would result
from rote denial of recovery for failure to comply with the stric-
tures of the Statute. 30
The second and more controversial support for using promis-
sory estoppel to circumvent the Statute comes from the emergence
of authorities suggesting the doctrine's possible status as an inde-
pendent theory of recovery.4' 1 Some recent cases suggest that the
Statute does not bar claims premised upon promissory estoppel
since such claims are not contractually based and, therefore, are
beyond the Statute's scope. 32 Such a suggestion represents a sig-
424. See supra notes 400-01 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 265-81 and accompanying text.
426. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1) (1981).
427. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 comment d (1981). This
comment provides that "when specific enforcement is available under the rule stated in §
129 [providing specific enforcement of land sales contracts when courts can avoid injustice
only by specific performance], an ordinary action for damages is commonly less satisfac-
tory... ." Id.
428. See supra notes 265-81 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 402-15 and accompanying text.
430. See Note, supra note 255, at 1242.
431. See supra notes 295-308 and accompanying text.
432. See, e.g., R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Economy Mechanical Indus., 606 F.2d 182, 188
(7th Cir. 1979) (permitting plaintiff to assert promissory estoppel claim notwithstanding
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nificant theoretical departure from the courts' traditional rationale
in using estoppel to circumvent the Statute's operation-the pre-
vention of injustice that otherwise would result from the Statute's
operation.33 While little practical difference arguably exists be-
tween allowing promissory estoppel to "substitute for" the Statute
and treating the doctrine as an independent theory of recovery, the
rationale of the latter theory is pregnant with significant implica-
tions concerning the fate of other traditional "contract" defenses
such as the parol evidence rule. As Grant Gilmore observed,
[S]ome of the recent cases are beginning to suggest that liability under § 90
or the doctrine of promissory estoppel or however it is described is somehow
different from liability in contract. Thus, it may be, defenses based on the
statute of frauds or the contract statute of limitation or the paroI evidence
rule-all these being looked on as contract-based defenses-are no longer
available if the underlying theory of liability-§ 90 or an analogue-is not
contract theory at all. 4
Treating promissory estoppel as an independent theory of recov-
ery, furthermore, could provide judges with an obvious, albeit tech-
nical, device for circumventing the Statute in situations in which
mechanical application of the Statute otherwise would produce
harsh results. Finally, by giving promissory estoppel independent
theory status, judges would avoid charges of judicial usurpation of
legislative power and abrogation of the Statute's writing
requirement. 3 5
V. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RuLE.
A. The Cases
While, as the foregoing discussion plainly indicates, promis-
sory estoppel has gained widespread legitimacy as a device for cir-
cumventing the Statute of Frauds, the same is not true in the parol
evidence context. Upon survey of extant judicial authority on the
subject, several things become abundantly clear. First, very few
cases exist in which the issue of promissory estoppel's applicability
to the parol evidence rule ever has arisen. Second, the fundamental
attribute that all of the cases in which the issue has arisen share is
a paucity of significant judicial analysis on the estoppel issue. Last,
Statute's bar to contract recovery); N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736,
738-40 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687,
696-97 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976).
433. See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
434. G. GnLMOR, supra note 203, at 66 (emphasis added).
435. See supra notes 376-89 and accompanying text.
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and perhaps most significantly,"" very few cases exist in which a
court has refused to consider convincing evidence of an extrinsic
promise in situations in which such refusal, in the court's judg-
ment, would work a serious injustice on the party relying on the
extrinsic promise. In one of the earliest cases to consider the appli-
cability of promissory estoppel in the parol evidence context, how-
ever, the court did refuse to consider such convincing evidence.
In Berverdor, Inc. v. Salyer Farms3 7 the California Court of
Appeals held the trial court in error for admitting parol evidence
of an omitted lease condition since the written lease was "on its
face, full and complete and no fraud, mistake, imperfection, illegal-
ity or ambiguity was proved. '43 The appellate court rejected any
application of equitable estoppel because the defendants had failed
to prove the misrepresentation of fact that the doctrine required.
The court then rejected application of promissory estoppel, al-
though it acknowledged that promissory estoppel properly could
be founded on a promise of future performance. The court ob-
served that "we have been cited no case and we have been unable
to find any case which in any way aids in the application of that
doctrine to the case at bar. 43 9 Given the court's form-oriented ap-
proach to the parol evidence rule, its views on the unenforceability
of the extrinsic agreement, and the realization that the court de-
cided Berverdor nearly three months before the California Su-
preme Court's landmark Monarco decision on promissory estop-
pel's applicability to the Statute of Frauds,44 ° that the court gave
436. See infra notes 580-83 and accompanying text.
437. 97 Cal. App. 2d 459, 218 P.2d 138 (1950).
Plaintiff-lessor sued defendant-lessees for the last year of rent due under a three-year
farm lease. Defendants acknowledged their failure to pay, but argued that the written lease
was subject to a parol condition that the lessor would excuse rent payments if it became
unprofitable for the lessee to pay. Id. at 460, 218 P.2d at 139-40. The trial court allowed
defendants to introduce certain letters evidencing the alleged condition in support of this
contention. Plaintiff's managing agent had signed the letters and had sent them to defen-
dants prior to the execution of the lease. Id. at 461, 218 P.2d at 140. The trial court also
allowed defendants to introduce evidence of certain conversations with plaintiff's agent who
died shortly after execution of the lease; the most important of these conversations focused
on defendants' concerns that the lease did not contain the agreed upon rent adjustment
provision and on the agent's assurances that this omission was unimportant. Id. The trial
court further allowed defendants to introduce evidence that in the year when they did not
pay the rent insufficient water was available to support a profitable crop. Id. The trial court
rendered judgment for plaintiff in a reduced amount, and both parties appealed.
438. Id. at 464, 218 P.2d at 142.
439. Id.
440. See supra notes 369-72 and accompanying text. The California Supreme Court
decided Monarco on August 1, 1950. The California appeals court decided Berverdor on
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defendants' estoppel arguments relatively short shrift is not
surprising.
Nonetheless, the treatment that the defendants received in
Berverdor stands in rather stark contrast to the treatment afforded
parties relying on alleged oral agreements in much earlier Califor-
nia Statute of Frauds cases. In Seymour v. Oelrichs,441 for exam-
ple, the court allowed a party who had relied upon an alleged oral
promise to reduce a wholly oral ten-year employment contract to
writing to prove the existence of that contract. In Berverdor, on
the other hand, the court denied defendants the opportunity to
prove the existence of a single term of an otherwise written con-
tract, even though defendants had credible written evidence sup-
porting the existence of that term, were arguably no less reasona-
ble in relying on the agent's promises and assurances than their
counterpart in Seymour, and had suffered a significant injustice as
a result of their reliance.
While the scant attention the Berverdor court paid to defen-
dants' promissory estoppel arguments, perhaps, is excusable since
the promissory estoppel doctrine had not departed yet from its
traditional roles in any dramatic way when the court decided the
case, later cases in which litigants sought to apply promissory es-
toppel in parol evidence cases unfortunately fail to provide any
greater judicial analysis of the issue. For example, in Mack v. Earle
M. Jorgensen Co.442 the court found that the parties' written con-
tract represented a complete integration of their agreement and
that the parol evidence rule barred any proof of alleged oral
promises. The court refused to allow proof of the promises under
the umbrella of promissory estoppel, but did not reject outright
the possibility that the reliance doctrine could, in some circum-
stances, operate to circumvent the parol evidence rule. Instead, the
court concluded that "the evidence presented precludes the appli-
cation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ' '443 observing that
"We are not aware of any decision applying the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel where, as in the instant case, the alleged oral agree-
May 10, 1950.
441. See discussion supra notes 356-60 and accompanying text.
442. 467 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1972). In Mack a terminated manufacturer's representa-
tive sought to introduce proof of oral assurances that his employer would not discharge him
as long as he performed adequately. He alleged that various officers of the defendant com-
pany made these assurances after the company acquired his original employer and before he
signed a written contract of employment containing a thirty-day termination clause. Id. at
1178-79.
443. Id. at 1179.
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ment or promise was followed by a written contract, the terms of
which are in direct conflict with the alleged oral agreement or
promise."444 Thus, the perceived conflict between the alleged oral
assurances and the written contract served, in the eyes of the
court, to prevent any further consideration of the estoppel issue
because "[iun such a situation, we seriously doubt whether the
promisee could successfully argue that his reliance on the promise
was justifiable. '445 Of course the alleged oral promises conceivably
were not inconsistent with the written terms, but rather repre-
sented a condition upon the terms. Viewed in this light, the plain-
tiff's reliance seems more reasonable. The court's finding of incon-
sistency and its ultimate resolution of the case may reflect the
court's doubts about whether the parties ever made the alleged
promises.446 Furthermore, the facts as presented by the court evi-
dence no particular reliance by the plaintiff-no foregone alterna-
tive employment opportunities or other such substantial indicia of
reliance that would produce injustice if the court refused to en-
force the defendant's promise. Perhaps, given facts more conducive
to a promissory estoppel claim the court might have considered its
application to a parol evidence case.447
While the Seventh Circuit in Mack hinted at a willingness to
apply promissory estoppel in certain parol evidence cases, the Su-
preme Court of Alaska unceremoniously discarded the applicabil-
ity of the doctrine in Johnson v. Curran.448 The court in Johnson
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. The court, when discussing plaintiff's allegation that defendant's vice president
made the alleged promise on the day plaintiff signed the written contract, stated that plain-
tiff "claims that Dellinger [the vice president] told him that he wouldn't be terminated as
long as he did a good job." Id. (emphasis added). The court followed this statement with a
discussion noting that plaintiff signed the written contract without objection, even though
he had insisted on scratching out another provision which related to credits for orders
booked before termination and which defendant originally included in the same paragraph
as the termination clause. Id.
447. The validity of this suspicion is borne out by the court's subsequent decision in
Ehret Co. v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
943 (1976). See infra notes 484-96 and accompanying text.
448. 633 P.2d 994 (Alaska 1981). In Johnson plaintiffs brought suit against a nightclub
owner who fired them despite the fact that their eight-week written employment contract
(an American Federation of Musicians standard form contract) provided for two weeks more
employment. Defendant, in an uncontroverted affidavit in opposition to the plaintiff's mo-
tion for summary judgment, asserted that a band member misrepresenting himself as the
band's leader orally had assured her, before she signed the contract, that the agreement was
subject to termination on two week's notice if the band did not draw well. Id. at 995. Defen-
dant argued that the writing at best was a partial integration, that it was ambiguous, and
that, in any event, evidence of the parol agreement should be admissible because of fraud in
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affirmed the trial court's refusal to admit parol evidence of a termi-
nation clause not contained in the parties' standard form contract.
While the court recognized that evidence of fraud is admissible
even when a writing is a complete integration, the court held that
the fraud exception to the rule did not apply because defendant
failed to show that plaintiff's misrepresentation induced the defen-
dant to enter the contract. 9 More important for our purposes, the
court summarily dismissed defendant's promissory estoppel argu-
ment, noting that "the rule has no applicability in the factual con-
text presented in the instant case; promissory estoppel is a princi-
ple applicable to situations where a promise unsupported by
consideration is sought to be enforced and thus has no direct rele-
vance to the case at bar. ' 450 The court apparently did not have any
doubts about the credibility of the defendant's assertions since it
"assumed" that the defendant's assertions were true.4 51 The defen-
dant's reliance losses, however, were not of the sort likely to pre-
sent a particularly compelling case for relief. This consideration,
the court's narrow conception of promissory estoppel, and its
rather mechanical approach to the parol evidence rule make the
scant attention afforded the promissory estoppel argument more
understandable, if not more defensible.
In at least one more case in which the promissory estoppel is-
sue surfaced, the court not only sidestepped the estoppel question,
but also refused to grant relief on any other basis. In Clark Oil &
Refining Corp. v. Leistikow 452 the court found that defendant's
promissory estoppel argument presented no Statute of Frauds
problem, but observed that "there is ...difficulty with this de-
fense as it relates to the parol evidence rule" since the leases in
question were clear as to the duration of the agreement and con-
tained an integration clause requiring -modifications to be in writ-
ing and signed by the lessor's vice president.458 Rather than ad-
dress the issue of whether a party can use promissory estoppel to
circumvent the parol evidence rule, the court concluded that the
the inducement and promissory estoppel. Id. at 995-96.
449. Id. at 997.
450. Id. at 996.
451. Id. at 997-98.
452. 69 Wis. 2d 226, 230 N.W.2d 736 (1975). In Clark Oil two service station lessees
raised promissory estoppel as a defense to an eviction action that followed the expiration of
the parties' written lease agreement. The lessees argued that the lessor's agents orally prom-
ised that they could remain dealers as long as their performance was satisfactory, and that
they relied upon plaintiff's promise by leaving long-standing former employment.
453. Id. at 237-38, 230 N.W.2d at 743.
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defendant's allegations were insufficient to raise a promissory es-
toppel claim. The defendants, according to the court, had not
shown that the court could avoid injustice only by enforcing the
plaintiff's promises. The court also expressed doubts about
whether foregoing prior employment constituted reliance of a "def-
inite and substantial character." 45 The quoted language plainly
addresses the requirements of section 90 as manifested in the Re-
statement. 55 While the Restatement (Second) since has dropped
the definite and substantial reliance requirement, 456 and other
courts have found foregoing prior employment to be sufficient reli-
ance for a promissory estoppel claim, 57 the heart of the Clark Oil
court's refusal to confront the promissory estoppel issue or to em-
ploy any other legal device to protect the defendants' reliance
probably lies with its conclusion that defendants failed to demon-
strate sufficient injustice to justify enforcing plaintiff's oral prom-
ise. Defendants, after all, could have entered into a new lease at a
higher rate if they were willing to pay for it. Furthermore, defen-
dants did not stand to lose a substantial investment in the
franchise. Given the absence of a compelling claim for relief, the
court, not surprisingly, eschewed defendants' invitation to apply
promissory estoppel to the parol evidence rule.
While the courts in the foregoing cases denied application of
promissory estoppel in the parol evidence context and refused to
admit proffered extrinsic evidence on any other grounds, a number
of cases exist in which courts declined formal use of promissory
estoppel to circumvent the parol evidence rule, but found indepen-
dent bases for enforcing parol promises that engendered significant
reliance. For example, in Wojciechowski v. Amoco Oil Co." s plain-
tiff, a gas station franchisee, sought to enjoin the termination of a
written "trial franchise" agreement drafted in conformity with the
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act [PMPA].4 59 Plaintiff argued
that defendant's agents induced him to enter the trial agreement
by making oral misrepresentations that the PMPA required that
defendant treat him as a trial franchisee 460 and by orally promising
that defendant would renew plaintiff's franchise if plaintiff "per-
454. Id. at 239, 230 N.W.2d at 744.
455. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 309-12.
457. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
458. 483 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
459. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (Supp. IV 1980).
460. 483 F. Supp. at 111, 114.
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formed adequately."'" Defendant's witnesses disputed plaintiff's
version of these events, but the court concluded that plaintiff "was
a more credible witness. '46 2 The court, nonetheless, rejected plain-
tiff's argument that defendant's promise to continue his franchise
if he performed adequately gave rise to a claim based upon promis-
sory estoppel. Promissory estoppel, according to the court, "pro-
vides no help to plaintiff's claim [because the oral promises] were
made prior to the written contract. '463 Therefore, the court con-
cluded, "the parol evidence rule nullifies the salutory [sic] effects
of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
'4
"
Despite its holding on promissory estoppel, the Wojciechowski
court did not want to deprive plaintiff of his significant investment
in the franchise. Consequently, it held that defendant's misrepre-
sentations constituted a fraud that prevented the creation of a trial
franchise under the PMPA.465 Thus, defendant could not termi-
nate plaintiff's franchise until defendant conformed with the more
stringent PMPA requirements for terminating regular
franchises.46 6 Regarding the misrepresentations that PMPA re-
quired defendant to treat plaintiff as a trial franchisee, the court
acknowledged the general rule that fraud cannot arise from mis-
representations of law, but held that defendant's misstatements
concerning the PMPA's requirements fell within a recognized ex-
ception to the general rule predicated upon defendant's intentional
misrepresentation, the relationship of trust between the parties,
and defendant's superior knowledge and skill.46 7 To defendant's
objection that its promise relating to renewal of the franchise could
not constitute fraud because it represented acts Amoco was to do
in the future, the court responded that "if [defendant] had a pre-
461. Id. at 114.
462. Id.
463. Id. at 115.
464. Id. Wojciechowski relied heavily on McConnell v. L.C.L. Transit Co., 42 Wis. 2d
429, 167 N.W.2d 226 (1969), which concerned an alleged oral promise to a man employed as
a general manager that the company would not discharge him as long as the business earned
an annual profit. His written employment contract, however, clearly gave the employer the
right to terminate him upon payment of an agreed sum as liquidated damages. The McCon-
nell court did not reach the promissory estoppel issue because plaintiff asserted that defen-
dant made many of the alleged promises after the parties signed the agreement. Thus, the
parol evidence rule did not bar evidence of their existence and of their role in inducing the
plaintiff to forego other employment opportunities. Id. at 437, 167 N.W.2d at 229-30. The
Wojciechowski court, therefore, correctly concluded that McConnell was "of little help to
plaintiff." 483 F. Supp. at 115.
465. 483 F. Supp. at 114-15 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981)).
466. Id. at 115 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2802 (Supp. V 1981)).
467. Id. at 114-15.
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sent intention not to continue the franchise even if the perform-
ance was adequate, then this would constitute actionable fraud."""8
The court then concluded that "there is sufficient proof at this
juncture in the litigation to show that defendant misrepresented
its intention. '46 9
Walker v. KFC Corp.470 is similar in thrust, if not in method-
ology, to Wojciechowski. The plaintiff in Walker had purchased a
restaurant franchise from defendant franchisor. Plaintiff claimed
that defendant made numerous fraudulent parol representations
concerning the viability of the franchise and its intentions concern-
ing the franchise and the plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit on numer-
ous theories, including breach of contract, promissory estoppel,
and fraud. When the jury found for plaintiff on the promissory es-
toppel and fraud claims, defendant moved for a judgment n.o.v.,
arguing (1) that the existence of a contract between the parties
precluded any recovery under promissory estoppel and (2) that, in
any event, promissory estoppel was inapplicable to promises pre-
ceding a written contract because of the parol evidence rule.47 1
On the first point, the court acknowledged the general rule
that existence of a valid contract prevents any recovery based on
estoppel, 4 2 but noted that "defendants provide no authority for
the proposition that the mere existence of a contract between two
parties precludes a recovery based on promises that were not part
of the contract.' 34 The court then proceeded to hold the oral
promises as separate from the contract and to award recovery to
plaintiff. The court concluded that since the jury found for defen-
dant on the breach of contract claim, it necessarily based its ver-
dict on promises that "were not bargained for and that were not
included in the contract. '47 4
On defendant's second argument, the court noted with ap-
proval the instructions to the jury providing that evidence of ex-
trinsic terms was inadmissible for purposes of plaintiff's contract
and estoppel claims unless the jury found that the written contract
468. Id. at 115 (citing 37 AM. Jun. 2d Fraud § 59 (1968)).
469. Id.
470. 515 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
471. Id. at 616.
472. Id.; see, e.g., Guaranty Bank v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 568 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978); Pasadena Assocs. v. Connor, 460 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
The emergence of promissory estoppel as an independent theory of recovery, however,
would render such a rule obsolete. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 3, at 549.




either failed to reflect the parties' real intention due to fraud, mis-
take, or accident, or that the parties did not intend their writing to
be an exclusive statement of their agreement.475 The preceding lan-
guage seems to paint the court's refusal to set aside the jury's ver-
dict as standing for the relatively unexceptionable proposition that
parties may prove and courts may enforce on promissory estoppel
grounds those parol promises unsupported by consideration and
extrinsic to an incomplete, or fraudulently induced, written con-
tract.476 The court, however, achieved this result in an interesting
fashion. The jury, rather than the trial judge, ruled on the parol
evidence question, an approach that emasculates the parol evi-
dence rule and that virtually guarantees enforcement of parol
promises that the jury believes the parties actually made.47
In two other cases courts nimbly maneuvered around the
question of whether a court may use promissory estoppel to pro-
tect significant reliance on extrinsic promises that the parol evi-
dence rule otherwise bars, but, nonetheless, found other legal justi-
fication for protecting such reliance. In Prudential Insurance Co.
of America v. Clark,47 8 for example, the court allowed beneficiaries
of a life insurance policy issued to a soldier killed in a helicopter
crash in Vietnam to recover for his death despite war risk and avi-
ation exclusion clauses in the policy. Prudential's agent induced
the insured to drop a prior policy that contained neither exclusion
by promising to obtain a similar policy. The insured died after
filing an application and prepaying the premium, but before find-
ing out that the policy contained the exclusionary clauses. Pruden-
475. Id. at 616-17.
476. For another recent case taking a similar approach, see Kramer v. Alpine Valley
Resort, Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 417, 321 N.W.2d 293 (1982). In Kramer, a school teacher/artisan
leased space in a commercial complex, reduced his teaching load to half-time, and made a
significant investment in labor and materials to construct a workshop in reliance upon parol
promises that the complex would be open all year and would attract sizeable walk-through
traffic. Id. at 420, 321 N.W.2d at 294-95. Although his written lease agreement contained
neither of these promises, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument that
the existence of an unambiguous contract between the parties precluded plaintiff's resort to
promissory estoppel, holding that "where the contract fails to embody essential elements of
the total business relationship of the parties ... the existence of a contract does not bar
recovery under promissory estoppeL" Id. at 421-22, 321 N.W.2d at 295. The parol evidence
rule, the court held, did not prevent proof of the alleged extrinsic promises because the
written lease agreement "did not embody the entire business relationship" of the parties
and the extrinsic promises "in no way" varied or contradicted "anything in the lease agree-
ment." Id. at 426, 321 N.W.2d at 297-98.
477. On the traditional role of the judge in parol evidence cases, see supra notes 30-38,
46 & 50 and accompanying text.
478. 456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972).
1983] 1445
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tial initially paid the claim, then sued for return of the payment,
alleging oversight and mistake." 9 The court treated the agent's
promise as a separate promise independent of the written policy
and enforced it on the basis of promissory estoppel, observing that:
[T]his verdict recognized a duty of Prudential, dehors the writing, to act in
an honorable and upright way in accordance with its agent's promise. Thus,
application of promissory estoppel in no way trammels upon the parol evi-
dence rule. Involved here is a separate enforceable promise and not a vari-
ance or modification of the terms of the policy.48'
Similarly, in Hohenstein v. S.M.H. Trading Corp.481 a
stevedore firm's officer made an undisputed oral promise that the
cargo vessel which the firm selected to carry the plaintiff shipper's
cargo had sufficient capacity to store the shipper's entire cargo.
The parties, however, did not incorporate this promise into their
written contract. Subsequently, the shipper had to make other ar-
rangements when the stevedore firm could not load all the ship-
per's cargo in the provided vessel. The court observed that "were
this not complicated by an integrated writing constituting 'the'
contract, there would be no doubt that this inquiry [about the ca-
pacity of the selected vessel] and response and reliance thereon
would constitute a classic case analogous to 'promissory estop-
pel.' ,,482 Rather than confront the estoppel issue, however, the
court held that a fair reading of the written contract revealed a
commitment by the stevedore that it could and would load all of
the plaintiff's cargo on the specified vessel. 8 t
While the equities of the cases and the courts' sense of justice
may explain the decisions in the foregoing cases and the courts'
failure to devote any significant attention to promissory estoppel's
possible application to ,circumvent the parol evidence rule, three
cases furnish more formal, albeit quite limited, support for the reli-
ance doctrine's operation in the parol evidence context. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's opinion
479. Id. at 934-35.
480. Id. at 937 (emphasis added). For a case in which the parties never raised promis-
sory estoppel arguments, but in which the court employed similar reasoning to circumvent
the parol evidence rule, see Service Iron Foundry, Inc. v. M.A. Bell Co., 2 Kan. App. 2d 662,
669-70, 588 P.2d 463, 470-71 (1978) (sales agent who controlled insolvent principal held to
have made independent express warranty to disappointed buyer of pollution control device;
parol evidence rule inapplicable to sales agent who was not a party to written sales
contract).
481. 382 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1967).
482. Id. at 535.
483. Id. at 536.
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in Ehret Co. v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc.4 " contains a curious
admixture of both equitable and promissory estoppel principles. In
Ehret, the plaintiff sales representative for the defendant manu-
facturer signed a "Commission Sales Agreement" that contained a
"duration of agency" clause which gave either party the right to
terminate the contract upon thirty days' notice. The contract fur-
ther provided that in the event of termination the principal would
pay commissions only on orders that it accepted prior to termina-
tion and that were deliverable within three months from the termi-
nation date. 85 Plaintiff, prior to signing, expressed concern about
the termination provision because the nature of the defendant's
products required the plaintiff to engage in substantial develop-
ment work prior to the consummation of a sale. In response to
such concern, defendant's General Sales Manager in a letter ac-
knowledged the possible effect of the clause, but assured plaintiff
that "in those few cases where the contract has been cancelled by
us we have always been much more liberal than provided for in the
contract.' ' 4 He further assured plaintiff that "this discussion is
probably academic only." [I]n the very unlikely event of cancella-
tion, you will have to rely on receiving extremely fair treat-
ment.' ' 48 7 After receiving these assurances, plaintiff signed the
agreement. Eleven months later defendant requested that plaintiff
sign a new contract reflecting that defendant had changed its
name. The new contract contained the same termination clause
and an integration clause cancelling all prior agreements. Twenty-
six months after plaintiff signed the new contract, defendant noti-
fied plaintiff that it was terminating the agreement and intended
to construe the termination clause literally.4"
Plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract, claiming that the
General Sales Manager's letter entitled it to better treatment than
defendant had given. Plaintiff succeeded in winning a jury verdict
at trial. On appeal, defendant argued that the new contract con-
tained the entire agreement between the parties, but the court up-
held the trial judge's holding that defendant's representations "es-
topped" it from asserting its rights under the termination clause.' 8'
The court's language initially pertains to equitable estoppel, as the
484. 523 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976).




489. Id. at 283-84.
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court refers to the "representations" in the General Sales Man-
ager's letter and plaintiff's reliance thereon, and notes that al-
lowing defendant "to disclaim its representations after receiving
the benefits therefrom . . . would have the fraudulent effect that
an estoppel was designed to prevent."'4 °0
While defendant's statements that it always had been "more
liberal" in past termination cases and that the new contract was
necessary to reflect its name change were plainly representations of
fact that could be the proper subject for an equitable estoppel, de-
fendant's assurance of "extremely fair treatment" plainly is a
promise of future performance and, thus, the proper subject of a
promissory estoppel action. 91 Promissory estoppel further enters
into the court's reasoning in the following confused statement:
The question of damages was submitted to the jury on the theory of a possi-
ble breach of contract to give the plaintiff extremely fair treatment. Support
for the treatment as an enforcible [sic] promise of the promise which, as a
result of the plaintiff's reliance, creates an estoppel is supported by Restate-
ment, Contracts, § 90 and Restatement 2d, Contracts, § 90 (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1965). Following this view, admission of the "extremely fair treatment"
letter is not in conflict with the parol evidence rule as the defendant con-
tends. An estoppel is an equitable remedy with its own independent force.411
Of course, section 90 deals exclusively with promissory estoppel
and has nothing whatever to do with equitable estoppel, a point
that may have eluded the court. Later discussion by the court on
the damage issue, however, clearly indicates that the court is en-
forcing the "extremely fair treatment" promise as a promise.493
Following this tentative endorsement of promissory estoppel,
the Ehret court blunted the impact of its decision by advancing a
more conventional, if not more convincing, rationale for admitting
490. Id. at 283. The dissent concurred with the majority's "finding of equitable estop-
pel," but disagreed with its interpretation of the parties' agreement. See id. at 285-86
(Swygert, J., dissenting).
491. On the importance of the "fact/promise" distinction and its role in the evolution
of promissory estoppel, see supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
492. 523 F.2d at 283-84.
493. See id. at 284 (quoting Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 701, 133
N.W.2d 267, 276 (1964), a famous § 90 case discussed supra notes 291-304 and accompany-
ing text) for the following statement:
We recognize that there is authority in jurisdictions other than Illinois for the proposi-
tion that the promise which becomes the basis for the estoppel is not to be enforced as
a promise, and that damages, if awarded, "should be only such as in the opinion of the
court are necessary to prevent injustice."
The court, however, subsequently concluded that "in the circumstances of this case, this
latter theory produces the same result as determining damages under the contract." 523
F.2d at 284.
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the General Sales Manager's letter: the court claimed that the lan-
guage in the duration of agency clause was ambiguous, and noted
that admitting parol evidence is proper in determining the mean-
ing of contract terms.9 4 Thus, the court in a classic instance of
judicial legerdemain 49 5 has "put the cart before the horse" by ad-
mitting an extrinsic term to show an ambiguity that then justifies
the term's admission.'9 While few conclusions unequivocally
emerge from the welter of confusion that Ehret represents, one
thing seems plain enough: despite its unclear reasoning, the Ehret
court protected plaintiff's reliance on an extrinsic promise the exis-
tence of which defendant did not dispute and the terms of which
contradicted an unambiguous clause in the parties' contract.
The Philo Smith & Co. v. USLIFE Corp.97 decision exhibits
similar judicial confusion concerning the elements of equitable and
promissory estoppel. In Philo Smith the court dismissed plaintiffs'
contract and quantum meruit claims, holding that the Statute of
Frauds and the parol evidence rule barred the claims. Plaintiffs'
promissory estoppel claim, however, went to the jury, with the trial
494. 523 F.2d at 284.
495. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
496. On the subject of the "interpretation" exception to the parol evidence rule, see
supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
497. 420 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd per curiam, 554 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1977)
(construing New York law). In Philo Smith two partners sued to recover a finder's fee re-
sulting from a corporate acquisition. The partners, one James Rutherford and Rodney
Hawes, over a period of several years, signed two successive fee agreements to assist defen-
dant in the acquisition of All American Life & Financial Corporation [All American]. Prior
to signing the first agreement, Hawes objected to its proposed termination date. Defendant's
chief executive officer assured Hawes that the agreement would be extended if necessary.
With this assurance, Hawes signed. Id. at 1269. The acquisition fell through and Hawes took
no further action relating to the USLIFE acquisition of All American. Near the expiration
date of the agreement, defendant's CEO told Hawes he was still interested in acquiring All
American and sent him a copy of a new fee agreement, which extended the termination
date. Hawes again expressed concern about the termination date, but after receiving assur-
ances that defendant would extend the date if they still wanted to acquire All American, the
plaintiffs signed. Hawes again met with the CEO near the termination date of the second
agreement and suggested that defendant extend the December 31, 1972, termination date.
Crosby replied that they would "take care of the paper work if we get anything going after
the first of the year," id. at 1270, but shortly thereafter told Hawes' former employer that he
had no intention of entering another agreement because he was unhappy with Hawes' per-
formance. Id.
Some five months after the expiration date of the.second agreement the prospects for
the acquisition suddenly brightened and defendant's CEO called Rutherford, who had been
working continuously on the acquisition, and asked him to arrange a meeting with All
American. Rutherford agreed to do so, but suggested that the fee agreement be updated, to
which Crosby replied there would be no problem. USLIFE ultimately consummated the
acquisition, but refused to pay defendants a finder's fee.
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court ultimately granting a directed verdict in defendant's favor.""
The court noted that plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim faced
"serious obstacles" in the forms of the Statute and the parol evi-
dence rule,499 but acknowledged that the claim possibly could sur-
mount these obstacles when it stated that plaintiffs "had to estab-
lish the presence of the elements of promissory or equitable
estoppel if they were to avoid the combined effect of the statute of
frauds and the parol evidence rule." 500
The Philo Smith court listed five elements that plaintiffs must
show before courts will apply promissory estoppel. First, plaintiffs
must show "an oral promise ... made contemporaneously with or
subsequent to the making of a written agreement." 50 1 Second,
plaintiffs must show that "the promise was fraudulently made." ' 2
Third, "defendant must have anticipated that the plaintiffs would
rely on the oral promise and such reliance must have been reasona-
ble on the plaintiffs' part."503 Fourth, "plaintiffs must have relied
on [the] oral promise by engaging in acts which are 'unequivocally
referable' to the oral promise."50 4 Last, "plaintiffs must have suf-
fered substantial injury as a result"505 of their reliance. This list is
highly objectionable. The first element leaves no real guidance as
to the court's view about the effect that the parol evidence rule
would have on promissory estoppel claims predicated upon
promises made prior to the execution of the writing.506 While the
third and fifth elements properly reside under the umbrella of
promissory estoppel, the second element's requirement that the
promise be "fraudulently made" sounds more like equitable estop-
pel,50 7 and the "unequivocally referable" test of the fourth element
498. Id. at 1274.
499. Id. at 1271.
500. The Court observed that the "impact of the statute of frauds on this case is
stengthened by the effect of the parol evidence rule," since the parties had executed two
integrated written agreements. Id.
501. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
502. Id. (citations omitted).
503. Id. at 1272 (citations omitted).
504. Id. (citations omitted).
505. Id. (citations omitted).
506. For Corbin's views on the worth of the "contemporaneous" concept in the inte-
gration context, see supra note 69 and accompanying text. Of course, the parol evidence rule
should play no role whatsoever in the enforcement of extrinsic promises made subsequent to
an integration. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
507. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. Of course, equitable estoppel
would be inappropriate here because the plaintiffs alleged reliance on promises, not misrep-
resentations of fact by the defendant.
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smacks of the equitable doctrine of part performance."°'
Plainly, requiring relying promisees to meet such stringent re-
quirements in order to raise successfully a promissory estoppel
claim not only is questionable from the standpoint of traditional
principles of promissory estoppel, but also presents an insurmount-
able obstacle in many parol evidence situations. Given the stacked
list of elements, the court's finding that plaintiffs had failed to
show that any of defendant's promises met the requisite ele-
ments °' is hardly surprising. The heart of the decision probably
rests on the court's determination that "the plaintiffs have com-
pletely failed to demonstrate any injury resulting from acts of reli-
ance or that any acts of reliance were 'unequivocally referable' to
any oral promises." 510 Only the initial aspect of the court's deter-
mination should be relevant. The reliance of many promisees likely
is equally referable to the parties' written agreement.,11 The re-
quirement of substantial injury stemming from the reliance, unlike
the "unequivocally referable" requirement, is a universal element
of any formulation of the promissory estoppel doctrine. Perhaps
the best explanation of the result in Philo Smith, if not of its rea-
soning, lies with the court's conclusion that plaintiffs had not suf-
fered substantial injury as a result of reliance. If the court had em-
ployed the standard enunciated by section 139 of the Restatement
(Second),5'12 it would have found that no "injustice" would result
from denying enforcement to defendant's promises and the same
result would have occurred. 5 '
508. See supra note 348 for the allegation that part performance is nothing more than
an earlier, limited variant of the doctrine of equitable estoppeL One commentator doubts
that any conduct could meet the "unequivocally referable" test and observes that acts which
traditionally serve as evidence of part performance are nothing more than evidence of sub-
stantial reliance by the plaintiff. Note, supra note 216, at 286. Of course, under promissory
estoppel the promise must cause the promisee's reliance. Boyer, supra note 222, at 470-71.
The exact degree of causal relationship required, however, remains unclear. One author sug-
gests that the promise at issue must play a "major role" in inducing reliance, but need not
be the only causal factor. Comment, Promissory Estoppel in Washington, 55 WASH. L. REv.
795, 805 (1980). See also Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 1155, 66 N.W.2d 267, 274 (1954)
(unnecessary for plaintiff seeking to circumvent Statute of Frauds via promissory estoppel
to show reliance solely based on defendant's promise; sufficient that plaintiff would not have
acted without promise).
509. 420 F. Supp. at 1272.
510. Id.
511. For a discussion of this point as it relates to the evidentiary value of reliance in
parol evidence cases, see infra note 554 and accompanying text.
512. For the text of § 139, see supra note 421.
513. On appeal, the Second Circuit did little to clarify the trial court's decision. It
affirmed the lower court's decision, but only addressed the Statute of Frauds issue, limiting
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Five years after the Philo Smith decision, Triology Variety
Stores, Ltd. v. City Products Corp. 14 presented the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York with the op-
portunity to rectify Philo Smith's legacy of conceptual disarray.
Unfortunately, the court was only partially successful. In Triology,
plaintiff filed suit seeking injunctive relief and damages. Plaintiff
alleged five causes of action, three sounding in contract and two
premised on promissory estoppel. The court dismissed the contract
claims for, among other things, failure to comply with the Statute
of Frauds, but allowed plaintiff's promissory estoppel claims to
stand. 15 The court noted that the defendant "relies heavily" on
Philo Smith in support of its motion to dismiss, but rejected Philo
Smith's applicability and criticized its reasoning. The court re-
jected Philo Smith's requirement that reliance furnishing the basis
for promissory estoppel be "unequivocally referable" to the alleged
agreement516 by observing that it had not found approval either by
the Second Circuit or by the New York State courts, and by cor-
rectly noting that such a requirement more appropriately was asso-
its holding to the plaintiff's failure to prove substantial injury and expressing doubts about
the lower court's other holdings. See Philo Smith & Co. v. USLIFE Corp., 554 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
514. 523 F.Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (construing New York law). In Triology defen-
dant City Products Corporation, a franchisor of "Ben Franklin" stores, secured a ten-year
lease, including options to renew for either an additional ten-year period or two successive
five-year periods, on certain premises located in New York City. City Products subsequently
entered two contracts with plaintiff Triology Variety Stores. The first contract was a
franchise agreement conferring upon plaintiff's owners the right to use the "Ben Franklin"
name and to sell franchised goods to the public. The second contract was a sublease of the
premises that defendant previously leased for the store. The sublease was to expire sixteen
days prior to the expiration of City Products' lease. The parties renewed both the lease and
sublease at the end of the first ten-year period for an additional five years. In November of
1978, with twenty-six months remaining on the lease and sublease, an investor, after City
Products screened and approved him, purchased Triology and entered into a new franchise
agreement with a termination date of December 31, 1983. Prior to the purchases, the inves-
tor expressed concern about a clause in the franchise contract that allowed the franchisor to
terminate the franchise in the event that the franchised store moved to a new location. The
investor feared that this clause could cause his business to terminate at the end of the sub-
lease if City Products failed to renew the lease and sublease. He, therefore, sought and
allegedly received promises from various agents and employees of City Products that as long
as the franchise remained in good standing City Products would renew the sublease. City
Products, however, later refused to renew either the lease or the sublease. 523 F. Supp. at
693-94.
515. Id. at 694-96. Notably, the court's action in dismissing the plaintiff's contract
claims but allowing his promissory estoppel claims to survive is consistent with treating
promissory estoppel as a theory of recovery independent of contract. See Metzger & Phil-
lips, supra note 3, at 510, 512.
516. See supra notes 504, 508 & 510-11 and accompanying text.
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ciated with the doctrine of part performance. The court similarly
rejected Philo Smith's fraud requirement5 17 with the observation
that "New York State and federal courts have frequently applied
the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the absence of a finding of
fraud. 5 18 In the end, the court found that plaintiff and its owner
"have set forth a valid claim of substantial injury for which it
would be unconscionable to deny them the benefits of the promises
upon which they allegedly relied. 5 1 9
Plainly, Triology serves to clarify the elements of promissory
estoppel under New York law. Since the court's discussion solely
concerns promissory estoppel as a means of defeating the Statute
of Frauds, however, it sheds no light on the court's views about
whether promissory estoppel likewise may serve to defeat the parol
evidence rule. Arguably, no significant parol evidence question may
be present in Triology.5 20 Promissory estoppel's future as a device
for circumventing the parol evidence rule in the Southern District
of New York, then, clearly awaits further judicial clarification.
Although the foregoing cases do not lend much significant sup-
port for the proposition that promissory estoppel is a worthy can-
didate for recognition in the parol evidence context, a number of
considerations indicate a greater role for the doctrine in future pa-
rol evidence cases. The following section sets forth the arguments
militating in favor of so expanding the reliance principle and at-
tempts to anticipate and respond to counter-arguments that oppo-
nents likely will raise to any such expansion. The section, further-
more, briefly outlines the manner in which promissory estoppel's
extension into the parol evidence context should proceed. This lat-
ter effort is, by nature, particularly exploratory and is only an at-
517. See supra notes 502 & 507 and accompanying text.
518. 523 F. Supp. at 698 (footnote omitted).
519. Id.
520. Certainly, conventional arguments support the proposition that the admission of
evidence concerning defendant's promises would not violate the parol evidence rule. City
Product's oral promises concerning the written sublease, which the new owner acquired
when he purchased Triology, were made subsequent to the initial execution of the sublease;
potentially therefore, introduction of evidence of these promises might not contravene the
parol evidence rule. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; see also supra note 513. The
oral promises concerning the written franchise, although clearly made prior to the execution
of the writing, could have represented a "collateral" agreement that was separate and dis-
tinct from the franchise contract. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Alternatively,
the franchise contract arguably was not a complete integration of the parties' agreement on
the franchisor's obligations concerning renewal of the sublease. Whether the court failed to
discuss the parol evidence issue for one of these reasons or because defendant simply failed
to raise it, is unclear.
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tempt to raise some of the issues that future courts and commenta-
tors must clarify.
B. Should Promissory Estoppel Apply to Parol Evidence
Cases?
The parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds, as men-
tioned earlier, are strikingly similar. The same underlying policies
support both doctrines:52 1 prevention of perjury by excluding pre-
sumptively untrustworthy oral testimony5 22 and the desire to give
judges increased control over the jury.5 2 Both are rules of form 524
whose efficacy as such some commentators have questioned.52 5 The
criticisms directed at the Statute and the rule are remarkably simi-
lar. Scholars criticize both for causing injustice because they may
prevent proof of agreements that the parties actually made.52 6
Both, critics note, have been the source of an enormous volume of
litigation.2 7 Similarly, observers argue that the reasons for adopt-
ing the Statute and the parol evidence rule no longer are compel-
ling.528 Finally, the courts have meted out similar treatment to
both the Statute and the rule: erosion by numerous judicially-cre-
ated exceptions 529 and frequent manipulation by judges seeking
just results.530 In sum, critics of both legal doctrines are abundant
and these critics frequently suggest consigning the Statute and the
rule to oblivion.3 1
The similarities between the Statute and the rule, the judicial
trend of circumventing the Statute by promissory estoppel, and
the historically expansionist nature of the reliance doctrine suggest
that the parol evidence rule is a likely candidate for the applica-
tion of promissory estoppel principles. Certainly, the reasoning
521. Wallach, supra note 17, at 653.
522. See supra notes 27-28 & 320-21 and accompanying text; see also J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 109-10.
523. See supra notes 32-38 & 322-25 and accompanying text; see also Sweet, supra
note 21, at 1053.
524. See J. CALAmAEI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 108; see also Sweet, supra
note 21, at 1053-54.
525. See infra notes 559-63 and accompanying text.
526. See supra notes 184-89, 327 & 333-36 and accompanying text. Seavey, supra note
209, at 924 ("refusal to admit such evidence causes the Statute of Frauds and the parol
evidence rule to be a trap").
527. See supra notes 164 & 328 and accompanying text.
528. See supra notes 167-73, 190 & 329-31 and accompanying text.
529. See supra notes 124-52 & 339-40 and accompanying text.
530. See supra notes 153-61 & 341 and accompanying text.
531. See supra notes 190 & 332 and accompanying text.
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that justified estoppel's use in the Statute of Frauds context is ap-
plicable equally in parol evidence cases. The argument that estop-
pel's use to circumvent the Statute was necessary to prevent the
Statute from serving as an agent of injustice, an argument at the
heart of early estoppel cases involving the Statute,52 similarly
could serve to justify estoppel's use in preventing the parol evi-
dence rule from operating as an agent of injustice.3 " As one recent
commentator observed, "[i]f it is reasonable to rely on an entirely
oral agreement, it must also be reasonable in some cases to rely on
assurances that a writing is not necessary to preserve a particular
term of [an] agreement." 53 ' Furthermore, the authors' inclusion of
section 13911 5 in the Restatement (Second) "indicates an increas-
ing willingness to subordinate form to substance, where justice re-
quires," 536 a tendency which led one observer to conclude that "it
seems inevitable that another bastion of form-over-substance, the
parol evidence rule, eventually will fall under similar attack. 5 37
Several other considerations also militate in favor of promis-
sory estoppel's expansion into the parol evidence context. As previ-
ously observed, a general trend exists toward liberality in the en-
forcement of the parol evidence rule itself,3 8 a trend which
indicates a generally increased judicial willingness to admit evi-
dence of terms extrinsic to written contracts and a diminished
level of judicial concern for the doctrine's rule-of-form aspects.53 9
The courts' observed tendency to manipulate the rule to obtain
just results further supports promissory estoppel's expansion." °
This tendency should make at least some courts consider applying
a doctrine such as promissory estoppel, which openly and avowedly
seeks just ends. An expansion of promissory estoppel's scope would
be consistent with many observed tendencies in twentieth century
contract law in general,5 1 and with the modern fate of rules of
form in particular.4 2 Finally, if promissory estoppel ultimately
532. See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
533. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
534. Knapp, supra note 5, at 78.
535. See supra notes 421-30 and accompanying text.
536. Knapp, supra note 5, at 78.
537. Id.
538. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
539. See infra notes 558-65 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
541. See supra notes 207-08, 210, 213 & 287-88 and accompanying text.
542. See, e.g., Sweet, supra note 21, at 1054 ("Rules of form have a poor performance
record in American law.").
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gains recognition as a theory of recovery independent of con-
tract,543 courts could argue that the parol evidence rule, a creature
of contract, is simply inapplicable to claims premised on promis-
sory estoppel.""
Given the similarities between the parol evidence rule and the
Statute of Frauds, many of the concerns raised in criticism of
promissory estoppel's circumvention of the Statute also should ap-
ply to extensions of the doctrine into the parol evidence context.
Of course, the rebuttal arguments that support the use of promis-
sory estoppel in the Statute of Frauds context apparently outweigh
the concerns, and these arguments should prove equally persuasive
when applied to the parol evidence rule. Indeed, because of the
difference in the roles that the Statute and the rule play, propo-
nents of promissory estoppel's application to parol evidence cases
face an easier task than the proponents of the doctrine's applica-
tion in the Statute of Frauds context. The judicial fears concerning
abrogation of the Statute that observers often cite as a source of
the resistance which promissory estoppel's incursion into the terri-
tory of the Statute has encountered ' 5 should not be as great an
obstacle to estoppel's circumvention of the judicially created parol
evidence rule. The only major statutory manifestation of the rule is
section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code.MS The Code's sec-
tion 1-103 facilitates estoppel's application to the Statute of
Frauds;547 this section could justify promissory estoppel's applica-
tion to the Code's parol evidence rule just as easily.
Nonetheless, application of promissory estoppel to the parol
evidence rule is certain to provoke judicial fears, similar to the
concerns raised in the Statute of Frauds context," 8 concerning the
loss of the protection that the rule affords written contracts. These
fears include the increased threat of perjury, the loss of significant
evidentiary value, the elimination of the rule's channeling and cau-
tionary functions, the undermining of the rule's role as a source of
predictability and certainty in commercial transactions, and the
loss of the rule's capability of protecting the parties' intent to
543. See supra notes 297-308 & 431-35 and accompanying text.
544. See supra note 434 and accompanying text.
545. See supra notes 376-80 and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
547. See supra notes 387-89 and accompanying text. See also J. WHrr & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 27, § 2-11 (Judicially created exceptions to the parol evidence rule are still valid
under § 1-103 except as specifically precluded by the language of § 2-202.).
548. See supra notes 390-91 and accompanying text.
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finalize their agreement in an integrated writing. If the primary
motivation for such fears is the prospect of perjury, the doubts ju-
rists voiced about the efficacy of the Statute's writing requirement
as a device for preventing perjury are equally applicable to the pa-
rol evidence rule. The writing as easily could be a forgery in a parol
evidence case 54 as in a Statute of Frauds case. 550 Given the num-
ber of exceptions to both the Statute and the rule, a dishonest
plaintiff as easily could "frame" a contract within an exception to
the rule as he could within an exception to the Statute. 51 Argua-
bly, less danger of perjury exists in parol evidence cases than in
Statute of Frauds cases; in Statute of Frauds cases the basic issue
concerns the existence of a contract, generally a given in parol evi-
dence cases in which the central issue is whether the parties may
vary or supplement an existing written contract with alleged ex-
trinsic terms.552
While the existing writing, then, provides a convenient point
of reference against which a court may measure the believability of
the proffered extrinsic term in parol evidence cases,55 s a promisee's
reliance often may provide substantially less evidentiary value in
parol evidence cases than in Statute of Frauds cases.55 Certainly,
in some parol evidence cases the nature of the promisee's reliance
plainly will be referable to the existence of the proffered extrinsic
term; in many cases, however, reference to the parties' written con-
tract may explain the parties' reliance equally well. Any sensible
application of promissory estoppel in the parol evidence context
plainly should consider the evidentiary value of the promisee's reli-
ance in determining whether granting relief premised on reliance is
appropriate. 5 5 Notably, Corbin's view of integration, which has
been influential in current interpretations of the parol evidence
rule, already has eroded substantially whatever special evidentiary
protection the rule once afforded written contracts. 5 Thus, little
real residual protection likely remains that application of promis-
549. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
550. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
551. See supra notes 392-98 and accompanying text.
552. See Note, supra note 15, at 984.
553. Id. Since some formulations of the parol evidence rule concern prior written
terms, some parol evidence cases may exist in which the parties unquestionably agreed to
the proffered extrinsic term at least at some point in the negotiation process. See supra
notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
554. See supra notes 400-01 and accompanying text.
555. See infra notes 595-97 and accompanying text.
556. See supra notes 96-115 and accompanying text.
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sory estoppel to circumvent the rule would erode.
Commentators who believe that the parol evidence rule prop-
erly functions as a rule of form55' 7 likely will view any incursion by
promissory estoppel into the rule's province as a development that
deleteriously will affect the rule's ability to fulfill the normal rule-
of-form functions . 5 Although this undeniably would occur, critics
raised similar objections to estoppel's circumvention of the Statute
of Frauds. Proponents of this extension of the doctrine largely
overcame the objections by noting that the Statute did not work
well as a rule of form559-questioning its efficacy either as a cau-
tionary560 or channeling device.561 These arguments are more per-
suasive when applied to the parol evidence rule, which has no sig-
nificant role as a cautionary device and whose channeling
abilities 62 critics question.5 63 Modern interpretations of the rule,
in any event, have reduced dramatically its potential to operate as
a rule of form.5 " Finally, under contemporary versions of promis-
sory estoppel, partial enforcement of extrinsic agreements through
reliance-based damage awards is available. This option can pre-
serve a modest channeling function for the parol evidence rule in
much the same manner as it has done for the Statute of Frauds. 65
Critics of the doctrine's extension also may argue that applica-
tion of promissory estoppel in parol evidence cases would under-
mine the rule's vaunted, but often criticized,5 6 role as a source of
predictability and certainty in commercial transactions.8 This ar-
gument's veracity depends upon whether the rule as currently ap-
plied provides some real measure of stability. In view of the nu-
merous ways by which courts now circumvent the rule, questions
exist about whether the rule truly provides commercial transac-
tions with a significant measure of predictability.56 8
The last and most significant challenge to using promissory es-
557. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
558. Observers who view parol evidence's rule-of-form functions as significant also
must view as deleterious the numerous existing means for circumventing the rule and its
frequent distortion by the courts.
559. See Sweet, supra note 21, at 1053.
560. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
561. See supra notes 406-07 and accompanying text.
562. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
563. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
564. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
565. See supra notes 429-30 and accompanying text.
566. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
567. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
568. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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toppel to circumvent the parol evidence rule arises because the
rule's modern defenders justify it for its role in protecting the par-
ties' intent to finalize their agreement in an integrated writing. 69
The effect that circumventing the rule via promissory estoppel
would have on its ability to perform this admittedly salutary func-
tion depends on how a particular court determines the parties' in-
tent to integrate their agreement. In a jurisdiction that adopts a
Willistonian approach to integration, courts focus on the writing
itself as the major consideration in determining the parties' intent
to integrate. Formal recognition of promissory estoppel as a device
for circumventing the rule in appropriate cases could provide the
courts in such a jurisdiction with doctrinal justification for admit-
ting proof of extrinsic terms to which they believe the parties actu-
ally agreed, even though those terms are such that similarly situ-
ated parties might "naturally and normally" have included in the
writing.570
Admission of such terms under the ambit of estoppel could
serve to minimize the rule-of-form aspects of the Willistonian ap-
proach, which otherwise can operate to frustrate the parties' true
intent in the name of their presumed intent.57 1 Plainly, if properly
applied, promissory estoppel would in some cases facilitate admis-
sion of extrinsic terms to which the parties in fact did agree. The
rule otherwise would bar such evidence. Thus, promissory estop-
pel's application could effectuate the parties' actual intent. Courts,
however, that consciously follow the Willistonian approach, as op-
posed to courts that simply follow Williston out of blind adherence
to precedent, arguably do so because they still perceive either that
the rule so interpreted serves a valuable function as a rule of
form,72 or that the rule provides written contracts with a degree of
deserved protection. Such a court would be loath to circumvent the
parol evidence rule via estoppel because doing so would erode the
rule's perceived ability to perform this valuable function.
Courts embracing Corbin's views on integration already at-
tempt to determine the parties' subjective intent; these
courts-willing to consider all available evidence on the issue of
intent and to base admission solely on the basis of the evidence's
569. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
570. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
571. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
572. Even the Willistonian approach represents a diminution of the rule-of-form as-
pects of the parol evidence rule when compared with the now defunct "four corners" doc-
trine. See Wallach, supra note 17, at 656-60.
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credibility57s-already largely have abandoned the parol evidence's
rule-of-form aspects. 7 4 In these jurisdictions, the issue becomes
whether promissory estoppel really could offer any utility to such a
court. The proponent of an alleged extrinsic term seeking to justify
its admission on the grounds of estoppel presumably would have to
offer the court convincing evidence of the existence of the term.
Conceivably, the proponent also would have to offer evidence of
either a promise to incorporate the term into the writing or an as-
surance that incorporation into the writing is unnecessary to pre-
serve the term as an element of the parties' agreement.575 A court
adopting the Corbin approach as easily could conclude that the
writing was a partial integration of the parties' agreement. Such a
court would then admit evidence of the proffered term on this
more traditional ground without using promissory estoppel.
The Corbin-following court, however, could not handle simi-
larly a proffered term that plainly "contradicts" the writing but to
which the court, nonetheless, believes the parties assented. Some
courts might be willing to follow Corbin's lead to its logical conclu-
sion and reject such a writing on the grounds that it lacks final-
ity.5"6 Others, however, might feel constrained by the longstanding
general rule that only "consistent" extrinsic terms may supplement
partially integrated writings. If the proffered term contradicted
the writing, then the court either would have to reject the term on
the basis of inconsistency or resort to some difficult, though far
from uncommon, 78 judicial gymnastics aimed at depicting the
proffered term as consistent with the writing. The availability of
promissory estoppel as a means of circumventing the parol evi-
dence rule, in such a case, could provide doctrinal rationale for ad-
mitting contradictory extrinsic terms that the court, nonetheless,
believes the parties intended to stand. The court thus would avoid
frustrating the parties' true intent by excluding such a term and
would obviate the need for judicial subterfuge justifying admission
by pretending consistency.579
573. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
574. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
575. See infra notes 595-97 & 599 and accompanying text.
576. Corbin advocated abandonment of the "partial integration" idea on the ground
that parties rarely intend to consider an incomplete writing final. See 3 A. CoRBmN, supra
note 48, § 581, at 441. See also J. CALAmmu & J. PmILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 101 n.16.
577. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the pitfalls associ-
ated with this issue, see supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
578. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
579. But see Mack v. Earle M. Jorgenson Co., 467 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972).
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In addition to these concerns for the potentially deleterious
effects on the salutary functions of the rule, two other, more prag-
matic, problems exist that proponents of the change must confront
before promissory estoppel ultimately gains formal judicial recog-
nition in parol evidence cases. First, few cases exist in which the
courts have discussed promissory estoppel's availability in the pa-
rol evidence context; furthermore, these cases offer scant support
for the idea that courts may utilize estoppel in proper circum-
stances, to circumvent the parol evidence rule. The scarcity of such
cases, however, is due in part to the proposition's novelty and the
consequent unfamiliarity of courts and counsel with the arguments
that support it. Furthermore, although the few cases in which
courts have raised the promissory estoppel issue provide little au-
thority for the proposition's viability, none of these cases evidences
any thorough judicial analysis of the various arguments either in
favor of, or against, circumventing the parol evidence rule by es-
toppel. Thus, while the proponents of estoppel's eventual intrusion
into the sphere of the parol evidence rule cannot show convincing
precedent in favor of their proposition, they need not confront any
well-considered authority in opposition to it.
The second problem, however, is a more troubling argument
that opponents could advance both to explain the current failure
of promissory estoppel principles to make significant inroads into
the parol evidence context and to argue that any future formal rec-
ognition of estoppel as a device for circumventing the parol evi-
dence rule is unlikely: certain de facto aspects of the parol evi-
dence rule's operation exist that conceivably could render
superfluous any application of promissory estoppel. If, as some of
the rule's critics assert, the only genuine issue in most parol evi-
dence cases is whether the parties actually agreed to the alleged
extrinsic term580 and most courts in such cases seek "just" results
by selecting as authority whichever formulation of the rule and its
numerous exceptions reach the just result,581 then a serious ques-
tion arises concerning whether a controversial doctrine such as
promissory estoppel offers any advantages. Certainly, an excellent
explanation of why promissory estoppel, which has evidenced an
historical tendency toward ever-increasing intrusion into the prov-
580. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
581. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. For a well-known assertion that
this process of reasoning backwards to justify tentatively formed conclusions is actually de-




inces of traditional contract law, has yet to gain significant formal
recognition in the parol evidence context is that many courts long
have afforded protection to parties relying on oral promises. Al-
though rigorous application of the parol evidence rule would bar
proof of these promises, courts reach just results by manipulating
the rule itself.2
Several rejoinders to the argument of superfluousness are
available to proponents of estoppel's intrusion into parol evidence
rule cases. First, from an historical standpoint, judicial protection
of reliance in a variety of contexts via various manipulations of
traditional contract principles preceded the first Restatement's
formal recognition of promissory estoppel 85 Promissory estoppel
provided a clearer doctrinal explanation for the results in these
contexts and probably could provide a similar service in many pa-
rol evidence cases. Thus, the availability of other, less straightfor-
ward means of protecting reliance did not prevent ultimate recog-
nition of promissory estoppel's applicability in other legal contexts,
and no compelling reason exists to suspect that it will do so for the
parol evidence rule.
Second, by openly admitting that they will use promissory es-
toppel to circumvent the strictures of the parol evidence rule when
necessary to avoid injustice, courts could provide the parol evi-
dence rule with a much needed measure of conceptual clarity.
Apart from the general benefits associated with conceptual clar-
ity,584 formal recognition of the reliance principle in parol evidence
cases could reduce the inconsistency that characterizes the parol
evidence rule's current operation and thereby enhance the predict-
ability that the rule affords. These benefits would help cure aspects
of the rule that have been frequent targets of criticism.5 85 Clearly,
the availability of estoppel would have a beneficial effect on judi-
cial treatment of the various exceptions to the rule, which are
themselves the product of judicial dissatisfaction with the rule's
potential for injustice588 and serve as a frequent source of inconsis-
tent judicial application.587 Courts whose judicial arsenal included
582. See, e.g., the cases discussed supra notes 470-83 and accompanying text.
583. See supra notes 223-37 and accompanying text.
584. "[A] body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is
referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for
desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in words." Holmes, supra note 192, at
469.
585. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
586. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
587. See supra notes 130, 132, 137 & 149 and accompanying text.
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promissory estoppel as a device for furthering justice in parol evi-
dence cases simply would have little need to indulge in the circui-
tous, and intellectually dishonest, process of torturing the facts of
a case to bring the case within the ambit of an established excep-
tion to the rule. If ultimate results in parol evidence cases clearly
arise from the court's perceptions of the situation's equities rather
than from the arcana of the parol evidence rule, then predictability
and certainty would result from the consequent focusing on the
real issues involved.
Last, not all courts have indulged in manipulation of the parol
evidence rule to further the interests of fairness. Some courts
mechanically apply the rule to prevent proof of extrinsic terms
that the court may believe the parties actually agreed to and in-
tended to supplement the writing.5 88 To the extent that such judi-
cial behavior reflects timidity, rule-orientation rather than result-
orientation, or an unwillingness to participate in the subterfuges in
which more result-oriented courts indulge, the formal extension of
promissory estoppel's reach into the parol evidence context could
provide such courts with an acceptable doctrinal justification for
avoiding injustice.
The rudiments of a version of promissory estoppel suitable for
application in parol evidence cases already exist in section 139 of
the Restatement (Second), which allows courts to enforce oral
promises despite their failure to conform to the Statute of
Frauds.85 9 Section 139 and its attendant comments bear witness to
its drafters' careful consideration of the multiplicity of factors that
a court should consider carefully before employing promissory es-
toppel to circumvent a rule of form such as the Statute or the pa-
rol evidence rule. A comment to the section admonishes courts
that parties seeking to take advantage of the section should bear a
greater burden than their counterparts seeking relief under section
90.590 The second subsection of section 139 lists numerous factors
that are "significant" in "determining whether injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. "591 Most of these con-
siderations have some relevance in parol evidence cases as well; the
relevant factors include "the definite and substantial character of
588. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
589. See supra note 421.
590. "Like § 90 this Section states a flexible principle, but the requirement of consid-
eration is more easily displaced than the requirement of a writing." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CoNracrs § 139 comment b (1981).
591. See supra note 421.
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the action or forbearance in relation to the remedy sought,"59 "the
reasonableness of the action or forbearance,"593 and the "extent to
which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the
promisor."' 9e
Of particular relevance in parol evidence cases, however, is
"the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evi-
dence of the making and terms of the promise, or the making and
terms are otherwise established by clear and convincing evi-
dence."5 95 While the corroboration element may not have as much
practical utility in parol evidence cases as it does in most Statute
of Frauds cases,59 the drafters could modify the subsection for pa-
rol evidence cases to allow the existing writing to serve as a yard-
stick against which courts may test the credibility of the proffered
extrinsic term. 9 7 In addition, any formal promulgation of a parol
evidence-rule version of promissory estoppel could admonish
courts to consider the degree of formality surrounding the execu-
tion of the writing, the relative sophistication of the parties, and
any evidence indicating that the writing is the product of an abuse
of unequal bargaining power. Such factors are of obvious potential
relevance in reestablishing the environment in which the parties
made their agreement, and have some bearing not only on the de-
gree of credibility the court should afford evidence of alleged ex-
trinsic terms, but also upon the justice of the result sought by the
proponent of the extrinsic term. In any event, these factors argua-
bly play a sub rosa role in many courts' decisions regardless of
whether courts afford them formal recognition.5 98
Several other observations can be made about the form prom-
issory estoppel is likely to assume in parol evidence cases and the
impact its application is likely to have on the operation of the pa-
rol evidence rule. First, presumably courts that presently restrict
592. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(2)(b) (1981).
593. Id. § 139(2)(d).
594. Id. § 139(2)(e).
595. Id. § 139(2)(c). Such an approach is obviously consistent with those proposals for
reformation which suggest that courts compel proponents of extrinsic terms to prove their
existence by "clear and convincing" evidence. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
596. See supra note 554 and accompanying text.
597. See supra note 553 and accompanying text. Since these factors merely play an
admonitory role rather than serving as conclusive determinants of the availability of relief,
inconsistencies between the writing and the proffered extrinsic term should engender a mea-
sure of judicial wariness. Such inconsistencies, however, should not serve as a bar to enforce-
ment if the court, nonetheless, believes in the legitimacy of the extrinsic term. See supra
notes 576-79 and accompanying text.
598. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
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promissory estoppel's application in Statute of Frauds cases to
those cases concerning ancillary promises would impose similar re-
strictions on its application in parol evidence cases. Thus, these
courts probably would insist on proof of a promise to incorporate
the alleged extrinsic term into the writing or a promise not to raise
the parol evidence rule as a defense to subsequent proof of such a
term. Such a limitation of the reliance doctrine's application in the
parol evidence context, however, would be subject to the same crit-
icisms that critics have lodged against the limitation in the Statute
of Frauds context.5 99 Courts, therefore, should avoid such limita-
tions. Second, as previously observed,60 0 the potential for partial
enforcement of an extrinsic term, which modern versions of prom-
issory estoppel afford, could allow the parol evidence rule to con-
tinue to perform a channeling function, albeit at a reduced level.
Last, the extension of promissory estoppel into the parol evidence
rule's domain would not operate necessarily to deprive judges of
the rule's jury control aspects, which allow the courts-without ap-
pearing to rule on the credibility of the party proffering evi-
dence601-to exclude from jury consideration evidence of extrinsic
terms whose credibility the court doubts. A court could maintain
some jury control because while the issues of whether the promisor
made a promise that he reasonably should expect to induce reli-
ance and whether the promise actually induced reliance are ques-
tions of fact for the jury, the issue of whether enforcement of the
promise is the only way to avoid injustice is a discretionary ques-
tion of policy for the court to decide.60 2 Thus, a court that remains
unconvinced in the face of evidence that the jury has found con-
vincing still retains a point of entry to judicial corrective action,
albeit at a later stage in the proceedings. 03
599. See supra notes 358-70 and accompanying text.
600. See supra note 565 and accompanying text.
601. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
602. Gruen Indus., Inc. v. Biller, 608 F.2d 274, 280 (7th Cir. 1979); Kramer v. Alpine
Valley Resort, Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 417, 422, 321 N.W.2d 293, 296 (1982); Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 698, 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (1965). At least one court has held
that there is no right to a jury trial in promissory estoppel cases because promissory estop-
pel is an equitable doctrine. See C & K Eng'g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1,
11, 587 P.2d 1136, 1141, 151 Cal. Rptr. 323, 328 (1978). For a discussion of C & K and a
criticism of its holding, see Note, supra note 208, passim.
603. While this obviously concerns judicial subterfuge of the sort this Article criticizes,





The parol evidence rule long has been the deserving recipient
of criticism-criticism aimed at the confusion surrounding its ba-
ses in policy, the inconsistencies in its formulation, and the vagar-
ies in its application. Several extant considerations suggest that
the rule is both a likely and a proper candidate for the meliorating
ministrations of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Prominent
among these considerations are the inherently expansionist nature
of the reliance principle, the already well-established tendency of
courts to circumvent the Statute of Frauds using promissory estop-
pel, the numerous similarities between the Statute and the rule,
the modern trend toward liberality in the interpretation and appli-
cation of the rule, and the possibility that promissory estoppel
eventually will gain recognition as a separate theory of recovery
independent of contract. 04
An examination of the issues related to any eventual intrusion
by promissory estoppel into the domain of the parol evidence rule
indicates that the consequences attendant to such a development
generally would be salutary in nature. Estoppel could enhance the
effectuation of the parties' true intent in a written contract, an ob-
jective shared by modern formulations of the parol evidence rule,
and could minimize the injustice associated with mechanical appli-
cations of the rule. Estoppel also could provide a better doctrinal
explanation for the results courts reach in many parol evidence
cases than the traditional parol evidence rubric that courts cur-
rently employ affords. Such doctrinal clarity would result in the
focusing of judicial attention in parol evidence cases on the real
issues that ultimately will determine whether a court will give legal
effect to an extrinsic promise, a consequence likely to provide a
much needed measure of clarity and predictability in the adminis-
tration of the parol evidence rule. Finally, promissory estoppel's
application in parol evidence cases would be consonant with the
tendency of twentieth century contract law to elevate substance
over form in the pursuit of just results, a tendency of which the
reliance principle is merely one manifestation. Thus, although the
extant evidence is admittedly far from conclusive and exercises in
prediction are fraught with obvious perils, one addressing the parol
604. For a discussion of the numerous factors upon which such an eventuality de-
pends, see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 3, at 553-56.
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evidence rule might borrow from Lord Tennyson and say:
There's a new foot on the floor, my
friend,
And a new face at the door, my
friend,
A new face at the door. 0 5
605. A. TENNYSON, The Death of the Old Year, in THE WORKS OF ALFRED LORD TEN-
NYSON 62 (1896).
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Throughout the turbulent labor history of this nation, the pri-
mary economic strike has been considered the union's ultimate
weapon for bringing about recognition, or for forcing an employer to
accede to its collective bargaining demands. Recent events, however,
suggest that, at least with regard to the most bitter labor-management
disputes, the strike weapon may be replaced, or at least substantially
supplemented, by secondary boycott activity."
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I. INTRODUCTION
Labor's increased efforts to induce secondary consumer boy-
cotts2 have drawn into question the constitutionality of restrictions
on labor's power to use picketing and nonpicketing publicity for
this purpose. The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of restrictions on a union's ability to seek consumer support by
picketing' in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, Local 1001
(Safeco),4 holding that Congress, without violating the first amend-
ment, may prohibit a union from picketing any secondary em-
ployer when the effect of the picketing predictably would result in
substantial loss to or ruin of the secondary employer. Neither the
courts nor the National Labor Relations Board (the Board), how-
ever, has addressed directly the constitutionality of restrictions on
nonpicketing labor publicity.5 Rather, they consistently have
avoided deciding the issue,' as illustrated most recently by the Su-
2. A secondary boycott is the application of economic pressure by a union upon a
person with whom the union does not have a dispute (the secondary or neutral party), in
order to induce that person to apply pressure upon a person with whom the union does have
a dispute (the primary or nonneutral party). Economic pressure in the form of appeals to
consumers to withhold patronage is a secondary consumer boycott; union appeals directed
to the secondary's employees seeking a work stoppage is a secondary employee boycott. This
Article considers only secondary consumer boycotts.
3. Picketing typically refers to speech that includes patrolling, the carrying of plac-
ards, and face-to-face confrontation. See Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 151 N.L.R.B.
1666, 1669 (1965).
4. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
5. Unless otherwise noted, nonpicketing labor publicity, as used in this Article, refers
to nonpicketing publicity directed against the secondary.
6. See, e.g., Solien v. United Steelworkers, 593 F.2d 82, 88 n.3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
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preme Court's decision in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB."
The reluctance to address the first amendment questions that re-
strictions on nonpicketing labor publicity have raised leaves the
state of the law in doubt and provides little guidance to unions
that increasingly contemplate employing this most effective eco-
nomic weapon. The courts' reluctance is particularly disturbing
since Congress enacted the relevant statutory provision to avoid
unconstitutional restrictions on union speech.8 Thus, a proper stat-
utory analysis should have included consideration of the first
amendment.
This Article attempts to provide the appropriate constitu-
tional analysis of restrictions on nonpicketing labor publicity. Part
II describes the relevant statute and illustrative cases, including
the Supreme Court's DeBartolo decision, that have raised but not
resolved the first amendment issues concerning nonpicketing labor
publicity. The cases focus attention on two restrictions the courts
have imposed on nonpicketing labor publicity-the "producer-dis-
tributor" and the "for the purpose of" requirements. Part III ana-
lyzes the protected status of the nonpicketing labor speech by
comparing nonpicketing labor publicity with labor picketing and
commercial speech-two areas that bear superficial similarity to
nonpicketing labor publicity and that do not receive full first
amendment protection. Demonstrating that the justifications for
restrictions on labor picketing and commercial speech are not ap-
plicable to nonpicketing labor publicity and that nonpicketing la-
bor publicity satisfies traditional first amendment values, this Arti-
cle reasons that nonpicketing labor publicity should trigger full
first amendment protection. Part IV identifies the possible govern-
444 U.S. 828 (1979); Hospital and Serv. Employees Union Local 399 (Delta Air Lines), 263
N.L.R.B. 153, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159 (Sept. 10, 1982); Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades
Council (DeBartolo), 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 705 n.3 (1980), enforced sub nom. Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.Ct. 2926, 2933 (1983);
United Steelworkers (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. 96, 102 n.33 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Pet, Inc. v.
NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1981).
7. 103 S. Ct. 2926, 2933 (BNA) (Sept. 10, 1983).
8. See 105 CONG. REc. 17,720 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLoSuRE AcT OF 1959, at 1388-89 (1959) (state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; 105 CONG. REc. 17,898-
99 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1432 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 105
CONG. REC. 6233 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1038 (statement of Sen.
Humphrey); 105 CONG. REc. 18,133-34 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1720-21
(statement of Rep. Thompson); see also NLRB v. Servette, 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964) ("The
proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern that the unions' freedom to appeal
to the public for support of their case be adequately safeguarded.").
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ment interests in the "for the purpose of" and "producer-distribu-
tor" requirements and shows that because these interests do notjustify the infringements on nonpicketing labor publicity the re-
quirements are unconstitutional. Finally, the Article in Part V con-
cludes by recommending a less restrictive alternative that allows




Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 9 of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act) governs the limits of a union's ability to induce a secon-
dary boycott10 by prohibiting a labor organization from threaten-
ing, coercing, or restraining "any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce" for the purpose of forcing the
person to "cease doing business with any other person. . . ." Con-
gress, however, in response to the first amendment concerns of its
members11 provided an exception to the prohibition of secondary
boycotts. The exception, known as the publicity proviso, exempts
union appeals to the public when the publicity (1) does not include
picketing; (2) is truthful; (3) is for the purpose of informing the
public that the primary party to the dispute produces a product
that is distributed by the secondary; and (4) does not result in a
work stoppage.1"
The construction and constitutionality of the third element of
the publicity proviso has fostered great controversy and Board and
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). Congress enacted this provision in 1959 as part
of the Landrum-Griffin amendments to the Act.
10. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not restrict labor activity aimed directly against the
primary employer or directly against others sufficiently related to the primary's business to
lose their neutral or secondary status.
11. See sources cited supra note 8.
12. The complete text of the publicity proviso is:
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained
in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as
long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by
any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse
to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the estab-
lishment of the employer engaged in such distribution;
National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
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court attention.13 Recent decisions have established that the third
element contains a two-prong requirement that union activity
must satisfy for publicity proviso exemption. First, a producer-dis-
tributor relationship must exist between the union's primary and
secondary targets (the "producer-distributor" requirement). Sec-
ond, the union's publicity must relate solely to the primary dispute
or to the secondary's relationship to the primary dispute (the "for
the purpose of" requirement). This interpretation of the publicity
proviso, in turn, raises the unanswered constitutional question that
is the focus of this Article-whether the first amendment permits
Congress to restrict truthful nonpicketing labor publicity that does
not result in an employee work stoppage solely on the ground that
the labor activity does not satisfy the "producer-distributor" or the
"for the purpose of" requirements.
B. The Cases
1. The "Producer-Distributor" Requirement
The constitutionality of the "producer-distributor" require-
ment arose in United Steelworkers (Pet, Inc.),14 and in Florida
Gulf Coast Building Trades Council (DeBartolo).5 In Pet, Inc.,
the United Steelworkers Union (the Union) had a labor dispute
with Hussmann, a wholly owned subsidiary of Pet, Inc. When the
Union struck and Hussmann hired permanent replacements l" the
Union responded by advertising in newspapers and distributing
handbills in the St. Louis area urging the public to boycott Pet
products and all Pet subsidiaries.1 7 The Union conducted its pub-
licity in an orderly and peaceful manner, did not picket, 8 and
truthfully disclosed that its primary dispute was with Hussmann,
whose connection to Pet the Union accurately indicated.1 9 The
publicity did not cause any work stoppage. 20
Pet filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board
charging that the Union's activity violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of
13. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 6.
14. 244 N.L.R.B. 96 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir.
1981).
15. 252 N.L.R.B. 702 (1980), enforced sub nom. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB,
662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983).
16. Solien v. United Steelworkers, 593 F.2d 82, 83 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828
(1979). Solien was a related injunction proceeding in federal court. See infra note 25.
17. 244 N.L.R.B. at 99.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 100.
20. Id. at 99.
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the Act and that the publicity proviso did not protect the activity
because the requisite "producer-distributor" relationship between
Pet's subsidiaries and Hussmann did not exist.21 The Union coun-
tered that its conduct did not violate the Act, came within the lan-
guage and purpose of the publicity proviso, and in any event, was
conduct protected by the first amendment.22
The Board ruled in favor of the Union, finding that the requi-
site "producer-distributor" relationship existed because "Huss-
mann applies' capital, enterprise, and service to Pet and its other
subsidiaries" in the form of profits and goodwill.2" The Board
therefore held that regardless of whether the Union's activity vio-
lated the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), the publicity pro-
viso protected the activity.24 Despite specific instructions from the
court of appeals in a related proceeding,25 the Board declined to
address the first amendment issue.2 6
21. Id.
22. Id. at 99-100.
23. Id. at 101.
24. Id. at 100 n.23. The Union asserted that its conduct had not violated the Act be-
cause Pet and its subsidiaries were not neutral secondaries and therefore did not fall within
the Act's protection. The Union also asserted that it had not exercised any restraint or
coercion within the meaning of the Act. One may wonder why the Board did not quickly
dispose of the complaint by finding that Pet, Inc. was not a neutral secondary since it whol-
ly owned Hussman. The neutrality issue, however, is not as simple as it may appear. The
Board has held that divisions of the same company may be neutral; mere potential for con-
trol does not rob a parent of its neutrality. See Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69, 185
N.L.R.B. 303, 304-05 (1970), enforced, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1018 (1972); American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, Washington-Baltimore Local,
185 N.L.R.B. 593 (1970), enforced, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For a general discussion of
the Board's neutrality doctrine, see Siegel, Conglomerates, Subsidiaries, Divisions and the
Secondary Boycott, 9 GA. L. REv. 329 (1975); Comment, The Single Employer Doctrine as
Applied to Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 28 CATH. U. L. REv. 555
(1979); Comment, Unions, Conglomerates, and Secondary Activity Under the NLRA, 129
U. PA. L. REv. 221 (1980).
25. After Pet, Inc. filed its complaint, the Board assumed jurisdiction of the case and
sought an injunction against the Union in federal court pursuant to the National Labor
Relations Act § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l)(1976). The issues presented were identical to those
later argued to the Board. The district court dismissed the Board's petition, finding that the
Union's actions were outside the prohibition section of the Act. See Solien v. United Steel-
workers, 449 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mo. 1978), rev'd, 593 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 828 (1979). The court of appeals reversed, finding reasonable cause to believe that a
violation of the Act had occurred. Without deciding whether an injunction would violate the
Union's first amendment rights, the court of appeals directed the district court to grant an
injunction. The court of appeals called the first amendment claim "not insubstantial" and
directed the Board to consider the claim in the administrative proceeding. 593 F.2d at 88
n.3.
26. 244 N.L.R.B. at 102 n.33.
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed.2 7 According to the
court, the connection between Pet's products and Hussmann was
"highly attenuated," and the Board's finding that Hussmann was a
producer of Pet's products because "Hussman's profits inure to the
benefit of Pet" was "totally at odds with any normal interpretation
of the word 'produce.' ,28 Thus, the court concluded that the pub-
licity proviso did not protect the Union's conduct because Huss-
mann was not a producer of the products of Pet or Pet's subsidiar-
ies and remanded the case to the Board to decide whether the
union activity came within the prohibitions of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The court recognized, but like the Board, declined
to reach the first amendment issue.29
Thus, in Pet, Inc., Hussmann permanently replaced the Union
members who engaged in primary activity and the court enjoined
the Union's attempt through secondary activity to take its appeal
to the public. At present, three courts and the National Labor Re-
lations Board have heard the Union's case, yet the Union still has
not received a decision on, or even a discussion of, its first amend-
ment claims. The most recent case in which the constitutionality of
the "producer-distributor" requirement arose is DeBartolo,"0 which
concerned a primary labor dispute between the respondent Florida
Gulf Coast Building Trades Council, AFL-CIO (the Union), and
High Construction Company (High) over the payment of allegedly
substandard wages and fringe benefits. 1 The H.J. Wilson Com-
pany (Wilson) previously had hired High to build a retail store in a
mall3 2 that the Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. (DeBartolo) managed.
The Union, in support of its primary dispute with High,"3 circu-
lated handbills urging the public not to shop at the mall or patron-
27. Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1981).
28. Id. at 549.
29. Id. at 550.
30. 252 N.L.R.B. 702 (1980), enforced sub noma. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB,
662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983).
31. See id. at 703.
32. See id.
33. The handbill appeal, see infra note 34, might suggest that the Union's primary
dispute was with DeBartolo, not High, and accordingly that the Union's handbilling was
primary and not secondary activity. The Union, however, possibly to avoid potential anti-
trust liability, see, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975),
stipulated that its primary dispute was with High and not with DeBartolo. The charging
party, rather than contest that stipulation, claimed that the handbill was misleading and
untruthful by omitting High's name and focusing on DeBartolo. The Board rejected the
claim, finding that the handbill had not "substantially departed from fact or intended to
deceive." 252 N.L.R.B. at 704 n.2. The Board never questioned the stipulation that the
primary dispute was with High.
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ize the stores in the mall until "the mall's owner publicly prom-
ise[d] that all construction at the mall [would] be done using
contractors who [paid] their employees fair wages and fringe bene-
fits." The Union conducted the handbilling peacefully and did
not cause any employee work stoppage.3 5
Before the Board, DeBartolo charged that the Union had vio-
lated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. DeBartolo further asserted
that since DeBartolo and the mall tenants had no relationship to
High, no "producer-distributor" relationship existed and the pub-
licity proviso of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) could not apply.36 The Union
responded that the publicity proviso exempted the Union's activity
from the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and that even if the
proviso did not apply, the first amendment protected the Union's
activity.37 The Board ruled in favor of the Union and dismissed the
complaint. Relying on its decision in Pet, Inc.,3 8 the Board held
34. 252 N.L.R.B. at 703. The complete text of the handbill read:
PLEASE DON'T SHOP AT EAST LAKE SQUARE MALL PLEASE
The FLA. GULF COAST BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO is requesting
that you do not shop at the stores in the East Lake Square Mall because of the Mall
ownership's contribution to substandard wages.
The Wilson's Department Store under construction on these premises is being
built by contractors who pay substandard wages and fringe benefits. In the past, the
Mall's owner, The Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, has supported labor and our local
economy by insuring that the Mall and its stores be built by contractors who pay fair
wages and fringe benefits. Now, however, and for no apparent reason, the Mall owners
have taken a giant step backwards by permitting our standards to be tom down. The
payment of substandard wages not only diminishes the working persons's [sic] ability
to purchase with earned, rather than borrowed, dollars, but it also undercuts the wage
standard of the entire community. Since low construction wages at this time of infla-
tion means [sic] decreased purchasing power, do the owners of East Lake Mall intend
to compensate for the decreased purchasing power of workers of the community by
encouraging the stores in East Lake Mall to cut their prices and lower their profits?
CUT-RATE WAGES ARE NOT FAIR UNLESS MERCHANDISE PRICES ARE
ALSO CUT-RATE.
We ask for your support in our protest against substandard wages. Please do not
patronize the stores in the East Lake Square Mall until the Mall's owner publicly
promises that all construction at the Mall will be done using contractors who pay their
employees fair wages and fringe benefits.
IF YOU MUST ENTER THE MALL TO DO BUSINESS, please express to the
store managers your concern over substandard wages and your support of our efforts.
We are appealing only to the public-the consumer. We are not seeking to induce
any person to cease work or to refuse to make deliveries.
Id.
35. See id. at 703-04.
36. See id. at 704.
37. See id.
38. At the time of the Board's decision in DeBartolo, the Eighth Circuit had not re-
versed the Board's decision in Pet, Inc.
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that "a union could lawfully handbill a neutral employer, urging a
total consumer boycott of that employer, 'so long as the primary
employer has at some stage produced, in the sense of applying cap-
ital, enterprise, or service, a product of the neutral employer.' -19
The Board, employing rather impressive sophistry, found that
High's relationship with DeBartolo and the mall tenants satisfied
the "producer-distributor" requirement as a result of the "mutual
obligations" and "symbiotic" relationship of the parties. 40 The con-
tribution of High (the primary employer and producer) to the mall
enterprise was application of "its labor to a product, i.e., the Wfl-
son's store, from which DeBartolo and its tenants [the secondary
employers and distributors] will derive substantial benefit.' 1  The
Board again did not address the first amendment issue.
On appeal, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit, according
great respect to the expertise of the Board42 and rejecting the anal-
ysis of the Eighth Circuit in Pet, Inc., affirmed. The court clarified
the Board's reasoning by supplying the missing "distributed by"
link of the producer-distributor chain and thus found that a pro-
ducer-distributor relationship existed between the mall tenants
and High.4' The court's clarification, however, made the Board's
construction of the statutory language no less tortuous. Despite
urging by the Board's appellate counsel, by intervenor Florida Gulf
Coast Building Trades Council, and by amicus Building and Con-
struction Trades Department, the Fourth Circuit also declined to
address the first amendment issue."
39. 252 N.L.R.B. at 705.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 662 F.2d at 269.
43. The court summarized the Board's finding.
The Board concluded that High is a producer of the Wilson's store at the mall because,
by its employees' labor, it adds value to the store. High is also a producer of the mall
enterprise itself because, by helping to build the Wilson's store, it has applied capital,
enterprise, and service to the mall enterprise and has thus added value to that enter-
prise. Both the Wilson's store and the mall enterprise itself, therefore, are products of
High's labor.
Although the Board does not elaborate, its reasoning suggests that it considered
DeBartolo and the mall's tenants to be distributors of both of High's products.
DeBartolo and the tenants help "distribute" the new Wilson's store and its inventory
by attracting shoppers, helping to maintain common areas, and participating in joint
advertising. They help "distribute" the mall enterprise and the goods sold through that
enterprise simply by conducting business.
44. See id. at 271 n.6.
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The Supreme Court reversed DeBartolo.45 The Court had lit-
tle trouble with the Board's finding that a person who, at some
stage, adds capital, service, or enterprise to a product is a producer
within the meaning of the Act. The Court, however, faulted the
Board for failing to give even a "fairly possible" meaning to the
"distributed by" language of the publicity proviso. 46 The Court
reasoned that by focusing on the relationship between two secon-
dary employers, DeBartolo and the cotenants, and testing that re-
lationship by a standard so generous that virtually any employer
could satisfy it, the Board effectively had eliminated the "distrib-
uted by" language from the publicity proviso. 47 The Court held
that the secondary parties in DeBartolo did not satisfy the "dis-
tributed by" language because they neither had a business rela-
tionship with nor sold any products whose chain of production
could reasonably be said to include the primary, High.48 The Court
also declined to address the first amendment issue, remanding the
case for the Board to determine whether the Union conduct fell
within the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 49 Thus the consti-
45. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983).
46. Id. at 2933.
47. Id. at 2932. One can make an entirely reasonable argument that Congress, in draft-
ing the "producer-distributor" requirement did not intend to restrict the scope of the pub-
licity proviso with its "distributed by" language. Congress may have chosen such language
as an example since the normal context of a secondary boycott is when the secondary party
distributes the goods of the primary manufacturer. Thus, reading the "distributed by" lan-
guage out of the statute arguably is completely appropriate. See, e.g., Kamer, supra note 1,
at 581-84. Of course such a construction would obviate the need for any constitutional anal-
ysis and was impliedly rejected by the Court.
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2932-33. The Court could have held that the Union appeal did not
satisfy the "producer-distributor" requirement solely because the secondary did not sell any
product whose chain of production included the primary. The Court, by also suggesting that
the existence of a business relationship can satisfy the "producer-distributor" requirement,
left open the possibility that a parent-subsidiary relationship as in Pet, Inc. might fall
within the proviso's coverage. Whether the Court intended the proviso to include within its
coverage parent-subsidiary relationships is unclear.
49. Id. at 2933. The Court cited NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001
(Safeco), 447 U.S. 607 (1980) and NLRB v. Fruit Vegetable Packers Local 706 (Tree
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964), suggesting that the appropriate question on remand was
whether the Union advocated a boycott of a "substantial portion" of the secondaries' busi-
ness. 103 S. Ct. at 2933. The DeBartolo handbill, however, clearly presented a Union appeal
for a total boycott.
Two additional arguments that avoid the first amendment issue are available, however,
to establish that the Union's conduct did not violate § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The first argument is
that the Union's message did not "threaten, coerce, or restrain" the secondaries, DeBartolo
and the cotenants, since the secondaries' relationship to the primary, High, was so remote
that even advocacy of a total boycott of the secondaries was not "reasonably calculated" to
induce customers not to patronize the secondaries at all. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employ-
ees Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 614 (1980). The second argument is that the object of the
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tutionality of the "producer-distributor" requirement remains
unaddressed.
2. The "For the Purpose of" Requirement
The question of the constitutionality of the publicity proviso's
"for the purpose of" requirement arose in Hospital and Service
Employees Union Local 399 (Delta Air Lines).e In Delta Air
Lines, the Union had a primary dispute with Statewide, a nonun-
ion contractor that Delta Air Lines hired to perform janitorial ser-
vices. In furtherance of its primary dispute with Statewide, the
Union, in front of Delta's airport and downtown facilities distrib-
uted handbills urging passengers not to fly Delta. 1 One of the
handbills, in addition to publicizing the facts of the labor dispute,
disclosed Delta's flight safety record implying that Delta was
unsafe.52
Delta filed a complaint with the Board charging that the
Union violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and argued that the publicity
proviso did not protect the Union conduct since the conduct was
not solely "for the purpose of" advising the public of the primary
labor dispute. A divided Board agreed with Delta and held that the
handbill, by including information about Delta's flight safety re-
cord, was not "for the purpose of" advising the public of a labor
dispute-only information related solely to the primary dispute
could satisfy that requirement. 5 The Board declined to decide the
constitutionality of this interpretation and took the position that
handbilling was not to force a secondary employer "to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer," 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976), because neither DeBartolo nor the cotenants had any business relation-
ship with or power to control the labor policies of the primary, High, or any substantial
business relationship with or control over the contracting decisions of the initial secondary,
Wilson. The Board by adopting either argument would once again avoid confronting the
first amendment issue. The conflict between the "producer-distributor" requirement and
the first amendment would nevertheless remain, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in
DeBartolo that Congress intended the "producer-distributor" requirement to restrict the
scope of the publicity proviso. See 103 S. Ct. at 2932. The merits of the statutory arguments
are beyond the scope of this Article.
50. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159 (Sept. 10, 1982).
51. See id. at 1160.
52. The Union had distributed a total of four different handbills and republished the
text of two in two Union newspapers. Id. The statutory issues concerning all but the one
handbill discussed in the text are not relevant here.
53. See id. at 1161-62. The Board indicated that it would not prohibit publication of
noncoercive information unrelated to the primary dispute. Id. at 1162 n.11. The publicity
proviso, however, does not exempt such information. The prohibition section simply does
not proscribe the information in the first instance.
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the Board could "presume the constitutionality of the Act ... ab-
sent binding court decisions to the contrary."5
Thus, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), as interpreted by the Board and
the courts, imposes at least two restrictions on truthful nonpicket-
ing labor publicity that does not result in an employee work stop-
page. The secondary must have a specified relationship with the
primary-the "producer-distributor" requirement-and the pub-
licity must relate solely to the primary dispute or the secondary's
relationship to the primary dispute-the "for the purpose of" re-
quirement. Curiously, however, the courts have avoided addressing
the constitutionality of these restrictions on nonpicketing labor
publicity despite the fact that unions increasingly are engaging in
this activity and have presented the Board and courts with the op-
portunity to decide the issue. An appropriate constitutional analy-
sis of the two restrictions on nonpicketing labor publicity as
presented below necessitates a two-prong analysis-focusing first
on the protected status of the speech infringed and second on the
government's justification for the infringement. The analysis dem-
onstrates that the "producer-distributor" and "for the purpose of"
restrictions on nonpicketing labor publicity are unconstitutional.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF NONPICKETING LABOR
PUBLICITY
The first inquiry in analyzing the constitutionality of the "pro-
ducer-distributor" and "for the purpose of" requirements is the ex-
tent to which the first amendment protects nonpicketing labor
publicity.55 To make this determination, the courts may look to the
54. Id. at 1163 (footnote omitted).
55. The question whether nonpicketing labor publicity is entitled to any first amend-
ment protection is not in issue, because it is clear that handbilling and other methods of
peaceful publicity are forms of protected speech, see, e.g., United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct.
1702, 1706 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980); Organization for a Better Aus-
tin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971), and that these forms remain within the area of free
expression when their subject is a labor dispute. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 102 (1940) ("In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information con-
cerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion
that is guaranteed by the Constitution."). Members of the Court, however, have begun to
order the degree of protection afforded different classes of speech. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacific
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746-47 (1978) (indecent speech) (Stevens, J., concurring); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (nonobscene "adult movies") (plu-
rality opinion); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech); see also Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1689
(1983) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3426 (1982)) ("speech
on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and
is entitled to special protection"); Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger
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law of the seemingly related activities of labor picketing and com-
mercial speech. The courts may treat nonpicketing labor publicity
as speech plus conduct similar to labor picketing, or as economi-
cally motivated similar to commercial speech, and therefore rele-
gate the publicity to lesser first amendment protection. A review of
the justifications for judicial restrictions on labor picketing and
commercial speech and a comparison of such speech with nonpick-
eting labor publicity, however, illustrate the inappropriateness of
subjecting nonpicketing labor publicity to similar restrictions.
Nonpicketing labor publicity satisfies traditional first amendment
values and is entitled to full first amendment protection.
A. Labor Picketing vs. Nonpicketing Labor Publicity
The Supreme Court has treated labor picketing with increas-
ing disrespect. The broad pronouncements concerning the impor-
tance of labor speech contained in Thornhill v. Alabama" have
eroded to the point that the Court has upheld restrictions on labor
picketing with the most "cursory" first amendment analysis.57 The
Court has justified its cavalier treatment of labor picketing speech
through the use of two related doctrines-the "speech plus"5 8 and
"unlawful objective" 59 theories. The two theories, however appro-
priate they may be in the picketing context, are not applicable to
Court, 68 CAL. L. REv. 422, 452-53 (1980); Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A
Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265, 282-96 (1981); Stephan, The First Amendment
and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. Rav. 203, 212-14 (1982). The relevant inquiry there-
fore is the extent of protection nonpicketing labor publicity deserves, i.e., whether nonpick-
eting labor publicity is entitled to full first amendment protection. Whether the protection
afforded different categories of speech should be ordered at all is beyond the scope of this
Article.
56. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). See supra note 55.
57. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 616
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring); American Radio As'n v.
Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 229-30 (1974); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local
760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 77 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); id. at 93-94 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289
(1957); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950); International Bhd. of Team-
sters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474 (1950) (plurality opinion); Building Serv. Em-
ployees Int'l Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Stor-
age & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 n.6 (1949) (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers
Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
59. See, e.g., Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616; International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v.
Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. at 293-94; International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 501 v. NLRB, 341
U.S. 694, 705 (1951); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. at 465-66; Building Serv. Employ-
ees Int'l Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. at 539-40; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. at 501.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1469
nonpicketing labor publicity.
1. "Speech Plus" Theory
The "speech plus" theory focuses on the physical component
of labor picketing, arguing that picketing is "something more"
than speech. The "speech plus" aspect of labor picketing thus jus-
tifies additional restrictions on labor speech-restrictions that are
not applicable to other forms of noncommercial speech. "Speech
plus" theorists contend that labor picketing constitutes, at least in
part, conduct designed to coerce and to "induce action of one kind
or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are
being disemminated." 0 According to these theorists, coercion may
take the form of (1) threats of physical harm, (2) threats of eco-
nomic sanctions, (3) unreasoned appeals to class or union loyalties,
or (4) psychological pressure in the form of possible social embar-
rassment."1 Regardless of their merits as applied to labor picketing,
these arguments cannot justify restrictions on nonpicketing labor
publicity because this form of publicity lacks the conduct neces-
sary to effectively coerce the listener-i.e. the consumer.6 2
60. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. at 465 (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers &
Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. at 775-76 (Douglas, J., concurring)). The first amend-
ment does not protect from regulation speech that merely coerces the listener. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969); NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941); see also Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 964, 998-1002 (1978).
61. See cases cited supra note 58; see also Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the
Regulation of Union and Employer Conduct, 49 MCH. L. REv. 191, 198-210 (1950); Teller,
Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HAav. L. Ray. 180, 200-02 (1942).
62. Nonpicketing pubicity may attempt to coerce nonlisteners, i.e. secondary employ-
ers. The union, by applying economic pressure to the secondary, hopes to coerce the secon-
dary to pressure the person with whom the union has a primary dispute. The reviewing
body considers this coercion when it determines if there is a statutory violation. A finding of
coercion that satisfies the statutory requirements of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), however, cannot control
the outcome of the first amendment question. Once the court reaches the first amendment
issue, the analysis must focus on the possible coercion of the listener i.e., the consumer. See
Baker, supra note 60, at 998; Jones, Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets,
39 VA. L. Rv. 1023, 1047-51 (1953).
Under the first amendment, the government cannot regulate secondary consumer boy-
cotts on the grounds of nonlistener coercion anymore than it can regulate, for example, the
solicitation of voters by special interest groups attempting to "coerce"--lobby-legislators
or the appeals to consumers by civil rights organizations seeking a boycott of stores to "co-
erce" employers to cease engaging in racial discrimination. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982) (The first amendment protects a secondary boycott by civil
rights organizers.). Unless the union coerces the listener, the government must base its regu-
lation solely on the expected result of the uncoerced response of listeners to the union's
message, precisely the kind of content-based restriction that is suspect under the first
amendment. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
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First, nonpicketing labor publicity does not threaten-either
implicitly or explicitly-physical harm or violence. Although ob-
servers at one time may have associated labor picketing with regu-
lar outbursts of violence,6" a similar association never has been pre-
sent with nonpicketing labor publicity." Nonpicketing publicity
neither involves a procession of patrolling bodies that physically
may intimidate consumers nor requires consumers seeking access
to the secondary to contend with stationary crowds.6 5 Many forms
of nonpicketing publicity include no physical presence and, conse-
quently, no face-to-face confrontation that even remotely could
threaten violence.6" Moreover, even if a slight chance of physical
harm existed-for example, from a single overly enthusiastic
handbiller-the appropriate response would be to regulate the of-
fending conduct, not to regulate the speech that only remotely may
produce the conduct.6 7
Second, nonpicketing appeals to consumers to boycott a secon-
dary employer do not threaten economic sanctions. A union-no
matter how powerful-cannot punish or impose sanctions upon a
consumer. The fear of economic sanctions is relevant only when a
union directs its appeal to the employees of the secondary. 8 While
575 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Linmark Assoc., Inc., v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1971); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969); see also, L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTTUtioNAL LAW 580-81 (1978); Cox, The Supreme Court 1979
Term-Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HAiv. L. REv. 1, 33-34
(1980); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HAv. L. Rav. 1482, 1496-1502 (1975); Stone, Restrictions
of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U.
CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978).
63. See Jones, supra note 62, at 1030; Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First
Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1469, 1490-91 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Peaceful
Picketing].
64. The association of labor picketing to sporadic violence does not suggest that the
government properly may restrict labor picketing because of a perceived potential for physi-
cal intimidation. Not all picketing presents this concern, thus the government's restriction
on all picketing may violate the first amendment. See Cafeteria Employees Union Local 302
v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1943); Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech:
Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YAiL L.J. 938, 952-53 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Labor Picketing]; Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 63, at
1491; see also infra note 140.
65. When disruptive handbillers block public access, the publicity may constitute
picketing. See Service and Maintenance Employees Union Local 399, 136 N.L.R.B. 431
(1962).
66. No one would argue, for example, that a newspaper advertisement physically
abused its reader.
67. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
68. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 445-46 (1970); Cox,
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consumer appeals inadvertently may reach the secondary's em-
ployees, nonpicketing publicity is less likely to induce employees to
engage in a secondary boycott than is consumer picketing. Con-
sumer picketing is more visible and conjures up the historical bat-
tle between management and labor and thus carries much greater
symbolic force than does the distribution of handbills. Moreover,
even if nonpicketing publicity directed at consumers occasionally
induces a secondary employee boycott, the proper first amendment
response is not to prohibit the broad class of nonpicketing public-
ity but rather to treat separately the occasional instances of resul-
tant secondary employee boycotts. 9
Third, while nonpicketing publicity does appeal to consumer
loyalties this without more does not constitute coercion. In many
disputes the union must rely not only on its presentation of its
grievances but also on the public's existing class biases. The union
may seek to convince the public that the union's individual dispute
is part of labor's greater cause. Such appeals, however, are no dif-
ferent than a political candidate's declaration of party affiliation to
garner machine and party support despite possible differences on
individual issues. In short, the government and courts must not
limit first amendment protection to speech that seeks only to
change the listener's mind but must extend protection to speech
that encourages the listener to act on existing beliefs and loyalties.
Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAN. L. REv. 574, 594-95 (1951); Note, The
Invisible Hand and the Clenched Fist: Is There a Safe Way to Picket Under the First
Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 177-78 (1974).
69. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. A prohibition of nonpicketing publicity
that results in a work stoppage may have its own constitutional problems. See Note, Labor
Picketing, supra note 64, at 945 n.40 ("the economic effect, actual or intended, of a peaceful
consumer picket has no bearing on whether it is communication and should not be relevant
in determining its level of protection under the First Amendment"). Some obvious differ-
ences exist, however, between nonpicketing publicity that does result in a work stoppage
and publicity that does not produce a stoppage which may justify different constitutional
treatment. When a work stoppage results, it is more likely that the union implicitly or ex-
plicitly threatened economic sanctions or promised benefits (e.g., support in any future work
stoppage by the secondary employees), see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969), and it is more likely that the union had an objective that was illegal or contrary to a
public policy unrelated to the expression (e.g., violation of a no-strike clause). See Note,
Labor Picketing, supra note 64, at 938 n.2. Moreover, the court may presume that the union
intended an employee work stoppage when a consumer appeal results in a work stoppage.
See American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, Inc., 419 U.S. 215, 231-32 (1974) (rational
inferences arising from the effect of picketing may be relevant to a determination of its
purpose). If the union did not have such an intent, the union could request that the secon-
dary employees return to work. The secondary employees probably would honor the union's




Finally, while nonpicketing publicity may produce social em-
barrassment"0 and cause some persons to shop elsewhere rather
than suffer some minor discomfort, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that social embarrassment alone cannot justify restrictions
on protected speech.7 1 The purposes of the first amendment would
be undermined severely if speech became unprotected merely be-
cause it caused people to feel uncomfortable. The novel, the radi-
cal, the religious, and the political all may cause discomfort to one
group or another.
Thus, nonpicketing publicity does not contain the same ele-
ments of conduct that the Court has considered sufficient to justify
reduced protection of labor picketing.72 The isolated incidents of
coercion that could arise do not justify restrictions on first amend-
ment rights.
A second argument that "speech plus" adherents might ad-
vance is that nonpicketing publicity is part of an integrated course
of union conduct that is designed to put pressure on the secondary.
This argument would claim that the appeal to boycott transforms
what otherwise would be protected speech into economic conduct
subject to regulation.73 This view has two problems. First, as the
Supreme Court repeatedly has acknowledged, the first amendment
"extends to more than abstract discussion, unrelated to ac-
tion. . . . 'Free trade in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity
to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts."7 4 Second, dis-
tinguishing between information that discloses a secondary's par-
ticipation in or connection with a labor dispute and appeals to con-
sumers to boycott the secondary is not practicable. The former
necessarily implies a request for the latter. Thus, this second justi-
70. To the extent one considers social embarrassment relevant, labor picketing carries
a much greater potential for embarrassment than nonpicketing publicity. Picketing is more
visible, carries greater symbolic force, requires face-to-face confrontation, and generally in-
cludes larger numbers of persons than does nonpicketing publicity.
71. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3424 (1982).
72. The Supreme Court in dicta has recognized some of the common sense differences
between labor picketing and nonpicketing publicity. See, e.g., Safeco, 447 U.S. at 618-19
(Stevens, J., concurring); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 311
n.17 (1979); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950).
73. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) ("it has never
been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means
of language ...").
74. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3424 (1982) (quoting Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945)); see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978); Organi-
zation for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
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fication for characterizing nonpicketing publicity as "speech plus"
also fails.
2. "Unlawful Objective" Theory
The "unlawful objective" theory, as originally formulated, de-
nied protection to any picketing whose object or imminent effect
was the violation of a valid state law. 5 The courts, however, soon
expanded the doctrine to preclude from protection picketing whose
purpose was to induce any action that either the legislature'or the
courts judged to be against state or congressional policy.78
The "unlawful objective" doctrine is not applicable to
nonpicketing labor publicity for two reasons. First, the doctrine
evolved from the Court's finding that labor picketing was "speech
plus," which permitted application of a less strict first amendment
analysis.77 While nonpicketing labor publicity may have the same
ultimate objective as secondary labor picketing-that is, to force
the secondary to apply pressure to the primary-nonpicketing la-
bor publicity does not share the necessary "speech plus" elements
upon which the "unlawful objective" theory depends."
Second, a union does not seek an unlawful objective when it
appeals to consumers to boycott a secondary employer. The public
violates no law if it heeds the union's advice and refuses to
purchase from the secondary employer; the secondary employer
does not act illegally if, as a result of the consumer pressure, it
ceases to deal with the primary; and the primary does not violate
the law if in response to such pressure it agrees to the union's de-
mands concerning the terms and conditions of employment.7 9 A
75. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (union pick-
eted in an attempt to obtain agreement from wholesale ice distributor to refuse to sell to
nonunion ice peddlers; the agreement would violate state antitrust statute so the picketing
was not protected under the first amendment).
76. See, e.g., Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (the Court affirmed an
injunction prohibiting picketing for purpose of inducing employer to hire blacks in propor-
tion to their population in the area because the picketing violated judicial policy against
hiring on the basis of race); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc.,
354 U.S. 284, 289-93 (1957) (tracing the evolution of the illegal objective doctrine).
77. See, e.g., American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, Inc., 419 U.S. 215, 229-30
(1974); International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289-93 (1957);
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-66 (1950); Building Serv. Employees Int'l
Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950).
78. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
79. Cox, supra note 62, at 36-37; see Note, Labor Picketing, supra note 64, at 945-46.
But cf. Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975)
(contractor's agreement with union to subcontract only to union subcontractors was subject
to the Federal Antitrust Laws).
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court, nevertheless, could find that the objective of nonpicketing
publicity contravenes a valid law or policy by determining that sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) itself prohibits secondary boycotts. This reason-
ing, however, clearly constitutes bootstrapping and, if valid, would
permit states or Congress to impose by legislation any restriction
on speech simply by declaring invalid the purpose of the speech.80
Thus, neither the "unlawful objective" nor the "speech plus"
theories, by which courts justify restrictions on labor picketing, are
applicable to nonpicketing labor publicity. Accordingly, the labor
picketing cases, although indicative of the Court's unsympathetic
view toward union appeals, are not controlling in determining the
constitutionality of restrictions on nonpicketing publicity.,,
B. Commercial Speech v. Labor Speech
The Supreme Court has manifested its view that labor speech
may be unworthy of full first amendment protection not only by a
differential treatment of labor picketing, but also by making un-
flattering characterizations of labor speech in dicta in commercial
80. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1941); T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 446 (1970). But see NLRB v. Retail Store Employees
Union Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980) (plurality opinion).
The Court in Safeco apparently applied this fallacious reasoning when it upheld the
restrictions on labor picketing contained in § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The plurality opinion held that
the secondary consumer picketing furthered an unlawful objective and therefore was subject
to regulation. The Safeco opinion marked the greatest departure from the early illegal ob-
jective cases and was the first consumer picketing case in which the court found the illegal
objective in the very statute that made the speech illegal.
The plurality opinion in Safeco garnered only four votes and has been sharply criti-
cized. See Cox, supra note 62, at 36-39; Note, Labor Picketing, supra note 64, at 944-46;
Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 63, at 1480-81; Comment, Picketing at the Secondary:
Retail Store and the Right to Publicize, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 405 (1981). No reason supports
the extension of the discredited Safeco reasoning to nonpicketing publicity.
81. The picketing precedents also are inapplicable to nonpicketing publicity because,
while restrictions on picketing leave other channels of communication open, see NLRB v.
Fruit Vegetable Packers Local 706 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 93 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing), a prohibition extending to nonpicketing publicity would cut off the entire message.
Thus, the uniqueness of the medium or the manner of presentation could not justify
reduced first amendment protection of nonpicketing publicity. See also infra note 125. The
Supreme Court often has acknowledged the difference between regulations that leave alter-
nate channels of communication open and those that do not. Compare Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976) (time-place-manner regulation of adult movie
theatres valid because those wanting to view adult movies still had access) with Schad v.
Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (absolute ban on one form of adult entertain-
ment unconstitutional). See also International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc.,
456 U.S. 212, 227 (1982); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 n.28 (1978); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67
(1972).
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speech cases."2 The first amendment values underlying labor
speech, particularly nonpicketing publicity, however, indicate such
speech is not analogous to commercial speech and is deserving of
full first amendment protection.
1. The Commercial Speech Analogy
The Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. s reversed the longstanding rule
of Valentine v. Christensen8 4 and extended limited first amend-
ment protection to commercial speech. The Court based its deci-
sion in part upon the similarity between commercial and labor
speech, finding "no satisfactory distinction between the two kinds
of speech. '8 5 The Court explicitly refused to express any views on
the constitutionality of restrictions on labor speech.88 The Court's
inability to distinguish labor and commercial speech coupled with
its characterization of some labor speech as "of an entirely private
and economic character, ' ' 87 however, raises the question whether
labor speech should enjoy any greater first amendment protection
than commercial speech.
The Court's decision four years after Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission" raised further doubts about the protected status
of labor speech. The Court in Central Hudson struck down a regu-
lation that prohibited electric utilities from advertising to promote
the purchase of utility services, characterizing commercial speech
as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience."89 As the concurrence warned, this broad
definition-unlike the Court's usual definition of commercial
speech as speech proposing no more than a commercial transac-
tion9 --arguably includes labor speech.9 1 Although labor speech is
82. See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
83. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
84. 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (the first amendment does not protect purely commercial
advertising).
85. 425 U.S. at 763.
86. Id. at 763 n.17.
87. Id. Several later cases draw upon this characterization of labor speech. See, e.g.,
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425-26 (1982); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 364 (1977); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980) (rejecting the
claim that labor picketing deserves more first amendment protection than other picketing
and suggesting the contrary was true).
88. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
89. Id. at 561.
90. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 4961, 4963 (June 24,
1488 [Vol. 36:1469
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not related solely to the economic interests of its audience, the
union's economic interests certainly are a motivating factor. The
Central Hudson definition of commercial speech uncomfortably
parallels the Court's characterization of some labor speech as "of
an entirely private and economic character."9 Thus, Central Hud-
son and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy provide precedent for
extending to any form of labor speech no greater first amendment
protection-and perhaps even less-than that afforded commercial
speech.9
3
2. First Amendment Values
An analysis of how commercial' 4 and labor speech satisfy the
values underlying the first amendment-(a) individual self-fulfill-
1983); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
The Court in Central Hudson restated the traditional definition of commercial speech
later in its opinion, 447 U.S. at 562, but whether the Court believes the definitions are
equivalent or prefers one definition is unclear.
91. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579-80 (Stevens, and Brennan, JJ., concurring).
The concurring justices opined that the majority's definition of commercial speech was too
broad because the definition "arguably could include labor speech." Labor speech, according
to the concurrence, should not receive the lesser commercial standard of first amendment
protection, but the maximum protection available under the first amendment. Id.
92. More ominous to Professor Cox was the fact that the Court's decision in Central
Hudson seemed to afford even greater respect to commercial speech than to labor speech.
See Cox, supra note 62, at 36-39; see also Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 64, at 1487.
In Central Hudson, as in Safeco, which the Court decided the same day, the government
proscribed a form of expression appealing to readers or observers because the government
believed that the message would persuade its audience to behave in an undesirable way. Yet
the Court, without providing an explanation for the different treatment, invalidated the
nonlabor regulation in Central Hudson and upheld the labor regulation in Safeco. See Cox,
supra note 62, at 37.
93. Some commentators have suggested that the Court already may have relegated
labor speech to no greater than commercial speech status. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 62, at
39; Note, Labor Picketing, supra note 64, at 959-60.
94. This discussion considers commercial speech to be that speech which does no more
than propose a commercial transaction. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also
Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. Rav. 1, 35
(1976). This Article does not consider the categorization problems here. See Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 4961, 4962-63 (June 24, 1983); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764-65 (1976). But see
Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment,
65 VA. L. Rav. 1, 21-24 (1979) (categorization has not been and should not be a problem).
This Article does not examine the values that commercial speech satisfies to analyze the
merits of the Court's decision in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, because that analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article. See generally id.; Baker, supra; Farber, Commercial
Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. RPv. 372 (1979); Redish, The First
Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression,
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ment, (b) the advancement of knowledge and discovery of truth,
(c) participation in decisionmaking by all members of society, and
(d) the maintenance of the proper balance between stability and
change95-compels the conclusion that labor speech, particularly
nonpicketing labor speech, deserves greater protection than com-
mercial speech.96
(a) Individual Self-Fulfillment
Professor Emerson argues that "every man ... has the right
to form his own beliefs and opinions" and "to express these beliefs
and opinions .... For expression is an integral part of the devel-
opment of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of
self. '9 7 Thus, this first amendment value fosters individual self-re-
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 720 (1982). Rather, the Article addresses the values satisfied by commer-
cial speech to provide a framework for analysis and comparison of the value of the labor
speech upon which the "producer-distributor" and "for the purpose of" requirements
infringe.
95. Professor Emerson first described the values the accompanying text analyzes and
other noted commentators generally have accepted these values. T. EMERsON, Tim SYSTEM
OF FREE EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970); see also G. GuNrHER, CONSTrrtrONAL LAW 1044 n.3 (9th ed.
1975); Baker, supra note 60, at 990-91. Some scholars emphasize one value over or to the
exclusion of another. See, e.g., A. MIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF Gov-
ERNMENT (1948) (emphasizing the value of political participation, but defining it sufficiently
broadly to encompass other values); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (emphasizing exclusively the decisionmaking value, arguing
that the first amendment extends only to explicitly political speech); BeVier, The First
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle,
30 STAN. L. Rav. 299 (1978) (emphasizing only political speech, but accepting extension of
protection to some additional speech for pragmatic and institutional reasons); Jackson &
Jeffries, supra note 94 (emphasizing the value of self-government, although also acknowl-
edging a possible interest in individual self-fulfillment). The Emerson values, however, do
not exclude any important value. Moreover, while some commentators criticize the Emerson
choices as overinclusive, the overinclusiveness may be more apparent than real. Some values
derive from others, see, e.g., Baker, supra note 60, at 991, and Emerson himself recognized
that the four values have meaning only as an integrated set. Emerson, First Amendment
Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980); accord Note, supra note
94, at 731 n.80.
96. Indeed, since the courts have subjected restrictions on commercial speech to an
increasingly rigorous first amendment analysis, see infra notes 155 and 156, the courts
should provide full first amendment protection to nonpicketing labor publicity.
97. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GNERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966); see
also Baker, supra note 60, at 995 (the value of self-expression is the most important value
underlying the first amendment).
The Supreme Court also has recognized that the first amendment protects the individ-
ual's interest in self-expression. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978); id.
at 804 (White, J., dissenting); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971).
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alization and self-determination.
Providing first amendment protection to commercial speech
will not promote these goals.98 A seller hawking his wares is not
engaged in an expression of self. The advertisements giving the
price of cigarettes or toilet tissue are not instrumental to the devel-
opment of anyone's personality and do not give the speaker a feel-
ing of self-fulfillment. 9s
Labor speech, by contrast, is an expression of self-of the in-
dividual's frustrations and aspirations. The individual pleading
"Do Not Patronize"-like the person wearing the jacket bearing
the words "Fuck the Draft"'100 or a war protestor chanting "Stop
This War Now"' 0 -is expressing his emotions and views on a sub-
ject of special importance to him. Providing first amendment pro-
tection to such speech "comport[s] with the premise of individual
dignity"'10 2 and channels emotions away from more socially unde-
sirable behavior-e.g. violence-that may undermine the individ-
98. See Baker, supra note 94, at 9-25; Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 94, at 14-15. But
see Note, supra note 94, at 744. The form of an advertisement, in some limited cases, may
be an expression of self, e.g., a humorously presented commercial or nouveau poster. The
protection given the commercial message, however, may be separable from that given. the
form of communication. Even if not separable, uniquely expressive advertisements are rare
and their existence only suggests the problems of categorization (i.e. whether particular
speech "does no more than propose a commercial transaction.") While problems of categori-
zation may justify coverage of all commercial speech, see Farber, supra note 94, at 384, the
Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy did not rely on this reasoning, finding instead that
speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction deserves protection for
its own sake. 425 U.S. 748; see Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 94, at 18-20.
99. Without a self-fulfillment interest, an individual's commercial speech, unlike labor
speech, does not deserve first amendment protection unless the speech satisfies other first
amendment values and the speech of other speakers could not satisfy those values. This
follows because only the self-fulfillment value furthers the speaker's first amendment inter-
ests. See Note, supra note 94, at 738.
100. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
101. Baker, supra note 60, at 994. Professor Baker argues that-
[t]o engage voluntarily in a speech act is to engage in self-definition or expression. A
Vietnam war protestor may explain that when she chants "Stop This War Now" at a
demonstration, she does so without any expectation that her speech will affect the con-
tinuance of war or even that it will communicate anything to people in power; rather,
she participates and chants in order to define herself publicly in opposition to the war.
This war protestor provides a dramatic illustration of the importance of this self-ex-
pressive use of speech, independent of any effective communication to others, for self-
fulfillment or self-realization. Generally, any individually chosen, meaningful conduct,
whether public or private, expresses and further defines the actor's nature and contrib-
utes to the actor's self-realization.
Id. (emphasis in original).
102. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); see Z. CHAM, supra note 80, at 33
("There is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters
vital to them if life is to be worth living .... ."); see also Cox, supra note 62, at 1.
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ual's self-actualization as well as society's stability."' 3
Labor speech also is connected intimately with the individual's
associational rights. The union member acts as part of a
group-the union-and learns to interact with other members of
that group. He achieves his goals most effectively when he coordi-
nates his efforts with those of his co-workers in an attempt to per-
suade his employer and often the public. Thus, labor speech not
only leads to the development of the individual qua individual, but
also contributes to the individual's growth as a member of the
group and of the larger society.104
(b) Advancement of Knowledge and Discovery of Truth
The second value is essentially a formulation of the classic
"marketplace of ideas" metaphor that litigants and the courts fre-
quently invoke to protect challenged speech.105 As Justice Holmes
explained, "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market
"106
Commercial speech only remotely promotes this value. Com-
mercial speech does not convey ideas, is not a response to the ideas
of another, is not susceptible to opposing argument, and is not con-
ducive to dialogue that will ferret out facts to yield some ultimate
103. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
104. See Baker, supra note 60, at 1033 ("the contribution of associations or assemblies
as the embodiment of people's power to the first amendment values of self-fulfillment or
participation in change should be obvious").
A trade association promoting its product also may include some element of association
rights. Since the individual's message lacks an expression of self, however, the combined
efforts of the group conveying the commercial message make a reduced contribution to the
individual's growth. Moreover, unlike labor speech, a trade association's commercial speech,
although formulated jointly, is rarely communicated to the public through group activity.
Perhaps most important, trade association speech is not representative of commercial
speech. Whereas all labor speech contains an element of association, only a very small por-
tion of commercial speech has that element of joint communication.
105. See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,
102 S. Ct. 2799, 2808 (1982); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 n.13, 279 n.19 (1964); see also L. TRmE, supra
note 62, at 576-77. For a criticism of the market place of ideas model, see Baker, supra note
60, at 974-81.
106. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); accord
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980); see also 2 Sz-
LECTr LITERARY AND POLITICAL PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF WOODROW WILsoN 333 (1926),
quoted in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 546 n.1 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring); Stone,
supra note 62, at 101-03.
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truth. Commercial speech presents facts and little more.10 7
Some labor speech, like commercial speech, may suffer from a
failure to express ideas. The union member carrying a picket sign
saying no more than "on strike" provides a new fact, but may not
contribute to the marketplace of ideas any more than a classified
advertisement that offers minimum wage.10 8 Most labor speech,
however, provides greater impact on the formation of opinions and
beliefs than an "on strike" sign. In particular, nonpicketing public-
ity typically will provide information and express opinions about
the labor dispute.10 9 In contrast to the use of a picket sign that the
public may have difficulty reading if all the details of the labor
dispute are presented, a handbill or advertisement is circulated
precisely to allow for a more thorough discussion of the facts. 110
Finally, since labor unions most often communicate verbally,
by handbill or by picketing, a representative sharing the expressed
opinion generally is available to respond to questions. The repre-
sentative can indicate the causes of the dispute, the reasons for the
action, and the goals the union seeks. When such information is
107. The claim that the facts conveyed in commercial speech are essential to the
proper working of the economic marketplace, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763, 765 (1976), is not sufficient to satisfy the
second value in the first amendment analysis. The marketplace depends on much more than
just commercial speech. For example, the absence of automotive transportation would crip-
ple delivery systems. Yet the first amendment does not prevent governmental restrictions on
and regulation of motor vehicles. Quite simply, arguments based upon the needs of the mar-
ketplace merely resurrect economic due process "in the ill-fitting garb of the first amend-
ment." Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 94, at 30; see also Note, Labor Picketing, supra note
64, at 957-58. Furthermore, the argument that these commercial facts help to form opinions
about important public issues also falls short of satisfying the second value in the first
amendment analysis. See infra note 114.
108. Both the picketer and the classified advertisement may help to form the opinion
that labor is oppressed. Neither, however, directly makes that argument; instead, the public
must arrive at its own conclusion based on the interaction of the individual's life experience
with the new fact.
109. For an example, see the DeBartolo handbill, supra note 34.
110. The difference in the detail with which labor picketing and nonpicketing public-
ity describe a labor dispute arguably could provide a justification for treating the two forms
of publicity differently. That is, one could attempt to treat labor speech that presents views
or opinions (typically nonpicketing publicity) differently from so-called "signal" labor
speech (presumably picketing), which does not add to the marketplace of ideas, but merely
manifests that a labor dispute exists. This approach, however, presents several problems.
First, determining what constitutes enough information to contribute to the marketplace of
ideas would be a difficult task. Second, when union activity provides few details the message
is less persuasive, proportionately reducing the government interest in suppressing the com-
munication. Last, a detail-based approach does not accord sufficient weight to the contribu-
tion that a picket sign makes to the value of self-expression. Cf. Baker, supra note 60, at 995
(self-expressive speech more fully promotes fundamental first amendment values than does
speech that communicates propositions and attitudes).
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provided, the employer who is the object of the dispute has some-
thing to which he may respond. He may post signs in his store
window, speak to customers personally, or counteradvertise. Labor
publicity therefore permits the dialogue that the marketplace of
ideas model envisions.
(c) Participation in Decisionmaking
The third main function of free expression is to provide for
participation in decisionmaking through a process of open discus-
sion that is available to all members of the community."' This
function has particular significance in the political realm in which
the state makes most of the immediate decisions on its survival,
welfare, and progress, and in which the state has a special incen-
tive and often more effective power to suppress free expression.112
Thus, to many, the most important societal interest that the first
amendment advances is this third value, self-government.1
Commercial speech does not provide information directly rele-
vant to the individual's participation in the political process.11 4
111. See T. EMERSON, supra note 97, at 8-11.
112. See id. at 9.
113. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 51 U.S.L.W. 4436, 4437 (Apr. 20, 1983); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3426 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467
(1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 14-15, 39 (1976). Indeed, some commentators argue that the political process principle
should be the only premise employed when construing the limits of the first amendment.
See also supra note 95.
114. "The typical newspaper advertisement or television commercial makes no com-
ment on governmental personnel or policy. It does not marshall information relevant to
political action, nor does it focus public attention on questions of political significance."
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 94, at 15; accord BeVier, supra note 95, at 353-55.
Commercial speech arguably transmits information that contributes to the public's for-
mation of political opinions and thereby indirectly contributes to the individual's participa-
tion in the political process. See Note, supra note 94, at 745; see also Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); id. at 780
n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring). For example, Justice Stewart argued in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy that drug price information might affect a person's views concerning price control
issues, government subsidy proposals, special health care, consumer protection, or tax legis-
lation. Id. at 780 n.8. The ban on drug prices challenged in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,
however, also may help the public form opinions on those same issues and has the identical
political significance. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 94, at 15 n.53. Similarly, an individ-
ual viewing a street fight may conclude that the government should do more to reduce
crime, should make sentencing or parole laws stricter, should reform prisons, or should im-
prove police service. No one, however, would seriously argue that the ban on drug price
information in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy or the street fight were protected speech. In
short, all of life's experiences may affect a person's views concerning some political issues.
Accordingly, a more direct link to the political process than that Justice Stewart postulates
is necessary to trigger first amendment protection for commercial speech.
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Commercial speech also does not further the individual's ability to
participate in the political process. Unlike speech in such fields as
philosophy, logic, or literature, commercial speech neither expands
the limits of the mind nor improves upon the individual's overall
decisionmaking processes. 15
Labor speech also generally makes no comment on govern-
mental personnel or policy and, like commercial speech, often is
economically motivated. Labor speech, however, unlike commercial
speech, does concern political and social choices. The union ap-
peals to the public for support in its particular dispute and in its
larger struggle. 11" The success of the appeal depends upon the pub-
lic's decision to forego what it had perceived as in its economic
self-interest and to support the political and social values the
union represents. 1 7 The meaningfulness of these political and so-
cial choices ultimately rests upon the union's ability to communi-
cate its message. A public deprived of information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute is deprived of the ability to participate
knowledgeably in the decisionmaking process." 8 Furthermore, re-
115. Commercial speech, of course, does enable the consumer to engage more ration-
ally in economic decisionmaking. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; see
also Redish, supra note 94, at 443-45. The first amendment, however, was not designed to
further strictly economic interests. See supra note 107.
116. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940); Note, Labor Picketing, supra
note 64, at 955.
The Court in Thornhill reasoned that free discussion concerning labor disputes is indis-
pensible to the proper use of governmental processes to shape the destiny of modern indus-
trial society. 310 U.S. at 103. This reasoning arguably suffers from the same defect implicit
in the Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy opinion-the lack of a direct link between the speech
and the political decision. See supra note 114. If the only political decision at issue was a
future electoral decision on the roles of labor and management in industrial relations, the
argument might have merit. A union's message and its act of transmitting it through group
association, however, unlike the commercial advertisement, have more immediate political
and social repercussions. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
117. Moreover, the union members themselves engage in political decisionmaking by
the very practice of bonding together with their fellow workers to voice their concerns on
public issues. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981).
While the political and social choices the union and the public make do not immedi-
ately register in the voting booth, only the most restrictive definition of political speech
would require electoral significance. See Bork, supra note 95, at 29-35. Judge Bork would
limit first amendment protection to political speech that deals "explicitly, specifically and
directly with politics and government." Id. at 26. Although this interpretation of political
speech would exclude labor speech from first amendment protection, it also would exclude
scientific and literary expression as well. Id. at 28. The Supreme Court never has endorsed
the Bork definition of political speech. See Connick v. Myers, 51 U.S.L.W. 4436, 4438 (Apr.
20, 1983); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231-32 (1977).
118. See Carpenters and Joiners Union Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942)
(Black, J., dissenting).
Disputes between one or two unions and one contractor over the merits and justice of
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pression of labor's grievances also might affect the political
processes by undermining the confidence and faith of the public in
the democratic system. Justice Brandeis recognized that "repres-
sion breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies."" 9
(d) Balance Between Stability and Change
The final value the first amendment promotes is a "method of
achieving a more adaptable and at the same time more stable com-
munity, of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus."12 Expression therefore allows
society to avoid the natural tendency toward rigidity on the one
hand and the violent response such rigidity may produce on the
other.1211
Commercial speech does not satisfy this value. Commercial
speech neither calls for nor addresses social, political, or even eco-
nomic change nor allows dissidents to "'let off steam,' 1122 nor con-
stitutes a response to such minority views. Rather, commercial
speech is merely a means by which the speaker seeks to benefit
from the existing economic structure.123 Indeed, observers have ex-
union as opposed to non-union systems of employment are but a part of the nationwide
controversy over the subject. I can see no reason why members of the public should be
deprived of any opportunity to get information which might enable them to use their
influence to tip the scales in favor of the side they think is right.
Id. at 730.
119. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The
need to prevent repression closely parallels the ddfe process requirements of our judicial
system. Both further the individual's self-dignity and the operation of the underlying sys-
tem, whether judicial or political, by maintaining confidence in its equity and fairness. The
Brandeis argument does not apply to commercial speech because this form of speech lacks a
self-expression value and thus repression would not breed hatred.
120. T. EMERSON, supra note 97, at 11; cf. Connick v. Myers, 51 U.S.L.W. 4436, 4437
(Apr. 20, 1983) ("The First Amendment 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' ");
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means . . . is a fundamental principle
of our constitutional system.").
121. See T. EMERSON, supra note 97, at 11-12.
122. Id. at 12.
123. Certain businesses will benefit over others through the process of consumers reg-
istering their preferences in the marketplace. This process may result in a gradual change in
our economic institutions. The consequent change, however, is a mere shifting of interests
within a given segment of the existing economic structure, resulting in neither a fundamen-
tal change in the distribution of wealth between existing classes, nor a restructuring of the
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pressed concern that commercial speech may help to rigidify the
prevailing distribution of wealth and economic structure.""
By contrast, advocacy of political and social change is at the
core of labor speech. The essence of the labor movement is the
realignment of individual wealth from one segment of society to
another. The union member appeals to the public to support his
cause in a particular dispute. The union member's plea, however, is
also directed to the public's sentiments towards labor's larger
struggle, which the individual dispute is, in fact, the first step to-
ward resolving. Silencing labor speech not only would impede so-
cial change, but also would risk channeling union frustrations into
more destructive avenues of release. s12 The union will accept more
readily the common judgment when given an opportunity to per-
suade consumers to adopt the union's cause. If, however, the law
permits complete repression of the union's voice, the union may
resort to force, rather than consumers' marketplace votes, to per-
suade the secondary employer. Thus, allowing labor speech strikes
the delicate balance between stability and change.
In summary, neither the labor picketing nor the commercial
speech precedents can justify reduced first amendment protection
of nonpicketing labor publicity. Nonpicketing labor publicity satis-
fies all the values underlying the first amendment and does so
more fully than commercial speech. Indeed, since the Supreme
Court recently has subjected restrictions on commercial speech to
increasingly thorough first amendment analysis, courts should ap-
ply an even more rigorous analysis to restrictions on nonpicketing
labor publicity. Under an appropriate analysis, the "for the pur-
pose of" and "producer-distributor" requirements clearly infringe
fully protected nonpicketing labor speech. The finding that the
"producer-distributor" and "for the purpose of" requirements are
an infringement on fully protected speech, however, does not end
the relevant inquiry.
larger economic system. The fourth value contemplates the balance between stability and
change in these larger institutions. See id. at 11-14.
124. See Baker, supra note 60, at 979-80 and n.59.
125. See T. EMERSON, supra note 97, at 12-13. This justification for protecting labor
speech is particularly strong for nonpicketing publicity. An individual restrained from pick-
eting may have alternate avenues of communication to convey his message, but a prohibi-
tion extended to nonpicketing publicity cuts off an entire message. While other avenues may
be available to pressure the primary employer, the union member nevertheless may feel
frustrated by his inability to make the secondary bear the full responsibility of his relation-
ship to and possible support of-whether by action or inaction-the primary.
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IV. JUSTIFYING THE RESTRICTIONS ON PROTECTED SPEECH
The second stage in the analysis of the constitutionality of the
"producer-distributor" and "for the purpose of" requirements is an
evaluation of the government's justification for infringing upon
nonpicketing labor speech. To regulate fully protected speech 126 on
the basis of its content, the government must show that the regula-
tion is a narrowly tailored means to promote a compelling govern-
ment interest.12 7 The "producer-distributor" and "for the purpose
126. Congress may regulate fully protected speech if the regulation is "a reasonable,
content-neutral, time, place or manner regulation." See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949). The "for the purpose of" and "producer-distributor" requirements, however, pro-
hibit certain messages and consumer appeals at all times, at all places, and in every manner,
see infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text, and, therefore, lack the content neutrality
required of reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516-17 (1981) (plurality opinion); Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
The government also may regulate fully protected speech if the communication is part
speech and part conduct and the regulation promotes an important or substantial govern-
ment interest, is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and imposes incidental
restrictions on first amendment freedoms no greater than is essential to further the govern-
ment's interest. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien
test-whether viewed as limited to expressive conduct or as representing a subcategory of
time, place, and manner regulations-and regardless of the feasibility of separating conduct
from expression, see generally, L. TRIBE, supra note 62, at 599-601; Baker, supra note 60, at
1009-12; Cox, supra note 62, at 48-49; Ely, supra note 62, at 1493-95; Farber, Content Regu-
lation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 743-46 (1980); Red-
ish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113, 148 n.204
(1981)-has no application to the nonpicketing publicity upon which the "for the purpose
of" and the "producer-distributor" requirements infringe. The restrictions resulting from
those requirements are not "unrelated to the suppression of expression." The government's
concern arises from the nonpicketing publicity's communicative impact-the way the public
is expected to respond to the union's message-and is explicitly content-based. See Ely,
supra note 62, at 1497; infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text..
The government also may regulate fully protected speech that occurs in a nonpublic or
special forum. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 51 U.S.L.W. 4436 (Apr. 20, 1983) (office environ-
ment of government employer); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433
U.S. 119 (1977) (prison); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base); Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (interior advertising space of mass transit vehi-
cle). This justification for restricting protected speech is not even arguably applicable to the
"for the purpose of" and "producer-distributor" requirements, which apply to publicity con-
ducted through traditional channels of communication that are open to the public. When
labor publicity occurs on private property, an employer nondiscriminatorily may enforce
valid trespass laws, regardless of the "for the purpose of" and "producer-distributor" re-
quirements. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
127. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 4961, 4962 (June 24, 1983);
United States v. Grace, 51 U.S.L.W. 4444, 4446 (Apr. 20, 1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
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of" requirements, however, do not satisfy any of the judicially ap-
proved bases for regulating protected speech. The two restrictions
on nonpicketing labor publicity are content-based and are not the
least restrictive means of achieving a sufficiently compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
A. Content-Based Restrictions
The "for the purpose of" and "producer-distributor" require-
ments most assuredly are content-based. The two restrictions do
not merely regulate labor speech in the context of a statute balanc-
ing labor and management rights 1 2  or present difficult questions
concerning the content-neutrality of subject-matter regulation. 129
Rather, the "for the purpose of" and "producer-distributor" re-
quirements restrict speech that presents a particular point of
view-the union's. Moreover, the restriction is triggered only when
the union's speech has a particular message.130 Even in labor pick-
eting cases members of the Court have recognized that restrictions
on appeals to consumers to boycott a secondary are content-
based. 3 1 A fortiori when the restriction completely cuts off a par-
ticular message, -regardless of whether the communication is speech
only or speech plus conduct the government has regulated on the
basis of content.13 2
786 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963); see also Redish, supra note 126,
at 113; Stone, supra note 62, at 82.
The government subjects certain categories of speech to content regulation on a regular
basis. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libelous speech); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (fighting words). These categories, however, are not exceptions to the general rule
against content-based restrictions on protected speech, but are examples of speech that the
Court has found not worthy of first amendment protection.
128. See Farber, supra note 126, at 736; Stephan, supra note 55, at 204.
129. See generally Farber, supra note 126; Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in
the First Amendment, 43 U. CH. L. REv. 20 (1975); Stone, supra note 62.
130. For example in Pet, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 96, rev'd sub noma. Pet, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.
641 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1981), the Union could have circulated handbills in the same location
requesting that the public not shop at Hussmanns. The Union, however, apparently lost its
first amendment rights by including other Pet subsidiaries in its plea. Similarly, in Delta
Air Lines, 263 N.L.R.B. 153, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159 (Sept. 10, 1982) the Union handbill
would not have violated the Act if it had not included information about Delta's flight
safety record. The inclusion of that specific message caused the Union to lose its protection.
131. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 618
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) ("[W]e have a case in which picketing,
otherwise lawful, is banned only when the picketers express particular views.").
132. See also Ely, supra note 62, at 1498. (A regulation is content-based if the need
for the regulation would disappear when the audience could not read English).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
B. The Government's Interest in the "For The Purpose Of"
Requirement
The acknowledged government interest in enacting the secon-
dary boycott provisions of the Act was to protect neutral employ-
ers and employees from disputes not of their own making.13 The
"for the purpose of" requirement as interpreted by the Board in
Delta Air Lines does not promote that interest. The Board clearly
indicated that it would have found no fault with a Union handbill
without the flight safety information and would have permitted the
Union to enmesh Delta in its primary dispute by requesting cus-
tomers to withhold patronage from Delta. 1 3  Thus, the "for the
purpose of" requirement, as interpreted by Delta Air Lines, will
not protect neutral employers from labor disputes not of their own
making.
A second government interest that arguably justifies the Delta
Air Lines interpretation of the "for the purpose of" requirement is
preventing severe economic harm to the business of an individual
employer. That strictly economic interest, however, does not con-
stitute, in the first amendment context, a substantial-much less
compelling-government interest.
Furthermore, the government's interest in regulating one ac-
tivity is not sufficiently compelling when the government does not
regulate other activity that jeopardizes the same interest.135 The
arguable interest in preventing severe economic harm to an indi-
vidual business suffers from this infirmity. The government fails to
regulate not only some other activity, but all other activity that
produces the same "evil" as the union's publicity.' The decision
133. 93 CONG. REC. 4323 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISToRY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1106 (1948) (Statement of Sen. Taft); see also
DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2926, 2932 (1983); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr.
Trade Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951); Service Employees Local 399 (Delta Air Lines), 263
N.L.R.B. No. 153, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159, 1161-62 (Sept. 10, 1982).
134. Service Employees Local 399 (Delta Air Lines), 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 111
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159, 1162 (Sept. 10, 1982).
135. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 520 (1981) (plural-
ity opinion); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 793 (1978); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972).
136. The defect of the "for the purpose" requirement is not simply that too little
speech falls within the prohibition. Rather, by ignoring some speech that is indistinguish-
able from the speech prohibited, the government has undermined the likelihood that a gen-
uine state interest exists for restriction of the prohibited speech. As explained by Justice
White, "The exceptions do not create the infringement, rather the general prohibition does.
But the exceptions to the general prohibition are of great significance in assessing the
strength of the city's interest ...... Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
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in Delta Air Lines would have allowed any person other than a
Union member to publicize the same information contained in the
Union's handbill without incurring liability. For example, Ralph
Nader or even a competing business would not violate the law by
publishing Delta's flight safety record, 13 7 yet the injury to Delta
would be as great as, if not greater than, the injury the Union's
handbilling caused."3 '
A final arguable justification for the "for the purpose of" re-
quirement is that the restriction serves the government interest in
preventing the dissemination of misleading information. The con-
cern is that union publication of information about the secon-
dary-such as Delta's safety record-may present the data mis-
leadingly or lead the public to believe that a primary dispute exists
with the secondary. While the Board's "for the purpose of" re-
quirement may prevent the dissemination of misleading data by
prohibiting all information unrelated to the primary dispute, the
restriction obviously is overbroad. Handbills and advertisements
are memorialized on paper-the government easily can police their
truthfulness on an individual basis. 139 Since "broad prophylactic
rules in the area of free expression are suspect, 1 40 the solution to
520 (1981) (plurality opinion).
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1982). First amendment rights
should not depend solely upon who the speaker is. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 777 (1978). The "for the purpose of" restriction is particularly objectionable be-
cause it makes first amendment rights depend not only on who the speaker is, but also on
whether the speaker is a union member. The restriction therefore also may violate first
amendment associational rights. See Baker, supra note 60, at 1031-35 (first amendment pro-
tects association as well as assembly); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S.
Ct. 3409, 3423 (1982); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
138. When the Union publishes Delta's flight safety record, the public, believing that a
vindictive motive prompted the Union to publish the information, may discount the record's
credibility. See NLRB v. Local Union 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 477
(1953).
139. Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978) ("in-person solicita-
tion is not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny," therefore, the government may
justify more easily prophylactic regulation).
140. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
In Ohralik, a commercial speech case, the Court endorsed the use of broad prophylactic
regulations. 436 U.S. at 464. Labor speech, however, is not commercial speech, nor should it
be treated similarly. See supra notes 97-125 and accompanying text. Moreover, the more
demanding inquiry into the government's interest and the precision of its regulation that
the Supreme Court has made in other commercial speech cases indicates that Ohralik may
be limited to its facts. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug. Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983);
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Bel-
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the problem of potentially misleading messages is not to enjoin all
messages as did the Board in Delta Air Lines, but to restrain only
the misleading ones1 41 or perhaps to require greater disclosure.142
Thus, the "for the purpose of" requirement is not narrowly tai-
lored to accomplish any sufficiently compelling government
interest.143
C. The Government's Interest in the "Producer-Distributor"
Requirement
The constitutional validity of the "producer-distributor" re-
quirement also is suspect. The producer-distributor language at-
tempts to further the acknowledged government interest of pro-
tecting neutral parties from labor disputes not of their own
making144 by focusing on the secondary's relationship to the pri-
mary: the more remote the relationship, the more "neutral" the
secondary, and the less the union can justify the publicity. In con-
trast, when the secondary distributes the primary's product, a close
relationship exists between the parties, and the secondary is less
neutral, and a secondary boycott directed against the primary's
product 145 injures the secondary roughly1 46 to the extent the secon-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
141. The Board in Delta Air Lines discussed the possibility that the safety data might
be misleading, but did not rule on that basis. The Board's injunction prohibited all publica-
tion of information unrelated to the primary dispute, not merely nontruthful or misleading
publicity. See 263 N.L.R.B. 996, 111 L.R.R.M. 1159 (BNA) (Sept. 10, 1982). Moreover, the
majority expressly rejected the administrative law judge's finding that the publicity proviso
did not cover the handbill because it contained "misleading unrelated" information. Id. at
998, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1161. Finally, to the extent the handbill misled the public about the
parties to the primary dispute, the Union's appeal probably was less effective and the gov-
ernment's interest not as great. See supra note 138.
142. See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
143. The Court's decision in NLRB v. Local Union 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers
(Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953), ostensibly supports the constitutionality of the
restriction in Delta Air Lines. In Jefferson Standard, technicians employed by, and in a
labor dispute with a broadcasting company, distributed handbills attacking the quality of
the company's product. The Board and the Supreme Court found that the employer was
justified in terminating the responsible technicians since the disparaging information was
unrelated to the primary dispute. No constitutional issue, however, arose in Jefferson Stan-
dard. The Court did not prohibit the employees from publicizing their message, but merely
found that the employees' activity had no affirmative statutory protection. The case in-
volved state action.
144. See supra note 133.
145. A boycott directed against only the primary's product is a product boycott. A
union's appeal to the consumer to withhold all patronage from the secondary is a total
boycott. A product boycott in some cases may "merge" into a total boycott when the pri-
mary product is inseparable from the secondary's remaining business. See, e.g., Hoffman v.
Cement Masons Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972) (struck product was homes, secon-
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dary benefits from its relationship with the primary. While this fo-
cus on the relationship between the primary and secondary may
appear tailored to the government's interest,1 7 the Board and
courts have interpreted the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
and the producer-distributor language of the publicity proviso in a
manner inconsistent with the government's acknowledged goal.
The Board and courts have not focused properly on the injury to
the secondary vis-a-vis its relationship to the primary; rather, they
have adopted a bifurcated approach when construing section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) that belies the government's acknowledged interest.
The inquiry under the "producer-distributor" requirement is
whether some business relationship or chain of production nexus
exists between the primary and secondary.14 When some minimal
relationship exists, the law permits total boycotts as well as prod-
uct boycotts.149 The law does not attempt to tailor the extent of
permissible injury to the nature of the secondary's relationship
dary employer was real estate developer), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); American Bread
Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969) (struck product was bread, secondary employer
was restaurant owner). When a merger occurs, the Board and the courts have treated the
appeal as one for a total boycott. Id. at 154.
146. Some consumers may withhold all patronage from the secondary even when the
union requests only a product boycott. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 82-83 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). With that exception, how-
ever, the secondary boycott would have no greater effect on the secondary employer than an
effective primary strike.
147. The statute, even if construed literally, still might be insufficiently tailored to the
government's interest. By focusing on the lines of production and distribution existing be-
tween primary and secondary, the proviso ignores other situations in which the secondary's
contributions to the primary are far greater than that of a distributor. But see supra note
48. For example, when the secondary is the parent of the primary but does not have appar-
ent actual control, the Board might consider the parent neutral, even though the parent
company may substantially influence the labor policy of the primary. See supra note 24;
Comment, Unions, Conglomerates, and Secondary Activity Under the NLRA, supra note
24, at 239 ("A conglomerate's power in labor negotiations stems from its size and diversifica-
tion, which give it the ability to 'cross-subsidize between industries and plants and whipsaw
different unions at . . . various facilities-supported by substantially enhanced financial
staying power.' ") (quoting Alexander, Conglomerate Mergers and Collective Bargaining, 24
INDUS. & LAB. REL. Rav. 354, 362 (1971)); see also Comment, Consumer Picketing of Eco-
nomically Interdependent Parties: Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB (Safeco
Title Insurance Co.), 32 STAN. L. Rav. 631, 643 (1980). This criticism, of course, may apply
more strongly to the Board's neutrality definition than to the "producer-distributor"
requirement.
148. See supra note 48.
149. See, e.g., United Steelworkers (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. 96, 101 (1979), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1981); American Fed'n of
Television and Radio Artists Local 55 (Great Western Broadcasting Corp.), 150 N.L.R.B.
467, 470-72 (1964), aff'd sub nom. Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1002 (1966).
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with the primary, and as a result, a secondary employer can incur
injury far beyond that which its relationship with the primary war-
rants. The inquiry, when the publicity proviso is found inapplica-
ble, even more starkly belies a government interest in protecting
secondary parties to the extent of their neutrality. The reviewing
body asks whether the boycott threatens substantial loss or
financial ruin to the secondary, 15 0 protecting the secondary only
when the boycott affects a substantial portion of the secondary's
business. Thus, rather than protecting relatively innocent parties,
the courts have construed the statute to provide more protection
to those secondary distributors who are less neutral.151
The chief problem, however, with the "producer-distributor"
requirement is not its failure to focus on the harm to the secondary
vis-a-vis the extent of its neutrality. Rather, it is that the restric-
tion is not the least restrictive alternative necessary to achieve the
government's goal. The government can achieve its goal equally
well by ensuring that the public learns of the actual relationship
between the secondary and primary employers.
A union is unlikely to conduct a consumer boycott of a secon-
dary that has no business relationship with the primary. The possi-
ble pressure a secondary could apply to the primary would be min-
imal. More importantly, even if informal means of pressure did
exist-through, for example, personal relationships of officers or
directors of the primary and secondary-the secondary likely could
not be persuaded to exercise the pressure through a consumer boy-
cott since the consumer appeal would have little affect on the sec-
ondary if the public was aware of the secondary's neutrality.1 52
On the other hand, if the secondary does have a business rela-
tionship with the primary, the government's interest does not re-
150. See supra note 49.
151. This, of course, assumes the Court has not determined the secondary to be non-
neutral, see supra note 24; see also NLRB v. Business Mach. & Office Appliance Mechanics
Local 459 (Royal Typewriter), 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955) (ally doctrine), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 962 (1956), or otherwise outside the prohibitions of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). See generally
supra note 49. As the Safeco case illustrates, however, the secondary can have a substantial
relationship with the primary without falling within either of these categories.
152. This highlights yet another infirmity with the Act's restrictions on nonpicketing
publicity. The Act by not requiring the charging party to show actual harm to the secondary
or imminent coercion of the primary before the trier issues an injunction thus sweeps within
its scope harmless as well as harmful speech and speech that does not produce a "clear and
present danger" of the feared substantive evil. See Jones, The Right to Picket-Twilight
Zone of the Constitution, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 995, 1020-27 (1954). Since the Act does require
a showing of harm for a damage award, see National Labor Relations Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. §
187 (1976), the problems of proof can not justify their overbreadth.
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quire that the secondary receive full protection from the union's
message since the secondary no longer would be completely neu-
tral. While the interested secondary arguably should not incur in-
jury far beyond its relationship to the primary, here again, the best
judge of the extent of the secondary's neutrality is the public. A
public that is aware of the secondary's relationship can decide
whether the relationship is significant enough to warrant the pres-
sure the union urges.153 Thus, the key to achieving the govern-
ment's interest is full and accurate disclosure of the secondary's
relationship with the primary.
The central failing of both the "producer-distributor" and "for
the purpose of" requirements ultimately is the government's un-
willingness to allow truthful speech for fear that the public may
not perceive its true merit or give it proper weight. Such paternal-
istic regulation cannot meet the exacting scrutiny of the compel-
ling interest standard,154and likely would be infirm even under the
lesser commercial speech standard. 55
153. The collective judgment may distort the individual's judgment-that is, many
consumers may feel that a secondary's limited relationship with the primary justifies limited
withholding of patronage and therefore decide to shop elsewhere, unaware that many other
consumers are doing likewise. The result, of course, would be a reduction in the secondary's
sales beyond that which the individual consumer desired. This "very distant possibility of
harm", however, does not justify infringing first amendment rights. In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 436 (1978).
154. See id. at 432; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 24 (1971); see also Redish, supra note 126, at 143; Stone, supra note 62, at 82.
155. In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980), the Court announced a four-part analysis for restrictions on commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted gov-
ernmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must de-
termine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
The Court has applied these requirements rigorously, see, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zen's Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and repeatedly has acknowledged that
the government may not suppress commercial speech entirely merely because the govern-
ment fears the misuse of such speech. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9; First
Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 791-92 & n.31; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
The restrictions on nonpicketing labor publicity suffer from precisely that infirmity.
Moreover, even in the case of commercial speech, the preferred solution to potential
harm is more-not less-speech, see infra note 159, the simple expedient that has eluded
the government in its restrictions on nonpicketing publicity. Thus, even under the lesser
protection due commercial speech, which is the minimum protection due nonpicketing labor
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V. A LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
The "producer-distributor" and "for the purpose of" require-
ments are not the least restrictive means to achieve the govern-
ment's goal to ensure that the union's appeals do not unjustly in-
jure secondary employers. 56 The government can achieve its
interest as effectively and less restrictively by more, not less, dis-
closure, a remedy that also accords well with the theoretical under-
pinnings of the first amendment.157 Full disclosure would provide
an informed public that could decide best if and the degree to
which the public should boycott the secondary. Full disclosure
would protect substantially innocent parties without trampling
first amendment rights. The government could place responsibility
for disclosure on either the secondary, the union, or both.
First, the law might require that the secondary employers
themselves provide the additional disclosure of information about
the secondary-to-primary relationship. Secondary employers can
counteradvertise, speak to consumers personally, or display signs
in their company windows. Placing the burden of disclosure on the
secondary alone, however, may be a more attractive than practical
solution. A secondary employer may not know of the union's activ-
ity or what the union's message is until after the union has begun
its appeal. Moreover, counteradvertising may not reach the identi-
cal audience that the union appeal reaches.
speech, see supra notes 96-125 and accompanying text, the "for the purpose of" and "pro-
ducer-distributor" requirements violate the first amendment.
156. Of course, least restrictive analysis can be a "slippery slope" for, as some justices
have recognized, "[a] judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with
something a little less 'drastic' or a little less 'restrictive' in almost any situation, and
thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
279 n.3 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers
Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). By the same token, however,
less restrictive alternative analysis requires something more than merely deferring to the
legislative judgment when the alternate regulation is only marginally less effective than the
regulations that restrict first amendment rights. See Ely, supra note 62, at 1486-87; see also
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978).
The Court has often applied a rigorous, less restrictive alternative analysis even in the
commercial context. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 540-41 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). Accordingly, a rigorous analysis is appropriate here, particu-
larly since nonpicketing labor publicity is a traditional mode of communication, see Ely,
supra note 62, at 1488, and since the proposed remedy relies on opening, not closing, the
channels of communication. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982) ("preferred remedy
is more disclosure, rather than less"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
157. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977)
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
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The second and preferred solution is to require the union to
make the disclosure. The Board already treats publicity that does
not sufficiently identify the primary as untruthful.15 A require-
ment that the union disclose additional information to prevent an
appeal from misleading the public would be within the limits of
this precedent.1 9
The union disclosure solution, however, does not resolve the
issue of what constitutes enough disclosure. The current Board
truthfulness requirement prohibits publicity that substantially de-
parts from fact or that is intentionally deceptive,"1 0 but because of
difficult questions of intent, this standard may not suffice to ensure
full disclosure." 1 The Board or the court, however, could engraft
onto the truthfulness requirement a simple burden-shifting proce-
dure to alleviate this problem and still provide the union with
some measure of predictability. For example, the Board could give
the union the burden of asking the secondary employer to provide
158. See, e.g., Local 732, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Servair), 229 N.L.R.B. 392, 392
(1977); Honolulu Typographical Union, No. 37, 167 N.L.R.B. 1030, 1032 (1967), aft'd, Hono-
lulu Typographical Union, No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952, 957-58 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
159. Questions arise whether the proposed disclosure requirements would be found
constitutional. To the extent the omission makes the publicity untruthful, the answer is
simple-untruthful speech is subject to regulation. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53,
67 (1966). Merely because the Board defines misleading speech as untruthful, however, does
not make it so. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, has broadly endorsed disclosure require-
ments at least in the commercial speech context, to prevent misleading, even if not untruth-
ful, messages. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (the remedy in the first instance for
potentially deceptive speech is not necessarily a prohibition but preferably a requirement of
disclaimers or explanation); see also id. at 200 & n.11; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 570-71 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
792 n.32 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). But see Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 n.11 (1979). The Court has reasoned that the commercial speaker is in
a position to know the truth of his message and has a strong financial motive that would
overcome any chilling effect that requiring disclosure would produce. See Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers,
440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 & n.24 (1976). Whatever the merits of a category-by-category
approach to chilling effects, see Farber, supra note 126, at 759, the Court likely would find
the same arguments applicable to labor speech. The union is a participant in the labor dis-
pute and therefore is likely to know the facts. Moreover, the union's strong motivation to
present its message frequently leads it not only to ignore threats of an injunction, but also
to speak in violation of an injunction. But see T. EMMSON, supra note 95, at 449 (full
protection theory applied to labor publicity would mean that the government could not im-
pose a truthfulness requirement).
160. See DeBartolo, 252 N.L.R.B. at 704 n.2; International Bhd. of Teamsters Local
537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 906 (1961).
161. See supra note 33.
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a disclaimer about its connection to the primary. The union's re-
quest would shift the burden of providing such a disclaimer to the
secondary. The union, exercising its option to include the secon-
dary's disclaimer in its publicity, would raise the potentially ir-
rebuttable presumption that both parties had made sufficient dis-
closure. 162 The presumption would serve as the union's "safe
harbor." The union's choice not to include the secondary's state-
ment in the union publicity would raise a presumption that the
union "intended to deceive." The union could rebut by explaining
why it excluded the disclaimer'63 and by demonstrating that the
message nonetheless was truthful and not misleading.
This remedy, admittedly, may not prevent all harm to a neu-
tral secondary. For example, consumers may not read the union's
entire message yet may respond to the appeal to withhold pa-
tronage. Alternatively, the initial receptors of the union message
may perceive the secondary's true relationship to the primary yet
convey that message incorrectly to others."' The secondary, how-
ever, partially may reduce these harms by counteradvertising. Un-
like the voter in an election, a consumer may recast his economic
vote.16 5 More fundamentally, "the people in our democracy are en-
trusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the rela-
tive merits of conflicting arguments .... [I]f there be any danger
that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments
advanced..., it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the
First Amendment."'' 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Labor increasingly has used the secondary boycott as a
weapon to apply economic pressure upon noncooperating employ-
ers. The secondary boycott raises statutory issues that the Na-
162. Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B.
901, 906 (promptly remedied handbill was evidence that the union did not intend to
deceive).
163. The union might decide to exclude the secondary employer's disclaimer from the
union's handbill because the disclaimer was too long, too costly, or inaccurate.
164. Nonpicketing publicity also may produce certain harms such as violence or re-
stricted access that are unrelated to the union's message. State law, however, provides suffi-
cient remedy for those injuries. See UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S.
266, 274-75 (1956); see also supra note 126.
165. But see Teller, supra note 61, at 201; Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commer-
cial Context, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1191, 1208 (1965).
166. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978); see also Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976);
Stone, supra note 62, at 104.
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tional Labor Relations Board and the courts have analyzed exten-
sively. The courts also have considered the constitutionality of
restrictions on one form of secondary pressure, consumer picket-
ing. The Board and the courts, however, repeatedly have avoided
addressing the constitutionality of restrictions on nonpicketing
forms of secondary consumer pressure. The legitimacy of such re-
strictions remains in doubt.
This Article argues that nonpicketing labor publicity should
receive full first amendment protection. Nonpicketing labor public-
ity shares few of the qualities that have justified the lesser protec-
tion accorded labor picketing. Despite its economic motivation,
nonpicketing labor publicity also is more deserving of full first
amendment protection than commercial speech, an area of speech
in which restrictions have come under increasingly rigorous scru-
tiny. Unlike commercial speech, nonpicketing publicity fully satis-
fies all the traditional values that underlie the First Amendment.
The restrictions that recent Board and court decisions impose
on nonpicketing publicity therefore infringe fully protected speech.
That infringement remains unjustified. The "for the purpose of"
and "producer-distributor" requirements are content-based restric-
tions that are not drawn narrowly to further a compelling govern-
ment interest. By ignoring the simple expedient of requiring more,
not less, speech, the restrictions are likely infirm under the re-
duced commercial speech standard which is the minimum standard
that courts can apply to nonpicketing labor publicity. In an era of
complex economic relationships, the use of secondary consumer
pressure is likely to increase and take novel forms. Accordingly,
the failure of the Board and courts to provide guidance to unions
and their advisors on the constitutional protection due such activ-
ity is most unfortunate. The courts should adopt the analysis that
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During the last half century the proper scope of the fourth
amendment1 and its related exclusionary rule has provoked heated
discussion among jurists' and scholars. 3 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the amendment as providing constitutional recognition
of the individual's right to privacy.4 The amendment, therefore,
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1. The fourth amendment guarantees,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. For a sampling of this debate in recent cases, see United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct.
2637 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319
(1983); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981);
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
3. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MIN. L. REV.
349 (1974); Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Pri-
vacy," 34 VAND. L. REv. 1289 (1981); Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?
Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974);
Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment?, 62 JuDicATuta 66 (1978); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary
Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect
World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 307 (1982);
McMillian, Is there Anything Left of the Fourth Amendment?, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1979);
Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulat-
ing the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365 (1981); Miles, Decline of the Fourth
Amendment: Time to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio?, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 9 (1977); Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1970); Schlesinger,
The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That it is a Deterrent to Police?, 62 JUmi-
CATURE 404 (1979); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 Ju-
DiCATURE 214 (1978).




protects the individual from unwarranted governmental intrusion
upon his person and domain. This protection is essential to the
maintenance of the proper balance between the life of a person as
an individual and his life as a member of society." Accordingly, po-
lice normally must have probable cause, and often a search war-
rant, before they lawfully can invade an individual's privacy to
search for or seize evidence.6 Few scholars question the value of so
protecting individual privacy. In contrast, however, the wisdom of
using the exclusionary rule as a procedural remedy for governmen-
tal violations of fourth amendment guarantees has been a topic of
extensive debate.
Under the exclusionary rule courts must exclude at trial any
evidence seized during searches made in violation of fourth amend-
ment standards. Since its earliest pronouncement,8 critics have
condemned this procedure that keeps relevant and reliable evi-
dence from the trial fact-finder. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo, for
example, described the rule as a mechanism permitting "[t]he
criminal. . . to go free because the constable has blundered."'
More recently the exclusionary rule's detractors have mar-
shalled their forces to reduce the rule's impact by carving out a
good faith exception. The exception provides for admission of ifle-
gally obtained evidence if the offending officer acted with the rea-
sonable good faith belief that his conduct conformed to the fourth
amendment. In their frustration with the exclusionary rule a num-
5. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 74 (1966). Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter recognized that the fourth amendment held "a place second to none
in the Bill of Rights." Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Even the first amendment cannot claim greater importance because "speech
activity is [but] a small albeit precious part of the lives of most citizens, and even its fullest
protection leaves the police unfettered to deal as they please with most of us most of the
time." Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 377-78.
6. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 356-58 (1967); United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102 (1965); cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In some situations
the search may be sufficiently limited as not to require probable cause. E.g., Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). Exigencies also may prevent an officer from obtaining a warrant. E.g.,
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
7. This statement is somewhat too broad. As discussed in part I, see infra text accom-
panying notes 38-42, illegally obtained evidence is admissible in certain types and stages of
various proceedings. But, as a general proposition, courts must exclude illegally seized
evidence.
8. The Supreme Court first articulated the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), but imposed the rule only upon federal courts. Nearly fifty years
passed before the Court extended the rule's application to encompass state courts as well.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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ber of courts,'0 jurists," state legislatures,' 2 legal associations,"
and scholars 14 have adopted or supported some form of this good
faith exception.'5
Given this climate, the good faith exception unsurprisingly has
gained the attention of the Supreme Court. Four, or perhaps even
five, of the Justices publicly have acknowledged their unease with
the exclusionary rule's effect and their sympathy with suggested
reforms."' At the Court's request, the attorneys in Illinois v.
Gates17 briefed and argued the issue of a good faith exception dur-
ing the October 1982 term. The Court, however, sidestepped the
issue by deciding the case on other grounds.'8 Nevertheless, within
10. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically has recognized a good faith excep-
tion. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1127 (1981). Since the new Eleventh Circuit was carved out of the old Fifth Circuit,
Williams likely is binding in the Eleventh Circuit as well.
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, _ 441 N.E.2d 725, 733-
34 (1982) (Wilkins, J.), cert. granted sub noma. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534
(1983).
12. At least two states have adopted by legislation some form of a good faith excep-
tion. See Axuz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (1982); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-3-308 (1982).
13. The prestigious American Law Institute has recommended the exclusion of evi-
dence only in those cases in which the police violation was "substantial." In determining
whether the violation, indeed, was substantial a court should consider all the circumstances,
including the willfulness of the violation. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §
SS 290.2(2), (4) (Official Draft 1975).
14. See, e.g., Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Excep-
tion to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. Crm. L. & CmIMNOLOGY 635 (1978); Bernardi, The
Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve a Liberal Interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment2, 30 DE PAUL L. REv. 51 (1980); Sunderland, The Exclusionary
Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141 (1978).
15. In its final report Attorney General William French Smith's bipartisan Task Force
on Violent Crime urged the Attorney General to support a good faith exception through
court argument and legislative recommendation. ATTORNEY GENERAL's TASK FORCE ON VIO-
LENT CRIME, FINAL REP. 55 (Aug. 17, 1981).
16. Four Justices have authored opinions supporting some form of a good faith excep-
tion. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2340-47 (1983) (White, J., concurring); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
611-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542
(1975) (Rehnquist, J.). Furthermore, Justice O'Connor, at her nomination hearings before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, testified about her belief that courts do not have to ex-
clude illegally obtained evidence under the fourth amendment if the court takes into ac-
count the good faith of police. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Nomi-
nation of Sandra Day O'Connor, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. 79-80 (1981) (unbound transcripts on
file in Senate Document Room).
17. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
18. In Gates the Court reversed the Illinois court's ruling suppressing evidence ob-
tained under a warrant supported predominately by an anonymous tip. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, found sufficient police corroboration of the tipster's information to
justify the magistrate's finding of probable cause. The Justice apologized for the Court's
avoidance of the good faith argument, but claimed such avoidance appropriate upon a re-
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three weeks of the Gates decision the Court accepted for argument
during the October 1983 term three cases concerning good faith
claims.19 Obviously, the Justices have signaled their readiness to
enter the fray.
Opponents of the good faith exception, therefore, now must
voice their arguments. This Article presents arguments that are
designed to influence the Court's deliberations, to create a basis for
critiquing the Court's opinions once rendered, and to provide guid-
ance for state courts, which soon may need to decide whether a
good faith exception is consistent with their state constitutions and
procedures. 20 To place the subsequent discussion in context, part I
cord which showed the prosecution never had raised or addressed the question before the
state tribunals and that none of the Illinois courts had considered the question. Id. at 2323.
Justice White, concurring separately, chastised the Court for avoiding the issue under a
totally unconvincing rationale. Noting that the Supreme Court's pronouncements bound the
Illinois courts regarding the federal exclusionary rule, he found requiring a litigant to re-
quest a state court to overrule or modify a United States Supreme Court precedent point-
less. Id. at 2338 (White, J., concurring). Such a practice would undercut stare decisis. "Ei-
ther the presentation of such issues to the lower courts will be a completely futile gesture or
the lower courts are now invited to depart from this Court's decisions whenever they con-
clude such a modification is in order." Id.
19. The United States Law Week noted the cases and described their good faith is-
sues as follows:
(1) Colorado v. Quintero, - Colo. -, 657 P.2d 948, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535
(1983). "Did Colorado Supreme Court mistakenly interpret Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against unreasonable search and seizure when it applied exclusionary rule to undis-
puted good-faith seizure of stolen property?" 51 U.S.L.W. 3914 (June 28, 1983).
(2) United States v. Leon, No. 82-1093 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1983), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
3535 (1983). "Should Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule be modified so as not to bar
admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on search warrant that is
subsequently held to be defective?" 51 U.S.L.W. 3914 (June 28, 1983).
(3) Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted
sub noma. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983). "Does Fourth Amendment
require inflexible application of exclusionary rule when police officer has reasonably and in
good faith relied upon search warrant to seize items specified in his application for warrant,
but warrant is subsequently invalidated for magistrate's error in failing to specify items in
warrant itself?" 51 U.S.L.W. 3913 (June 28, 1983).
Subsequent to the writing of this Article, on December 12, 1983, the Court dismissed
the writ of certiorari in Quintero. 52 U.S.L.W. 3460 (Dec. 13, 1983). The Court explained
that "it appear[ed] that respondent died on November 27, 1983." Id. Ironically, Quintero
could have been the most significant of the three cases since it involved the only search by
an officer not acting pursuant to any warrant.
20. Assuming the Supreme Court approves a good faith exception to the federal exclu-
sionary rule, state courts, consistent with the United States Constitution, may interpret
their state constitutional provisions as granting broader protections than federal law man-
dates. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489, 502 (1977). See, e.g., People v. Sporleder, - Colo. - , 666 P.2d 135 (1983)
(warrantless use of a pen register violates the Colorado Constitution even if it is consistent
with the federal Constitution under Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)); State v. Al-
ston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981) (New Jersey retains defendant's automatic standing
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of the Article briefly sketches the historical development of the ex-
clusionary rule. Part II develops the general arguments against the
exclusionary rule and the specific arguments in favor of a good
faith exception. Part III exposes the conceptual flaws of the excep-
tion by demonstrating its inconsistency with a constitutional con-
cept of right, its disastrous effect on the substance of the fourth
amendment, and its interference with a defendant's right to effec-
tive counsel. The Article considers practical problems associated
with implementation of such an exception in part IV. Finally the
Article, in its entirety, demonstrates the hidden agenda behind the
movement supporting the good faith exception: minimizing the
fourth amendment's significance and substantive protection.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
An understanding of the arguments for and against a good
faith exception requires some basic familiarity with the evolution
of the exclusionary rule and its traditional justifications. In 1914
the Supreme Court decided Weeks v. United States,2 1 which pro-
hibited the use in federal courts of evidence obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment. The Court stated in defense of this
position:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures... should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of
the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal
for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.22
The Court's concern in Weeks, therefore, was not nearly as
much with preventing illegal seizures by law enforcement officers
as it was both with preventing courts from becoming accomplices
in this illegal conduct2 3 and with dissipating any impression of ju-
dicial imprimatur.24 The Court viewed exclusion of illegally ob-
to invoke the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases in spite of federal court decisions
such as Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)); People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634
P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981) (California suspects have a right to counsel at pre-
indictment lineups even if federal suspects have no comparable right under Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972)). A recent amendment to the Florida Constitution, however, forbids
Florida courts from excluding evidence in those circumstances when similarly obtained evi-
dence would be admissible in federal courts. FLA. CONsT. art. 1, § 12.
21. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
22. Id. at 392.
23. The Court used precisely this language in the much more recent case of Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
24. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). William Mertens and Silas Wasserstom
identify four normative principles underlying the Weeks exclusionary rule: first, convicting a
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tained evidence as necessary to fulfill its responsibility under the
fourth amendment. Thus, the Court considered the substantive
scope of the fourth amendment and the procedural remedy of the
exclusionary rule inseparably intertwined.
Thirty-five years passed before the Court suggested the exclu-
sionary rule was not essential to enforcement of fourth amendment
guarantees. In Wolf v. Colorado2 5 the Court allowed the admission
in state criminal proceedings of evidence that would have been
inadmissible in federal proceedings under the exclusionary rule. In
so doing, however, the Supreme Court did recognize that the
fourth amendment limitations on governmental searches and
seizures bound the states, 2e but refused to require exclusion of evi-
dence as a remedy for state violation of the amendment's stan-
dards. Consequently, the Court severed the exclusionary rule from
its mooring in the substantive amendment and severely restricted
the exclusionary rule's range and effect. Therefore, free to develop
their own remedies for fourth amendment violations, 7 the states
and their law enforcement agencies found the Court's fourth
amendment rhetoric unobjectionable. Justice Murphy in dissent,
however, impliedly recognized that acknowledgement of a right
without provision of a specific remedy for violation likely would
result in no right at all: "Alternatives are deceptive. Their very
statement conveys the impression that one possibility is as effec-
tive as the next. In this case their statement is blinding. For there
is but one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction
at all.
''2s
Over time the wedge Wolf drove between the fourth amend-
ment and the exclusionary rule became unbearable to the Court.
defendant on the basis of unlawfully seized evidence is simply unfair; second, admission of
such evidence at trial constitutes an additional invasion of privacy; third, government is not
to be advantaged by the wrongdoing of its agents; and last, admission of unlawfully seized
evidence compromises the integrity of the courts. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 3, at
377-78.
25. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
26. Id. at 27-28. Because the Bill of Rights as initially conceived applied only to the
federal government, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 242, 246 (1833), from early
times the Court interpreted the fourth amendment as inapplicable to the states. See Smith
v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 Howard) 71, 76 (1855). With the advent of the post-Civil War
amendments, however, the Court gradually imposed the Bill of Rights upon the states by
incorporation into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, Wolf
held that the security of one's privacy against arbitrary government intrusion was "implicit
in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause" of the fourteenth amendment. 338 U.S. at 27-28.
27. See id. at 30-33.
28. Id. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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Many states ignored the Court's plea for them to design and im-
plement remedies for fourth amendment violations. Twelve years
after Wolf, the Court's dissatisfaction with the states' general un-
responsiveness culminated in Mapp v. Ohio2 9 The Justices no
longer were willing to accept the existence of a right without an
effective remedy for its violation. All evidence obtained by state
officials in violation of the fourth amendment, therefore, became
inadmissible at trial.3 0
According to Mapp, the exclusionary rule was to perform two
functions: first, protection of judicial integrity by avoiding the ap-
pearance of impropriety created by permitting use of tainted evi-
dence;"1 and second, deterrence of illegal police searches by com-
pelling "respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it.'))3 Protecting judicial integrity was firmly grounded in exclu-
sionary rule history dating back almost fifty years to the Weeks
opinion. The purpose of deterring illegal police behavior, however,
was of more recent vintage. In fact, the deterrence language that
the Court approvingly quoted first had been set forth in a decision
that the Court had rendered just one year earlier.33
While the Mapp decision failed to indicate which of these
functions was weightier, later decisions clearly illustrate the
Court's view that police deterrence is the preeminent purpose of
the exclusionary rule." Although occasionally alluding to the "im-
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. Id. at 655.
31. Id. at 659; see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960).
32. 367 U.S. at 656.
33. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Elkins marked the demise of
the so-called "silver platter" doctrine, whereby federal authorities could use in federal pros-
ecutions evidence unlawfully obtained by state police.
34. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Court refused to give retroactive
effect to Mapp's extension of the exclusionary rule to the states:
[A]ll of the cases... requiring the exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on the
necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police action.... We cannot say that this
purpose would be advanced by making the rule retrospective. The misconduct of the
police... has already occurred and will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners
involved.
Id. at 636-37. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the Court held illegally
obtained evidence admissible at grand jury proceedings under the theory that forbidding the
evidence's use at trial already achieved all possible deterrence. Id. at 349-52. But even as-
suming both Linkletter and Calandra were correct vis-a-vis deterrence, judicial integrity
surely was at stake in both cases. Evidently, the Court considered only police deterrence of
sufficient importance to mandate exclusion.
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perative of judicial integrity,"3 the Court has stressed the limited
role this justification plays in determining whether the rule should
be applied in a particular case. 6 Thus, the exclusionary rule has
taken on an instrumental appearance, warranting application only
when its consequence is significantly to enhance deterrence of ille-
gal searches and seizures. From this perspective, before a decision
to exclude evidence is justifiable a court must answer the following
two questions: First, will the suppression of evidence in a specific
case enhance deterrence of illegal police behavior? Second, is the
deterrence sufficient to outweigh the damage to other goals of the
criminal justice system? The decisional process, hence, becomes
utilitarian: simply balancing costs against benefits.37
Accepting this utilitarian approach to exclusionary rule deci-
sions, the Court has refused to apply the rule to those situations in
which its deterrent effect would be minimal. Accordingly, prosecu-
tors may use illegally obtained evidence in grand jury proceed-
ings,38 in impeaching a criminal defendant's testimony at trial,3 9 in
civil proceedings brought by a different sovereign than the one
that actually seized the evidence, 40 and in the criminal trial of a
defendant who lacks standing to invoke the rule's protection be-
cause he was not the actual victim of the improper search.,1 Fur-
thermore, a state prisoner no longer may seek federal habeas
corpus relief on fourth amendment grounds if he had a "full and
fair opportunity" to litigate the issue at the state level because, at
least in the Supreme Court's view, the "additional incremental de-
terrent effect" of exclusion at the habeas stage is insignificant.' 2
35. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
36. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976). Some scholars now view deterrence
as essentially the "sole theory" behind the exclusionary rule. E.g., Wilkey, supra note 3, at
220.
37. Utilitarian decisional modes are arguably inappropriate when dealing with consti-
tutional rights rather than with societal gratuities. See infra text accompanying notes 103-
07.
38. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
39. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
40. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
41. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
42. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). This consequentialist perspective
has become so prevalent in the exclusionary rule context that some of the rule's opponents
claim it now influences judicial analysis of the fourth amendment's substantive rights. Pro-
fessor Steven Schlesinger, for example, insists that the exclusionary rule forces the judiciary
to expand dangerously the meaning of a legal search in order to avoid exclusion of evidence
the judges are reluctant to suppress. Schlesinger, supra note 3, at 405. Professor Schles-
inger's perspective may explain the courts' increasing number of refusals to suppress evi-
dence by claiming no, or only a limited, legitimate expectation of privacy existed. See
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The pervasive deterrent justification for the exclusionary rule,
however, makes it highly vulnerable to attack. Whether suppres-
sion of improperly obtained evidence actually deters illegal police
behavior is subject to question.43 With its deterrent benefit in
doubt then, opponents of the rule argue its costs are too high and
its benefits too low. The rule's detractors now use this cost benefit
argument to justify a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
II. THE CASE FOR A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
Advocates of a good faith exception first focus on the general
costs of any exclusionary rule application. They stress that physi-
cal evidence is reliable whether or not illegally obtained. The pub-
lic, consequently, perceives excluding such reliable evidence as
merely freeing countless guilty defendants44 who then are able to
commit further offenses. 45 The rule further impairs the truth-find-
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (bank depositor has no fourth amendment
privacy interest in copies of bank checks and deposit slips retained by bank); Smith v. Ma-
ryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed); Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (the expectation of privacy in automobiles is sufficiently
reduced to justify a search with probable cause but without warrant).
43. As Professor Francis Allen observed, "the case for the rule as an effective deterrent
of police misbehavior has proved, at best, to be an uneasy one." Allen, The Judicial Quest
for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 537.
44. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule, therefore, may have significantly more
harmful effects than the exclusion of incriminating statements obtained in violation of fifth
amendment guarantees. Police tactics violating the fifth amendment purportedly threaten
the reliability of the verbal evidence so gathered. In contrast, little doubt exists about the
reliability of physical evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. Furthermore,
confessions frequently only serve to cement a conviction. See Interrogations in New Haven:
The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1588 (1967). In contrast, judicial suppression of
evidence obtained by illegal police searches actually may be determinative in some prosecu-
tions, especially those dealing with consensual offenses. See Oaks, supra note 3, at 746.
45. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413-16 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If The Constable Blunders?,
50 Tax. L. REv. 736, 741 (1972). Fourth amendment decisions, unlike decisions concerning
self-incrimination, are not directed predominately toward police treatment of the poor and
ignorant. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Rather,
their greatest impact is upon police investigations of activities frequently controlled by or-
ganized crime. Physical evidence is most essential in proving the offenses of gambling, pros-
titution, counterfeiting, and narcotics distribution. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1028; Oaks,
supra note 3, at 681-89. Furthermore, the consensual nature of many of these offenses, cou-
pled with the fear organized crime can inflict on its members and victims, makes police
fulfillment of the traditional demands of probable cause before search unusually difficult.
Trickery and deception, often perceived by law enforcement officials as necessary to over-
come evidentiary difficulties in dealing with sophisticated crime, are the very seeds from
which fourth amendment problems are born. Former New York City Police Commissioner
Vincent L. Broderick stated:
The narcotics agent-local or federal-who seeks evidence against organized criminals
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ing function of the trial proceeding, exclusionary rule opponents
argue, because the rule's application diverts the trial's focus from
ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the defendant to examining
police behavior.46 Additionally, critics assail the suppression rem-
edy as protecting only those against whom police discover incrimi-
nating evidence while providing no protection for innocent persons
subjected to illegal but fruitless searches.47 Its opponents, there-
fore, insist that each application of the exclusionary rule exacts a
substantial societal cost for the vindication of fourth amendment
rights.48
The exclusionary rule's indifference to the seriousness of the
defendant's alleged offense or the severity of the police officer's in-
fraction accentuates the appearance of excessive cost. Critics at-
tack as "contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to
the concept of justice' 49 the universal "capital punishment" that
the rule inflicts on all improperly acquired evidence regardless of
apparent disparities which at times can exist between the officer's
error and the degree of a defendant's likely guilt. These critics, fur-
necessarily operates undercover, on the street, masquerading as someone he is not.
Similarly the Secret Service agent attempting to capture counterfeiters assumes the
identity of an underworld purchaser of counterfeit bills. Laws against consensual
crimes, such as gambling and vice, can be enforced effectively only if police officers in
plainclothes conceal their true identities and adopt other ones. Deception and trickery?
Certainly. How else can we cope with sophisticated crime?
Broderick, Book Review, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 737, 741 (1968); see also A Forum on the
Interrogation of the Accused, 49 CORNELL L. Rsv. 382, 394 (1964). Clearly, then, exclusion
of illegally seized physical evidence can impede law enforcement efforts to convict the guilty
more severely than does exclusion of illegally obtained confessions.
46. Oaks, supra note 3, at 755.
47. See Irvin v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Oaks, supra note 3, at 755.
48. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727, 734 (1980). The cost of losing inherently trustworthy evidence may tempt courts either
to water down the standards for probable cause, Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights,
and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Stip. CT. REv. 46, 66, or to draw unrealistic distinctions in
favor of law enforcement, Ashdown, supra note 3, at 1315, in order to avoid the exclusionary
effects of a potential fourth amendment violation. Justice White, in his Gates concurrence,
suggested the monetary cost of exclusion also should be considered. Citing the Comptroller
General's study of the impact of the exclusionary rule on federal prosecutions, White noted
that one-third of federal defendants going to trial file fourth amendment suppression mo-
tions; 70% to 90% of such motions included the expense of formal hearings. 103 S. Ct. at
2343 (White, J., concurring) (citing COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPACT
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 10 (1979)).
49. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976). "[S]ociety has ... [a] right to expect
rationally graded responses from judges in place of the universal 'capital punishment' we
inflict on all evidence when police error is shown in its acquisition." Bivens v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The sense of the
criminal defendant's windfall, of course, is greatest when the officer allegedly made the error
in good faith.
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thermore, herald the rejection by other nations of a comparable
rule excluding evidence illegally obtained ° as proof that the doc-
trine is both unwise and unnecessary. Thus, although the exclu-
sionary rule's supporters defend it as a deterrent to unlawful police
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for fourth amend-
ment values,51 others fear that the public perception of a judicial
system easy on criminals and unresponsive to the cries for greater
security does considerable damage to the reputation of the crimi-
nal justice system and generates disrespect for the law generally.52
If the exclusionary rule is nothing but a judicially created de-
vice chosen from among other devices to enforce fourth amend-
ment guarantees5s and if this device truly has led to widespread
public disfavor with the criminal justice system," then judicial
50. England, Canada, Germany, and Israel all have refused to exclude evidence ob-
tained through illegal police searches and seizures. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 415 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Wilkey, supra note 3, at 217.
51. The Mapp court, for example, justified the exclusionary rule partially upon the
need for legal institutions to educate the public through example. "If the government be-
comes a law breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy." 367 U.S. at 659.
52. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule
and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScL 255, 256 (1961);
Wilkey, supra note 3, at 223; Wright, supra note 45, at 737.
Not only the public may react negatively to such a situation, but some jurists may as
well, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting), and undoubtedly law enforcement officers also lose respect for a system
they perceive as forcing the government to play the game fairly despite the criminal oppo-
nent's ruthlessness.
53. The fourth amendment, unlike the fifth, does not explicitly mandate exclusion of
evidence as the proper response for violation of its guarantees. This textual distinction be-
tween the amendments, coupled with court decisions justifying fourth amendment exclusion
on the basis of its deterrent value, has led many critics to view the fourth amendment's
exclusionary rule as a judicially created device rather than as an integral aspect of the con-
stitutional right. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976); Wilkey, supra note 3, at 216;
Crovitz, Exclusionary Rule Lives in a World Apart, Wall St. J., June 30, 1983, at 28, col. 3.
Clearly, this was not the Weeks Court's perspective of the importance of the rule in guaran-
teeing fourth amendment rights. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
54. The extent and depth of public disapproval in some quarters is clearly apparent in
newspaper editorials. See, e.g., Houston Post, Editorial, Nov. 16, 1977, at 2E (The results of
the exclusionary rule lead to "an absurdity that would likely be sensibly ordered in a more
primitive society."); Washington Star, Editorial, July 7, 1975, at A16 (The exclusionary rule
"is sometimes an outrage to common sense."); Wall St. J., Editorial, July 12, 1971, at 8, col.
1 ("Given the ... need to bolster public confidence that courts do dispense justice, it's
scarcely unreasonable to ask that [the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule] be reexam-
ined.") See also Crovitz, supra note 53, at 28, col. 6 ("The present U.S. exclusionary rule
does substantive injustice.")
Professor John Kaplan reports that public opinion polls show a high rate of disapproval
for courts seen by the public as coddling criminals. He identifies the exclusionary rule as the
prototype judicial doctrine causing this perception. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1035-36.
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concern over the rule is justified.5  The legitimacy of law exists on
a foundation of faith. The public must perceive its views of "good"
and "right" as prevailing rather than being circumvented by insti-
tutional machinations or it may lose its belief in the ultimate
moral nature of law. The loss of such a belief can lead to spiritually
unstable institutions and a general weakening of governmental
legitimacy.58
Societal faith thus is essential for effective functioning of any
legal system. The criminal justice system, in addition to controlling
unacceptable deviance, also serves to control the response by socie-
tal enforcers to such deviance.5 Although vendetta and mob rule
could serve to control deviance, only a criminal justice system that
also controls the controllers can enhance human dignity. A justice
system that limits the enforcers, however, will be able to promote
human dignity only if the system fulfills public expectations of so-
cietal protection sufficiently to remain legitimate. When legal insti-
tutions so limit the enforcers that the community believes its
needs for safety and justice are unfulfilled, however, the system
may lose its legitimacy and thus its power to control societal re-
sponses to deviance. Excessive judicial concern for individual
rights in the face of a public outcry for greater safety, conse-
quently, may lead to a popular backlash decreasing rather than en-
hancing respect and conformity to enforcement limitations.5 8
If utilization of the exclusionary rule leads to lost system legit-
imacy, the cost is high indeed.59 But detractors of the exclusionary
rule do not rest their position on costs alone; they also stress the
55. As Chief Justice (then Judge) Warren Burger remarked, "If a majority-or even a
substantial minority-of the people in any given community... come to believe that law
enforcement is being frustrated by what laymen call 'technicalities,' there develops a sour
and bitter feeling that is... sociologically unhealthy." Burger, Who will Watch the Watch-
man?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 22 (1964).
56. For a fuller discussion of the legitimation of law, see Ingber, The Interface of
Myth and Practice in Law, 34 VAND. L. Rv. 309, 338-46 (1981).
57. This dual purpose of criminal law is developed in Ingber, A Dialectic: The Fulfill-
ment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law, 28 RuTG. L. REv. 861, 863-68 (1975).
58. Fear of such a backlash was the basis of Justice White's dissent in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). He expressed concern that the call for human dignity in the
name of the defendant had gone too far. If governmental authority was unable to protect
the public from crime because of judicially imposed limitations on law enforcement, White
feared that "those who rely on the public authority for protection" might revert to the sav-
age techniques generally associated with self-help. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). He fur-
ther asserted that "[w]ithout the reasonably effective performance of the task of preventing
private violence and retaliation, it is idle to talk about human dignity and civilized values."
Id. at 539.
59. But see infra text accompanying notes 309-16.
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limited benefits of the rule. As developed earlier,6 0 the main articu-
lated and recognized benefit of the exclusionary rule is deterrence
of illegal police behavior. Scholars" and Supreme Court Justices,62
however, have expressed grave doubts on whether the exclusionary
rule actually influences police behavior. Statistics do not support
the rule's efficiency in deterring police misbehavior since criminal
defendant's make many motions to suppress illegally obtained evi-
dence each year. The abundance of such motions, however, also
does not support the conclusion that the rule is ineffective. No way
exists to determine whether many more fourth amendment viola-
tions would occur without the rule. The statistical battle, there-
fore, often turns upon who has the burden of proof: the rule's pro-
ponents to verify its deterrent value or its opponents to verify its
lack of such value. 4 Despite the lack of statistical proof either for
or against the rule's deterrent value, at least three factors justify
some intuitive doubt as to the rule's ability to influence police be-
havior: ideology of the police subculture, police goals other than
criminal convictions, and lack of meaningful communications be-
tween the courts and police.
Police gain their identity from their image as crime fighters.6 5
60. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
61. See, e.g., J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WrrHoUT TRMI 211-19 (1966); Dworkin, Fact Style
Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329
(1973); Oaks, supra note 3; Wilkey, supra note 3.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 n.5 (1974) (Powell, J.)
(doubt as to effectiveness of the exclusionary rule); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415-16 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("the hope that [the objective
of control of official activity] could be accomplished by the exclusion of reliable evidence
from criminal trials was hardly more than a wistful dream . . . [and] the history of the
suppression doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and practically inef-
fective in accomplishing its stated objective").
63. See Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961
Sup. CT. Rav. 1, 34.
64. The burden of proof issue, always implicit in the exclusionary rule deterrence con-
troversy, recently has become an explicit focus of the conflict. Compare Canon, The Exclu-
sionary Rule: Have Critics Proven that It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979)
with Schlesinger, supra note 3.
65. The popular view of the police officer in this society, at least of the urban police
officer that predominately has influenced the constitutional developments in criminal inves-
tigatory procedures, is one of a committed crime fighter protecting society. This image,
largely based on the false belief that police devote most of their time to crime prevention,
influences both who choses to join the police force and the self-image of those on the force.
See Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65
MICH. L. Rzv. 1123, 1124-25 (1967). Thus, although police spend most of their time dealing
with family squabbles, noisy disturbances, and requests for various forms of services and
information, law enforcement officials gear police agencies primarily to deal with crime, see
Goldstein, Police Response to Urban Crisis, 28 PUBL. AD. REV. 417, 418 (1968), and police
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The police force trains its officers to perceive themselves as better
equipped for crime fighting work than anyone else. This perceived
expertise is a source of status from which police hope to gain socie-
tal recognition for their "professional" position." Police, therefore,
tend to resent any interference by outsiders that reflects upon
their professionalism or inhibits performance of their professional
responsibility to control crime. Consequently, police officers are
not predisposed to accept and accommodate the court imposed ex-
clusionary rule.6 7
Police officers' increasing isolation from the rest of the com-
munity accentuates their lack of appreciation for the rule. While
police seek public admiration and support, their working personal-
ity which emphasizes danger and authority estranges them from
the conventional citizenry68 as well as from those who represent
potential threats. 9 Many civilians are uncomfortable about includ-
ing police officers among close acquaintances." The extreme mor-
alistic nature of the criminal law that police must enforce only ex-
acerbates this civilian concern about socializing with police officers.
Police, in turn, perceive themselves as representing authority.
see crime fighting as the "real" police work, see J. SKOLNICK, supra note 61, at 220.
66. Professionalization brings a sense of individual worth through identification with a
group publicly recognized as better than others at performing a specific job.
67. "[The police officer's] perception of himself as a crime-fighting craftsman," notes
Professor Albert Quick, "is outwardly manifested by a general hostility toward concepts of
procedural due process and those institutions that are identified with securing individual
rights-the courts and the liberal elements of society." Quick, Attitudinal Aspects of Police
Compliance with Procedural Due Process, 6 Am. J. Crm. L. 25, 26 (1978).
68. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 61, at 44.
69. According to Professor Jerome Skolnick,
The element of danger seems to make the policeman especially attentive to signs indi-
cating a potential for violence and lawbreaking. As a result, the policeman is generally
a "suspicious" person.
[B]ecause his work requires him to be occupied continually with potential
violence, [he] develops a perceptional shorthand to identify certain kinds of people as
symbolic assailants, that is, as persons who use gesture, language, and attire that the
policeman has come to recognize as a prelude to violence.
Id. at 44-45. See also Piliavin & Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM. J. Soc. 206
(1964). Often having to make instantaneous decisions, a police officer is likely to form and to
use stereotypes to facilitate his decisionmaking. Police may watch blacks, the poor, and
those acting in any way out of the ordinary more warily, not necessarily out of any
prejudice, but because these groups represent higher statistical risks of danger to society.
See Balch, The Police Personality: Fact or Fiction?, 63 J. Cram. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
Sci. 106, 111 (1972).
70. Civilians' knowledge that police officially are always on duty and frequently carry
guns generally inhibits civilians' speech and actions when in police presence. See Hahn, A
Profile of Urban Police, 36 LAw & CONTsMP. PROBs. 449, 453 (1971).
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Thus, they feel unable to shed this pose and act naturally except
among other officers and their families. A tendency, therefore, ex-
ists for police officers to nearly totally restrict both their profes-
sional and social relationships to other members of the police
force.7 1 This alienation from society and dependence upon other
officers for needed support and approval results in the creation of a
police subculture, which provides a basis for self-respect somewhat
independent of civilian norms.72
The prevalent attitudes of this police subculture, conse-
quently, far more than any abstract judicial articulation of right
and wrong, determine the pressure police experience to abide by
court imposed restrictions on their crime fighting ability.73 Officers,
"engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime, 7 4 may gain peer support or even reward for behavior that
the courts would not consider legal. 5 The need to respond situa-
tionally either to a perceived danger to others or to a threat
against his own authority may provoke an officer into action that
courts do not approve.7 6 As long as the officer strongly identifies
with the police subculture, which approves of his behavior, he hasimmediate and certain reinforcement from his primary peer group.
The mere possibility that sometime in the future, at trial or on
appeal, some aversive contingency may follow is significantly less
effective in controlling his future behavior.7 7 In fact, given the ex-
71. See M. BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY 188-219 (1964).
72. Lipset, Why Cops Hate Liberals-and Vice Versa, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1969, at
80.
73. The existence of a powerful police subculture results in police officers potentially
lacking awareness of the offsetting value positions possessed by individuals who identify
with numerous groups. Strong group cohesion among officers reinforces their attitudes and
limits needed appreciation and status to that given by the subculture. See J. SKOLNICK,
supra note 61, at 219. Society's evaluation becomes far less important to a police officer than
his peer group evaluation. Consequently, the impact of nonpolice criticism is minimal in
affecting police esteem and, thus, behavior.
74. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
75. For example, valued goals of the police subculture include return of stolen goods
or confiscation of contraband. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83. Furthermore,
judges are rule oriented; police are situation oriented. The police officer "approaches inci-
dents that threaten order not in terms of enforcing the law but in terms of 'handling the
situation.'" J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 31 (1968) (emphasis omitted). Conse-
quently, police view many strategies that would be illegal from a judicial standpoint as to-
tally justifiable.
76. Chief Justice Warren recognized the inability of the exclusionary rule to deter po-
lice behavior in circumstances that the police officer finds threatening. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968).
77. Chief Justice Burger, in a vigorous dissent assailing the exclusionary rule, noted
that "the long time lapse-often several years-between the original police action and its
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clusionary rule's focus on trial proceedings, it arguably has more
effect on the prosecution than on the offending police officer."
Whether the prosecutor's inability to gain a conviction will influ-
ence the police depends on whether police interests encompass
concerns other than successful prosecution.
A review of institutional incentives and pressures affecting po-
lice, however, shows that numerous purposes other than obtaining
convictions at trial79 may induce officers to use searches and ar-
rest.8 0 For example, law enforcement agencies often rely upon the
percentage of reported cases "cleared by arrest" as a measure of
police alertness and professionalism." Since an arrest need not re-
sult in a conviction to affect favorably the "clearance rate," this
institutionalized sign of police success subtly encourages illegal
searches and arrests.
The public itself sometimes encourages illegal searches and
seizures by vehemently demanding more aggressive law enforce-
ment.8 1 In an attempt to gain broader societal acceptance while
still fulfilling their subculture's primary objective of fighting crime,
final judicial evaluation" dilutes any "deterrent impact" on police of evidence suppressions.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 417-18 (1971).
78. The Court may be incapable of using evidentiary decisions as a means of control-
ling pretrial police behavior. See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 350-51.
79. Because a knowing and intelligent guilty plea does not require the defendant's
awareness of evidentiary defenses, Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 710 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958), and because all prior police behavior may be invulnerable
to attack once defendant enters such a plea, see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the incriminating evidence illegally gained may
sufficiently impress a defendant that he will plead guilty and avoid trial. Illegal searches,
consequently, still may aid in gaining convictions.
80. See Dworkin, supra note 61, at 330; Oaks supra note 3, at 721-22; see also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (exclusionary rule is powerless when police motive is other than
successful prosecution).
81. See J. GRIFFIN, STATISTICS ESSENTIAL FOR POLICE EFFICIENCY 69 (1958); J. SKOL-
NICK, supra note 61, at 167. Bureaucratic pressures can significantly affect police attitudes.
The factors used to evaluate merit and the heirarchy of roles all act as a system of incen-
tives for the officer intent on advancing within the force. The police bureaucracy places
value on obedience and efficiency. "Real" police work-work that gains both peer and offi-
cial acknowledgement-involves catching criminals. An officer rarely gets credit for not ar-
resting, searching, or questioning. In addition, "it is relatively easier to measure output re-
flected by the number of people arrested and the number of crimes solved than it is to
measure, for example, the number of people whose rights were protected. In a sense mea-
surement determines goals." Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the Police Organiza-
tion, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467, 472 (1971) (footnote omitted). See also Newman, The
Effect of Accommodations in Justice Administration on Criminal Statistics, 46 Soc. & Soc.
RESEARCH 144 (1962).




police frequently respond to such public pressure by making ar-
rests as efficiently and quickly as possible. While such arrests may
not gain judicial acceptance, they certainly improve the police's
public image. Community dissatisfaction, consequently, shifts from
what the public could have perceived as ineffective law enforce-
ment to what now it perceives as an overly technical court. Public
support and peer approval also can encourage illegal police behav-
ior if the officer, through an illegal search or seizure, can perform a
socially valuable service such as rescuing a kidnap victim, re-
turning stolen goods to their rightful owner, or removing narcotics
from the streets. Often police find lost convictions preferable to
lost opportunities to fulfill these goals."'
Police also believe that substantially increasing the expenses
attendant to criminal activity aids in their crime fighting responsi-
bility. Confiscation of criminal paraphenalia, the necessity for re-
peated bail payments, and the inconvenience and time loss that
the criminal experiences in arrest procedures all serve to cripple
criminal activity whether or not the corresponding searches and
seizures ultimately result in conviction. Incarceration prior to trial
can remove a danger 84 or public nuisance 5 from the streets, some-
times dissipating the problem despite the lack of a permanent con-
viction. Police may view arrest of a delinquent juvenile or a petty
hoodlum as necessary to reestablish official authority and reinforce
respect for the law. Additionally, arrest and search intimidation
greatly facilitates recruitment of informers, allegedly so vital in
fighting organized crime, regardless of any police intent to press
for prosecution.
Accordingly, the police have many alternative goals to convic-
tion that, at times, serve to encourage illegal behavior.88 When one
or more of these goals is present in a situation, the exclusionary
83. As the importance of the "pinch" becomes greater, the deterrence value of the
exclusionary rule correspondingly increases. Ironically, the public most questions the exclu-
sionary rule precisely when the crime is serious and the rule most likely will deter illegal
police behavior. Professor Kaplan, for example, has recommended exempting police misbe-
havior relating to serious crimes from the rule's coverage. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1046-49.
84. Fearing flare-ups of teenage gang rivalries, for example, police may incarcerate
gang leaders until passions have calmed.
85. For example, police often pick up prostitutes and drunks simply to remove them
from the streets.
86. Some critics even have suggested that the exclusionary rule allows corrupt officers
to appear to attempt zealous enforcement of the law while, through use of illegal searches,
immunizing from effective prosecution those criminals willing to pay the price. Dash, Cracks
in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 45 ILL. L. REV. 385, 391-92 (1951); Wilkey, supra
note 3, at 226.
19831 1527
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
rule's deterrent value likely is minimal. Furthermore, if the police
view the fourth amendment standards as impossible to fulfill, these
alternative goals become of primary rather than secondary impor-
tance. Difficulties in the court's communications with the police
make the amendment's standards at least difficult to understand,
if not impossible to fulfill.
Even assuming police desire to gain a conviction in a given
case, they must still know and understand what the court requires
of them before the exclusionary rule can deter their illegal behav-
ior. The case-by-case method of constitutional adjudication in
search and seizure matters often creates decisions no broader in
application than the case at hand.87 Additionally, court opinions,
striving to gain and retain a court majority, are rarely models of
clarity.8 Issues that badly divide the Supreme Court, fostering
strong dissents, further confuse police understanding of what the
Court requires of them.89 Police, therefore, may receive little guid-
ance for their behavior in the diverse situations that may confront
them. 0 Consequently, the deterrent benefit of the rule once again
is put in question.9 1
87. E.g., United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct.
1319 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
88. Often a dissenting opinion in a Supreme Court decision surpasses the Court's
opinion in logic and clarity. This occurs because the dissenter does not need to appease his
colleagues to retain a majority or worry about how his opinion actually will affect the law's
practical functioning. The majority opinion, on the other hand, must satisfy all the joining
Justices and must consider carefully whether the decision will obtain the public support
required for legitimacy and peaceful compliance.
89. Prosecutors trying to educate police about court cases face these same obstacles.
90. One scholar argues that the fact orientation of appellate court decisions is the
greatest impediment to control of police. Dworkin, supra note 61, at 334. Another author
recommends that courts draw "bright lines" formulating a clear set of rules that, in most
instances, will allow police to quickly reach a correct determination of whether a situation
constitutionally justifies an invasion of privacy. LaFave, supra note 3, at 320-24. The Su-
preme Court, in recent years, has made some steps in this direction. See United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
91. Attempting to limit the costs of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has cre-
ated the exceptions discussed supra in text accompanying notes 38-42. Ironically, these at-
tempts to limit the rule's costs likely have the corresponding impact of reducing its deter-
rent benefit. For example, because motions to exclude illegally obtained evidence only may
be made by a person with the requisite standing, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
174 (1969), such evidence may have great trial utility. The requisite standing exists only
when police violate that particular defendant's legitimate expections of privacy. Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Rakas v. nlinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). This standing require-
ment has encouraged illegal searches, especially illegal wiretapping and electronic eaves-
dropping. These devices are most useful in attacking organized crime. For example, the in-
formation obtained by police through an illegal wiretap may not be used against the owner
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The above arguments suggest that from a utilitarian perspec-
tive the exclusionary rule has excessive costs and limited benefits.
Opponents, thus, advocate total abandonment of the rule,92 or at
least, through judicial recognition of a good faith exception, further
restriction of the rule's effects in situations in which its benefits
are least likely. The proponents of a good faith exception base
their arguments on reason and precedent. If courts exclude evi-
dence in order to deter unlawful police behavior, exclusion argua-
bly has no value when the officer is honestly and reasonably una-
ware that his behavior is illegal. An officer acting in a manner he
believes consistent with fourth amendment mandates has no rea-
son to fear exclusion and, thus, no motivation to alter his con-
duct.93 In such circumstances, good faith exception proponents
note, exclusion retains its high cost without even the semblance of
any deterrent benefit gains. Furthermore, releasing a hardened
criminal because of insufficient evidence while "punishing" a dili-
gent police officer for making a reasonable good faith error in a
complex area of law seems manifestly unjust.
The Fifth Circuit has extended this logical position. In addi-
tion to having no deterrent benefit, argued the court, exclusion of
evidence obtained by a good faith error affects police behavior in
an undesirable manner. The court insisted that an officer, pun-
ished for behavior he honestly believed was legal, would eventually
become reluctant to act when his "proper and reasonable instinct
tells him that the activity he observes is criminal. ' 9 4 The above
utilitarian perspective, thus, provides proponents of a good faith
of the phone or against those participating in the overheard conversation. Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 178-79 (1969). For police willing to trade the lower echelon of
the criminal world for the higher-ups, however, illegal wiretaps can produce evidence admis-
sible against anyone other than those owning the phone or participating in the discussions
because they lack standing to object. Id. at 171-72, 174. See also United States v. Payner,
447 U.S. 727 (1980). Since fighting organized crime is an important police goal, the standing
requirement depletes the rule of much of its deterrent value. While the exclusionary rule's
critics approve of the standing requirement because it reduces the rule's costs, they fail to
note that it is a primary cause of their second objection to the rule, the limited deterrent
value of exclusion.
92. Even staunch critics of the exclusionary rule have sometimes expressed concern
over the negative symbolic effect abandoning the rule prior to the development of some
meaningful substitute might have upon fourth amendment interests. Bivins v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Kaplan, supra
note 3, at 1055; Oaks, supra note 3, at 756.
93. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1044.
94. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 842 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (quoting




exception with a logical and initially appealing argument.
In addition to this utilitarian logic, exception proponents offer
precedent to demonstrate that a good faith exception is not incon-
sistent with fourth amendment doctrine but rather is simply the
fruition of a developing trend. The two cases most frequently men-
tioned by those advocating the exception are United States v.
Peltier95 and Michigan v. DeFillippo.96 In Peltier the Supreme
Court refused to retroactively apply its holding in Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States.97 In Almeida-Sanchez a roving border
patrol seeking illegal aliens discovered contraband during a vehicle
search. Neither probable cause nor consent existed for the search;
the car was simply in the general vicinity of the Mexican border.
The Court found the evidence seized inadmissible. The search in
Peltier predated the Almeida-Sanchez opinion. In finding for the
government the Court used language the meaning of which, some
insist, extends far beyond the parameters of a retroactivity
controversy:
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct[,]
then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be
said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be
charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. 8
Such language, claim those supporting an exception, signals the
Court's disapproval of applying the exclusionary rule when police
act both reasonably and in good faith.
Michigan v. DeFillippo concerns a somewhat more complex
factual situation than Peltier. Police arrested defendant for violat-
ing a Detroit ordinance requiring a person lawfully stopped by po-
lice to produce evidence of his identity. During the search incident
to this arrest police found drugs on defendant's person. The Michi-
gan Court of Appeals, finding the ordinance under which the arrest
occurred unconstitutionally vague, believed that both the related
arrest and search, thus, were invalid. The state court, therefore,
overturned the defendant's drug offense conviction. The Supreme
Court reversed.
The Court accepted the state court finding that the ordinance
under which the police made the initial arrest was unconstitu-
tional. The Court, however, held constitutional the police officer's
95. 422 U.S., 531 (1975).
96. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
97. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
98. 422 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added).
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behavior and the resulting drug conviction. In upholding the
search, the Court insisted that it should not require a prudent po-
lice officer to anticipate that a court subsequently will find invalid
the ordinance under which he is making an arrest and incidental
search. 9
Exception proponents use DeFillippo as precedential support
for a good faith exception under the following reasoning: If courts
cannot require a prudent officer to anticipate the ultimate consti-
tutionality of an ordinance before a search can be valid, how can
the courts require such an officer to anticipate a change in the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of fourth amendment guarantees?
Exception proponents argue it is equally, if not more, inappropri-
ate to punish an officer for resolving a situational crisis in a man-
ner consistent with that recommended by many of the most delib-
erative legal minds merely because five of the nine sitting Supreme
Court Justices reject his actions. The proponents, thus, argue that
a general reasonable good faith exception is consistent with the
spirit and logic of such precedent.
This Article has now described the historical development of
the exclusionary rule, presented the arguments opposing the rule,
and presented the logic and precedent supporting a good faith ex-
ception. The Article now shall prove that recognition of a good
faith exception would be at best inadvisable; at worst, disastrous.
III. THE CONCEPTUAL FLAWS OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
A good faith exception to the exclusionary rule has a number
of serious conceptual flaws. The exception would thwart any vindi-
cation of recognized fourth amendment rights, and thereby depre-
cate the constitutional provision itself. Furthermore, the concept of
deterrence, which detractors use to attack the exclusionary rule
and thus to support the good faith exception, is improperly nar-
row. Most significantly, adoption of the exception would affect det-
rimentally the substance and development both of the fourth
amendment and of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
A. The Vindication of Right
1. The Concept of Right
At the most conceptual level, the utilitarian perspective sur-
rounding and justifying the exclusionary rule generally and the
99. 443 U.S. at 37-38.
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good faith exception specifically is misdirected. For the concept of
right in this constitutional system to have any significance, it must
embody more than an arithmetic computation of costs and bene-
fits. In a democratic system of government, dominant viewpoints of
established groups need no protection. Electoral accountability en-
sures that public officials who regularly dissociate themselves from
or interfere with popularly accepted perceptions of public welfare
cannot obtain or hold their positions. Only speech, religions, and
claims of individual prerogative that the public does not recognize
in their situational context 00 as generally advancing societal inter-
ests need protection under the auspices of "right." "The institu-
tion of rights against the Government," insists Professor Ronald
Dworkin, "is not a gift of God, or an ancient ritual or a national
sport. It is a complex and troublesome practice that makes the
Government's job of securing the general benefit more difficult and
more expensive . . . ,,101 If rights were cost free they would need
no constitutional articulation. The Bill of Rights is inherently anti-
governmental. It exists precisely to prohibit government from us-
ing certain specified means, whether or not such means are effi-
cient or necessary to reach what the public believes to be legiti-
mate and laudable societal goals.102
A utilitarian perspective on rights developed as an outgrowth
of the writings of the legal realists who perceived law's authority as
stemming from its ability to affect society beneficially.103 While the
end/means utilitarian justification for law advanced by the realists
appears highly appropriate in legislative and administrative poli-
cymaking forums and in the development of common law doctrine,
the justification denigrates the unique status of claims of constitu-
tional rights. Such constitutional claims take on an ethical and
normative aura that normally must transcend a cost benefit analy-
100. While the public rhetorically may embrace the value of free speech, for example,
everyone is not likely to defend the rights of Nazi's to march and demonstrate in the
predominantly Jewish community of Skokie, Illinois. See generally Goldberger, Skokie: The
First Amendment Under Attack by its Friends, 29 MERCER L. REV. 761 (1978).
101. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198 (1977).
102. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 353. In a democratic system, the written guaranty of
individual rights that judicial institutions are to enforce either may be (1) an act of extreme
elitism because the guaranty abrogates policies supported by popularly accountable institu-
tions or, (2) an act of self-imposed paternalism accepted by a polity not always confident of
its situational wisdom.
103. See, e.g., R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1954).
According to Professor Roscoe Pound, a renowned spokesman of the utilitarian perspective,
law is concerned with "social engineering" and the lawyer and jurist, at least when fulfilling
their most creative roles, are "social engineers." Id. at 47.
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sis within the specific situational contexts in which the claims
arise. The rights' acceptance in light of their cost demands a sense
of their transcendental value, their mysticism, rather than merely
their instrumental justification. 04 Justice Brennan recognized the
uniqueness of claims of right when he wrote, "the efficacy of the
Bill of Rights as the bulwark of our national liberty depends pre-
cisely upon public appreciation of the special character of constitu-
tional prescriptions."' 05
Certainly, to argue that resource availability and the impact
on important societal goals are irrelevant to the recognition and
acceptance of a claim of constitutional right would be simplistic
and constitutionally naive. When the Justices claim that such con-
siderations are improper,' they most often merely are acknowl-
104. Courts considered and supported the non-pragmatic but symbolic role of law dur-
ing the Watergate debates over the amenability of the President to judicial process. Judge
Wilkey of the District of Columbia Circuit writing in dissent asked the realist's question:
"[I]f the court . . . has no physical power to enforce its subpoena should the President
refuse to comply. . .[then] what purpose is served by determining whether the President is
'immune' from process?" Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting). The majority of the Court, however, disagreed with the implication of Judge
Wilkey's rhetorical question. Instead, they upheld the ruling of the trial judge, Judge Sirica,
who insisted, "That the Court has not the physical power to enforce its orders to the Presi-
dent is immaterial to ...resolution of the issues. ... [T]he Court has a duty to issue
appropriate orders. . . .[I]t would tarnish the Court's reputation to fail to do what it could
in pursuit of justice." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Richard M.
Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1973). Impact was not the issue; constitutional responsibil-
ity was.
105. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 634 (1980). Only on rare occasions in re-
cent years has the Court recognized the special character of constitutional rights that for-
bids balancing them against the interest of other societal goals. For example, in New Jersey
v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), the Court held that testimony given under a grant of legisla-
tive immunity could not be used to impeach the witness at his later trial for misconduct in
office. Regardless of the societal interest in keeping a defendant from benefiting from a
possible perjury, the Court concluded that: "Here... we deal with the constitutional privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form. Balancing, therefore, is
not simply unnecessary. It is impermissible." Id. at 459.
106. In Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), the Supreme Court upheld an indi-
gent's right to a free trial record for appeal purposes even though the crime was punishable
only by fine. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, insisted that
Griffin [v. Illinois] does not represent a balance between the needs of the accused and
the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defen-
dants out of as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own
way. . . .The state's fiscal interest is, therefore, irrelevant.
Id. at 196-97. In a society more and more conscious that resources are finite, however, deci-
sionmakers (judges and others) are more likely to recognize rights when resources are read-
ily available to effectuate such rights than when recognition would bankrupt other societal
goals. Few judges have been as candid as Judge Clement Haynesworth who, in Moffitt v.
Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), supported a right to ap-
pointed counsel for permissive appellate review by arguing that "[w]hat is requisite today
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edging the myths of constitutional continuity and stability, and are
using them to bolster their own position even though they are
aware that the myths are unattainable. The proper decisional pro-
cess for courts when determining whether to recognize a right pos-
sessing a scope broad enough to encompass the claim of its viola-
tion in a specific case, however, is fundamentally different from the
decisional process that courts should use once they accept the right
and find a violation. Interpretation of the open textual clauses of
the Bill of Rights may require an evaluation of whether the inter-
preted right proffered is worth the societal cost that its acceptance
would entail. If courts can define the right in such a way to allow
most of its potential benefit while reducing its cost, so much the
better.107 But once courts recognize a right, they no longer should
be able to find its enforcement too costly in specific cases. Further-
more, if the concept of right is to have any meaning, once the court
acknowledges a violation it must provide a remedy that allows the
injured individual to gain vindication for his claim. Courts, there-
fore, justifiably may consider costs and benefits when determining
the meaning and scope of rights. But consideration of such factors
is improper when the query is whether courts should grant a rem-
edy to an individual whose constitutional rights acknowledgedly
were violated by the state.
Admittedly, the fourth amendment is not cost free. Public
safety, indeed, may be more difficult to provide or expensive to
obtain when the fourth amendment restricts the types of behavior
government can utilize in fighting crime. The existence of the
amendment, however, exemplifies a societal belief that, although
community safety is a legitimate public concern, the price for such
may not have been constitutionally requisite ten years ago, or even a few years ago. As our
legal resources grow, there is correlative growth in our ability to implement basic notions of
fairness." Id. at 655.
107. This perspective explains those cases that only permit prospective application of
newly articulated criminal process rights. See, e.g, Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244
(1969); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965). Requiring retroactive application of all such rights might require the re-
lease or retrial of numerous convicted criminals. Jurists, thus, may find it difficult to accept
that the societal gain from the new interpretations is worth the societal loss that extremely
disrupting the criminal justice system would entail. Prospective only application allows for
evolution of new interpretations of process rights as ethical perspectives change without
requiring the system first to absorb the cost of former misinterpretations. Consequently,
nonretroactivity cases such as Peltier, see supra text accompanying notes 95-98, encourage
constitutional development in the fourth amendment field. This Article later notes that a
general good faith exception retards precisely such a development. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 200-15. Peltier, therefore, is distinguishable and good faith proponents cannot
justifiably view it as precedential support for a broad good faith exception.
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safety, seen in terms of lost individual privacy, can become too
great.""8 The Constitution accomplishes this accommodation of the
public's interest in safety and the individual's interest in privacy
through a guarantee of individual rights that is not absolute: the
amendment's language clearly indicates that government rightfully
can invade individual privacy when it acts reasonably, often neces-
sitating the existence of probable cause and the possession of a
warrant.10 9 An analysis of costs and benefits is built into the
amendment itself. What courts must decide in the individual case
is whether the government acted reasonably in invading the indi-
vidual's privacy, not whether protection of such privacy is too
costly or of too little benefit to support vindication of the right
once they find a violation.
A legal system that attempts simultaneously to control unac-
ceptable deviance and the behavior of the laws' enforcers 10 is un-
derstandably complex in its application to individual situations. A
result in a specific case may seem inefficient and improper."1 But
108. The development and utilization of technology capable of keeping all people
under constant surveillance could drastically reduce the threat to societal order. But, in
spite of the imminence of the year 1984, the prices of such an Orwellian state are too high.
109. Even under such a qualified right, the Constitution does inhibit somewhat the
criminal justice system's quest for truth. The searches prohibited by the fourth amendment,
if permitted, likely would expose much evidence of criminality that the courts, in turn,
could use to convict the truly guilty and acquit the truly innocent. No question exists that
the quest for truth is a fundamental goal of our criminal justice system, but it is not an
exclusive goal nor even one superior to all others. The quest for truth rather is an objective
that the criminal justice system may obtain only by means consonant with other objectives,
most particularly those established in the Constitution. Justice Brennan articulated this
view, insisting that,
The procedural safeguards mandated in the Framers' Constitution are not admonitions
to be tolerated only to the extent they serve functional purposes that ensure that the
"guilty" are punished and the "innocent" freed; rather, every guarantee enshrined in
the Constitution, our basic charter and the guarantor of our most precious liberties, is
by it endowed with an independent vitality and value, and this Court is not free to
curtail those constitutional guarantees even to punish the most obviously guilty.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 524 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The community's concern about the effective prosecution of crime is understandable.
Society, however, must be wary for "[t]he history of liberty has largely been the history of
observance of procedural safeguards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
Furthermore, the relaxation of those safeguards historically almost always has taken place
in the face of plausible governmental claims of threats to good social order. Amsterdam,
supra note 3, at 354.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
111. E.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). Police operating under a warrant to
search a bar for narcotics also searched the several patrons of the bar then present. The
state courts held the heroin discovered on one of the customers admissible because a state
statute authorized the police when executing a warrant to search all those present. The
statute's purpose was to protect the officers from attack and to prevent the disposal or con-
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such inefficiency and impropriety may be the cost of having and
enforcing controls upon the controllers-the fourth amendment,
for example-in the first place.
2. Remedy as Vindication
For constitutionally guaranteed rights to represent something
beyond simple platitudes, the remedy provided for their violation
must have some measurable consequence that vindicates the right
in a manner which "invokes and magnifies the moral and educative
force of the law."112 The exclusionary rule, of course, does provide
this needed confirmation of the right of privacy of one's person
and domain. 13 During the evolution of exclusionary rule doctrine,
however, courts increasingly have ignored the rule's efficacy in vin-
dicating the violated right. Judicial perception of the rule's pur-
pose has become misdirected. The relevant concern has switched
from whether the rule vindicates the right violated to whether it
serves to deter illegal police behavior by "punishing" a police
wrongdoer.1 1 4 The legitimate purpose of exclusion is not to place
sanctions upon the specific officer, but to impose them upon the
legal system in whose name he is functioning. Exclusion not only
vindicates the right violated, but also eliminates the appearance of
a system that encourages practically what it condemns rhetorically.
Weeks clearly defended exclusion upon this basis. 115 But
courts have interpreted Mapp as recognizing the suppression doc-
trine's utilitarian deterrent function. Mapp, however, does not dis-
cealment of those things described in the warrant. The Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tions concluding that an individual's mere presence at the site of a warranted search does
not subject him to a search of his person. Permitting such a search, however, certainly would
provide protection of the officer and prevent defeat of the warrant's goal. Despite these
efficiency concerns, however, the Court recognized that probable cause to search must be
more particularized than the statute dictated if the fourth amendment was to remain rele-
vant to individuals functioning in a mobile society. Rights and symbols took precedence
over efficiency.
112. Professor Dallin Oaks, often viewed as an exclusionary rule detractor, recognized
that the rule functions in this manner. Oaks, supra note 3, at 756.
113. If a court admitted illegally obtained evidence at trial, the propriety of the illegal
conduct would appear confirmed rather than the violated right vindicated. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
114. This focus on punishing police is very strong among the exclusionary rule's crit-
ics. Wilkey, supra note 3, at 220. The good faith exception further confuses the issue of the
fulfillment of a right with that of the culpability of an officer. Certainly, the law should not
punish a nonculpable officer. See infra text accompanying notes 142-43, & 175. But a police
officer's good faith error should not make the violation of a citizen's reasonable expectations
of privacy a matter of inconsequence and system indifference.
115. See supra note 24 and text accompanying notes 23-24.
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cuss punishment of culpable officials, but rather in using the lan-
guage of Elkins, it insists that exclusion is necessary to deter by
"compell[ing] respect for the constitutional guaranty . . .by re-
moving the incentive to disregard it.""'  Courts, thus, were to
achieve deterrence not by punishing the erring officer, but by nur-
turing respect for the right through creation of a system that in no
way supported or encouraged the right's violation. The Court rec-
ognized that the exclusionary rule would not end all illegal
searches or seizures, but it would assure that the judicial system
would not approve violations, thus ensuring the right's vindication.
Mapp's concept of deterrence was inherent in, rather than sepa-
rate from, its interest in judicial integrity and in law playing a role
as educator. The Court did not consider the exclusionary rule to be
based upon a shakey utilitarian foundation. 7
Largely due to this confusion surrounding Mapp, Supreme
Court opinions considering fourth amendment violations and their
appropriate remedies, at times, have appeared to accept inconsis-
tent or contradictory doctrines." Standing cases have required
that defendants demonstrate distinctly personal rights or interests
in the evidentiary items they seek to suppress before they can
press for an exclusionary remedy because "Fourth Amendment
rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously as-
serted." 9 Thus, prosecutors may use illegally obtained evidence at
trial against all but those whose particular expectation of privacy
the police invaded. At other times, however, the Court has insisted
that although the defendant can prove a personal violation, exclu-
sion may not be necessary. These cases view the exclusionary rule
as a "judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.
1 20
Under this doctrine the vindication of individual rights becomes
116. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (emphasis added).
117. Ironically, the utilitarian analysis of situationally balancing costs and benefits,
apparently accepted by a majority of the Court, may encourage law enforcement agents to
do similar balancing when considering whether to search or arrest. Given the police officer's
likely bias for ferreting out crime, see supra text accompanying notes 65-66, the utilitarian
perspective may diminish the exclusionary rule's ability to deter a specific officer from act-
ing illegally.
118. See generally Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The
Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151 (1979).
119. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 164, 174 (1969).
120. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). See also Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 482 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975).
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secondary. The primary purpose becomes regulating governmental
conduct by assuring adequate deterrence of illegality. Thus, a
prosecutor may not use unlawfully acquired evidence at trial for
his case in chief but may use the evidence for impeachment pur-
poses 21 or before a grand jury.122
Professor Anthony Amsterdam suggests that these two lines of
cases represent divergent views of the fourth amendment. Under
one view the amendment is a "collection of protections of atomistic
spheres of interest of individual citizens . . . ." Under the other
view the amendment is establishing a regulatory principle requir-
ing police to act in a certain way in order to protect people gener-
ally. '2 While the atomistic language used in the standing line of
cases does appear inconsistent with the regulation language in the
other, two explanations are possible. The first explanation accepts
that the rhetoric is inconsistent, but points out that both lines of
cases functionally support limitations upon the scope and effect of
the exclusionary rule. Under this explanation the Court is merely
focused on the unitary goal of reducing the scope and effect of the
rule and is willing to be inconsistent in its rhetoric if such inconsis-
tency furthers its goal.
The second, and more palatable explanation, argues that the
two perspectives are not inconsistent, rather, they represent two
different stages in fourth amendment analysis. The first stage con-
cerns a determination of who may demand vindication of a vio-
lated right. Only those who can demonstrate deprivation of per-
sonal rights will have the court address their claims at stage two.
The second stage concerns choosing an appropriate remedy. Not
all defendants whose fourth amendment rights the police have vio-
lated may insist upon the same remedy. At this stage, the court
may consider the public utility of various remedies. From this per-
spective, a court legitimately may restrict application of the exclu-
sionary rule "to those areas where its remedial [deterrent] objec-
tives are thought most efficaciously served. 1 2" The remedial
deterrent objective may not be as readily achievable when a police
infraction is due to a reasonable good faith error. Thus, under this
explanation the good faith exception indeed seems attractive.
An individual whose claim has reached the second stage, how-
ever, already has proved violation of his fourth amendment rights.
121. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
122. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
123. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 367.
124. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
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The only question remaining is what remedy device a court should
choose to vindicate such rights. A decision against applying the ex-
clusionary rule, therefore, must assume that an alternative remedy
exists and is preferable. Otherwise a court, although acknowledging
the right's violation, would be treating it as a matter of indiffer-
ence, and the claim of right would go unvindicated. This argument
is essentially the same as that the Court made in Mapp itself:
"without the [exclusionary] rule the assurance against unreasona-
ble. . . searches and seizures would be 'a form of words,' valueless
and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable
human liberties .... ,,ls5An appropriate retort is that all this Ar-
ticle has proved is that a court must vindicate an individual whose
fourth amendment rights it recognizes as violated by imposing a
remedy of some measurable consequences, but not necessarily with
a remedy as costly to the criminal justice system as the exclusion-
ary rule. Chief Justice Burger has championed this contention ob-
serving that "[r]easonable and effective substitutes [for the exclu-
sionary rule] can be formulated . ... ,, Contrary to the Chief
Justice's assertion, however, exclusion provides the only effective
remedy for fourth amendment violations, especially those made in
good faith.
Although alternative legal remedies for illegal searches and
seizures have superficial appeal, all have serious defects. A court
likely would not issue injunctions prohibiting illegal police behav-
ior: although they could be useful against violations sanctioned by
promulgated state policy, 2 8 such injunctions likely would be inef-
125. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
126. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
127. Oaks, supra note 3, at 673.
128. Even such a limited use of injunctions is unlikely. In a recent suit, petitioner,
claiming to have been choked illegally by police who were acting consistent with police de-
partment policy, sought an injunction against such police behavior. In City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983), the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts could not grant
such injunctions. The Court held that while plaintiff conceivably should receive damages for
injuries already suffered, an injunction applies to future behavior. Since the plaintiff could
not demonstrate that in the future police again would stop and illegally choke him, his need
for an equitable remedy was too speculative. Id. at 1669. The plaintiff was unable to show a
"personal stake in the outcome" of the case, id. at 1665, and thus the Court dismissed plain-
tiff's appeal for lack of an established case or controversy. Justice Marshall noted in dissent
that the ruling virtually removed an entire class of constitutional violations from the courts'
equitable powers. "It immunizes from prospective equitable relief," he insisted, "any policy
that authorizes persistent deprivations of constitutional rights as long as no individual can




fective against situational violations by individual police officers.12
Criminal prosecution of police officers for improper searches and
seizures also would be ineffective. Police are reluctant to arrest,
prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute, and juries are reluctant to
convict officers who make illegal searches in an effort to protect
society from crime.130
Additionally, although improper police behavior is a common-
law tort, juries are not likely to find significant damages13 1 against
police, especially in favor of a plaintiff accused or convicted of
crime.3 2 Besides, damages may not be collectible if the officer
lacks recoverable resources and sovereign immunity protects the
officer's employing governmental unit.133 Although Monell v. De-
partment of Social Services"" held that injured parties could sue
cities for violating constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
Supreme Court specifically cautioned that liability could not exist
unless the city's agent was acting in furtherance of official policy.1 15
Consequently, most illegal searches and seizures, involving situa-
tional use of discretion by police, can not lead to governmental lia-
bility. Thus, tort liability also proves an ineffective remedy for
these fourth amendment violations. Even assuming such liability
were available, however, such a remedy might give the impression
that government has the authority to simply buy out of any re-
sponsibility it has to comply with constitutional commands. Dam-
ages from illegal searches then would become just one more added
129. The Court often has demonstrated its lack of enthusiasm for granting injunctions
that would require active and continuous monitoring by the courts in the situational enter-
prise of police work. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488 (1974).
130. Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L.
REV. 621, 628-29(1955); see Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. at 651-52.
131. Even if juries did find damages, common law torts, such as trespass, focus upon a
different kind of damage to the plaintiff than a fourth amendment violation. "It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offense," recognized Justice Clark in Mapp, "but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty and private property .... 367 U.S. at 641 (quoting
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). Treating a fourth amendment violation as
simply another property tort insufficiently vindicates the claim of right involved.
132. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MiNN. L.
Rav. 493 (1955); see generally Symposium-Police Tort Liability, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rzv.
397 (1967).
133. See Dakin, Municipal Immunity in Police Torts, 16 CLEv.-M& L. REv. 448
(1967). Of course, the sovereign may waive its immunity.
134. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
135. Id. at 694. Monell, therefore, discourages police departments from prescribing
rules for police conduct. Such rules would increase the risk of departmental liability.
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cost of doing business."' 8 Such a response would not vindicate the
constitutional right but rather would diminish its luster.'137
Furthermore, more informal remedies also are impractical. Po-
lice solidarity and their intense commitment to values consistent
with their view of job requirements and professional skills"3 ' make
internal administrative review and officer discipline of questiona-
ble value. 3 9 Internal review also may exacerbate the concern seg-
ments of the community have over the bias they believe is evident
when police investigate complaints of police abuse. The appear-
ance of partiality may cause possible complainants to lose all trust
in a police-controlled system. The police's intensely negative reac-
tion to outsider control has made civilian review boards with any
power of decision and enforcement difficult to establish and
maintain. 14 0
All alternative remedies to exclusion are even more clearly in-
effective when the officer's violation was due to a reasonable good
faith error. If the police subculture tolerates and sometimes en-
courages intentional fourth amendment violations, 141 then good
faith violations could not conceivably result in intradepartmental
discipline. Criminal conviction for good faith errors is even less
conceivable or desirable. Furthermore, the requisite mens rea
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish. Impo-
136. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HAav. L.
Rav. 1532, 1562 (1972).
137. Of course this danger assumes police consciously would decide to violate fourth
amendment rights if the benefits thus gained justify in their minds the damages that would
ensue. Such decisions would not be a simple good faith error. Other problems arise, how-
ever, in using tort remedies when dealing with good faith mistakes. See infra text accompa-
nying note 142.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 65-78.
139. Occupational pressures frequently require police to make instantaneous decisions.
The low visibility of the frequent discretionary actions of police limits the ability even of
police officials to direct the behavior of their rank and file. See generally Goldstein, Police
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Adminis-
tration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960). Police, in fact, represent one of the rare bureau-
cracies in which discretion increases as one goes down the hierarchy. This inability to super-
vise the police officer on the streets constitutes an unresolved problem for those who
recommend an increased effort at rulemaking by police officials. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra
note 3, at 416-39; Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LAW
& CON=EMP. PROBS. 500 (1971); Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1050-55. Rulemaking efforts may
succeed only in alienating police rank and file from their upper echelon.
140. Barton, Civilian Review Boards and the Handling of Complaints Against the
Police, 20 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 448 (1970); Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accounta-
bility, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 515 (1971). Civilian review boards in both New York City
and Philadelphia, for example, had exceedingly short lives. Hudson, supra at 522-28.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86.
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sition of tort liability, in addition to all the difficulties heretofore
mentioned, is virtually impossible since courts clearly recognize
that law enforcement officers possess a common-law immunity to
civil liability for good faith errors.142
Protecting the individual offending officer from "punishment"
for good faith errors is justifiable since, although he is a wrongdoer,
he is without culpability. But inherent in the concept of a good
faith exception is the admission that the police have violated an
individual's right and the courts must vindicate his claim of right.
Once a court acknowledges the individual's claim as justified it
may choose among remedies. But as Professor Oaks conceded "[i]t
would be intolerable if the guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure could be violated without practical consequence."' 43
Since all alternative remedies to exclusion are least convincing
when dealing with good faith police error, the suppression doctrine
is the only conceivable device for vindication of the admittedly vio-
lated right. In the context of a good faith error Justice Murphy's
dissent in Wolf is correct: "there is but one alternative to the rule
of exclusion. That is no sanction at all.' 44 Courts must not treat
constitutional violation as a matter of indifference or the public
soon will perceive the right itself similarly.
B. The Meaning of Deterrence
The preceding discussion illustrates that the proper justifica-
tion for the exclusionary rule is not its deterrent value but rather
its ability to appropriately remedy fourth amendment violations.
Since exclusion is truly the only remedy available when the offend-
ing officer has made a good faith error, focusing on the rule's in-
ability to deter such an error ignores that a violated right goes un-
remedied. Even if, however, the rule's deterrent value were a valid
consideration in deciding whether exclusion is a proper remedy for
a good faith error, the specific deterrence concept, which the ex-
ception's proponents use as their primary justification for the good
faith exception, is unnecessarily narrow.
Specific deterrence emphasizes the effect of evidence exclusion
upon the specific offending officer. The good faith exception's pro-
ponents focus on the exclusionary rule's inability to deter an of-
142. The Supreme Court discussed and extended this common law immunity to § 1983
suits in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
143. Oaks, supra note 3, at 756. Professor Oak's reputation as one of the most
respected "critics of the exclusionary rule makes this admission quite significant.
144. 338 U.S. at 41.
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ficer's behavior when he, in good faith, is unaware of his transgres-
sion.14 5 Certainly, an officer who reasonably and in good faith
believes his behavior legal is not likely to avoid that behavior for
fear of exclusion. To argue that the system should not punish such
a nonculpable officer by exclusion, however, confuses the concepts
of deterrence and punishment and ignores the deterrent potential
of exclusion with respect to the officer's future behavior.
Admittedly a nonculpable officer does not deserve punish-
ment. The appropriateness of punishment, however, is a separate
and distinct concern from the rule's deterrent value. Exclusion of
the evidence seized under a reasonable good faith error undoubt-
edly has the potential to deter the officer from committing the
same error in the future.146 Consequently, while punishing a
nonculpable officer may not seem fair, such a concern should not
obscure the exclusionary rule's future deterrent potential.
Those urging a good faith exception also argue that the fear of
exclusion will not prevent an officer who has had evidence ex-
cluded because of a reasonable good faith error from thereafter
making a second good faith error in a different context. They,
therefore, argue that excluding evidence seized in reasonable good
faith has no specific deterrent effect. But this argument proves too
much. If the inability of the exclusionary rule to deter specifically
justifies a reasonable good faith exception it also justifies an unrea-
sonable good faith exception. Deleting the objective reasonableness
component of the good faith exception has no effect on this pro-
posed nondeterrence justification. An officer making an unreasona-
ble, but honestly held, good faith error is no more likely to ques-
tion his own behavior and is no more likely to have his behavior
deterred by the fear of exclusion than is the officer making a rea-
sonable good faith error. As Judge Rubin of the Fifth Circuit aptly
observed, "A policeman who is in complete subjective good faith is
145. Specific deterrence is also the focus of much of the conflict about the exclusionary
rule generally. Insisting that the suppression doctrine does not deter illegal police behavior,
see supra text accompanying notes 60-92, critics argue for its total abolition. The same crit-
ics, however, also argue that the exclusionary rule hamstrings police efforts at law enforce-
ment. This argument is paradoxical: how can the rule both fail to specifically deter and yet
hamstring the officer? For an attempt to resolve this paradox, see Ingber, Procedure, Cere-
mony and Rhetoric: The Minimization of Ideological Conflict in Deviance Control, 56
B.U.L. REv. 266, 305-07 (1976).
146. Arguably each new situation may contribute different complicating factors that
allow for new good faith mistakes. See infra text accompanying notes 150-53 for a discussion
of a method to avoid this danger.
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unlikely to stop to ask himself, 'Am I also reasonable?' "147
An unreasonable good faith exception is, of course, unaccept-
able because of the premium it would place on police ignorance. 148
Consequently, the foregoing rationale makes patently obvious that
the rule's inability specifically to deter good faith errors by offend-
ing officers cannot be the only justification for a good faith excep-
tion. If a lack of the rule's deterrent value is, indeed, a justification
for the proposed exception, then its proponents must expand their
concept of deterrence. Upon such expansion, however, the deter-
rent value of excluding evidence obtained through a good faith po-
lice error becomes obvious.
Judicial suppression of evidence also may deter generally by
influencing other officers not to duplicate the offending officer's er-
ror. An identification of the conduct causing a constitutional viola-
tion (whether committed culpably or not) will communicate to
others that a trial court will exclude the fruits of their search if
they act similarly. Hopefully such communication will prevent
such unconstitutional searches in the future. Viewed in this man-
ner, the suppression remedy does not protect only those against
whom police find incriminating evidence. The exclusion of such ev-
idence will have an "overflow effect" upon all individuals by dis-
couraging unwarranted searches whether or not they would be
fruitful. Courts then, by removing the incentive to search, would
protect the rights of both the innocent and the guilty. 49
Good faith exception proponents claim that such general de-
terrence is both unrealistic and often undesirable. They assert, for
example, that court decisions are too complex, too vague, and too
situational to give police the guidance necessary for general deter-
rence to function. The inability of police to understand judicially
articulated fourth amendment standards, however, is not related to
the issue of remedy, but is a product of the fact-orientation of
search and seizure litigation and court opinions. Unintelligible
rules of conduct will diminish the deterrent potential of any rem-
edy chosen to vindicate fourth amendment rights.
147. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 850 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) (Rubin, J., concurring).
148. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1044.
149. Expanding the deterrence beyond a specific infractor exposes one danger of the
good faith exception. If an officer knows that an honest and reasonable error excuses his
behavior, he willfully may feign a good faith mistake hoping that the court will find his error
reasonable without discovering the secret of his willfulness. If the good faith exception has
such an effect it would encourage both illegal searches and police perjury.
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The negative effect that judicial imprecision has had on the
exclusionary rule's general deterrent value does not now justify
recognition of a good faith exception. The deterrence problem lies
not with the rule, but rather with its judicial administration. Ad-
mittedly, the Court has made difficult its responsibility of finding a
remedy for fourth amendment violations by erroneously focusing
on the rule's deterrent value rather than on its ability to remedy
the constitutional violation, and then by negating that deterrent
value through unclear opinions. The solution, however, cannot be
the abrogation of the Court's solemn responsibility to provide a
remedy for a violated fourth amendment right.150
The manner in which to avoid decreasing the rule's deterrent
potential through court opinions unintelligible to police is not to
treat the constitutional violations with indifference, but rather to
clarify fourth amendment standards through opinions drawing
simple and understandable "bright lines" for police conduct."5
"Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclu-
sionary rule," Professor LaFave observes,
is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and
thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police
in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily
engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands,
and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinc-
tions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers
and judges eagerly feed, but they may be "'literally impossible of application
by the officer in the field." 152
Lack of judicial clarity should not lead to a device for excusing
fourth amendment violations, but to a method for simplifying the
task of officers truly endeavoring to respect constitutional preroga-
tives.1 53 Consequently, those urging adoption of a good faith excep-
150. The good faith exception, as already demonstrated, leaves the violated right un-
remedied. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
151. In recent years courts have made some attempts to formulate such bright lines.
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981).
152. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 141 (footnotes omitted). Of course, while opin-
ions setting out "bright lines" more clearly would communicate search and seizure stan-
dards for police, not all bright lines are equally defensible. See LaFave, supra note 3, at 325-
33. Conflicts over where the courts should draw the line-what they should define the stan-
dard of conduct to be-would continue. See id.
153. Ironically, a court that often has rejected the precision of per se rules for the
flexibility (and uncertainty) of "totality of circumstances" analysis, see Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); supra note 87 and accompanying text, also bemoans the
inability of law enforcement officials to deduce appropriate constitutional standards. When
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tion should not justify the exception on the grounds that lack of
judicial clarity creates general deterrence problems.
Exception proponents, however, also argue that general deter-
rence in a good faith context actually may be undesirable.15 4 Jus-
tice White, for example, one of the most vociferous advocates of a
good faith exception,155 defended his position by asserting:
The officers [making a reasonable good faith error], if they do their duty, will
act in similar fashion in similar circumstances in the future; and the only
consequence of the rule as presently administrated is that unimpeachable
and probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the truth-finding
function of the proceedings is substantially impaired or a trial totally
aborted. 156
Consequently, he concludes, that "[m]aking the arrest in such cir-
cumstance is precisely what the community expects the police of-
ficer to do.''1 57 According to Justice White, therefore, deterring
such behavior is undesirable.
This position reveals the hidden agenda behind the good faith
exception. If the police officer truly acted, under the circum-
stances, in a manner that courts should not deter, why is his be-
havior anything but reasonable? If, then, the search and arrest is
reasonable, it is also constitutional under the fourth amendment.15 8
Rather than merely advocating a good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule, Justice White is surreptitiously, consciously or uncon-
sciously, disagreeing with the judicial determination that the police
action violates fourth amendment standards. If a violation actually
did take place, even assuming the officer was only reasonably con-
fused and chose to act erroneously, the community still should
have preferred him to have acted otherwise and not to have vio-
lated the constitutional mandate. White's argument lies not with
the remedy but with the judicial determination that a constitu-
tional violation had taken place. He would have chosen to find that
the search was constitutional. Other exception proponents who ar-
gue that the general deterrence of the exclusionary rule is undesir-
the Court then considers correcting the problem by disregarding legitimate claims of right
under the auspices of a good faith exception the court magnifies this irony.
154. The Fifth Circuit, for example, asserted that general deterrence in a good faith
context in undesirable. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 849 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). See supra text accompanying note 94.
155. Justice White presents his view most completely in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2340-47 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
156. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 539.
158. Fourth amendment privacy is not an absolute right, but only a qualified one out-
weighed when governmental intrusion is reasonable. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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able with respect to good faith errors also actually are saying that
the scope of the fourth amendment should be sufficiently narrow
as not to prohibit the police behavior at issue.
Further proof of this observation becomes evident by tracing
the application of Justice White's position in the decisions of other
courts such as Colorado v. Quintero.159 In Quintero the police ar-
rested defendant for theft and possession of a stolen television set.
At the time of the arrest, defendant claimed to have no identifica-
tion and to have purchased the television set from someone in the
neighborhood. The police knew that defendant was a stranger to
the community and had seen him attempt to cover the set with his
shirt. At the time of the arrest, however, no complaints or evidence
established that defendant had committed a crime.160 On the basis
of these facts, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that the of-
ficer had acted without probable cause in arresting and searching
the defendant. According to the court, probable cause to arrest ex-
ists only "when the facts and circumstances within an officer's
knowledge are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that a crime
has been committed by the person arrested." 161
Justice Rovira dissented. He initially argued that the officer's
actions were reasonable and, therefore, constitutional. Only subse-
quently did he assert that a good faith error should not activate
the exclusionary rule, quoting for support Justice White's com-
ment that the officer had acted precisely as the community would
expect.162 Clearly both arguments are the same. According to Jus-
tice Rovira, the court's interpretation of the fourth amendment
standard is too stringent. If no constitutional violation occurred,
then no remedy vindicating the right would be necessary. Justice
Rovira is using the good faith exception covertly to undermine the
claim of right acknowledged by the majority. The opinions of both
Justices White and Rovira illustrate that exception proponents
who argue that the general deterrence of the exclusionary rule is
undesirable with respect to good faith errors actually are saying
that the fourth amendment itself should not prohibit the impli-
cated police behavior. Perhaps the fourth amendment should not.
The issue, however, is one of substantive standards that needs de-
159. 657 P.2d 948, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983), cert. dismissed, 52 U.S.L.W.
3460 (Dec. 13, 1983).
160. The police, in fact, did not learn who owned the television set until more than
five hours after the arrest. Id. at 950.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 952.
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bate and resolution on that level rather than obfuscation and cam-
ouflage in the garb of the seemingly innocuous issue of remedy.
The foregoing discussion sets the stage for a reconsideration of
whether DeFillippo is good precedent for a general good faith ex-
ception.16 The officer in DeFillippo arrested and searched defen-
dant for violating a statute later found unconstitutionally vague.
Chief Justice Burger, ruling the seized contraband admissible,
properly asserted that "[s]ociety would be ill-served if its police
officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and
which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.1 64 The of-
ficer in DeFillippo acted precisely as the community would wish.
He limited his concern about constitutional rights to the sphere of
police law enforcement. The fourth amendment, however, asserts
that an officer acting unreasonably, without probable cause and a
warrant when necessary, clearly is not acting as the Constitution
requires. Had such an officer acted otherwise, in accordance with
his responsibility under the clause, his choice would be constitu-
tionally preferable and worthy of praise. In DeFillippo, the consti-
tutional error was the legislature's not the officer's, and was not of
fourth amendment origin. The exclusionary rule's justification is to
protect an individual's privacy from unwarranted intrusion; it is
not a remedy for all constitutional violations.1 15 The Court's hold-
ing in DeFillippo is distinguishable from one adopting a general
good faith exception on the basis of differences in the desirability
of general deterrence directed toward police behavior when the
constitutional error is that of the legislature rather than of the of-
ficer. DeFillippo's precedential value for a good faith exception,
thus, is questionable.
The foregoing analysis of general and specific deterrence
reveals that some advocates of the good faith exception utilize a
deterrence rationale which is conceptually flawed. A consideration
of systemic deterrence e1 6 reveals additional shortcomings in the ad-
vocates' concept of deterrence. In addition to its specific and gen-
eral deterrent value, the exclusionary rule also may deter illegal
163. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
164. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38.
165. When a statute forbids leafletting on public streets the police officer's responsibil-
ity is to enforce that law. A court need not exclude the narcotics found on an arrested
leafletter because the statute violates first amendment rights. Other remedies are truly
available for this claim of right violation such as declaring the statute unconstitutional and
reversing any conviction for the statute's breach.
166. "Systemic deterrence" is a construct borrowed from the writings of Mertens and
Wasserstrom, supra note 3, at 399-401.
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police behavior by increasing police officials' awareness of constitu-
tional requirements and their responsibility to abide by them. If
police officials realize the importance of complying with fourth
amendment dictates, they can encourage individual officers to
comply through training and developing departmental guidelines
for searches, seizures, and arrests. 1 7 While individual officers ini-
tially may be hostile toward fourth amendment demands, depart-
mental insistence on respect for such demands likely would reduce
resistance to restrictions that police officers otherwise may view as
illegitimately imposed by authorities external to the police subcul-
ture. The increased use of search warrants, the stepped up devel-
opment of police educational programs, and the creation of ongo-
ing working relationships between police and prosecutors already
reflects the exclusionary rule's potential beneficial effects.16 8
The exclusionary rule, however, also has had a less obvious,
yet more important, systemic impact. Fourth amendment consider-
ations only became part of the national consciousness when courts,
due to the rule, had occasion and incentive to articulate them. The
rhetoric of these decisions slowly acclimated the public to the
fourth amendment values that the decisions defended.169 Police de-
partments, of course, recruit their officers from the general public.
The police today, therefore, are more likely to be sympathetic to
167. Id. at 399. The low visibility of the discretion exercised by lower echelon police
officers may limit the effectiveness of departmental rulemaking. See supra note 139.
168. LaFave, supra note 3, at 319. One Florida prosecutor noted that within his juris-
diction police are forbidden to seek a warrant before a prosecutor reviews their requesting
papers.
169. Rhetoric can be a powerful instrument for change. For years ethnologists study-
ing the relation of language to culture have insisted that any change in language constitutes
an influence on both perception and conception. See, e.g., R. BRowN, I. Copi, D. D. Du-
LANEY, W. FRANKENA, P. HENLE & C. STEVESNSON, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT & CULTURE 1-24
(1958); E. Sapir, Language, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD SAPiR IN LANGUAGE, CULTURE
AND PERSONALITY 7-32 (D. Mandelbaum ed. 1949); B. Whorf, The Relation of Habitual
Thought and Behavior to Language, in LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND PERSONALITY: ESSAYS IN
MEMORY OF EDWARD SAP R 75-93 (L. Spier, A. Hallowell & S. Newman eds. 1941). Edward
Sapir, an early leader in ethnology wrote:
The relation between language and experience is often misunderstood. Language is not
merely a more or less systematic inventory of the various items of experience which
seem relevant to the individual, as is so often naively assumed, but is also a self-con-
tained, creative symbolic organization, which not only refers to experience largely ac-
quired without its help but actually defines experience for us by reasons of its formal
completeness and because of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectation into
the field of experience.
E. Sapir, Conceptual Categories in Primitive Languages, in LANGUAGE IN CULTURE AND So-
cETY 128 (D. Hymes ed. 1964). Rhetoric thus may grease the wheels of ideological change.
See generally Ingber, supra note 145, at 268-73.
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fourth amendment values then were their pre-exclusionary rule
predecessors.
Some critics of the exclusionary rule, however, claim that the
lack of a good faith exception reduces rather than enhances the
potential of systemic deterrence. They argue that departments
which attempt to educate their officers but still find evidence ex-
cluded due to further development or change in judicial interpreta-
tion may adopt an attitude that "the courts cannot be satisfied,
that the rules are hopelessly complicated and subject to change,
and that the suppression of evidence is [thus] the courts' problem
and not the departments'. ' 170 Such frustration may discourage a
department from even trying to educate its officers to avoid fourth
amendment violations.
This assertion is similar to the objection of tort defendants
that the law does not give sufficient direction as how to avoid lia-
bility.171 A jury determination that the defendant failed to act in a
reasonable, prudent manner, indeed, provides little guidance as to
what behavior would have been sufficient. Even a finding of no lia-
bility leaves the defendant and those in similar situations wonder-
ing whether he was more cautious than required.
This vagueness in tort law, however, is socially valuable. While
violation of a known or knowable standard of conduct makes moral
reproach and punishment more justified, 72 tort law does not focus
on individual moral responsibility. 173 Tort law functions not to
earmark personal culpability, but to continuously press societal
members to make choices that will lower the risk of injury and
pain.17 4 Legally fixing the duty of an individual in a particular con-
170. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1050. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 61, at 212-29.
171. Justice Holmes enthusiastically supported the movement to define more stably
the responsibility of both tort defendants and plaintiffs. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co. v. Good-
man, 275 U.S. 66 (1927); Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596, 49 N.E. 1010 (1897).
172. Consequently, the state must have given the defendant in a criminal trial fair
notice at the time of his offense of the standards of criminal liability. Criminal law equates
individual moral culpability and accountability. The law justifies punishment only if the
wrongdoer deserves some measure of societal approbrium. As the text suggests, violation of
a known or knowable standard of conduct makes such a societal response more appropriate.
173. The widespread use of liability insurance, which associates risks with activities
rather than with individuals, clearly indicates a concern other than individual accountabil-
ity. Furthermore, courts hold mentally limited individuals to a standard of care even when
they can demonstrate their personal inability to function at the required level. Vaughan v.
Menlove, 3 Bing. 468 (N.C. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1837). Clearly, moral responsibility is not the
crucial issue.
174. The use of tort law to reduce the costs of accidents is discussed in G. CALnREs1,
THE CosTs OF AccmE-NTs 26-28 (1970). See also Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between
Reason and Decency. 65 VA. L. REv. 785, 812-33 (1979).
1550 [Vol. 36:1511
DEFENDING THE CITADEL
text and steadfastly refusing to change that duty removes the need
to strive to develop better ways of avoiding injuries. Legally fixed
duties, thus, would retard the valuable evolution of tort law.
The exclusionary rule's application to fourth amendment vio-
lations serves the same type of socially valuable function as tort
law. The rule's purpose is not to punish culpable officers, but to
structure a criminal justice system with incentives for police to
strive continuously to respect more fully, rather than to violate,
constitutional norms.175 Yet the desire of police departments that
courts fix and do not change fourth amendment standards repre-
sents the improper view that the exclusionary rule's purpose is to
punish the culpable officer. If the legal system encourages police
departments always to improve and more fully to respect constitu-
tional values, then systemic deterrence more likely will result. The
articulation by courts of fixed and unchanging constitutional stan-
dards, given the pressure of the police role, likely will convert con-
stitutional minimums into institutional maximums. Likewise, a
good faith exception will encourage departments not to counsel or
advise their officers to give any more consideration for fourth
amendment rights than existing case law absolutely mandates. 1 6
The good faith exception, therefore, is inconsistent with the goal of
systemic deterrence.
While the exclusionary rule clearly has deterrent potential,
measuring the general and systemic deterrent value of the rule is
likely impossible. No statistics reveal the number of unlawful
searches that the rule has deterred. But empirical evidence of the
rule's deterrent effect is no weaker than evidence of the deterrent
effect of laws, for example, against larceny. 7 7 As Professor Dwor-
175. Professor Amsterdam analogizes the exclusionary rule to police sponsored anti-
theft programs that brand personal property. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 431-32. Identifi-
cation marks diminish the property's value to a prospective thief because he knows it will be
more difficult to sell the goods at a worthwhile price. Although these identification programs
do not influence those who steal for excitement, revenge, or personal use, diminishing the
property's worth correspondingly decreases the motivation to steal it.
176. A tension, of course, exists between the need for "bright line" decisions offering
police guidance, see supra text accompanying notes 151-53, and the value of ever change-
able standards encouraging police departments to review continuously and to strive for im-
provement in their procedures. Bright lines demand court decisions that are not excessively
fact bound. As argued earlier, however, not all bright lines are equally defensible. See supra
note 152. Conflicts over where the courts should draw the line would continue to assure the
flexibility of fourth amendment doctrine necessary to encourage continued systemic
deterrence.
177. Some writers suggest the case supporting the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect
is the stronger of the two. E.g., Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 431.
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kin observed: "Deterrence is partly a matter of logic and psychol-.
ogy, largely a matter of faith. The question is never whether laws
do deter, but rather whether conduct ought to be deterred. .. .
Certainly, then, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule de-
serves as much respect as does the deterrent value of the criminal
'law generally.
C. The Good Faith Exception's Effect on the Scope of the
Fourth Amendment
Thus far this Article has shown how the exclusionary rule both
offers appropriate vindication for fourth amendment violations and
has deterrent value. Its critics, therefore, only can argue that the
rule adversely affects the police's ability to fight crime. Accord-
ingly, this section discusses these alleged adverse effects while de-
veloping insights into the good faith exception's effect on the scope
of the fourth amendment.
A portion of society perceives the exclusionary rule as ham-
stringing police and allowing guilty defendants to go unpunished.
Statistical studies, however, suggest this perception is faulty. First
while the exclusionary rule only functions to suppress evidence at
trial, our criminal justice system focuses more on obtaining guilty
pleas than on securing convictions at trial. Seventy to ninety per-
cent of prosecuted cases result in guilty pleas.179 The criminal jus-
tice system probably will not notice any police misconduct in these
cases.180 One plausible interpretation of such statistics is that they
show only that prosecutors screen out and never prosecute a signi-
ficant number of cases that contain illegal searches and seizures.
Another study, however, refutes this interpretation. After monitor-
ing felony case processing in five cities, the study found that due
process violations, including but not limited to fourth amendment
violations, accounted for one (1) to nine (9) percent of the cases
rejected through prosecutor screening.181 "While it may be that po-
178. Dworkin, supra note 61, at 333.
179. Y. KAMiAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22 (5th ed.
1980); Allen, Central Problems of American Criminal Justice, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 813, 819
(1977).
180. Police misconduct often may go unnoticed even by defense counsel who may
spend only enough time with his client to ask whether or not the client is guilty. One study
in which public defenders represented defendants, for example, indicated that 30% of the
defendants reported their attorney spent less than 10 minutes with them; 32% stated 10 to
29 minutes; 27% stated one-half hour to 3 hours; and only 14% stated more than 3 hours. J.
CASPER, CRIMINAL CouRTs: THE DEFENDANTS PERSPECTIVE IV (1978) (abstract).
181. Brosi, A Cross-City Comparison of Felony Case Processing 18-19 (1979). Groups
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lice do not arrest some suspects because of search and seizure limi-
tations," the report concluded, "these percentages seem to counter
the conventional wisdom that Supreme Court decisions cause
many arrests to fail because of technicalities. . .. In felony cases
other than drugs, less than 2% of the rejections in each city in-
volved abrogation of due process.118 2 While the exclusionary rule's
effect on the government's decisions to prosecute appears
deminimus, its effect upon trial outcomes is even smaller. The
same Comptroller General's study that Justice White cited in
Gates to support a good faith exception s noted that of the 2,804
defendants charged in thirty-eight United States attorney offices
during a two month period only 30% of the cases included a search
or seizure and only 11% of the defendants filed motions to sup-
press. Courts denied these motions in the overwhelming majority
of cases, so that in only 1.3 % of the sampled criminal cases did the
courts actually exclude evidence.184 Furthermore, over half of the
cases in which the court granted the motion to suppress still re-
sulted in conviction.' 5
Even though these statistics belie the popular impression that
the exclusionary rule severely undermines law enforcement, the
rule's supporters cannot disregard the existence of popular mis-
perception. Institutional legitimacy is a matter of perception
whether or not the perception is correct. If the exclusionary rule's
interference with police work even in a small number of cases sig-
nificantly undermines public confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem, the rule is a fitting subject of concern. Consequently, the ac-
tual relationship between the exclusionary rule and limitations on
police behavior needs exploration.
Soon after Mapp extended the exclusionary rule to state crim-
inal proceedings, New York City Police Commissioner Murphy
wrote an article complaining:
I can think of no decision in recent times in the field of law enforcement
which had such a dramatic and traumatic effect as this .... I was immedi-
ately caught up in the entire program of reevaluating our procedures ...
such as the U.S. Department of Justice and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion commissioned the study.
182. Id. at 19. Prosecutors encounter search and seizure problems most commonly in
crimes, such as possession of narcotics, that lack traditional complainants. See supra note
45.
183. See supra note 48.
184. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION II (Apr. 19, 1979).
185. Id. at 13.
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modifying, amending, and creating new polices and new instructions for the
implementation of Mapp . . . . Retraining sessions had to be held from the
very top administrators down to each of the thousands of foot
patrolmen. . ... 86
Obviously Mapp caused New York police to consider dramatic be-
havior changes. But why such dramatic changes proved necessary
is unclear. Fourth amendment standards should have limited New
York police since the Wolf decision, which preceded Mapp by
twelve years.'8s Mapp merely changed the remedy for violations;
the decision should not have changed the substantive standards of
the fourth amendment with which police already were required to
comply. Police Commissioner Murphy's statement demonstrates
that, prior to the implementation of the exclusionary rule, police
departments were indifferent to fourth amendment restrictions on
police conduct and that the suppression doctrine does have sys-
temic deterrent value.
The contention that the exclusionary rule "handcuffs" police
is simply wrong.' Rather than the remedy chosen to vindicate vi-
olated fourth amendment rights, the interpreted scope of the
fourth amendment itself mandates actual limitations on police
conduct.8 9 Consequently, the public's perception that the exclu-
sionary rule hamstrings police in fulfilling their crime fighting re-
186. Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement: The Problem
of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 Tax. L. REv. 939, 941 (1966).
187. See supra text accompanying note 26.
188. The assertion that the exclusionary rule allows the criminal to go free because the
constable has blundered is misleading. Such as assertion implies that had the constable been
more careful the court would have convicted the criminal. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 3, at 366 n.5. Often, however, this is not the case. If the officer, lacking probable cause
to arrest or search, abided by fourth amendment dictates, the criminal still would have gone
free because no arrest or search would have taken place. In such contexts the constable
must have blundered for any prosecution to occur at all.
189. As long also as 1938 Senator Robert Wagner of New York noted before his state's
constitutional convention that the right, rather than the remedy, mandates police restraint-
All the argument [that the exclusionary rule will handicap law enforcement] seems to
me to be properly directed not against the exclusionary rule but against the substantive
guarantee itself.... It is the [law of search and seizure], not the sanction, which im-
poses limits on the operation of the police. If the [law of search and seizure] is obeyed
as it should be, and as we declare it should be, there will be no illegally obtained evi-
dence to be excluded by the operation of the sanction.
... It seems to me inconsistent to challenge the exclusionary rule on the ground
that it will hamper the police, while making no challenge to the fundamental rules to
which the police are required to conform.
1 New York Constitutional Convention, Revised Record 560 (1938), reprinted in J.
MICHAEL & H. WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 1191-92 (1940). See Oaks,
supra note 3, at 754.
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sponsibility is not only statistically but also conceptually
incorrect.19
Furthermore, an internal analytical inconsistency exists in
condemning the exclusionary rule on the one hand for not deter-
ring police misconduct and on the other for hamstringing police in
their crime fighting efforts. If the courts chose an alternative
fourth amendment remedy that more effectively deterred illegal
searches and seizures, then the same or even a greater number of
guilty individuals would go free, because without such arrests and
searches police would discover even less evidence upon which pros-
ecutors could base conviction191 or gain a guilty plea. Presently, for
example, a defendant's lack of standing to protest the admission of
incriminating evidence obtained in violation of someone else's pri-
vacy right allows some use of illegally seized evidence at trial.192 If
a different remedy more effectively had deterred the offending of-
ficer, he would not have committed the illegal search, he would not
have found the incriminating evidence, and the defendant more
likely would have avoided conviction. Consequently, a remedy
more efficient at deterring illegal police behavior than the exclu-
sionary rule as presently applied also would restrict more severely
the police's ability to gain convictions.1 93
In addition to the loss of evidence that contributes to convic-
tions and guilty pleas, the police no longer would make many
searches that presently serve to recover stolen goods and confiscate
contraband. Nor could they respond as easily to community de-
mands for increased enforcement. Consequently, replacement of
the exclusionary rule with a more effective police deterrent greatly
would impede some practices law enforcement officers presently
find beneficial in controlling crime.19"
190. One critic of the exclusionary rule credits it with the defeat of effective gun con-
trol law. See Wilkey, supra note 3, at 224. But the fourth amendment itself, not the exclu-
sionary rule, prevents police from searching anyone with a bulging pocket. Furthermore, no
reason exists to believe that the community's criminal element refrained from carrying guns
until the Court decided Mapp in 1961.
191. This argument assumes that police could not find alternative means to obtain
evidence. If legal alternatives did exist, however, and the police still acted illegally, release
of criminals would not be a product of overly restrictive constitutional standards but of
police ineptness.
192. See supra note 91.
193. Evidence also would not be available for impeachment purposes or for submission
to a grand jury. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
194. Society, in fact, may saddle police with performing tasks that it wants accom-
plished but not condoned. Professor Paul Chevigny suggests that:
For legislators and judges the police are a godsend, because all the acts of oppres-
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The ramifications of adopting a more effective remedy there-
fore would be extensive. 195 Because police would make no unlawful
searches or arrests, many crimes would appear totally unsolved. Al-
though courts would free fewer defendants on what the public per-
ceives as legal technicalities, a reduction would occur in the overt
demonstration of police capability, for example, to solve crime, to
protect the public, and to retrieve stolen property. The more effec-
tive remedy could result in increased public satisfaction with the
visible functioning of the courts and decreased approval of the visi-
ble functioning of the police. The courts would appear to be deal-
ing effectively with those prosecuted; by contrast, the police would
appear as unequal to the task of apprehending criminals deserving
prosecution.
Obviously, public dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule oc-
curs because the rule functions after an unlawful arrest or search
already publicly has unveiled a wrongdoer. The rule, thus, openly
flaunts the price of the fourth amendment;""8 in fact, it "rubs our
noses in it. ' 197 Critics of the exclusionary rule, thus, in reality are
critics of the fourth amendment itself. They apparently believe
that sufficient discredit of the rule could lead to judicial interpre-
tations either further limiting the rule's scope or replacing it with a
less, rather than a more, effective remedy.198 A forthright demand
for a less effective remedy clearly would focus the resulting conflict
not on the remedy for illegal intrusions of privacy by police, but on
whether the law should deem illegal and deter such intrusions at
all. This demand thereby would entail a frontal attack on the val-
sion that must be performed in this society to keep it running smoothly are pushed
upon the police. The police get the blame, and the officials stay free of the stigma of
approving their highhanded acts. The police have become the repository of all the illib-
eral impulses in this liberal society; they are under heavy fire because most of us no
longer admit so readily to our illiberal impulses as we once did.
P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE PowER 280 (1969).
195. Imagine, for example, an effective tort remedy that required police officers violat-
ing the fourth amendment to assume significant individual damage liability. If, as exclusion-
ary rule critics argue, fourth amendment doctrine is intolerably obscure, officers wishing to
protect themselves and their families from financial hardship would be fearful of making
arrests and searches that even arguably may be improper. Courts, however, upon formal
review might find proper many of such chilled searches. An effective tort remedy, conse-
quently, may chill the legally justified searches now occurring under the exclusionary rule.
196. J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 215-16 (1978).
197. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1037.
198. Even Professor Oaks recognized that the argument concerning the exclusionary
rule's "handcuffing" police put the rule's critics in the "untenable position of urging that the
sanction be abolished so that [police] can continue to violate [constitutional] rules with im-
punity." Oaks, supra note 3, at 754.
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ues embodied in the fourth amendment itself.
A frontal attack on the fourth amendment, however, is diffi-
cult because the Bill of Rights has held an almost mystical position
in American heritage. Accepting fourth amendment values in the
abstract, while whittling away their importance by developing ex-
ceptions to the remedy, avoids the blasphemy of an overt challenge
to such values. Avoiding such blasphemy, in turn, increases the
chances of societal acceptance of reductions in the fourth amend-
ment's scope and significance."9
Avoiding a blatant attack on the fourth amendment while re-
ducing the significance of the rights it embodies would be the ef-
fect, if not the purpose, of a good faith exception. The attack is
upon the citadel of the fourth amendment rather than simply upon
the exclusionary rule. Consequently, when courts entertain adopt-
ing a good faith exception, they should consider how the exception
actually retards the development and restricts the scope of the
fourth amendment rather than the more comfortable issue of
whether the rule has any deterrent value in specific situations. In
anticipation of this evaluation, this Article now will demonstrate
how the proposed exception is a subtle and, consequently, highly
dangerous attack on the viability of the fourth amendment.
1. Retarding Fourth Amendment Development
A good faith exception will either slow or freeze fourth amend-
ment development "dead in its tracks."200 Under such an exception
evidence obtained by a police officer when acting upon a reasona-
ble good faith belief that his conduct was lawful is admissible
whether or not his behavior was, or was not, constitutional. Conse-
quently, the preliminary issue of judicial concern will be whether
the officer acted under such a reasonable good faith belief. When a
court finds the existence of such a belief, the actual constitutional-
ity of the officer's behavior, thus, becomes irrelevant. Courts using
199. A literary example of the procedure's use as a tool of conflict settlement that
conceals disagreements of substantive values is Shirley Jackson's short story, The Lottery,
in THE LOTTERY 291 (1949). The society Jackson describes in her story has no predilection
against individual sacrifice for collective goals. In fact, the society prefers such an arrange-
ment. The story describes a communal ceremony wherein lots are drawn to determine whom
the community will stone to death for some unspecified community need. Although the
eventual winner of the lottery objects, she couches her objection in terms of proce-
dure-that the lots were drawn too quickly-rather than in terms of the substance of the
activity. Id. at 299.
200. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
LaFave, supra note 3, at 354-55.
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the good faith exception, therefore, will have no need to further
develop or refine fourth amendment doctrine.2 0 1 No articulation of
the appropriate rule of conduct that police and courts should fol-
low in future situations will be forthcoming; thus, no general or
systemic deterrence will ensue. If, in fact, the officer's behavior was
unconstitutional, nothing will prevent that officer or others from
continuing to make the same good faith error in the future.
Justice White, in his Gates concurrence, rejected the inevita-
bility of this outcome if the Court adopted the good faith excep-
tion. He insisted that if a fourth amendment case presented a
novel situation in which a court had to decide the constitutionality
of an officer's behavior in order to provide guidance for his and
others' future actions, the court would have sufficient reason to de-
cide whether a violation had occurred before turning to the good
faith question.2"2
Both constitutional precedent and prudential considerations,
however, suggest that this advisory opinion procedure advocated
by Justice White is not likely to occur.101 Consider, for example,
the Supreme Court's response to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Bowen v. United States.0 4 While refusing to retroactively apply
the standards articulated in Almeida-Sanchez for roving border
patrol searches, 05 the Ninth Circuit first found the challenged
search illegal under those standards. 208 The Supreme Court agreed
that retroactive application was not necessary but then warned,
This Court consistently has declined to address unsettled questions regarding
the scope of decisions establishing new constitutional doctrine in cases in
which it holds those decisions nonretroactive .... This practice is rooted in
our reluctance to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily .... Because
this reluctance is in turn grounded in the constitutional role of the federal
courts ... the district courts and courts of appeal should follow our practice,
when issues of both retroactivity and application of constitutional doctrine
201. Justice Brennan observed that if, under a general good faith exception, evidence
is admissible unless clear precedent, not subject to reasonable misinterpretation, declares
the search in question unconstitutional, "the first duty of a court will be to deny the ac-
cused's motion to suppress if he cannot cite a case invalidating a search or seizure on identi-
cal facts." Peltier, 422 U.S. at 554.
202. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2346.
203. Whether Justice White would wish such a procedure actually to develop is not
clear. Within the same paragraph discussed in the text, he observes that: "It is not entirely
clear to me that the law in this area has benefited from the constant pressure of fully-
litigated suppression motions." Id.
204. 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
205. For a discussion of Almeida-Sanchez, see supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
206. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974).
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are raised, of deciding the retroactivity issue first."°
Even assuming the Court did not mean literally that Article III
limitations prohibit a court from addressing such constitutional is-
sues, prudential considerations alone probably would lead most
courts first to decide the good faith issue and, thus, avoid unneces-
sary judicial interference in effective law enforcement. °s
Even assuming Justice White's position ultimately proves cor-
rect, however, recognition of a good faith exception still would re-
strict severely fourth amendment development. According to the
Justice's theory, courts could articulate new fourth amendment
standards while refusing to exclude evidence in a particular case
because the officer reasonably could not have anticipated the
change. But if a good faith error does not lead to suppression of
the illegally obtained evidence, a defense attorney would have little
incentive to make the new and creative argument that might sup-
port recognition of a new standard. Criminal defense counsels try
to make argnnents that immediately benefit their clients rather
than to urge abstract and conceptual points of law for the future
benefit of others. 0 9 Proposing radically new approaches or consid-
erations in search and seizure cases would not further criminal de-
fense strategy. Consequently, defense counsels are not likely to ar-
gue cases that raise a good faith exception at a level that would
allow Justice White's theory to function.2 10
207. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 920 (emphasis added).
208. Some jurists forthrightly have acknowledged this fact. "It is no sufficient objec-
tion that [a good faith exception] would require courts to make still another determination"
writes Judge Henry Friendly. "[R]ather, the recognition of a penumbral zone where mistake
will not call for the drastic remedy of exclusion would relieve them of exceedingly difficult
decisions whether an officer overstepped the sometimes almost imperceptible line between a
valid arrest or search and an invalid one." Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 953 (1965).
209. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 3, at 451. In response to this concern, Justice
White proposed allowing application of a new fourth amendment standard to the party in
whose case the rule is first announced. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.19. Depending
upon the interpretation of the Justice's proposal, one of two flaws is obvious. If the Justice
means that newly announced fourth amendment rules will not receive general retroactive
application, this is already the case, see United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), and a
good faith exception adds nothing. If he means to motivate attorneys to make new argu-
ments by permitting exclusion of evidence for some but not all good faith errors, determin-
ing which errors should lead to suppression becomes a matter of judicial whim rather than
fairness to law enforcement authorities. That very fairness to police, however, is the precise
rationale allegedly justifying the exception. Thus, under this interpretation Justice White's
proposal undercuts the exception's validity.
210. An alternative scenario is possible. A good faith exception might result in endless
judicial debate over whether an officer should have anticipated a specific interpretation of
the law. What constitutes a "reasonable mistake of law" is exceedingly difficult to deter-
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1511
In the past the exclusionary rule has functioned to assure that
courts' continually reassess and refine fourth amendment protec-
tions. 11 Some procedure must exist that allows courts to review
claims of right and articulate constitutional doctrine.212 A good
faith exception severely would reduce the need of courts to con-
sider and adopt new fourth amendment standards. Stripped of this
responsibility to develop new standards 213 or subtly refine those al-
ready recognized,1 4 the courts no longer will offer the guidance
necessary for general or systemic deterrence of behavior that vio-
lates the fourth amendment.21 5 Without systematic deterrence, of
course, the importance of and respect for the fourth amendment in
this society gradually will diminish.
Previously, this Article presented United States v. Peltier as
possible precedential support for a general good faith exception.1 6
The above discussion, however, provides the analysis necessary to
distinguish Peltier. The Peltier court simply refused to apply ret-
mine. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1044. Cf. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 357, 530 P.2d 589,
593 (1975) (finding malpractice when attorney failed to perform adequate research to advise
his client on an uncertain point of law); Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F.
Supp. 1283 (M.D. La. 1973) (courts uneasy about finding that an attorney has malpracticed
when failing to anticipate changes in the law). Instead of a forthright confrontation over
what standards should exist, judicial attention would be focused upon the meaning of prior
decisions articulating prior standards. This scenario, consequently, also would impede
fourth amendment development.
211. See Oaks, supra note 3, at 756.
212. Although Wolf in 1949 declared that the fourth amendment bound the states, no
court cases attempted to determine the contour of the states' responsibility under the Con-
stitution until after Mapp imposed the exclusionary rule on the states in 1961.
213. If the fourth amendment standard proposed at trial differs dramatically from or
fills a gap in prior fourth amendment doctrine, the officer reasonably could claim a good
faith error. If evidence is then admissible, the court need not decide whether the officer's
conduct is constitutionally improper. Under such an exception the Court would not have
had a chance to decide the following landmark decisions, which dramatically deviated from
prior case law: Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
214. If the officer's behavior in a specific case is objectionable only if the court makes
subtle distinctions from prior case law, the officer again may claim a reasonable good faith
error. Doctrinal contours thus will remain unclear if courts have no opportunity or incentive
to refine doctrine through the process of repeated application. Yet, scholars traditionally
deem this type of development highly appropriate for judicial institutions. Levi, An Intro-
duction to Legal Reasoning, reprinted in G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 964 (1963). But see
supra note 176 and text accompanying notes 151-53.
215. Exposure to flesh and blood cases, which force courts to learn experientially,
properly discourage courts from relying on rarefied abstractions. A good faith exception
would diminish such valuable exposure. See O.W. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Howe ed.
1963) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.").
216. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
1560
DEFENDING THE CITADEL
roactively a fourth amendment standard newly articulated in Al-
meida-Sanchez. Cases such as Peltier that acknowledge the exis-
tence of newly articulated constitutional standards, but then refuse
to apply them retroactively21 do not impede the development of
constitutional doctrine and do not destroy the general and sys-
temic deterrence provided by the new standards. Rather, such
cases encourage novel and creative approaches by reducing the so-
cietal cost of judicial acceptance of new constitutional standards.
Consequently, the ramifications of non-retroactivity decisions and
of a good faith exception are considerably different. Given such
different effects, Peltier is unconvincing precedential support for a
good faith exception.
2. Erosion of Fourth Amendment Doctrine
Besides retarding fourth amendment development and dimin-
ishing the general and systemic deterrence of fourth amendment
standards, the good faith exception also would erode the fourth
amendment's already articulated substantive doctrines. Consider,
for example, its effect on the requirement of probable cause. Prob-
able cause is the linchpin of fourth amendment protection for it
marks the point at which the qualified individual right to privacy
must succumb to the community's need for security and law en-
forcement. Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts as known
would lead a reasonably cautious individual to believe that the per-
son police are to arrest has or is committing an offense.218 The law
requires the same quantum of evidence before it authorizes a full
search except the conclusions are somewhat different. Probable
cause for a search requires a reasonable belief that the items
sought relate to criminal activity and that police will find the items
at a specific time in the place the police are to search.219 A finding
of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search, thus, does not
require certainty but merely the reasonableness of the officer's or,
in the case of a warrant, the magistrate's belief. The concept of
probable cause, therefore, already subsumes the possibility of a
reasonable error.
Consequently, for a court to find that a police officer or magis-
217. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
218. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949).
219. Y. KAMISAa, W. LAFAvF & J. ISRAEL, supra note 179, at 268.
1983] 1561
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
trate lacked probable cause it must believe that the specific arrest
or search was unreasonable. If a court applied the reasonable good
faith exception under these circumstances, it necessarily would
have to determine whether the offending official, who admittedly
held an unreasonable belief that probable cause existed, had a rea-
sonable good faith belief that probable cause did exist. The para-
dox is evident: how can one reasonably believe an unreasonable be-
lief? Applying the reasonable good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule in this context clearly requires a determination
that the official acted reasonably, with probable cause, in the first
place.2 20 Thus, courts using such an exception would be imposing
covertly a far more permissive interpretation of probable cause.
Once again, the exception is reducing the scope of the fourth
amendment's already articulated standards rather than merely
providing an innocuous exception to the remedy chosen to vindi-
cate fourth amendment rights.
3. Interfering With the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The good faith exception also would subtly and insidiously
erode the importance and effectiveness of the sixth amendment
right to counsel. Ever since the early 1960's, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the aid of counsel in a criminal trial is essential
to ensure both a fair trial2 21 and proper protection of the individ-
ual liberty interests at stake.222 The defense attorney, then, as well
as the prosecution, is crucial to society's adversarial system of
criminal justice. In a 1963 report by the Attorney General's Com-
mittee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Jus-
tice 223 the Committee recognized that,
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The survival of our system
of criminal justice and the values which it advances depend upon a constant,
searching, and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of au-
thority at all stages of the process. The proper performance of the defense
function is thus as vital to the health of the system as the performance of the
220. Consequently, the dissent in People v. Quintero, as argued previously, see supra
text accompanying notes 159-62, is attacking the majority's determination that probable
cause for a search did not exist.
221. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
222. Scott v. Illinois; 440 U.S. 367 (1979), held that a court only need grant counsel to
a defendant on trial for a misdemeanor if, upon conviction, the court in fact sentenced him
to a period of incarceration. The Supreme Court found that defendants only sentenced to
fines have no such constitutional right. See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
223. Commentators often refer to the report as The Allen Report, after the Chairman
of the Committee, Professor Francis A. Allen.
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prosecuting and adjudicatory functions. 22'
The defense attorney, thus, is valuable not merely because he en-
sures a fair trial and protects his client's liberty interests, but also
because he provides the open criticism and analysis of governmen-
tal behavior necessary for a healthy criminal justice system. While
defending his client, he also exposes governmental improprieties
and, thus, aids in the control of the controllers.225
Seemingly, therefore, defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel concerns more than the presence or appointment of some-
one labeled "defense counsel"; the individual so labeled also must
function effectively as counsel. Ineffective counsel may result ei-
ther from lack of attorney diligence or from a system structured to
prevent defendants from benefitting from attorneys' efforts.
Over twenty years ago Justice Douglas spoke of a criminal de-
fendant's right to have and benefit from the efforts of an "imagina-
tive lawyer. ' 228 A good faith exception would diminish such a right.
If an imaginative lawyer has not convinced any prior court that a
new fourth amendment standard is necessary, the offending officer
in a given case only need claim that he in good faith did not antici-
pate the proposed perspective in order to deprive defense counsel
of any opportunity to bring a creative and imaginative argument to
the court's attention.22 7 If the officer acted in good faith the evi-
dence would remain admissible. No matter how capable and con-
vincing is defense counsel's presentation, the good faith exception
will deprive defendant of the benefit of his attorney's argument
unless prior defendants had equally capable counsel. 228 Defendants
should not need to rely on anyone other than their own attorney
for vindication of their constitutional rights. A system that re-
224. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963), reprinted in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 179, at 53.
225. Some jurists and scholars reject this system regulation role of defense counsel and
advise a more complete focus on the criminal justice system's truth-finding function. Fran-
kel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1055 (1975). Crimi-
nal law, thus, would seek to control only the potential deviant. For a discussion of the law's
need also to control the controllers, see supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
226. Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 447 (1962).
227. As previously asserted, defense counsel will have no incentive to develop or pro-
pose new and creative arguments that do not inure to his client's benefit. See supra notes
209-10 and accompanying text.
228. In fact a danger exists of an infinite recursion, in which an officer's claim of good
faith error defeats defense counsel's arguments, which courts in turn similarly had dismissed
on good faith grounds when raised in earlier cases. This process would prevent further de-
velopment of the law.
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quires otherwise interferes with the fundamental right to counsel.
A conceptual critique of the good faith exception, thus, reveals
that the exception is premised erroneously on the inability of the
exclusionary rule to deter illegal police behavior in good faith error
circumstances and ignores that a constitutional violation goes un-
remedied. Further, as this Article has shown, the very premise of
the exception is faulty because it neglects the general and systemic
effects of the rule in good faith error contexts. More significantly,
however, recognition of the exception severely would restrict the
scope of the fourth amendment and potentially would freeze fur-
ther development of fourth amendment standards. Additionally,
while the exception's adverse effect on the sixth amendment right
to effective counsel is subtle, the effect is substantial. All these fac-
tors make a strong conceptual case against recognition of a good
faith exception. The practical problems associated with implemen-
tation of the exception, however, also are extensive and require
exploration.
IV. THE DIFFIcULTIES AssOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF A
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
The practical problems associated with implementation of a
good faith exception should be sufficient to discourage its adop-
tion. The judicial process used to determine whether a court
should apply the exception will diminish the importance and scope
of the fourth amendment as well as encourage police to manipulate
the criminal justice system.
A. Defining Reasonable Good Faith
The proposed good faith exception has both a subjective and
objective component. The subjective component requires an officer
honestly to believe his actions lawful. Since the primary justifica-
tion for the exception is the exclusionary rule's inability to deter
an officer who mistakenly regards his behavior as constitutional,
the subjective aspect of "good faith" lies at the heart of the excep-
tion. The objective component, the requirement that the error be
reasonable, attempts to avoid placing a premium on ignorance and
poor training. Without the objective aspect, protection from gov-
ernmental intrusion would be no greater than that observed by the
least knowledgeable and least diligent member of the law enforce-
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ment team.2 2 ' Both the subjective and objective components, how-
ever, pose extensive problems that require discussion.
The following hypothetical provides a basis for illustrating the
difficulties associated with the good faith exception's subjective
component. Assume the existence of an area of search and seizure
law that courts have not defined clearly and that lacks authorita-
tive determination by the Supreme Court.23 0 Given the law's un-
certain condition, reasonable individuals could disagree whether
certain police behavior is legal in a specific context. Assume that
an officer confronts a situation within this nebulous area, and that
he reasonably and in good faith believes a search would be legal,
performs the search, and discovers illegal drugs. Another officer
confronts the identical situation. He, in contrast to the first officer,
reasonably believes a search would be illegal..23  He, however, per-
forms the search and also uncovers illegal drugs. A court, reviewing
the second officer's behavior and recognizing the officer's bad faith,
will eliminate any good faith assertion and find the officer's behav-
ior unconstitutional.3 2 Consequently, the court will exclude the
drugs at the second defendant's trial. At the first defendant's trial,
however, the same court, reviewing the first officer's behavior and
recognizing that the officer reasonably believed his behavior was
legal, will admit the drugs into evidence. Therefore, although both
defendants have had their fourth amendment rights violated in
precisely the same manner, under a system recognizing a good
faith exception the same court will vindicate one defendant's vio-
lated right while allowing the other's to go unremedied. ss
These incongruent results, mandated by the good faith excep-
tion, pose two immediate problems. First the inconsistent treat-
229. "A proper legal definition of 'good faith' involves not only a lack of malevolence
but also a reasonable effort to comply with the law." Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass.
488, -, 441 N.E.2d 725, 738 (1982) (Liacos, J., concurring). See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 2340-47 (White, J., concurring).
230. For example, the extent to which police may use the "drug courier profile" to
justify a forcible stop, search, and seizure is an area of law that similarly lacks authoritative
determination by the Court. See Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983); Reid v. Georgia,
448 U.S. 438 (1980); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
231. Each officer's respective police department may have trained him: one to view
such behavior as lawful, the other to view it as improper. Again, both departments would be
interpreting the law reasonably although they disagree.
232. Of course, this assumes the court could overcome the evidentiary difficulty that
finding subjective bad faith entails. See infra text accompanying notes 242-54.
233. Thus, the argument that the officers' different motivations justify different reme-
dies is untenable. No alternative remedy exists for an individual whose rights police violated
while acting on the basis of a good faith error. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
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ment of two identically culpable defendants whose fundamental
rights police violated 23 4 in the same exact way is intuitively dis-
comforting. In such a situation the importance of fourth amend-
ment norms seems unverified and the public's perception of courts
acting as defenders of the faith, protectors of constitutional liber-
ties, is severely shaken. Furthermore, a court's failure to follow the
principle insisting that it treat like situations alike will violate the
public's expectation of proper judicial functioning.3" Justice
Harlan recognized the importance of this principle nearly fifteen
years ago in his Desist v. United States dissent.236 In Desist, the
Court refused to apply the new fourth amendment standard ar-
ticulated in Katz v. United States,23 7 which required a warrant for
telephone taps, to cases in which police misbehavior occurred prior
to the Katz decision. The Court's rationale was that the Katz rul-
ing conceivably could deter only subsequent searches, thus justify-
ing exclusion only in such later situations. Justice Harlan dissented
and insisted that Katz should apply to all cases not yet final re-
gardless of the date of police misconduct. "If a 'new' constitutional
doctrine is truly right," he asserted
we should not reverse lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we
affirm those which have rejected the very arguments we have embraced. Any-
thing else would belie the truism that it is the task of this Court, like that of
any other, to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case. It is
only if our decisions can be justified in terms of this fundamental premise
that they may properly be considered the legitimate products of a court of
law rather than the commands of a super-legislature.23 8
Although Justice Harlan was unable to convince a majority of
the Court at the time, the Court belatedly accepted his dissent in
the 1982 decision of United States v. Johnson.3 9 In Johnson the
Court applied the newly recognized standard of Payton v. New
York,24° which required police to obtain an arrest warrant before
entering a suspect's home to make a routine felony arrest, to all
cases pending on direct appeal at the time the Court decided Pay-
ton regardless of the date of police misconduct. Relying heavily on
234. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (fourth amendment
rights are personal rights); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (fourth amendment
expresses a fundamental liberty of individuals binding upon the state through the operation
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
235. See L. FULLER, THE MoRALrrY oF LAW 33-41 (1964).
236. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
237. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
238. 394 U.S. at 259 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
239. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
240. 435 U.S. 573 (1980).
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Justice Harlan's dissent in Desist, the Court in Johnson recognized
the importance of the Court's behaving in a manner giving
credence to itself and support to constitutional rights whose scope
and violation the Court had acknowledged."4 1 The inconsistent ju-
dicial reactions to violated fundamental rights generated by the
good faith exception jeopardizes the same interests the Court in-
tended Johnson to protect.
Conditioning the evidence's admissibility on an officer's
nonculpable subjective state of mind existing at the time of his
search reveals the second problem posed by the earlier hypothe-
sized situation." Under the good faith exception an officer truly
must believe his conduct was lawful to avoid suppression of the
discovered evidence.24 ' The trial court hearing the suppression mo-
tion, therefore, seemingly must determine the beliefs of the officer
at the time he seized the evidence. If a law enforcement officer's
averment of good faith seems reasonable, however, defense counsel
will find the claim nearly impossible to refute.4 Consequently,
hearings to ascertain the subjective intent and actual knowledge of
the officer will be open invitations to perjury.2 "4 The officer's ad-
justment of the facts in order to obtain conviction of a defendant
he truly believes guilty is understandable given his engagement "in
241. If the fourth amendment protected citizens from only malevolent governmental
intrusions upon privacy then only one of the two earlier hypothesized defendants, see supra
text accompanying notes 230-33, would have a justified claim of right violation. Remedy in
only that one case then would be proper. But motive is not relevant to the issue of whether
police have infringed a citizen's fourth amendment rights. As suggested by Justice Mar-
shall's dissent in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), a focus on a tainted motive, while
possibly justified when dealing with suspect classification and societal gratuities, is concep-
tually irrelevant when the issue concerns fundamental rights. See id. at 113-16 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Although closing a public swimming pool may be unlawful only if done with
racial discriminatory intent, a ban on leafletting would be equally invalid under the first
amendment whether desires to prevent littering or to suppress speech motivated the ban.
See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 230-33.
243. If the officer had any doubt, the exclusionary rule's deterrent potential would
justify the rule's application.
244. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 132; Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for
Police Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1975).
245. Former Judge Irving Younger, a one-time federal prosecutor, frankly observed
that "[e]very lawyer who practices in the criminal courts knows that police perjury is com-
monplace." Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204 THE NATION 596, 596 (1967). Ironically, op-
ponents of the exclusionary rule generally criticize it for encouraging police distortion of
facts. See Rosenblatt & Rosenblatt, A Legal House of Cards, HARPERs, July 1977, at 18, 20
("While intended to curb abuse of police power, the exclusionary rule has opened up a
whole new field of police misconduct: perjury."). See also Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1032.
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the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 2 46 Police
likely view allowing a criminal to escape "justice" as a much
greater societal danger than a simple reconstruction of facts at a
suppression hearing.2 47 While the possibility of perjury exists
under the exclusionary rule, perjury is even easier under the sub-
jective component of the good faith exception. Consequently,
rather than alleviating this exclusionary rule weakness, the pro-
posed exception exacerbates it. The exception, thus, merely adds
another layer of potential police perjury to the suppression hear-
ing: a layer most difficult to counteract because only the officer
knows with certainty his subjective intent.
A presumption that all officers intentionally will commit per-
jury is not necessary, however, before the exception's critics can
show that its subjective component is impractical. People selec-
tively perceive, interpret, and recall their sensory impulses based
upon their interests and experiences.2 48 They seldom want to hear,
see, or remember that which is contrary to their needs. Further-
more, ideas, opinions, and positions that coincide with an individ-
ual's own interests or that appeal to his half-submerged prejudices
are difficult for him to reject as untrue.24 19 Given the strength of an
officer's identification with the interests and needs of the police
subculture, if a particular subjective belief is necessary to allow use
of the fruits of a search in a criminal trial, an officer will not have
difficulty convincing himself of its existence.5 ° Whenever a good
faith error reasonably explains police misconduct, an officer will
seldom engage in such misconduct without simultaneously exper-
iencing a strong, even if erroneous, belief in the lawfulness of his
behavior.5 1 Consequently, the good faith exception compounds the
overt problem of perjury with the covert problem of selective
perception.
The Supreme Court is not oblivious to the dangers of having
fourth amendment exclusionary issues revolve around the subjec-
tive belief or intent of individual officers. As recently as 1978, when
the Court was evaluating police conduct relating to wiretaps, it
246. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
247. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 61, at 215; LaFave, supra note 152, at 154; Younger,
supra note 245, at 596.
248. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendmeht Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 964, 974 (1978).
249. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1130 (1979).
250. See LaFave, supra note 152, at 154.
251. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 437.
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stated that the judiciary should use a "standard of objective rea-
sonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation
of the officers involved. 2 52 Furthermore, ten years earlier, three
Justices expressed their uneasiness with courts even attempting to
determine police subjective intent and vehemently asserted that
"sending state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds
of police officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation
of judicial resources." 53 If most courts feel the same queasiness
regarding the propriety of judicial determinations of subjective in-
tent,254 judicial review of the subjective component of a claimed
good faith error will be perfunctory at best.
Courts may avoid the aforementioned pitfalls of the good faith
exception's subjective component if they exclusively stress the ex-
ception's objective component. If courts emphasize the exception's
objective aspect, then the police behavior would be in good faith
whenever it is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of prior
doctrine. The officer's subjective intent or belief, therefore, be-
comes irrelevant. Such a purely objective good faith standard, how-
ever, also encourages police trickery and system manipulation. For
example, if an officer doubts whether he has sufficient evidence to
obtain a search warrant, he may proceed without the warrant in
the hope that a trial judge will find his misbehavior reasonable in
an effort to admit incriminating evidence.
Most unfortunately, whenever the law in an area is unsettled,
an objective good faith standard will provide the incentive for of-
ficers to choose the perspective that most jeopardizes fourth
amendment rights. 55 Police would not protect individual privacy
252. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
253. Ironically, Justice White, presently the Court's strongest spokesman for a good
faith exception, authored this assertion that an effort to determine police subjective intent
would misallocate judicial resources. Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968)
(White, J., joined by Harlan and Stewart, J.J.) (dissenting from a dismissal of certiorari as
improvidently granted).
254. Similar concerns over judicial determinations of subjective beliefs have led crimi-
nal courts frequently to reject mistake of law as a defense to criminal prosecution. Professor
Lon Fuller discussed the danger of recognizing such a defense:
The required intent is so little susceptible of definite proof or disproof that the trier of
fact is almost inevitably driven to asking, "Does he look like the kind who would stick
by the rules or one who would cheat on them when he saw a chance?" This question,
unfortunately, leads easily into another, "Does he look like my kind?"
L. FULLER, supra note 235, at 72-73. Courts may ask the same questions in suppression
hearings with answers biased by the judges' affinity for the police officer's goal of crime
control. See infra text accompanying notes 267-70.
255. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 559 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
LaFave, supra note 3, at 352. Under a good faith exception, the system will encourage foot-
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beyond the standards clearly mandated by case law because such
protection would seem unwarranted and inconsistent with law en-
forcement goals.258 Consequently, judicially articulated constitu-
tional minimums likely would become departmental maximums. A
legal system and police culture that encouraged behavior directed
predominantly toward crime fighting probably would influence
even those officers who otherwise would not consciously decide to
avoid doing more than they legally must.257 In contrast to the good
faith exception, the exclusionary rule at least tempers the law en-
forcement system's tendency to discourage concern over fourth
amendment rights by encouraging the police to err on the side of
greater protection when the law is ambiguous. 58 Precisely in such
cases individuals most need the exclusionary rule.
Consequently, although the subjective component of the good
faith exception is fraught with difficulties, under a purely objective
standard every legal ambiguity or uncertainty constitutes an ave-
nue for system manipulation and subterfuge by police. Consider,
for example, the circumstances in Brewer v. Williams.259 Police
were to transport defendant Williams to Des Moines, Iowa after
dragging as officials will have little incentive, in close cases, to err on the side of respect for
constitutional liberties. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982).
The Court in Johnson rejected the government argument that courts never should ap-
ply decisions resolving unsettled fourth amendment questions to cases that involve police
conduct which preceded the definitive decision. The Court's concerns, expressed in its deci-
sion, are also relevant to the effects of an objectively determined good faith exception: "Offi-
cial awareness of the dubious constitutionality of a practice would be counterbalanced by
official certainty that, so long as the Fourth Amendment law in the area remained unsettled,
evidence obtained through the questionable practice would be [admissible until the render-
ing of an opinion] definitively resolving the unsettled question." Id. See Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 273 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
256. The exclusionary rule's existence provides an officer who believes present doc-
trine insufficiently protects fourth amendment rights with an opportunity to behave in ac-
cordance with his beliefs while justifying his greater concern to fellow officers in crime fight-
ing terms. His behavior merely ensures that a future fickle court ruling will not reject his
arrests or searches. If the court recognizes the good faith exception, however, such an officer
no longer will be able to support fourth amendment interests in terms his colleagues will
accept. Consequently, the proposed exception to the exclusionary rule not only creates an
incentive to foot-drag and to interpret ambiguous areas of law so as to infringe upon fourth
amendment rights, but also creates a disincentive to decide to act in a fashion supporting
such rights by removing any and all legal insulation from peer pressure. See Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 276-77 (1969) (Fortes, J., dissenting) (rejecting court decisions
that award "dunce caps" to those officers who try to anticipate future trends in fourth
amendment doctrine).
257. This Article earlier discussed the role of selective perception and interpretation
of sensory data. See supra text accompanying notes 248-51.
258. See LaFave, supra note 3, at 352.
259. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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his arraignment for murder charges in Davenport. Police assured
defendant's counsel that they would not interrogate defendant
during the trip. Nevertheless the detective traveling with Williams
made a "christian burial speech," suggesting that due to the wors-
ening weather the murder victim would not receive a proper burial
if police could not locate the body quickly. Williams, susceptible to
such religious considerations, directed the police to the body. The
Supreme Court, in a five to four opinion, found that the detectives
had intentionally separated Williams from his attorney for the
purpose of playing on his sensitivities and eliciting incriminating
statements. Such conduct, concluded the Court, violated the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to counsel, and, thus, the trial court
could not use the defendant's incriminating statements.
Upon retrial, defense counsel argued that the court also should
not admit the evidence relating to the murder victim's body. The
court should suppress such evidence, he insisted, as "fruit of the
poisonous tree" since police discovered the body as the result of
unconstitutional behavior. The state responded that the instituted
police search of the area would have found the body eventually
even without the defendant's assistance and, thus, the court prop-
erly had admitted the evidence under an "inevitable discovery doc-
trine.12 60 The Iowa Supreme Court agreed that such evidence was
admissible but only if the state could prove that (1) the police did
not act in bad faith for the purpose of hastening discovery of the
evidence in question, and (2) that police would have discovered the
evidence by lawful means. 261
For purposes of this Article, the court's evaluation of bad faith
is highly informative. The court held,
While there can be no doubt that the method upon which the police em-
barked in order to gain William's assistance was both subtly coercive and
purposeful, and that its purpose was to discover the victim's body, we cannot
find that it was in bad faith. The issue of the propriety of the police conduct
in this case . . .has caused the closest possible division of views in every
appellate court which has considered the question. In light of the legitimate
disagreement among individuals well versed in the law of criminal procedure
who were given the opportunity for calm deliberation, it cannot be said that
the actions of the police were taken in bad faith.262
The Iowa Court resolved the issue of good faith simply by not-
ing that jurists, even Supreme Court Justices, reasonably had dis-
260. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 255-56 (Iowa 1979).
261. Id. at 260.
262. Id. at 260-61.
1983] 1571
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
agreed on the constitutionality of the police behavior.26 s That the
detective clearly tried to manipulate the defendant while out of his
counsel's presence and to trick him into incriminating himself was
of no significance. Although the Williams case does not involve a
fourth amendment issue it reveals the likely outcome if courts em-
phasize the objective component of the good faith exception to
avoid the dangers of the exception's subjective component. Wil-
liams illustrates how the objective component threatens police
abuse. In turn, courts can remove this threat of abuse only by de-
termining police intent and once again evaluating police subjectivi-
ties.28 4 The implementation problems associated with a good faith
exception, thus, are insoluble. Whether the courts focus on the ex-
ception's objective or subjective aspect, implementation of the
good faith exception will result in diminished protection of fourth
amendment rights. The institutional setting in which courts will
determine the existence of good faith exacerbates this danger.
B. Increased Pro-Police Bias of Suppression Hearings
The good faith exception inevitably would convert suppression
hearings into swearing contests. Police would assert that their be-
liefs are honest while the defense would question their integrity.
Trial court judges, thus, would have to make suppression decisions
on the basis of the least reliable or determinative kind of evidence.
Additionally, the need to define a "reasonable" mistake of law
would impose upon suppression judges the responsibility to make
exceedingly difficult determinations on a regular basis. The trial
court, therefore, would have tremendous discretion in ruling
whether or not the police engaged in the objectionable behavior in
263. If a good faith exception extended beyond the fourth amendment to all motions
for evidence suppression, the Iowa court's interpretation of good faith would have ended the
need for the Supreme Court's decision in Brewer in the first place. The incriminating state-
ments, obtained under a "good faith" error, would have been admissible. Additionally, if the
Court decided the issue of good faith first, the Court would not have needed to determine
whether the detective's behavior was proper. Sixth amendment doctrine in this area, conse-
quently, would remain unclear and police could repeat identical mistakes in "good faith."
264. Following a second conviction, Williams sought federal habeus corpus relief.
Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit rejected the perspective of the Iowa decision:
The question before us is not whether the Supreme Court's opinion in Brewer v. Wil-
liams is fairly debatable as a legal matter. Obviously it is. The question is rather what
was in [the detective's] mind during [the] ride back to Des Moines. . . . The relevant
question-bad faith-is subjective .. . . [Here the question is whether] the closeness
of a later judicial decision necessarily establish[es] that conduct approved by a minor-
ity of judges is not in bad faith? We think not.
Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
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good faith. Given that the lower judiciary "has hardly been very
trustworthy in this area" of police credibility and misbehavior,"6 5
this basically unfettered discretion likely will result, because of the
fact finding propensities of state trial courts,66 in almost auto-
matic admission of illegally obtained evidence whenever the officer
claims good faith.
Even critics of the exclusionary rule acknowledge the anti-ex-
clusionary rule bias of trial judges. 267 The judges' continuing rela-
tionship with police and prosecutors, their discomfort with refus-
ing to admit relevant and apparently reliable evidence, 68 their
interaction with crime victims, and their susceptibility to commu-
nity pressure to punish the guilty affect their perception leaving
them functionally and psychologically allied with police in the
prosecution of crime.26 9 Since the above factors leave trial courts
reluctant to interfere with police crime fighting efforts, under a
good faith exception such courts likely will be eager to believe of-
ficers claiming an honestly held belief in the lawfulness of the
search or seizure in question.
Decisions that reflect this bias rarely are susceptible to appel-
late review because appellate courts are disinclined to review trial
court findings of fact.27 1 Furthermore, determinations of credibil-
ity, frequently based on factors such as witness appearance or atti-
265. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1045.
266. Appellate courts arguably have constitutionalized whole areas of criminal proce-
dure precisely because of the trial court's fact finding propensities. For example, Professor
Amsterdam insists that the Supreme Court's fear of the trial court's pro-police bias shaped
the confession cases. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Crimi-
nal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 803-10 (1970). Lower courts consistently had resolved the
"swearing contest" over what took place during police interrogation in favor of the police.
Cf. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7 (1956).
267. E.g., Wilkey, A Call for Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule: Let Congress and
the Trial Courts Speak, 62 JUDICATURE 351, 356 (1979). Some argue that the exclusionary
rule pressures the courts to water down standards for proper searches and arrests in order to
avoid the rule's effect of "freeing obviously guilty defendants." Barrett, Personal Rights,
Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 66. See Ashdown,
supra note 3, at 1294, 1315 (courts now use the privacy concept of Katz, originally meant to
expand the scope of fourth amendment protection, to draw "unrealistic distinctions in favor
of law enforcement"); Schlesinger, supra note 3, at 405.
268. See Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police),
58 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc. 433, 448-49 (1967); Wilkey, supra note 267, at
356.
269. Amsterdam, supra note 266, at 792.
270. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1038-39.
271. Appellate judges are better able to confront dispassionately fourth amendment




tude which cannot be duplicated in a record for appeal, are virtu-
ally immune from review. Since the good faith exception's
subjective component requires a trial court determination of police
credibility, it gives trial judges, already opposed to the exclusion-
ary rule, a virtually unreviewable means of avoiding the rule's
impact. 27 1
Trial courts' rulings on the objective component of the good
faith exception also are likely to reflect an anti-suppression bias.
The police error is reasonable if the facts and circumstances of the
specific case as found by the trial court reasonably could justify the
police action under the then existing case law. Yet reasonableness,
arguably, has little more usefulness for analytical purposes than
indicating consistency within a given system of values and belief.2 73
Given the role of selective perception and the similarity of police
and trial judge attitudes about criminal law enforcement, judicial
findings of fact that make an officer's error reasonable should not
be surprising. If the error's reasonableness, in the context of the
facts found, is initially for the trial court to determine, in practice
appellate courts will defer to the factual findings of trial courts and
trial courts will defer to the factual testimony of police. 274
Under the good faith exception the traditional pro-police bias
of suppression hearings not only would be insulated from appellate
review, it likely would be aggravated. Under the present exclusion-
ary rule trial judges determine whether an officer's judgment was
wrong in a basically amoral, technical and mechanical sense. The
good faith exception, however, changes the issue from whether an
officer violated a fourth amendment right to whether he deserves
moral reproachment. A court will be far more open to finding an
officer "wrong" than to finding him "bad. '275 Thus, a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule frames the exclusion issue in
terms, and focuses its resolution at judicial levels, least conducive
272. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 3, at 449-50.
273. Weyrauch, Taboo and Magic in Law, 25 STAN. L. REV. 782, 800 (1973).
274. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 394.
275. Courts and law enforcement agencies much more calmly accepted the Supreme
Court decisions in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (requiring presence of defense
attorney at post-indictment lineup), and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (re-
quiring presence of defense attorney at post-indictment interrogations of defendant), for
example, than they did Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Wade and Massiah seemed
to revolve around the technical requirement of counsel for all post-indictment evidence pro-
ducing contacts between government and defendant. Miranda, on the other hand, admon-
ished police for trickery, perjury, and actions "destructive of human dignity," 384 U.S. at
457. Miranda was harder to accept precisely because it questioned the professionality and
integrity of the police. For further discussion, see Ingber, supra note 145, at 287-95.
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to the sympathetic development of fourth amendment rights.
C. The Unconvincing Nature of the Strongest Case for a Good
Faith Exception
Considering the good faith exception in its strongest context
illustrates the practical problems of its implementation. Exclusion
of evidence seems least fair when law enforcement officers reasona-
bly have relied on a judicially-issued search or arrest warrant later
found defective for lack of probable cause. When officers have
tested the existence of probable cause by dutifully obtaining a
search warrant from a judge or magistrate, and have executed the
warrant according to its terms, exception proponents point out
that exclusion of evidence can have no conceivable effect upon the
officers' behavior.Y Particularly when the magistrate also made
his determination of probable cause, although erroneous, reasona-
bly and in good faith, little justification seems to exist for exclud-
ing the discovered evidence. Upon closer examination of this con-
text, however, the argument for a good faith exception remains
unconvincing.
The Supreme Court long has manifested a constitutional pref-
erence for arrests2 7 and searches278 made pursuant to a warrant.
The Court has touted the ability of the warrant process to protect
fourth amendment interest because the process ensures that a neu-
tral and detached magistrate 79 makes the probable cause determi-
nation in an informed and deliberative manner.280 Jurists perceive
such a process of "judicial impartiality 281 as clearly preferable to
one in which police or prosecutors, engaged in the competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime,2 reach such decisions hurriedly,283
and judicial officers review the decisions only after the fact and by
hindsight judgment.
The actual existence of neutral and detached magistrates mak-
ing impartial deliberative determinations, however, is highly
276. In Gates, in which Justice White made his strongest pro-exception argument, po-
lice officers, arguably, had so obtained and executed a search warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 103
S. Ct. 2317, 2344-47 (1983).
277. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 93-96 (1964).
278. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965).
279. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
280. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964) (quoting United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)).
281. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
282. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
283. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964).
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doubtful. In most states the public elects magistrates to office. 284
Thus, the magistrates are susceptible to public pressure to more
effectively fight crime.28 5 In many states magistrates need not be,
and many rural magistrates are not, lawyers.288 Such lay magis-
trates often rely on the advice of the legally educated prosecutor in
determining whether to issue a warrant.
Urban magistrates, on the other hand, usually are trained law-
yers and, thus, seemingly could avoid dependency on prosecutorial
advice. They, however, have such extensive caseloads 28 7 that nor-
mally they have little time to adequately review a warrant applica-
tion. Consequently, such overworked urban magistrates, as their
rural counterparts, often give warrants perfunctorily relying on the
judgment of police and prosecutors to evaluate the need and pro-
priety of the request.2"8
When a magistrate's psychological and perceptual allegiance
to police crime fighting goals 2 9 couples with his susceptibility to
public pressure and his reliance on police and prosecutor probable
cause evaluations, his neutrality and detachment in issuing war-
284. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 179, at 8.
285. In other states governors or local governmental officials appoint magistrates for a
fixed term of office. Id. Political considerations make it unlikely that those seen as "easy on
crime" will receive appointments.
286. Id. See also Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of lay magistrates). Federal magistrates, on the other hand, must be attorneys.
Some federal magistrates, however, serve only part time while also practicing law. If a fed-
eral magistrate seeks clients in the community where he presides he may feel pressured to
portray an image of an official protecting the community from crime rather than one overly
sensitive to fourth amendment interests.
287. The responsibilities of these urban judges often include presiding over misde-
meanor trials, minor civil cases, and preliminary felony proceedings. In a busy urban court
the caseload per judge can reach 2000 per year. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, supra
note 179, at 9. The result is often "assembly line justice." "With their crowded facilities,
lack of adequate staffing and routinized procedure, these magistrate courts create an atmo-
sphere . . . that is more appropriate for a supermarket than a court of justice." Id.
288. "How can a magistrate be more than a 'rubber stamp' in signing warrants," ques-
tioned Professor Barrett,
unless he devotes at least some minutes in each case to reading the affidavits submitted
to him in support of the request for a warrant, and inquiring into the background of
the conclusions stated therein? And where is the judicial time going to be found to
make such inquiries in the generality of cases? The Los Angeles Municipal Court with
annual filings of about 130,000 (excluding parking and traffic) finds itself so pressed
that in large areas of its caseload it averages but a minute per case in receiving pleas
and imposing sentence: How could it cope with the added burden that would be in-
volved in the issuance of warrants to govern the approximately 200,000 arrests [much
less searches] made per year in Los Angeles for offenses other than traffic?
Barrett, Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass Production, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC,
AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 85, 117-18 (H.W. Jones ed. 1965).
289. See Amsterdam, supra note 266, at 792.
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rants are highly questionable. Magistrates with needs and interests
similar to law enforcement agents likely will perceive as reasonable
those steps that such agents perceive as reasonable.2 °0 Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, in the context of an ex parte review of a warrant
application, magistrates rarely fail to find probable cause to issue
the warrant. 1
Even if a magistrate is doubtful whether probable cause exists,
his reliance on police and prosecutor evaluations and his belief
that defense counsel adequately can test the validity of his proba-
ble cause determination by a motion to suppress, make it likely
that he will err on the side of greater rather than lesser police au-
thority. Yet, once police obtain a warrant they tend to be less cau-
tious. Furthermore, courts direct suppression hearing judges,
whom magistrates rely upon to correct magistrate error, to defer to
a magistrate's probable cause determination whenever possible.
2 92
Additionally, appellate judges are reluctant to overrule two prior
judicial determinations. 29 3 Responsibility for neutral and detached
probable cause determinations, thus, passes from hand to hand.
The warrant process, therefore, ultimately relies on the initial
290. See supra text accompanying notes 248-51.
291. Scholars widely have recognized the pervasive tendency for magistrates to grant
warrant applications without adequate independent evaluation. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra
note 3, at 471-72 n.532; see also W. LAFAvE, ARREsT-THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT
INTO CUSTODY 30-36 (1965); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 48
(1969); LaFave and Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and
Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 987, 991-95 (1965). In Lo-Ji Sales,
Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979), the Supreme Court castigated a magistrate for be-
coming a member of the police search party. While few magistrates would cooperate with
police quite as overtly as the magistrate did in Lo-Ji Sales, institutional comraderie may
function covertly, but effectively, in merging the interest of police, prosecutor, and
magistrate.
The problems associated with warrant grants do not suggest that warrants are of no
value whatsoever. The pre-search affidavit in support of a warrant application ordinarily
deprives the officer of the benefit of hindsight coloring the reasonableness of the search and
seizure after it has produced evidence in support of itself. See United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 828-29 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also W. LAFAvE, supra at 296-97; J.
SKOLNICK, supra note 61, at 214-15.
292. "[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
'substantial basis for. . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed." Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
293. A 1981 review of then recent decisions from the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, for
example, found no decision holding a warrant insufficient. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 3, at 456. Judicial questioning of magistrate judgments is much more difficult than
questioning police judgments. Magistrates are, of course, members of the same "trade
union" as are judges. Judges are unlikely to question one of their own since they themselves
are adverse to superior courts' questioning and overruling them.
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probable cause determinations of police and prosecutors: the very
judgments the legal system's architects designed the process to
oversee.
29 4
This practical rather than mythical perception of the warrant
process belies its neutrality and detachment. Recognition of a good
faith exception in this context merely would compound the prob-
lem. Under the exception whenever "well trained" officers and
magistrates reasonably could differ on whether probable cause ex-
ists, evidence seized under the defective warrant remains admissi-
ble." 5 Well trained officers, however, also are aware that a substan-
tial disparity exists among magistrates as to the extent of evidence
necessary before any given magistrate will issue a warrant."9 Thus,
the good faith exception encourages an officer or prosecutor unsure
whether probable cause for an arrest or search exists to "shop
around" for a lenient magistrate likely to err only in the direction
of effective law enforcement.2 7
Magistrate shopping, however, met with overt judicial disap-
proval in United States v. Davis.29 8 In Davis, a Treasury agent and
an assistant U.S. attorney requested a federal magistrate to issue a
warrant on the basis of an affidavit. The magistrate denied this
request. The following day the same agent and assistant attorney
presented the same affidavit to a second magistrate who issued the
warrant. The federal district court found such magistrate shopping
highly improper and concluded that the first magistrate's decision
was binding and prevented a second magistrate from issuing a war-
rant on the exact same showing.29 e A good faith exception covertly
will encourage the magistrate shopping Davis overtly condemns. If
the Court recognizes the exception, it merely will lead officers and
prosecutors to approach initially those magistrates reputed to be
more sympathetic to their needs, as was the second magistrate in
Davis.3 00 Law enforcement officers in the jurisdiction need never
repeat the agent's error in Davis; they merely can bypass the first
294. See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 394.
295. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2346 (White, J., concurring).
296. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 204 (1967).
297. See id. at 120.
298. 346 F. Supp. 435 (S.D. Ill. 1972).
299. Id. at 442.
300. The good faith exception, thus, compounds the magistrate-shopping problem. At
least in a Davis-type situation the second magistrate is aware of the proceeding before the
first magistrate and, thus, likely will act cautiously. Under a good faith exception, however,
if police or prosecutors merely choose strategically the first magistrate, that magistrate may
remain unaware of the uncertainty of probable cause in the case at hand.
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magistrate on questionable cases.
Ironically, although the defective warrant allegedly provides
the strongest justification for a good faith exception, the exception
is least necessary in this setting. Fourth amendment substantive
law already recognizes that in doubtful or marginal cases a court
should sustain a search with warrant when it would not without
one.301 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Gates insisted that re-
viewing courts merely should ensure that there was a" 'substantial
basis for. . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.' "302 Courts,
therefore, already are to disregard any reasonable deviation by a
magistrate from some hypothetically knowable probable cause
standard and sustain the resulting search and seizure as constitu-
tional.30 3 To recognize additionally a good faith exception when a
magistrate grants a warrant under circumstances in which even
this strong judicial preference is insufficient to sustain it, is to con-
done and encourage a magistrate's gross insensitivity to fourth
amendment values.3 0 4 Thus, even in the context its supporters
most frequently use to justify a good faith exception, the exception
again merely is a covert attack upon fourth amendment principles.
V. CONCLUSION: LEGITIMACY AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT
Judicial recognition of a good faith exception to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule would be more than a simple refine-
301. "[I]n a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable
where without one it would fall." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965).
302. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). "[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of
the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's
'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.'" Id.
at 2331 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)).
303. Gates itself, consequently, may encourage magistrate shopping.
304. Some jurists have questioned whether exclusion ever is a proper remedy when a
judge or magistrate rather than a police officer committed the constitutional error. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2345 (1983) (White, J., concurring); Commonwealth v.
Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, , 441 N.E.2d 725, 735 (1982). Yet, the system expects magis-
trates, even more than police, to understand court decisions and follow their directives. See
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 563 (1979). Although the deterrent value of exclusion upon
police confronted with hurried and situational choices may be questionable, see supra text
accompanying notes 73-86, the potential effect upon magistrates, many of whom are trained
in the law, is less open to doubt. The more direct effect of exclusion upon magistrates sug-
gests they are more susceptible to the educational force of judicial actions under the exclu-
sionary rule than are law enforcement agents. Without the possibility of exclusion in close
cases, courts never may have the opportunity to identify a magistrate's error and articulate
directives for magistrates to follow in future similar situations. Motions to exclude, thus, are
more vital when the error is the magistrate's rather than the police officer's.
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ment of remedy. The exception would serve as a well camouflaged
and subtle attack upon the values and substantive meaning of the
amendment itself. Courts rarely would articulate new search and
seizure standards sensitive to fourth amendment interests because
once a court found police good faith the constitutional determina-
tion would be irrelevant to the outcome of those very cases in
which such articulation might take place.305 Insulated from the
continuing pressure to decide new fourth amendment issues or
dramatically review old ones, courts will lose the opportunity or
incentive to set standards for future cases. Consequently, the disin-
centive to review new fourth amendment issues will reduce signifi-
cantly the exclusionary rule's ability to generally and systemically
deter illegal police behavior. Furthermore, the good faith exception
greatly will dilute existing substantive fourth amendment protec-
tions, such as probable cause, that already factor in the possibility
of reasonable error, and, thus, will leave the individual significantly
more vulnerable to governmental intrusion. In addition to this
clear, but often unrevealed, substantive effect upon the fourth
amendment, the exception has the procedural ramification of sub-
stituting the trial for the appellate court as the critical institution
for exclusion decisions. The good faith exception's focus on officer
credibility combined with trial court's notorious pro-police bias
likely would lead consistently to decisions sacrificing fourth
amendment interests.
Of more subtle, but greater, significance than these erosions of
the fourth amendment, would be the denigration of constitutional
rights generally arising from a system that responds with indiffer-
ence to violations of these rights.0 If constitutional rights were to
lose their transcendental aura and the citizenry were to view them
as deserving protection only when convenient or socially advanta-
geous, the importance of a written bill of rights in an otherwise
democratic society would be subject to grave doubts. The actual
existence of the American Bill of Rights sufficiently sanctifies the
right of privacy in this culture to justify a different approach for
305. As argued earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 226-28, this also may serve
to inhibit a creative attorney's ability to defend his client. The good faith exception, thus,
also may run afoul of the sixth amendment's right to counsel.
306. A legal system that treats the violation of one constitutional right with indiffer-
ence may find it increasingly acceptable to treat the violation of other rights similarly. The
fourth amendment is not the only constitutional right subject to the criticism of being ex-
cessively costly. Consequently, adopting a cost-benefit analytical mode for fourth amend-
ment issues may lead to the use of such analysis to lessen the significance of other constitu-
tional rights as well.
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controlling law enforcement than that used by other nations."0
The above factors should be the Supreme Court's foremost
concerns in evaluating the good faith exception during its October
1983 term.0 Yet, the Court has indicated its sensitivity to and
307. Whether the nations with which the United States is compared, see supra note 50
and accompanying text, have symbolic counterparts to the fourth amendment is unclear.
Additionally, the exclusionary rule may be a valid response to a unique American experi-
ence. This country is more ethnically and racially heterogenious than others. It also has a
greater tradition of lawlessness, by citizen and official alike, and a more moralistic system of
criminal law, which specifically pressures officials to disregard the privacy of citizens.
Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1031. As suggested by Professor Phillip Johnson: "We can no more
[expect to] import our solutions than we can export our problems." Johnson, Book Review,
87 YALE L.J. 406, 414 (1977).
308. Evaluation of the three cases originally scheduled for Supreme Court argument,
see supra note 19 and accompanying text, is now appropriate:
(1) Colorado v. Quintero, -Colo. - , 657 P.2d 948, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535
(1983), poses the issue whether a court should exclude evidence obtained by a good faith
seizure of stolen property. If the seizure was reasonable in light of the officer's knowledge at
the time, the seizure is based on probable cause and, thus, is constitutional. Consequently,
for good faith even to be an issue in this appeal by the state prosecutor, the state courts
must have found the seizure unreasonable. To allow a good faith exception in this context
would constitute either a surreptitious attack upon and dilution of the reasonable ground/
probable cause standard applied by the state court, see supra text accompanying notes 154-
62, or an acceptance of a totally subjective belief standard of good faith. This Article already
has described the dangers of such a subjective belief standard. See supra text accompanying
note 234-54. Although the Court recently dismissed the writ of certiorari in this case, see
supra note 19, if a similar situation presents itself in the future, the Court should reject
both of these alternatives.
(2) United States v. Leon, No. 82-1093 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1983), cert, granted, 103 S. Ct.
3535 (1983), asks whether a court should exclude evidence seized in reasonable, good faith
reliance on a search warrant subsequently held defective due to inadequate probable cause
for its issuance. Not to exclude such evidence blatantly will encourage magistrate shopping
with police and prosecutors presenting their warrant applications to magistrates reputed to
be lenient or willing to rubber stamp warrant requests. See supra text accompanying notes
295-300. In addition, the presumptive constitutionality of searches and seizures executed
under warrant already mandates courts to disregard possible marginal errors by a magis-
trate. See supra text accompanying notes 301-04. This presumption once compounded by a
good faith exception again would dilute fourth amendment protections.
(3) Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted
sub nom. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983), also pertains to seizure of
evidence by police relying in good faith upon a warrant. But in this case the warrant is
defective due to a magistrate error in failing to specify in the warrant itself items police
were to seize. The police search, however, was no more extensive or detailed than a magis-
trate could have authorized under a properly drawn warrant. This case, therefore, is more
equivocal.
The state supreme court held that the failure to describe the items police were to seize
was a "serious omission of constitutional significance." 387 Mass. at -, 441 N.E.2d at
733-34 n.17. The motion judge, in fact, had viewed the warrant as a "'general warrant' akin
to the colonial 'writ of assistance' which led to the enactment of. . . the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id. at 738 (Liacos, J., concurring). Although in the specific case the searching officer
also was the affiant and, therefore, knew what items the warrant meant to allow police to
retrieve, such is not always the case. Required itemization, thus, normally serves both to
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empathy with the public's dissatisfaction with the seemingly high
cost of the exclusionary rule.0 9 Concerns about its own legitimacy
and that of the criminal justice system generally, likely will tempt
the Court to recognize a good faith exception. Recognition of the
exception, however, would not be the preferable response of the
Court to the public outcry. The Court should acknowledge that the
substance of fourth amendment standards rather than the exclu-
sionary rule causes the alleged interference with police effective-
ness. Perhaps as society becomes more complex and individuals
and institutions become more interdependent, society must reduce
privacy interests to assure sufficient public safety.3 10 This nation
actually may be so fearful of crime that its citizens are willing to
compromise the sanctity of constitutional liberties. The rhetoric of
remedy, however, should not mask the decision to make such a
compromise. 1 A frontal attack upon the fourth amendment at
least would constitute a forthright admission that at issue is the
extent to which the society is willing to protect individuals from
governmental intrusion.3 1 2 The public and the Court must recog-
nize overtly the values at stake in order to assure that the ensuing
decisions reflects an accurate and preferred value choice.
Further, the proposition that the Court would enhance its role
give notice to an officer of the limits of his authority as well as to inform the party searched
of the extent to which the law obliges him to defer to the officer's demands. Without these
two ramifications, the warrant process is of little significance. Consequently, excluding such
evidence fulfills general and systemic deterrence interests as well as vindication of a consti-
tutional right.
Furthermore, in Sheppard, the magistrate's actions were not reasonable; they clearly
were negligent. As Justice Liacos asserted in his separate concurrence: "The magistrate who
utterly fails to describe the things to be seized under the search warrant has not made a
reasonable effort to comply with the law." Id. Even if a good faith error is arguably appro-
priate when the exclusion of evidence is unlikely to have a deterrent effect on an innocent
official, Sheppard is obviously not such a case.
309. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
310. This author remains unconvinced by this allegation.
311. Legal institutions often have masked value choices through use of procedure, cer-
emony, or rhetoric. See J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976); Ingber, supra
note 57, at 332-38; Weyrauch, Law as Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CALIF. L. REv.
699 (1978). While this device may avoid societal strife due to ideological conflict, see Ingber,
supra note 145, at 266-73, it also relieves from both institutions and individuals the need to
accept responsibility for the value choices in fact made. Ingber, supra note 57, at 325-29.
312. Some authors bemoan that the exclusionary rule has led to the narrowing of the
fourth amendment's scope. See supra note 267. They suggest that abolishing or modifying
the rule may lead to greater acceptance of a privacy right. Assuming they are correct, one
must question the significance of a right accepted as an abstraction, but which upon viola-
tion results in no meaningful vindication of its claim. Narrowing of articulated constitu-
tional protections in fact may be the only honest response to an unwillingness to continue to
accept the costs that society must pay for meaningful individual liberties.
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in our constitutional system by deferring to the public outcry itself
is doubtful. All individual rights when placed into context are
laden with societal cost and possible popular disapproval.313 The
heterogeneity of American society and the often irreconcilable ten-
sions between honored values make unanimous approval of any de-
cision impossible. Every decision, by necessity, will result in dissat-
isfaction by some. Consequently, no decisional institution can
afford to concern itself only with increasing its popularity. The le-
gitimacy that allows judicial institutions to be effective is signifi-
cant only if, at appropriate times, those institutions use the law to
educate and direct society rather than conform to and follow it. A
court enforcing individual liberties must contribute something be-
yond what a system of popular fiat could accomplish. 14
A significant portion of the Supreme Court's legitimacy comes
from fulfilling its role as protector of constitutional liberties.
Whether situationally comfortable or not, the Court has played a
role of moral leadership in our constitutional system.3 15 The
Court's adoption of a good faith exception because of public dis-
pleasure with the costs of fourth amendment rights would consti-
tute an abdication of its leadership responsibilities. Such an abdi-
cation, in turn, would diminish the Court's importance and
prestige.
Admittedly, the Court can lead society only if society is willing
to follow. If, in order to protect individual liberties, the Court too
frequently or too severely interferes with broad societal goals, pub-
lic opinion may threaten substantially its legitimacy. But institu-
tions such as the Court have the luxury of time at their disposal:
they can lead gradually. Language and rhetoric are tools that the
Court can use to slowly alter public perceptions in order to intro-
duce new or protect old values. As Professor Anthony Amsterdam
eloquently observed:
313. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
314. Many significant constitutional cases also are those that critics attacked most
stridently. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 195-98 (1962) (criticizing
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)); H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 36-48 (1961) (criticizing Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 438 (1954)); Baldwin & Nagan, Board of Regents v. Bakke: The
All-American Dilemma Revisited, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 843 (1978) (criticizing Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (criticizing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). Of
course, at those times when law educates and leads society, it is most open to the accusation
of elitism.
315. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 99 (1982).
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Like the Pythias cries, [Supreme Court decisions respecting suspects' and de-
fendants' rights] have vast mystical significance. They state our aspirations.
They give a few good priests something to work with. They give some of the
faithful the courage to carry on and reasons to improve the priesthood in-
stead of tearing down the temple."'
Fourth amendment exclusionary cases may only "state our aspira-
tions," aspirations frequently unfulfilled or unfulfillable in prac-
tice. But without such aspirations no transcendental importance to
individual rights exists and their recognition slowly may decay into
a matter of popular or official appreciation: a matter of costs and
benefits.
Observers expect the Supreme Court's responses to the good
faith proposal this term.117 Hopefully, the Court will address the
arguments presented in this Article and reject the exception. If
not, virtually every state supreme court may refight the battle as
defendants' attorneys ask them to interpret their state constitu-
tions' search and seizure provisions. The citadel may yet be saved.
316. Amsterdam, supra note 266, at 793.
317. 52 U.S.L.W. 3201 (Sept. 27, 1983); see supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many cases of disputed paternity in the past five years have
developed an unusual focus. Instead of addressing the paternity is-
sue in efforts to establish eligibility for welfare assistance,' an in-
1. The number of cases to establish an illegitimate child's paternity has increased
since 1976 because of federal legislation requiring any mother of an illegitimate child who
desires welfare assistance to cooperate with the state in establishing paternity. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 602 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Congress' intent, therefore, is to alleviate some of the taxpay-
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creasing number of recent cases have arisen in which a married
father participating in a divorce proceeding claims that a child of
the marriage is not his biological child2 or an unwed father seeks
to prove paternity in order to gain custody or visitation rights.'
The technology of blood testing has advanced dramatically with
the increased number of disputed paternity cases and, although
not completely accurate, this technology is better than ever before
at positively identifying the father of a particular child.' The
Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) test presently can exclude a
person from the list of potential fathers with ninety-five to ninety-
nine percent certainty and can verify paternity with ninety to
ninety-eight percent probability.5 Thus, the use of modern HLA
testing can affect dramatically cases of disputed parentage.
State law controls the admission of HLA test results as evi-
dence in paternity cases.6 Some states expressly allow admission of
HLA test results through statutes,7 while other states permit the
courts, in their discretion, to deal with this issue.8 In either situa-
tion, the courts enjoy a wide latitude in determining the weight
that they will accord the scientific evidence.' Policy considerations
such as protection of the best interests of the child and preserva-
tion of family integrity often affect a court's decisions on the ad-
ers' burden by shifting the obligation of support to the illegitimate child's father.
2. See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour, 413 So. 2d 1167 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); County of
Fresno v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 133, 154 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1979); Rachal v. Rachal,
412 A.2d 1202 (D.C. 1980); B.S.H. v. J.J.H., 613 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
3. See, e.g., LaCroix v. Deyo, 113 Misc. 2d 89, 447 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1981) (custody dis-
pute between step-father and biological father of child after mother's death); J.B. v. A.F., 92
Wis. 2d 696, 285 N.W.2d 880 (Ct. App. 1979) (custody dispute between maternal grandpar-
ents and biological father of child after mother's death).
4. Sussman & Gilja, Blood Grouping Tests for Paternity and Nonpaternity, 1981-1
N.Y. ST. J. MED. 343 (1981). See generally N. BRYANT, AN INTRODUCTION TO IMMU-
NOHEMATOLOGY 169-79 (1982) (discussion of HLA system and applications of HLA antigen
typing).
5. Sussman & Gilja, supra note 4, at 343, 345. See also Terasaki, Resolution by HLA
Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543 (1978).
6. H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA, THE LEGAL PERSPECTivE 218 (1981).
7. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-306 (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-8 (Burns 1980).
8. E.g., Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979); Malvasi v.
Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279 (1979); cf. Pratt v. Victor B., 112 Misc. 487, 448
N.Y.S.2d 351 (Fam. Ct. 1982).
9. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on
Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 270-72 (1981).
See also Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169, P.2d 442 (1946) (jury found actor Char-
lie Chaplin to be father even though blood tests excluded him); State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148,
209 S.E.2d 754 (1974) (state supreme court upheld jury finding that man was natural father
even though blood tests excluded him).
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missibility of and the weight given to HLA test results.'"
This Note, however, does not attempt to argue through evi-
dentiary analysis that more courts should recognize statistical and
mathematical probabilities of paternity that the HLA test fur-
nishes. Instead, this Note assumes that the judicial trend of using
HLA test results as affirmative evidence" will continue, and ac-
cepts the proposal that these results are scientifically reliable.' 2
The Note will focus on the policy considerations and arguments
that should affect the admissibility of the HLA blood test as af-
firmative evidence in various disputed parentage cases.
This Note first examines the use of HLA test results to deter-
mine the paternity of illegitimate children who do not have a legal
father, and concludes that courts should admit the results uncon-
ditionally in these circumstances. Second, the Note analyzes the
use of the HLA blood test to settle paternity disputes that arise in
a divorce context. Because of the important policy considerations
that exist, the Note recommends that courts admit the results sub-
ject to a legislatively developed statute of limitations of two or
three years. Finally, the Note advocates that public policy factors
indicate the need for a two-year statute of limitations to govern
the admissibility of HLA test results in situations in which an un-
married father attempts to introduce them to assert paternity
rights concerning a presumably legitimate child who has a legal
father.
II. HLA BLOOD TESTS
A. History of Blood Tests in a Legal Setting
Dr. Karl Landsteiner discovered the major blood groupings at
the University of Vienna in 1901.1' This discovery facilitated the
first safe transfusions of human blood 4 and resulted in increased
10. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 3-15 (1979); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1979). See generally Muench & Levy, Psychological Parentage: A Natural Right, 13
FAM. L. Q. 129 (1979).
11. Pratt v. Victor B., 112 Misc. 2d at 489-90, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 353. See also infra
notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
13. R. RACE & R. SANGER, BLOOD GROUPS IN MAN 8-9 (1975). The major groupings are
A, B, 0, and AB. Id.
14. A. ERSKINE, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF BLOOD GROUPING 6-7 (1973). Dr.
Landsteiner received the Nobel Prize in medicine in 1930 in recognition of his discovery of
the major blood groups. Id.
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knowledge of genetics15 and the use of blood tests as paternity de-
terminants. 16 The American Medical Association (AMA) fully en-
dorsed and recommended the Landsteiner series of tests17 to the
legal community in 1952.18 Because the tests were only fifty to
sixty percent efficient in definitely proving non-paternity," how-
ever, states enacted statutes that allowed courts to admit results of
the tests as evidence in paternity cases only if they excluded the
accused father.20
While such exclusionary statutes remained effective, scientific
advancements in the discovery of identifying antigens in blood
continued. Early blood tests had located antigens only on red
15. See generally M. LEVITAN & A. MONTAGU, TEXTBOOK OF HUMAN GENETIcs (1971)
[hereinafter cited as HUMAN GENETICS].
16. The discovery in 1927 by Dr. Landsteiner and his colleague, Dr. Phillip Levine, of
the M-N antigen on the red blood cell proved more useful in court as a paternity test than
in diminishing the risks that accompany blood transfusions. A blood group antigen is an
inherited antibody on the surface of a red blood cell that determines a blood grouping reac-
tion with specific antiserum. The genes that control development of blood group antigens
vary in frequency in different racial and ethnic groups. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 88
(5th ed. 1982).
The M-N antigen test is a reliable genetic marker because of this high percentage of
distinction in the genes of a random sample of the population. This test alone can establish
nonpaternity with approximately 32% efficiency. HUMAN GENETICS, supra note 15, at 148-
210. See also Page-Bright, Proving Paternity-Human Leukocyte Antigen Test, 27 J. Fo-
RENSIC SCI. 135, 139-40 (1982). See generally K. BOORMAN & B. DODD, AN INTRODUCTION TO
BLOOD GROUP SEROLOGY 154-63, 322-23 (1970).
17. The Landsteiner series of tests refers to the ABO blood test joined with the later
discovered M-N and Rh blood systems tests. The ABO test consists of identifying the blood
type of parents (0, A, B, or AB) and comparing it to that of the child. Ross, The Values of
Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HARv. L. REV. 466 (1958). The M-N data
proved useful in later studies of the Rh system, which Dr. Landsteiner and Dr. Alexander S.
Wiener discovered in 1940. The Rh system showed that humans carry either an Rh-positive
or Rh-negative antigen. In addition to explaining why persons who received a transfusion of
their own blood group sometimes reacted adversely to a blood transfusion, the Rh system
discovery helped explain and prevent erthroblastosis fetalis, a disease of the newborn. In
addition, the Rh system provided another genetic marker helpful in improving the exclusion
rate in a paternity test. A.G. ERSKINE, supra note 14, at 6. See also HUMAN GENETICS, supra
note 15; J. QUEENAN, MODERN MANAGEMENT OF THE RH PROBLEM 1-55 (1977).
18. Davidsohn, Levine & Wiener, Medicolegal Application of Blood Grouping Tests,
149 J. A.M.A. 699 (1952).
19. K. BOORMAN & B. DODD, supra note 16, at 321 (citing 62% efficiency of tests); L.
SUSSMAN, BLOOD GROUPING TESTS, MEDICOLEGAL USES 89 (1968) (citing 53% efficiency of
tests).
20. E.g., ALA. COD § 26-12-5 (1975); CAL. EVID. CODE § 895 (West 1966); GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-101 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66G (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.16
(Page 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-228 (1977). Georgia has amended its blood test statute
and now permits the admission of HLA tests specifically as evidence to prove or disprove
parentage. See authorities cited supra note 7.
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blood cells.21 Tests for antigens on white blood cells, however, soon
promised a higher probability of paternity exclusion because the
antigen on the white cell-the human leukocyte antigen
(HLA)-was more rare.22 Combining the HLA test with other
blood tests achieved a ninety-one to ninety-three percent
probability of paternity exclusion.23 The more recent use of the
HLA tests with antigen tests has improved the certainty of pater-
nity exclusion to ninety-five percent, while adding the RBC en-
zyme and plasma protein tests increase certainty to 99.95% .24 Ad-
ditionally, the pooling of the results of the HLA test with those of
the Landsteiner series and other blood antigen tests can lead to a
significant positive statistical probability of paternity that ap-
proaches one hundred percent.25
21. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1659-63 (5th ed. 1982). At least fifteen differ-
ent red blood cell antigenic systems exist, including ABO, M-N, P, Rh, Lutheran, Kell,
Lewis, Duffy, Kidd, Diego, Yt, I, Xg, Dombrock, and Colton. As of 1976, scientists had iden-
tified over 250 antigens on red blood cells. B. LEAVELL & 0. THORUP, FUNDAMENTALS OF
CLINICAL HEMATOLOGY 720 (1976).
22. N. BRYANT, supra note 4, at 172.
23. AMA & Family Law Section, ABA, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status
of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L. Q. 247, 257 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as AMA-ABA Guidelines]. See also Comment, Paternity Testing with
the Human Leukocyte Antigen System: A Medicolegal Breakthrough, 20 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 511 (1980).
24. Sussman & Gilja, supra note 4, at 345.
25. Id. at 343. In calculating the probability of paternity, the HLA test is more precise
than other blood tests because it identifies one specific genetic marker, the HLA haplotype.
Identification of this genetic marker allows more accurate determination of paternity be-
cause only approximately one person in one thousand has the same HLA haplotype as any
given person. Terasaki, supra note 5, at 544. Every individual inherits two immutable
haplotypes, one from each parent. N. BRYANT, supra note 4, at 171, 175-76. Four genes
compose each haplotype, and two inherited haplotypes that share a location on a white
blood cell are a genotype. Page-Bright, supra note 14, at 141. The genetic make-up of ge-
notypes can vary, and the observable characteristics of these variations comprise an individ-
ual's genetic category of phenotype. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1071 (5th ed. 1982).
Since science has identified at least 6600 phenotypes, Lee, Lebeck & Wong, Estimating
Paternity Index from HLA-typing Results, 74 AM. J. CLIN. PATH. 218, 218 (1980), and rec-
ognizes the theoretical probability that approximately 20 million different phenotypes exist,
the possibility that a child and a putative father share a common haplotype but are unre-
lated is very unlikely. A. SVEJGAARD, M. HAUGE, C. JERSILD, P. PLATZ, L. RYDER, L. NIELSEN,
& M. THOMSEN, THE HLA SYSTEM 8-12 (1975). See Note, Blood Test Evidence in Disputed
Paternity Cases: Unjustified Adherence to the Exclusionary Rule, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 977,
983-95 (1981).
In 1978, a study using HLA testing on one thousand putative fathers that the Land-
steiner series test had not excluded determined the rate of error in HLA testing procedures
to be 0.35%. Terasaki, supra note 5, at 548. The HLA test showed that 640 of the fathers
whom the Landsteiner test had not excluded had at least a 90% probability of paternity,
while it definitely excluded 250 of the men. The HLA test could not resolve 10% of the
cases. Id. at 552. Thus, because of the low rate of error and the high rate of exclusion, courts
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Courts also have addressed some of the test's disadvantages.
The cost of the HLA test, for example, is quite high in comparison
with other blood test costs.2 6 In Little v. Streater,27 however, the
Supreme Court reduced the unequal effect of this cost by holding
that an indigent male has a right to obtain blood tests, including
the HLA test, if a statute setting forth the requirements for a
child's receipt of welfare has caused the mother to name the indi-
gent as a defendant in the case.28 Other disadvantages of the HLA
test involve difficulties with the testing itself. For example, since
white blood cells generally are viable for only twenty-four to sev-
enty-two hours after drawing the blood sample,29 the HLA test
must occur within that timespan. Additionally, mailing samples of
blood to testing centers requires that the package arrive within
this period in an insulated box that protects the sample from ex-
treme temperatures.3 0 These disadvantages, however, appear minor
in comparison with the scientific proof and information that the
HLA test provides."1
B. Use of Blood Tests as Evidence
Blood tests did not gain significant judicial acceptance in the
United States until the 1940s,"2 and even then the courts often
have begun to use the HLA test more widely in cases of disputed paternity. Two reports in
which the HLA test results identified two different fathers for alleged twins further illus-
trate the power of the HLA test. See Majsky & Kout, Another Case of Occurence of Two
Different Fathers of Twins by HLA Typing, 20 TIssuE ANTIGENS 305 (1982); Terasaki,
Gjertson, Bernoco, Perdue, Mickey, & Bond, Twins with Two Different Fathers Identified
by HLA, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 590 (1978). HLA typing also has indicated that the husband
of a married woman who had been raped was the father of the fetus with a 96% probability.
This indication proved correct after the child's delivery. Pollack, Schafer, Barford, & Du-
pont, Prenatal Identification of Paternity-HLA Typing Helpful After Rape, 244 J.
A.M.A. 1954 (1980).
26. Sussman & Gilja, supra note 4, at 344 (usual blood grouping tests cost approxi-
mately $150, in comparison to $600 for blood grouping tests that include the HLA test).
27. 452 U.S. 1 (1981). See infra section III.
28. Streater, 452 U.S. at 3. The Court found that requiring an indigent in such an
instance to pay the high costs of the tests would violate due process since "[t]he effective-
ness of the seven systems [including HLA] attests the probative value of blood test evidence
in paternity cases." Id. at 8.
29. Keith, Resolution of Paternity Disputes by Analysis of the Blood, 8 FAM. L. REP.
[BNA] No. 4, at 4005 n.25 (Nov. 24, 1981); N. BRYANT, supra note 4, at 235-36.
30. Keith, supra note 29, at 4005 n.41.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
32. See, e.g., Livermore v. Livermore, 233 Iowa 1155, 11 N.W.2d 389 (1943). But cf.
Commonwealth v. Zammarelli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229 (1931) (first reported paternity case which
used blood test results).
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gave little evidentiary weight to the results.3 3 Instead, the courts
would adhere strictly to statutes that required blood tests to be
held inconclusive on the issue of paternity. Thus, in the infamous
1946 paternity case Berry v. Chaplin,4 the court held that Charlie
Chaplin was the father of a child even though blood tests clearly
excluded him as the biological father. 5 The result of the Charlie
Chaplin case is by no means archaic; failure to grant conclusive
effect to blood test evidence that definitely excluded the putative
father occurred as recently as 1974.36
Generally, however, standard blood tests have been important
evidence in United States paternity suits since the 1940s.3 7 Be-
cause of the Landsteiner series' low probability of successfully
proving paternity,3 8 legislatures fashioned statutes to permit the
use of these tests only if they proved that a man was not the fa-
ther. 9 The more precise HLA test, however, can serve as two types
of evidence: as exclusionary evidence to show that the putative fa-
ther could not be the biological father of the child,40 and as inclu-
sionary or affirmative evidence to indicate the high probability of
paternity.41 Since most states originally fashioned blood test ad-
missibility statutes to deal with exclusionary evidence that the
Landsteiner series provided,42 the use of the HLA test to exclude
the putative father has not created as much legal controversy as its
affirmative use to prove paternity. A majority of the states which
have such statutes mandate that blood tests are admissible only to
33. See supra note 9.
34. 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946).
35. Id. at 664-65, 169 P.2d at 451. Because of the heated adverse publicity that the
case attracted, the California Legislature adopted the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Deter-
mine Paternity, CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 890-897 (West 1966). The Act provides in pertinent
part: "If the Court finds that the conclusion of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence
based upon the tests, are [sic] that the alleged father is not the father of the child, the
question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly." CAL. EVID. CODE § 895 (West 1966). See
infra note 45.
36. State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 209 S.E.2d 754 (1974). In 1975 the North Carolina
Legislature amended the state statute to provide that blood test results which exclude the
possibility of paternity be conclusive in effect. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1 (1981). See also
supra note 9.
37. See, e.g., Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949) (Maine Supreme Court
held that jury cannot disregard blood group tests which exclude one in paternity action);
Commonwealth v. D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642, 162 N.E.2d 19 (1959) (if blood test excludes one
as father in paternity suit, court must find in defendant's favor as matter of law).
38. See supra notes 16 & 21 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 20 and authorities cited therein.
40. H. KRAUSE, supra note 6, at 218-19.
41. Id. at 219-42.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
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exclude paternity.43 Eight states, however, have enacted statutes
that adopt section 12 of the Uniform Parentage Act, thereby al-
lowing admission of statistics which address the likelihood of pa-
ternity.44 Ten other states have retained statutes from previously
drafted uniform acts that permit introduction of blood tests as af-
firmative evidence if the court, within its discretion, deems the evi-
dence relevant.45 A few state courts have used judicial notice to
admit evidence of statistical probability in paternity suits.46
In those jurisdictions that have no controlling statute, courts
can use the standard set forth in Frye v. United States47 to admit
blood test results as reliable scientific evidence. Frye allows a court
to admit scientific evidence only if the evidence has "gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. "48
Courts additionally require stringent proof that scientific evidence
is reliable because judges fear scientific test results unduly will im-
press and sway jurors,49 and that the results or methods of scien-
43. See supra note 20 and authorities cited therein.
44. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-113 (1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 584-12 (1976); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.63 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-113 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-
50.1 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-11 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.110 (Cum.
Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-110(a)(iii) (1977). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000 to 7021
(West 1983) (adopting Uniform Parentage Act, but not provision concerning statistical evi-
dence of likelihood of paternity).
Section 12 of the Uniform Parentage Act provides that "[e]vidence relating to paternity
may include... (3)blood test results, weighted in accordance with evidence, if available, of
the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 12, 9A
U.L.A. 602 (1979). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Bar Association approved the Act in 1973.
45. CAL. EvID. CODE § 895 (Cum. Supp. 1981-82); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.40 § 1401 (Smith-
Hurd Cum. Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.111 (Bobbs-Merrill 1970); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:397.2 (West Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19 § 280 (Cum. Supp. 1982);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 522:4 (1974); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.258 (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6136 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-14 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-10
(1977).
These ten states have adopted either § 4 of the Uniform Act on Blood Test to Deter-
mine Paternity (UBTA) or § 10 of the Uniform Act on Paternity (UPA). The two sections
are nearly identical and § 10 of the UPA provides in pertinent part: "If the experts conclude
that the blood tests show the possibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission of the
evidence is within discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood
type." The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Ameri-
can Bar Association enacted the UBTA in 1952, and approved the UPA in 1960.
46. See, e.g., Broadwater v. Broadwater, 247 Md. 607, 233 A.2d 782 (1967); Malvasi v.
Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279 (1979).
47. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See also Imwinkelried, supra note 9, at 262-73.
48. 293 F. at 1014.
49. E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 92 (1980). See also Huntingdon v.
Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 414 P.2d 382, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1966).
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tific tests are faulty. 0 The HLA test, however, apparently meets
the Frye standard because it has gained general acceptance and
recognition in both legal and medical circles. 1 Nevertheless con-
troversy still surrounds the use of the HLA test as affirmative evi-
dence in paternity suits because courts are hesitant to recognize a
statistical probability of paternity. For example, in 1980 a Massa-
chusetts court52 reiterated the concern of the Judicial Council of
Massachusetts that litigants would raise "constitutional questions
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. . . if. . .test results
[were] used to establish the probability of paternity rather than
being limited to proof of exclusion of paternity. 53 Other courts,5
however, have viewed HLA test results as highly reliable admissi-
ble evidence even when state statutes did not expressly permit
their use as affirmative proof of paternity. In Pratt v. Victor B.,55
for instance, a New York Family Court judge wrote in dicta:
It is recommended that the current Legislature consider an amendment
which would permit the use of ... [the ABO red cell antigen series], even if
it does not exclude the putative father, when offered in combination with the
HLA test. Of course, there would still be no basis for using this test for proof
of paternity except in combination with a nonexclusory HLA test.
56
This Note now focuses on the policy considerations that affect the
admissibility of HLA test results in various disputed paternity
cases.
III. USE OF HLA BLOOD TESTS IN CASES OF DISPUTED
PARENTAGE
A. Paternity Determination of an Illegitimate Child
1. The Necessity for Accurate and Objective Evidence
Because a high percentage of the approximately three million
illegitimate children born in the United States between 1972 and
50. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 49, at 92.
51. See AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
52. Commonwealth v. Blazo, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 324, 406 N.E.2d 1323 (1980).
53. Id. at 327 n.1, 406 N.E.2d at 1326 n.1 (paraphrasing Fifty-fifth Report of the Judi-
cial Council of Massachusetts, PUB. Doc. No. 144, 31, 38-40 (1979)).
54. See, e.g., Pratt v. Victor B., 112 Misc. 2d 487, 448 N.Y.S. 2d 351 (1982); J.H. v.
M.H., 177 N.J. Super. 436, 426 A.2d 1073 (1980). See also, Tice v. Richardson, 7 Kan. App.
2d 509, 644 P.2d 490 (1982) (statute fails to specify type of blood test and court held that
the certainty associated with HLA tests allows that evidence to be admitted to determine
paternity).
55. 112 Misc. 2d 487, 448 N.Y.S.2d 351.
56. Id. at 490, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
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197957 received welfare assistance,58 the United States Congress in
1975 enacted legislation that places the burden of supporting these
children upon their parents, especially their fathers.5 9 The Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program requires
mothers of illegitimate children to cooperate with the states in
establishing their children's paternity in order to obtain support
payments from fathers.60 Unless a mother agrees to cooperate, the
government can refuse to disperse funds to the family. 1 Families
can receive AFDC aid only if the government does not locate the
child's putative father, or if a court finds that the man is not the
father or is indigent.2 This forced cooperation requirement cou-
pled with the large number of illegitimate children who attempt to
qualify for AFDC funds"' has precipitated the largest number of
disputed parentage cases.6
Recognition of the inadequacy of the other types of evidence
that courts admit in disputed paternity cases demonstrates an
imperative need for reliable affirmative scientific evidence in such
litigation. Courts generally will admit the testimony of the mother
and putative father concerning their alleged sexual relations.6 5
57. BUREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEp'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITErD STATES 66 (1979).
58. For example, in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia between 30-50% of the children receiving welfare funds
were illegitimate. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., WAGE GAR-
NISHmENT, ATTACHMENT AND ASSIGNMENT, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF PATERNITY 288 (Comm.
Print 1975).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 602(26) (1976) provides in pertinent part that
as a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient will be required-
(B) to cooperate with the state (i) in establishing the paternity of a child born
out of wedlock with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining support
payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom such aid is
claimed, or in obtaining any other payments or property due such applicant or
such child, unless (in either case) such applicant or recipient is found to have good
cause for refusing to cooperate as determined by the State agency in accordance
with standards prescribed by the Secretary, which standards shall take into con-
sideration the best interests of the child on whose behalf aid is claimed ....
61. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
63. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Gelinas v. Nelson, 165 Conn. 33, 327 A.2d 565 (1973) (court admitted
mother's testimony about intercourse with defendant and denial of sexual relations with
other men near time of conception); Pryor v. James, 377 So. 2d 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (mother testified to several occasions of sexual intercourse with defendant who alleged
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Such testimony leads to obviously inherent problems. The testi-
mony not only will be self-serving, but a strong likelihood exists
that parties and witnesses will commit perjury.16 Other types of
proof also invite perjury. For instance, putative fathers often will
use the defense of multiple access-that the mother was sexually
active with other men at or near the time of conception-to
counter an allegation of paternity.6 7 Other evidence that courts ad-
mit because of its "quasi-scientific" nature includes physical re-
semblance, 8 gestation period of the child, 9 and polygraph tests.7 0
The reliability and accuracy of such evidence, however, is doubtful.
An obvious need, therefore, exists for accurate and objective
evidence that does not depend on the veracity of witnesses or on
"quasi-scientific" evidence. The recent Supreme Court decision in
mother had been promiscuous); People ex rel. Raines v. Price, 37 III. App. 3d 921, 347
N.E.2d 29 (1976) (parties and witnesses directly contradicted one another concerning sexual
relationships of plaintiff-mother); Collins v. Wise, 156 Ind. App. 424, 296 N.E.2d 887 (1973)
(mother testified to repeated acts of intercourse with defendant prior to and shortly after
child's conception date); Tice v. Richardson, 7 Kan. App. 2d 509, 644 P.2d 490 (1982)
(mother testified to numerous sexual relations with defendant but only one with present
husband during three month period); Pratt v. Victor B., 112 Misc. 2d 487, 448 N.Y.S.2d 351
(N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1982) (mother testified to having sexual relations with defendant who dis-
puted number of times and chronological period of the alleged acts).
66. See Arther & Reid, Utilizing the Lie Detector Technique to Determine the Truth
in Disputed Paternity Cases, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 213, 215 (1954).
67. State ex rel. Leonard v. Hogan, 32 Or. App. 89, 573 P.2d 328 (1978). See generally
Sass, The Defense of Multiple Access in Paternity Suits: A Comparative Analysis, 51 TUL.
L. REv. 468 (1977) (comparing the use of the multiple access defense in the United States,
West Germany, France, Hungary, and the Soviet Union).
68. J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 166, at 627 (3rd ed. 1940). Presenting "evidence" of phys-
ical resemblance usually entails examination of the child by the jury, which compares his
features to those of the father. See, e.g., McLemore v. Richardson, 32 Conn. Supp. 533, 343
A.2d 229 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975); G.L. v. S.D., 382 A.2d 252 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 403 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1979); Joseph v. State, 149 Ga. App. 296, 254 S.E.2d 383
(1979); Schigur v. Keck, 93 Mich. App. 763, 286 N.W.2d 917 (1979); Glascock v. Anderson,
83 N.M. 725, 497 P.2d 727 (1972); State v. Clay, 236 S.E.2d 230 (W.Va. 1977). A minority of
the states, however, do not allow the jury to examine the child. See Esch v. Graue, 72 Neb.
719, 101 N.W. 978 (1904); Cook v. State, 172 Tenn. 42, 109 S.W.2d 98 (1937); Scblehlein v.
Duris, 54 Wis. 2d 34, 194 N.W.2d 613 (1972). See generally Comment, Evidence: Admissi-
bility of Evidence of Resemblance, Where Paternity in Issue, 11 CORNELL L. Q. 380 (1926)
(discussion of older cases advocating use of all evidence of resemblance).
69. The alleged father usually presents evidence of gestation period to show that con-
ception was not possible on admitted dates of sexual intercourse because the length of time
between "conception" and the date of birth was beyond the normal 40 week duration of
pregnancy. American courts have used evidence concerning the length of pregnancy for
years. See In re Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552 (1919) (claim of 304 days as
duration of pregnancy held not normal period of gestation); Karen K. v. Christopher D., 86
A.D.2d 633, 446 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (256 day gestation period required
remanding for expert medical testimony).
70. See Arther & Reid, supra note 66, at 214.
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Mills v. Habluetzel1 heightened this need. The Court held in
Mills that a one year statute of limitations for filing a paternity
action on behalf of an illegitimate child violated equal protection. 2
Although the majority opinion did not suggest an appropriate stat-
ute of limitations for these actions; Justice O'Connor indicated in
her concurring opinion that even Texas' four year statute of limita-
tions was inappropriate. 73 Justice O'Connor supported her belief
that statutes of limitation should not bar paternity actions involv-
ing illegitimate children who do not have a legal father during the
child's minority by stating that the government has an interest not
only in seeing that "'justice is done' " but also in enhancing the
state's fiscal integrity by reducing the welfare rolls. 5 Justice
O'Connor also observed that the "State's concern about stale and
fraudulent claims is substantially alleviated by recent scientific de-
velopments in blood testing dramatically reducing the possibility
that a defendant will be falsely accused of being the illegitimate
child's father.17  Thus, if future litigants bring paternity actions
five, ten, or even fifteen years after the birth of a child, the courts
will need objective and reliable evidence such as the HLA test re-
sults, especially when the alternative types of evidence include
possible perjury or hazy recollections.
2. The Appropriate Evidentiary Weight for HLA Test Results
(a) Reliability
Although a present and future need for trustworthy evidence
such as HLA test results clearly exists in paternity suits, courts
still are uncertain about the evidentiary weight they should accord
affirmative, as opposed to exclusive, use of this evidence. Courts
either can hold positive test results conclusive on the issue of pa-
ternity or can consider them in conjunction with other evidence. 7
A decision by the courts to deem affirmative evidence of the
probability of paternity conclusive would foreclose the possibility
of considering or testing another man as the possible father.7 8
71. 102 S. Ct. 1549 (1982).
72. Id. at 1555-56.
73. Id. at 1556.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1557.
76. Id. at 1557 n.2.
77. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
78. Since the same HLA haplotype exists in only one person in one thousand, the
probability that the test would reveal a 90-99% likelihood of paternity in the wrong man is
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Courts, therefore, should not consider the HLA blood test conclu-
sive until it can indicate with one hundred percent accuracy the
fact, rather than the probability, of paternity. Currently, the more
practical alternative is to allow the trier of fact to consider HLA
blood test results in light of other evidence. Although the jurors
could not base their decision strictly on the HLA evidence, the
judge could instruct them to give it greater weight than the other
evidence.79 Recent casess and medical reports"1 that cite the accu-
racy of the HLA test in paternity disputes impliedly justify this
type of jury instruction.
(b) The Child's Best Interests
In addition to the reliability of the tests, strong policy reasons
also support a judicial determination to give HLA test results sig-
nificant affirmative evidentiary weight in paternity actions. The
two primary considerations are first, the best interests of the
child8 2 and second, the fiscal integrity of the state."8 A child's best
interests in this context include the receipt of financial and emo-
tional support from his father8 4 and establishment of a legal rela-
tionship with his father that engenders a sense of identity and may
facilitate inheritance 5 or "adoption" by the father or paternal
grandparents if the mother dies during the child's minority.8 " Of
course, a legal determination pursuant to HLA test results that a
highly doubtful. The possibility, however, is strong enough to create doubt in a juror's mind.
See supra note 25.
79. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvmENCE § 211, at 521-23 (2d ed.
1972).
80. See, e.g., Reid v. White, 112 Misc. 2d 294, 446 N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1982);
State v. Meachem, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 612 P.2d 795 (1980).
81. See supra note 25.
82. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 10. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit emphasize the emotional needs of
the child more than his financial needs.
85. See Stone, Report of the Committee on the Law of Succession in Relating to Ille-
gitimate Persons, 30 MOD. L. REv. 552 (1967). See generally Note, Uniform Probate
Code-Illegitimacy-Inheritance and the Illegitimate: A Model for Probate Reform, 69
MICH. L. REv. 112 (1970) (discussion advocating parity between legitmate and illegitmate
children's inheritance rights).
86. See, e.g., LaCroix v. Deyo, 113 Misc. 2d 89, 447 N.Y.S.2d 864 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1981)
(natural father and stepfather seek custody after death of minor child's mother); Mar-
ticorena v. Miller, 597 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1979) (two men, each of whom had previously been
married to deceased woman, sought status as biological father of child to facilitate custody);
J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d 696, 285 N.W.2d 880 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (maternal grandparents




man must support a child financially because he is the biological
father does not guarantee fulfillment of the social goal to provide
the child with emotional support. The establishment of an emo-
tional relationship between a father and child, however, is more
likely to occur if the court forces a nonindigent father to build a
financial tie to the child, than it is if the father never institutes any
type of contact.
In a more practical vein, judicial determination of paternity
can affect substantially the emotional and economic interests that
accompany inheritance. Most recent Supreme Court cases have at-
tempted to equalize the status of legitimate and illegitimate chil-
dren8 7 but the Court has allowed some forms of discrimination to-
ward illegitimate children to continue in the area of inheritance
law. In the 1978 case of Lalli v. Lalli,s5 the Supreme Court estab-
lished a principle that would allow the denial of an illegitimate
child's claim to any inheritance in his father's estate. In the five-
to-four decision the Court specifically upheld a New York statute
that required the adjudication of an illegitimate child's paternity
during the father's lifetime for the child to have any claim to the
father's estate via intestate succession. 9 The dissenting justices in
Lalli argued forcefully that if a father dies intestate before judicial
determination of a child's paternity then the state's intestacy laws
may prohibit the illegitimate child from inheriting even though the
community has common knowledge of the child's paternity or the
father openly acknowledges it. 90
87. See, e.g., New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973)
(Court invalidated on equal protection grounds a welfare statute that discriminated against
illegitimate children); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (Court invali-
dated on equal protection grounds a workmen's compensation provision governing disburse-
ment of benefits because it discriminated against illegitimate children); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968) (Court struck down state wrongful death statute that discriminated
against illegitimate children as violative of equal protection). But see Califano v. Boles, 443
U.S. 282 (1979) (Court upheld Social Security provision that denied insurance benefits to
illegitimate children because it lacked sufficient impact to constitute discrimination);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (Court upheld Social Security provision denying
benefits to illegitimate children not judicially recognized, as necessary for administrative
convenience).
88. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
89. Id. at 259 (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J., announcing judgment); id. at
276 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 276 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting). The
dissenting Justices pointed out that the father not only had acknowledged his illegitimate
child openly, but also had provided financial support. The dissent also expressed doubt that
a person who failed to write a will would have the cognizance to adjudicate his paternal
relationship with an illegitimate child for purposes of insuring that the child would inherit
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(c) The State's Fiscal Integrity
In addition to promoting children's best interests, the courts
also can use HLA blood test results as affirmative evidence that
can enhance a state's fiscal integrity. 1 Under the AFDC program a
mother cannot receive welfare assistance for an illegitimate child
until she helps the state institute a paternity suit against the natu-
ral father.92 Since the incidence of illegitimacy is steadily increas-
ing,93 states will save money if the fathers, rather than the states,
support these children.9 One state supreme court expressed this
policy as follows: "The State has a compelling interest in assuring
that the primary obligation for support of illegitimate children
falls on both natural parents rather than on the taxpayers of this
state."9 5 Other state courts have echoed this sentiment." Another
fiscal reason for judicial use of affirmative HLA blood test results
is the possibility of avoiding unnecessary costly litigation if such
use will expedite admissions of paternity by natural fathers and
acceptance by them of financial responsibility.97
Thus, strong public policy considerations favor use of the
HLA blood test as affirmative evidence in paternity determinations
of illegitimate children who do not have a legal father. No statute
of limitations, however, except the child's reaching majority age
via intestate succession. Id. at 278.
91. See, e.g., J.E.G. v. C.J.E., 172 Ind. App. 515, 360 N.E.2d 1030 (1977) (court ac-
knowledged that legitimate interest in paternity suit is to protect the public interest by
preventing the illegitimate child from becoming a ward of the state).
92. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
94. See supra text accompanying note 73.
95. State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 102, 569 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1977).
96. See, e.g., State ex rel. S.M.B. v. D.A.P., 284 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1981). The West
Virginia Supreme Court colorfully wrote in dicta-
In this regard we would note that the incidence of illegitimacy rises in this country
every year; furthermore, a few women, perhaps following the example of T.S. Garp's
mother, J. Irving, The World According to Garp (1978), deliberately choose to have
children out of wedlock because they consciously decide that they want a child but not
a husband. See, e.g., Rivlin, 'Choosing to Have a Baby on Your Own,' Ms, April 1979,
p. 68. While we hardly find this either an intelligent or an appropriate approach to the
sound upbringing of children, nonetheless, we must recognize the existence of new pat-
terns of life. The difficulty, of course, with eccentric lifestyles is that when they fail to
yield the results which were intended the ultimate burden of compensating for individ-
uals' lack of foresight ultimately falls upon the inadequate resources of the West Vir-
ginia Department of Welfare.
Id. at 915-16 (footnote omitted).
97. In re Karen K. v. Christopher D., 36 A.D.2d 633, 446 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. Fain. CL
1982).
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should limit its use.98 Although the Supreme Court had the oppor-
tunity in Mills99 to specify an appropriate statute of limitations for
paternity actions that mothers bring, it failed to do so.100 Some
state courts have commended the Court's reasoning in Mills that
the statute in question was invalid since no similar statute of limi-
tations governed a father's attempt to disprove paternity of chil-
dren born to his marriage. 101 State courts also have emphasized
that the HLA blood test is highly reliable, objective, and always
available. 102 The Minnesota Supreme Court made the highest rec-
ommendation for the HLA blood test when it urged its state legis-
lature to require the HLA test in all paternity cases.10 3 The court
attached as much importance to the test as to the right to counsel
in paternity disputes.10
4
B. Paternity Disputes at Time of Divorce
Many husbands who participate in divorces try to establish
grounds of adultery'05 or avoid payment of child support '06 by al-
leging that they are not the father of a child born to the marriage.
Generally, however, husbands must overcome a presumption that
children of the marriage are legitimate.1 07 Although some cases
have traced the presumption of legitimacy to Roman law,108 the
English common law embraced it with the adoption of Lord Mans-
field's Rule in the eighteenth century.109 The Rule effectively made
98. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
99. See authority cited supra note 71.
100. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. The Mills court found a four year
statute of limitations inappropriate. A later case cited Mills as precedent and found a six
year statute of limitations inappropriate. Hummel v. Smith, 301 Pa. Super. 276, 447 A.2d
965 (1982) (Beck, J., concurring).
101. In re Paternity of M.D.H., 437 N.E.2d 119, 125-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); see Le-
noir ex rel. Cogdell v. Johnson, 46 N.C. App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816 (1980); State ex rel. S.M.B.
v. D.A.P., 284 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1981).
102. Hummel v. Smith, 301 Pa. Super. 276, 285-86, 447 A.2d 965, 970 (1982) (Beck, J.
concurring); see Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1979).
103. Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 1979).
104. Id. at 344.
105. See, e.g., Rachel v. Rachel, 412 A.2d 1202 (D.C. 1980) (husband seeking legal sep-
aration on ground of adultery claimed younger child was not his biological offspring). See
also Note, Divorce-Authority of Court to Order Mother to Submit Her Child to Blood-
Grouping Tests to Determine Issue of Adultery, 15 J. FAM. LAW 592 (1977).
106. See L.A.J. v. C.T.J., 577 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (father challenged child
support decree on basis of his nonpaternity).
107. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 116, 173 S.W. 842, 843 (1915).
109. Goodwright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
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the presumption of legitimacy irrebuttable by preventing either
spouse from testifying to nonaccess to each other at the time of
conception. 110 Several commentators have criticized the Rule,111
however, and many American courts have abandoned it.""2
Although a few states such as California'" and Nebraska"
4
still have a conclusive presumption of legitimacy, most states have
adopted a rebuttable presumption through statutes'" or common
law.1 6 Eight states have statutorily adopted 17 a provision of the
Uniform Parentage Act" 8 that establishes a rebuttable presump-
tion of legitimacy." 9 Thus, the majority of states allow evidence
rebutting the presumption of legitimacy, including proof of the
husband's nonaccess, 20 the wife's adultery, 121 and the husband's
110. Id.
111. E.g. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVmENCE § 67 (2d ed. 1972); J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2063-64 (3d ed. 1940).
112. See, e.g., Serafin v. Serafin, 401 Mich. 629, 258 N.W.2d 461 (1977); Ventresco v.
Bushey, 159 Me. 241, 191 A.2d 104 (1963); Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317
(1937).
113. CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West Cum. Supp. 1983). See also Comment, The Irrebut-
table Presumption of California Evidence Code Section 621, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 452 (1979).
114. Hudson v. Hudson, 151 Neb. 210, 36 N.W.2d 851 (1949).
115. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 675.7-.15 (1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1101 (Supp. 1981);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-51 to -7 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 331 (1974); WEST VA. CODE
§§ 48-7-1 to 4 (1966 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
116. Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia have adopted a common
law rebuttable presumption of legitimacy. See Note, Children Born of the Marriage-Res
Judicata Effect on Later Support Proceedings, 45 Mo. L. REv. 307 n.5 (1980).
117. CAL. CiV. CODE § 7004 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105 (1973); HAWAU
RzV. STAT. § 584-4 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55 (West 1982); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-
105 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-04 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.040 (Supp.
1983); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-102 (1978). Montana's statute differs from the Uniform Parentage
Act in that it allows rebuttal of the presumption of legitimacy by a preponderance of the
evidence rather than by clear and convincing evidence. See infra note 137.
118. See supra note 44.
119. The Uniform Parentage Act provides:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:
(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other and
the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is
terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a
decree of separation is entered by a court;
(b) A presumption under this section may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by
clear and convincing evidence. If two or more presumptions arise which conflict with
each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considera-
tions of policy and logic controls. The presumption is rebutted by a court decree estab-
lishing paternity of the child by another man.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1) & (b), 9A U.L.A. 590-91 (1979).
120. See, e.g., Mock v. Mock, 411 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1982). See supra notes 128-30 and
accompanying text.
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impotence or sterility.122 State courts recently have admitted evi-
dence from blood tests like the HLA.12 3 Obviously, the older forms
of "proof' are neither as reliable nor as objective as the HLA blood
test 1 2' since they rely partly on past recollections and self-serving
commentary.1 2
5
The courts in those states with a rebuttable presumption of
legitimacy generally will allow the results of an HLA blood test
into evidence if the proponent husband shows good cause for their
admission.1 2' Because the husband is attempting to prove he is not
the father of the child, he would use the test results as exclusion-
ary evidence. If the test, however, indicated a high likelihood of
paternity the mother or child would want to use the results as af-
firmative evidence. The controversy surrounding the use of HLA
blood tests in divorce situations, however, does not concern
whether the results are exclusionary or affirmative as it does in pa-
ternity determinations in illegitimacy cases, 127 but instead focuses
more on the applicable statute of limitations. Recent judicial deci-
sions and modern policy considerations support a statute of limita-
tions in paternity determinations of illegitimate children, the only
limit of which should be a child's reaching the age of majority.12 8
However, similar policy considerations-the best interests of the
121. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
122. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1983) (statute provides that a conclusive
presumption of paternity exists if conception occurs while husband and wife cohabitate, but
that no such presumption exists if one can show that the alleged father was impotent or
sterile). Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1981) (The burden of
showing impotence or sterility is upon the person claiming paternity. The court will allow
blood test results to rebut conclusive presumption of a cohabitant's paternity only after the
claiming party carries the burden of proof and shows sterility or impotence.). See also Re-
cent Development, California's Tangled Web: Blood Tests and the Conclusive Presumption
of Legitimacy, 20 STA. L. REv. 754, 757 (1968).
123. See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 133, 137-38, 154
Cal. Rptr. 660, 662-63 (1979) (court allows use of the HLA blood test to prove nonpaternity
if parties lay adequate foundation and demonstrate good cause); J.H. v. M.H., 177 N.J.
Super. 436, 441, 426 A.2d 1073, 1076 (1980) (holding that HLA testing was not precluded in
divorce case); Wake County v. Green, 53 N.C. App. 26, 279 S.E.2d 901 (1981) (holding that
the HLA test may be used in a divorce case to show that a man other than the husband was
the father of a child). See also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
125. See cases cited supra notes 65-66 for purposes of analogy. The cases illustrate
instances in which courts have allowed older means of proof in paternity disputes. These
means of proof rely heavily upon self-serving statements and past recollections.
126. See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour, 413 So. 2d 1167, 1169 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); County
of Fresno v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 133, 137-38, 154 Cal. Rptr. 660, 662-63 (1979)
(existence of better blood test than ABO test found sufficient for good cause).
127. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
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child 29 and the preservation of family integrity1 0--bolster the ar-
gument for a very brief statute of limitations in paternity disputes
at the time of divorce.
1. The Child's Best Interests
Two of a child's possible interests at the time of a divorce are
maintenance of his status as legitimate 31 and insulation from rou-
tine disavowals of his legitimacy in divorce proceedings.3 2 Because
recent Supreme Court cases have sought to equalize the status of
illegitimate and legitimate children, 133 arguments based on the le-
gal consequences of being labelled "illegitimate" command less
support.134 The child's interest in preserving his legitimacy, there-
fore, is more defensible if parties present it to reflect a concern
with the maintenance of a legal relationship with the father as well
as the avoidance of any social stigmas of illegitimacy. Maintenance
of a child's legal relationship with his father achieves an important
and practical economic goal: as long as the child is the legal depen-
dent of the husband seeking a divorce, the husband must support
the child financially during minority.13 5 A child's interest in protec-
tion from courtroom denials of his legitimacy in divorce proceed-
129. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Ferguson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 744, 179 CaL Rptr. 108, 110 &
n.2 (1981).
131. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
132. See Recent Development, supra note 122, at 758, 759 n.23.
133. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. See also Comment, The Expanding
Rights of the Illegitimate, 3 CREIGHTON L. Rxv. 135 (1970).
134. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1976) (stigma of illegitimacy is
not determinative of illegitimate's rights to social security benefits); Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (discrimination results if state denies substantial benefits for an illegiti-
mate because of that child's status compared to legitimate children); Comment, supra note
133. Contra Serafin v. Serafin, 401 Mich. 629, 258 N.W.2d 461 (1977) (Coleman, J., concur-
ring). In his concurring opinion of the case, Justice Coleman wrote in dicta:
Despite these enlightened advances, there still are, unfortunately, social distinctions
made between the legitimate and illegitimate child which continue to stigmatize the
illegitimate child and scar his or her psychological development. We need no learned
treatise to know that many children branded as illegitimate suffer painful and some-
times crippling emotional damage at the hands of cruel or thoughtless peers and adults.
The work "bastard" has not yet lost its sting to the children against whom it is too
often applied. Moreover, feelings of parental rejection and abandonment are realities
that often continue to plague the illegitimate child. Related neglect and even abuse are
not uncommon. It is no accident that many of these children strike back by committing
antisocial or criminal acts.
Id. at 637-38, 258 N.W.2d at 464.
135. See, e.g., In re Paternity of M.D.H., 437 N.E.2d 119, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982);




ings, in comparison, reflects a concern for his emotional well-being.
If courts admit HLA blood test results in all divorce proceedings
for the purpose of denying paternity, then husbands could engage
routinely in "fishing expeditions" by requesting that the blood
tests be taken and the results admitted in efforts to avoid child
support.16 The traumatic effect of divorce on children is obviously
evident, and courts should recognize the repugnance of addition-
ally subjecting a minor to a blood test and thereby forcing the
child to acknowledge that his father is attempting to deny pater-
nity. The failure of some states to have a statute of limitations that
bars a husband's action to disprove his paternity'1 7 makes such
scenarios inevitable. Because the economic and emotional interests
of children are so significant, all states should adopt some statute
of limitations to limit such action.
2. Preservation of Family Integrity
The public policy of maintaining family integrity provides fur-
ther support for a short statute of limitations in the divorce con-
text. Some courts have characterized family integrity as "actual"
and "legal."138 Involvement in a divorce can destroy "actual" fam-
ily integrity,139 but courts feel that "legal" family integrity can sur-
vive.1 40 A reasonable statute of limitations that excludes some
blood test evidence in divorce proceedings would help maintain the
legal father-child relationship and, although the child would not
benefit from his father's presence, the existence of a legal relation-
ship hopefully would preserve at least some of the psychological
and emotional bonds between the two.141 An important considera-
tion that courts should include in their analysis of this policy-dom-
inated area is that, although the impact and accuracy of other
forms of evidence142 may diminish, the utility and accuracy of the
HLA blood test never waivers. 14s Thus, the HLA blood test could
affect dramatically the number of paternity disavowals and destroy
some legal relationships that courts should maintain to protect the
136. See Recent Development, supra note 122, at 759 n.23; R.D.S. v. S.L.S., 402
N.E.2d 30, 37 n.13 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
137. See, e.g., In re Paternity of M.D.H., 437 N.E.2d 119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
138. See, e.g., Stephen B. v. Sharyne B., 124 Cal. App. 3d 524, 530, 177 Cal. Rptr. 429,
432 (1981).
139. Id., at 530, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 531, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
142. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 25.
1606 [Vol. 36:1587
LEUKOCYTE TESTING
economic and emotional interests of children and the legal integ-
rity of the family. The best method for states to minimize the ef-
fect of HLA test results on children of divorce is to adopt short
statutes of limitation that begin to run at the birth of the child.
Present state statutes of limitation range from two years""' to non-
existent.145 Interestingly, the Uniform Act on Parentage contains a
statute of limitations of five years starting to run at the birth of
the child1 46 that apparently contradicts the express admonition in
the Act's Comments that "paternity actions should be brought
promptly"147 to determine the paternity of illegitimate children.
Although a child must be at least six months old before he can
undergo an HLA blood test,148 a two to three year statute of limi-
tations beginning at the date of the child's birth would be reasona-
bly adequate. A time limit of two or three years would afford a
husband enough time to disprove the paternity of a child whom he
discovered was not his biological offspring, yet would be short
enough to protect the economic and emotional interests of a child
who had achieved the longevity within the family unit that courts
equitably should recognize as worthy of the protection that they
give legal family integrity. In those divorce actions in which a man
seeks to disprove paternity within a two or three year statute of
limitations courts should admit HLA blood test results because
they most objectively can exclude the man as the biological fa-
ther.149 In those instances, however, when a husband seeks to dis-
prove paternity of a child who is over two or three years old, states
should have statutes of limitation that toll not only the admission
144. See, e.g., Stephen B. v. Sharyne B., 124 Cal. App. 3d at 527, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 431
(1981).
145. See supra note 137.
146. Section (6)(a) of the Uniform Parentage Act provides:
(a) A child, his natural mother, or a man presumed to be his father under Para-
graph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a), may bring an action
(2) for the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and child rela-
tionship presumed under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a) only if the action is
brought within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts, but in no
event later than five years after the child's birth. After the presumption has been re-
butted, paternity of the child by another man may be determined in the same action, if
he has been made a party.
UMF. PAMrENTAGE AcT § 6(a), 9A U.L.A. 593 (1979).
147. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 7 Commissioners' Comment (1979).
148. See, e.g., Elzey v. Smith, 412 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (baby had
to be six months old to undergo HLA blood test because the baby needed to weigh enough
to give blood).
149. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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of HLA blood test results, but also the cause of action itself.
C. Unwed Fathers Attempting to Establish Paternity Rights
Unwed fathers recently have attempted to establish various
rights respecting their children in the same actions in which
mothers seek paternity determinations of illegitimate children.
The rights that fathers usually seek are custody of the child,150 vis-
itation with the child,151 or prevention of the child's adoption.152
Many unwed fathers have achieved these goals since the Supreme
Court held in Stanley v. Illinois' that an unmarried father was
entitled to notice and a hearing in child custody proceedings for
his illegitimate children.'" Because the unwed father claiming pa-
ternity and seeking adoption of his illegitimate child bears the bur-
150. See, e.g., W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862
(1979); In re Kelvin M., 77 Cal. App. 3d 396, 143 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1978); In re Tricia M., 74
Cal. App. 3d 125, 141 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); Pi v. Delta,
175 Conn. 527, 400 A.2d 709 (1978); Stevens v. Leone, 35 Conn. Supp. 237, 406 A.2d 402
(1979); In re Ozment, 61 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 378 N.E.2d 409 (1978); Vanderlaan v. Vander-
laan, 9 Ill. App. 3d 260, 292 N.E.2d 145 (1972); Hrouda v. Winne, 77 A.D.2d 62, 432
N.Y.S.2d 643 (1980). See generally Note, Putative Fathers: Unwed, But No Longer Unpro-
tected, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 425 (1980) (general discussion of the increased rights presently
afforded putative fathers).
151. See, e.g., Roque v. Frederick, 272 Ark. 392, 614 S.W.2d 667 (1981); Donald J. v.
Evna M., 81 Cal. App. 3d 929, 147 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1978); Griffith v. Gibson, 73 Cal. App. 3d
465, 142 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1977); Sullivan v. Bonafonte, 172 Conn. 612, 376 A.2d 69 (1977);
Forestiere v. Doyle, 30 Conn. Supp. 284, 310 A.2d 607 (1973); People ex rel. Ritchie v.
Ritchie, 58 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 374 N.E.2d 1292 (1978); People ex rel. Vallera v. Rivera, 39 Ill.
App. 3d 775, 351 N.E.2d 391 (1976); Dustin v. Belanger, 429 A.2d 212 (Me. 1981); Penn-
sylvania v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965). See generally Note, The
Rights of Fathers of Non-Marital Children to Custody, Visitation and to Consent to Adop-
tion, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 412 (1979) (discussion of visitation rights under the Uniform Parent-
age Act).
152. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978); Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972); Adoption of Rebecca
B., 68 Cal. App. 3d 193, 137 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1977); Cheryl H. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App.
3d 273, 115 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1974); People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 Ill.
2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972). See generally Note, Unwed Fathers: Conflict of Rights in
Adoption Proceedings, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 559 (1979); Recent Development, Constitu-
tional Law-Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection Clause-Adoption-Rights of Pu-
tative Fathers, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 375 (1980) (discussion of statute requiring the mother's, but
not the putative father's consent before adoption as violative of equal protection).
153. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
154. Id. Stanley found that a father's interest in his illegitimate child was "cognizable
and substantial." Prior to this 1972 decision, unwed fathers were predominately unsuccess-
ful in attempting to claim custody of their biological children. See, e.g., Jolly v. Queen, 142
S.E.2d 592 (N.C. 1965). See generally Marcus, Equal Protection: The Custody of the Ille-
gitimate Child, 11 J. FAm. L. 1 (1971); Recent Development, Family Law-Voluntary Legit-
imation-Father Has No Absolute Right to Legitimate Child Solely on Proof of Biological
Fatherhood, 8 ST. MAR's L.J. 392 (1976); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
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den of proof,1 5 he needs a precise method of proving paternity like
the HLA blood test.15 '
Unwed fathers also have attempted to utilize the results of the
HLA test to prove their paternity when litigating other rights.1 57
On the basis of the Stanley decision and state statutes that adopt
provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act,158 for example, unwed fa-
thers successfully have sought custody of their children by using
the clear and convincing proof of the HLA blood test.15 9 Thus, the
HLA blood test has extended the rights of unwed fathers and, be-
cause admittance of the test has not proved controversial when un-
wed fathers seek to establish paternity of a clearly illegitimate
child, courts generally have denied admittance only intermittently
on the basis of outdated exclusionary statutes.6 0
The attempted extension of the use of the HLA test by an
alleged biological father to challenge the paternity of a presumably
legitimate child, however, has caused courts to consider important
policy considerations that might limit this controversial use. In
Happel v. Mecklenburger,"'' for instance, the alleged biological fa-
ther of an eight year old child brought suit to establish paternity
and visitation rights. The lower court denied his request to require
the parties to submit to the HLA blood test." The court of ap-
peals upheld the trial court's decision because the HLA blood test
was only one factor in the determination of paternity, and the de-
nial of the motion to require the test, therefore, was not reversible
error."' Extensive dicta which detailed strong policy considera-
tions indicated that the appellate court preferred to deny use of
tests like the HLA which could identify the biological father of a
155. See H. KRAUsE, supra note 6, at 140-47.
156. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 657 n.9.
157. See, e.g., Marticorena v. Miller, 597 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1979).
158. See UNIF. PARNTAGE AcT, §§ 2 & 6(a)(1), DA U.L.A. 588, 593 (1979). An unwed
father can bring an action under §§ 2 and 6(a)(1), which provide that the "parent and child
relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital
status of the parents" and that "a child, his natural mother, or a man presumed to be his
father under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a), may bring an action ... at any time
for the purpose of declaring the existence of the father and child relationship presumed
under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a)."
159. See, e.g., LaCroix v. Deyo, 113 Misc. 2d 89, 447 N.Y.S.2d 864 (N.Y. Fan. Ct.
1981), aff'd, 88 A.D.2d 1077, 452 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1982).
160. See, e.g., J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d 696, 698-705, 285 N.W.2d 880, 881-84 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1979).
161. 101 III. App. 3d 107, 427 N.E.2d 974 (1981).
162. Id. at 109, 427 N.E.2d at 977.
163. Id. at 112, 427 N.E.2d at 981.
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child whose paternity was in doubt even by his mother.1'" The
strongest public policy argument against a paternity claim by the
alleged biological father that the court recognized was the preser-
vation of the family unit.16 5 Although the parents of the child in
Happel had divorced, the legal father and child regularly visited
each other and the legal father supplied child support.16 Thus, in
denying the unwed father's cause of action the court gave more
weight to the established emotional family ties between the legal
father and the child than to the possibly destructive recognition of
the unwed father's paternity rights.67
Not all courts recognize the Happel rationale. In R. McG. v.
J.W.'68 the dissent voiced the same policy considerations that the
Happel court found determinative,16 9 but the majority allowed an
unwed father to use the HLA blood test successfully to claim pa-
ternity of a child born to a married couple.170 The dissent strongly
criticized the majority's holding and noted the state's strong inter-
est in promoting durable family ties.17' The majority, however,
based its decision on the equal protection grounds that an unwed
father has the right to seek his paternity rights concerning a child
born to a marriage, just as an unwed mother can institute a pater-
nity suit against a married man.172 Although the court did not dis-
cuss specifically the natural father's good faith, it did note that the
guardian ad litem consistently advocated allowance of the ac-
tion, 7 s and that the plaintiff instituted his claim one and one-half
years after the birth of the child.174 If factors such as these indicate
an earnest and persistent interest by the biological father to estab-
lish a parent-child relationship, then the effects of such a relation-
ship would be positive because the child would benefit from the
164. Id. at 115, 427 N.E.2d at 983. The mother had undergone artificial insemination
with sperm of both her husband and an anonymous donor near the time of conception. She
also had sexual intercourse with her husband and the plaintiff near the same dates. 427
N.E.2d 979.
165. Id. at 115, 427 N.E.2d at 983.
166. Id.
167. The unwed father sought both a determination of paternity and visitation rights.
427 N.E.2d at 977.
168. 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980).
169. Id. at 676 (Lohr, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 669.
171. Id. at 676-77.
172. Id. at 671.
173. Id. at 672.
174. Id. at 667-68.
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love and support of two "fathers" instead of one.1 "
Like the cases in which a husband wants to disprove his pater-
nity in a divorce, unwed father cases in which the plaintiff at-
tempts to prove he is a child's biological parent require the plain-
tiff to overcome a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy.176 The
plaintiffs in both Happel17 and R. McG.178 tried to use the HLA
blood test because it provides the most reliable evidence in estab-
lishing paternity. The differing conclusions on admissibility in
these cases, however, indicate the importance that courts place on
the values of family preservation. This Note proposes that an ap-
propriate statute of limitations would govern most effectively the
use of the HLA blood test in unwed father cases. No reason exists
to bar an unwed father, for instance, from claiming visitation
rights with his biological child if he institutes the action within a
reasonable time. 17 9 A suggested reasonable time of two years from
the date of the child's birth would give the unwed father enough
time to seek judicial recourse that used the precise, objective evi-
dence which the HLA test provides, and would also protect the
established family unit as deeper emotional ties between the child
and his legal father developed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of the HLA blood test as evidence in cases of disputed
parentage involves very emotional issues. Different types of dis-
puted paternity cases present similar policy considerations with
one common denominator: the best interests of the child. Determi-
nation of those interests, however, is difficult and scientifically in-
exact. Medical and bio-medical engineering developments in the
determination of paternity often outrace legal reasoning. Because
of this unavoidable dichotomy, American courts have shown mixed
reactions to the use of the HLA blood test as evidence in disputed
paternity cases. While many courts have recognized its accuracy
and extolled its use as objective evidence, other courts have ex-
pressed a more tentative attitude. In general, however, courts have
175. See Case Comment, Bastardizing the Legitimate Child: The Colorado Supreme
Court Invalidates the Uniform Parentage Act Presumption of Legitimacy in R. McG. v.
J.W., 59 DEN. L.J. 157, 171-72 (1981).
176. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 129-48 and accompanying text for an analogous argument in the
area of paternity disputes in divorce actions.
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admitted the HLA blood test as both exclusionary and affirmative
evidence in various paternity claims.
Yet, the common denominator-the best interests of the
child-has resulted in courts questioning the appropriateness of
the evidence in certain cases. Concerns for family values and the
child's emotional and financial health constitute the major public
policy considerations in this debate. Because the accurate, reliable
evidence that the HLA blood tests provides may clash with a
child's best welfare, admittance of the HLA blood test as evidence
in disputed paternity cases may not always be appropriate.
First, this Note proposes that the HLA blood test should be
unconditionally admissible in all paternity claims involving illegiti-
mate children who do not have a legal father. Requiring admission
of the HLA blood test in AFDC and non-AFDC paternity suits
would serve both public and private interests because it is the
most reliable and accurate evidence available. Positive identifica-
tion of the biological father would benefit the illegitimate child
emotionally and financially; and if the father continued to support
the child willingly, the public sector would realize financial bene-
fits. Litigation also would decrease if HLA blood test results con-
vinced a father to accept his parental duties without a judicial
mandate.
Second, this Note suggests that courts admit the HLA blood
test as evidence in paternity disputes which arise out of divorce
proceedings only if those actions fall within a two or three year
statute of limitations. Such actions involve different policy consid-
erations than do paternity actions involving illegitimate children
who do not have a legal father. A supposedly legitimate child, for
example, is subject to illegitimacy and loss of financial support if
the father who has supported him can prove he is not the biologi-
cal father. The law, therefore, should afford some protection to the
child from evidence-albeit accurate and reliable-which could se-
riously harm his best interests. The law, however, should not bar
such claims by the father completely, and arguably should protect
him from unjustified responsibility. Policy considerations, there-
fore, favor requiring the father to forego his paternity action
within two to three years from the child's birth.
Finally, this Note advocates a two year statute of limitations
for actions by unmarried fathers who attempt to introduce HLA
blood test results to assert paternity rights concerning a presuma-
bly legitimate child who has a legal father. Two very strong policy
considerations-the rights of unwed fathers and the best interests
1612 [Vol. 36:1587
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of the child-clash in this situation. Although an unwed father un-
doubtedly has a right to seek paternity of his illegitimate child,
such an action poses no difficulty to the use of the HLA blood test
as evidence. Indeed, courts should encourage the use of the HLA
test in this instance because of the accuracy and objectivity of the
evidence. In situations in which an unmarried father attempts to
introduce HLA blood test results in order to assert paternity rights
concerning a presumably legitimate child who has a legal father,
however, the public policies clash. The growing support for equal
protection of the rights of unwed fathers militates in favor of ad-
mission, but a child's emotional and economic interests and soci-
ety's interest in the preservation of the family constitute powerful
elements of the argument for inadmissibility. The best solution,
again, seems to be reliance on the statute of limitations as a line of
demarcation for the use of the HLA blood test as evidence. Thus,
if an unwed father wants to seek paternity rights of a child already
born to a marriage, courts should require him to bring his claim
within a two year period commencing at the birth of the child.
Thereafter, the courts should not permit the unmarried father to
disrupt the established family unit.
Thus, although the technology is available to provide accurate
and reliable information about paternity, courts should not allow
the unchecked use of this evidence. Legislatures and courts should
weigh carefully the availability and capability of the HLA blood
test against the desirability and necessity of the information it pro-
vides. Although the test can clarify biological relationships, courts
should not neglect the psychological, emotional, and economic as-
pects of the human condition in the blind rush to use all the evi-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter the "Fed-
eral Rules") permit parties to civil actions in federal courts to dis-
cover the opinions and conclusions of any expert witness that a
party-opponent expects to call as a witness at trial.1 Federal rule
26 governs discovery of these experts and provides several different
but integrated techniques for compelling disclosure of informa-
tion,2 including written interrogatories s and court ordered
depositions.4
The provisions of rule 26(b)(4) resulted from a protracted de-
bate by courts and commentators over the merits of permitting
discovery of expert witnesses.' Federal rule 26(b)(4) strongly af-
firms the idea that. adequate discovery of expert witnesses is essen-
tial to their effective cross-examination in today's complex and
highly technical civil cases.6
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
2. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 81, at 543 (4th ed. 1983).
.3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) & 33.
4. See id. at 26(a) & 27-32. A 1941 study of pretrial discovery revealed that parties
used oral depositions more than any other discovery device. See A. Stockman, Some Statis-
tical Observations on the Operation of Discovery and Related Provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 21 (1942) (unpublished study, Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts), cited in Note, Dead Men Tell No Tales: Admissibility of Civil Depositions upon
Failure of Cross-examination, 65 VA. L. REv. 153, 154 n.11 (1979).
5. See infra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
6. "Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation.
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Parties to civil actions enjoy an absolute right to cross-ex-
amine witnesses at trial.7 A party seeking discovery of a party-op-
ponent's expert witness in preparation for cross-examination and
rebuttal of the expert at trial, however, lacks sufficient preparation
to cross-examine or rebut the expert's responses to discovery ques-
tions. An expert's testimony during a discovery deposition,8 there-
fore, is not subject to true cross-examination but, nevertheless, still
is potentially admissible at trial against the discovering party. This
anomaly arises because rule 32(a)(3) permits any party to use the
deposition of a witness "for any purpose" if the witness becomes
unavailable9 to testify at trial.10 Thus, if a party to a civil action
deposed an expert witness pursuant to rule 26(b)(4), and the ex-
pert subsequently became unavailable to testify at trial within the
meaning of rule 32(a)(3), a federal district court judge, under the
Federal Rules as they presently exist, probably would permit intro-
duction of the deposition into evidence against the deposing
party. 1 A party who desires to depose a party-opponent's expert
witness in such cases faces the quandary of deposing the oppo-
nent's expert witness to prepare effectively for cross-examination
and thereby risking that opposing counsel will use the deposition
against him at trial.1 2
The system of discovery that the Federal Rules establish theo-
retically entitles all parties in civil actions, prior to commencement
of trial, to disclosure of all relevant nonprivileged information in
The lawyer even with the help of his own experts frequently cannot anticipate the particular
approach his adversary's expert will take or the data on which he will base his judgment on
the stand." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
7. See, e.g., Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691-92 (1931); United States v.
Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 826 (1952); 4 B. JONES, JONES ON
EVIDENCE § 25:1, at 106 (6th ed. 1972); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TIALS AT COMMON LAW §
1367, at 32 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1974).
8. Although the Federal Rules do not distinguish between discovery and evidentiary
depositions, recognizable practical differences distinguish them. See infra notes 125-28 and
accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 44-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unavailability
requirement in rule 32(a)(3).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a).
11. The problem of using discovery deposition testimony against a discovering party
exists with depositions of all witnesses, but the arguments against permitting this technique
are most compelling in the context of expert witness depositions.
12. A 1976 survey revealed that counsel deposes the opponent's expert in approxi-
mately 60% of the cases in which opposing counsel expects the expert to testify at trial.
Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Part Two, an Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169, 175 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Graham, Part Two].
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the possession of any person.13 Thus, federal discovery rules should
not force litigants to choose between failing to depose a party-op-
ponent's expert witness and thereby preparing inadequately for
trial, and deposing the expert witness and consequently risking
that opposing counsel will use the deposition against him at trial
without the benefit of cross-examination. Part H of this Note re-
views common law disagreement over the appropriateness of ex-
pert witness discovery and the acceptance of the principle under
the Federal Rules. Part III discusses the procedural mechanics of
discovering an expert witness and demonstrates the potential for
use of such a deposition against the discovering party. Part IV re-
views the judicial history of the expert witness deposition problem
and demonstrates that courts have ignored the policy reasons that
favor remedying this procedural problem. Part V discusses the in-
equities that the expert witness deposition problem causes. It con-
cludes that courts, by admitting discovery depositions of expert
witnesses against the deposing party, not only have controverted
the basic purposes of pretrial discovery, but also erroneously have
eliminated the process of deposing the witness of a party-opponent
as a pretrial discovery technique by effectively recharacterizing it
as an extension of formal trial proceedings that presume the de-
posing party engaged in full pretrial preparation. Part V then ex-
plores several possible methods courts and rulemakers could em-
ploy to solve this problem, including an amendment to rule 26.
II. LEGAL HISTORY CONCERNING DIsCovERY OF EXPERT
WITNESSES
A. Common Law Disagreement Over the Appropriateness
of Discovering Expert Witnesses
Before adoption of the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules,
most courts did not permit parties to discover information from
13. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 540. Professor Charles Wright described the scope of
discovery that Federal Rule 26 authorizes as follows:
The scope of discovery contemplated by Rule 26 is extremely broad. "No longer
can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquir-
ing into the facts underlying his opponent's case." Discovery may extend to matters
relating to the claim or defense of any party, unlike the former equity practice that
limited discovery to matters in support of the proponent's case. It is no objection that
the examining party already knows the facts as to which he seeks discovery, since one
of the purposes of discovery is to ascertain the position of the adverse party on the
controverted issues.
Id. at 543-44 & nn.27-30 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)) (footnotes
omitted).
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experts whom party-opponents hired as witnesses or consultants. 14
These courts characterized expert information as privileged and
articulated several reasons for this characterization. First, some
courts stated that an expert's status as an expert rendered the in-
formation in his possession privileged.'5 Second, some courts rea-
soned that expert information fell within the scope of the attorney-
client privilege.16 Third, some courts felt that expert information
constituted attorney work product and protected it with a qualified
privilege. 17 Last, some courts prohibited discovery simply because
they felt that allowing a party to obtain free access to information
for which a party-opponent had paid by hiring an expert was un-
fair. 18 Courts that did allow discovery of expert witnesses fre-
quently restricted it to certain circumstances or limited the
amount or type of disclosure a discovering party could obtain.
Some courts, for example, permitted parties to discover the infor-
mation that formed the basis of an expert's conclusions, but not
the conclusions themselves.' 9 Other courts allowed parties to dis-
cover only expert employees of a party-opponent. 20 Although
14. See Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14
STAN. L. REv. 455 (1962); Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 111, 116-119 (1966).
15. See American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prod. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 685
(D.R.I. 1959); Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378-79 (D.N.J. 1954); Lewis v.
United Air Lines Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
16. Some courts have applied the attorney-client privilege not only to communications
between expert witnesses and attorneys, but also to the expert's knowledge. See
Friedenthal, supra note 14, at 462-69. One line of decisions based this application of the
attorney-client privilege on the theory that the expert was acting as a mere "conduit," relay-
ing and interpreting the client's information to the attorney. Id.; see City & County of San
Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951); Webb v. Francis J. Lewald
Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d 532 (1931); Rust v. Roberts, 171 Cal. App. 2d 772, 341 P.2d 46
(3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Another court characterized an expert as an assistant to an attor-
ney and, therefore, held that the attorney-client privilege protected the expert from being
subject to questioning at a deposition. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
7 F.R.D. 684, 686 (D. Mass. 1947).
17. The attorney work product privilege prohibits litigants from discovering the "writ-
ten statements and mental impressions of opposing counsel" absent a showing of necessity.
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947). Some courts have extended this privilege
to information that an attorney obtains from an expert, reasoning that this information
becomes protected once it reaches the hands of an attorney. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc.
v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 218 (D. Del. 1960); United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land, 25 F.R.D. 192, 193 (N.D. Cal. 1959); White Pine Copper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co.,
166 F. Supp. 148, 162-63 (W.D. Mich. 1958).
18. See Friedenthal, supra note 14, at 479-88. See also United States v. 23.76 Acres of
Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596-97 (D. Md. 1963) (suggesting that the court can alleviate any un-
fairness in discovery costs by ordering the discovering party to pay).
19. Long, supra note 14, at 118.
20. Id. at 119.
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courts treated discovery of expert witnesses inconsistently,21 courts
that followed the predominant judicial trend either completely re-
stricted discovery of experts or placed severe limitations upon it.
2 2
The primary factor that motivated courts to prohibit or re-
strict discovery of expert witnesses was the fear that it would pro-
mote lazy advocacy by allowing attorneys to rely on the work of
opposing counsel to help them prepare their cases. 2 s By imposing
stringent limitations on discovery of expert witnesses, courts left
attorneys inadequately prepared to face modern cases that concern
complex, highly technical matters, and to counter the increased use
of expert testimony that these cases often demand. 4 Attorneys,
therefore, increasingly faced the prospect of cross-examining ex-
pert witnesses at trial without previously obtaining the information
necessary to develop an effective strategy of rebuttal.2 5 This situa-
tion totally subverted one of the main purposes of discovery: to
"make a trial less a game of blind man's buff [sic] and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest prac-
ticable extent."28
21. See id. at 117-19.
22. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 792 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
918 (1981).
23. Friedenthal, supra note 14, at 488. The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules,
recognizing that this concern was the basis for the restrictions on discovery of expert wit-
nesses, stated that "[p]ast judicial restrictions on discovery of an adversary's expert, partic-
ularly as to his opinions, reflect the fear that one side will benefit unduly from the other's
better preparation." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
24. Cases that concern complex subject matter often create a "battle of the experts"
scenario. See Friedenthal, supra note 14; Getzoff, Direct and Cross-examination of an Ex-
pert-Some Suggestions Concerning "How to Do It", 22 TIAL LAW. GUIDE 267, 267 (1978).
In these cases, expert testimony often determines which party ultimately will prevail. FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note; see United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc.,
26 F.R.D. 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
25. In United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963), the court
stated "that an expert is the most difficult witness to cross-examine, particularly if one is
unaware until trial of the substance of his testimony." Id. at 596.
26. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). In light of this
disturbing trend, Professor Jack Friedenthal, see Friedenthal, supra note 14, and others, see
Long, supra note 14, posed vehement arguments for reform of laws governing discovery of
expert witnesses. In addition, some courts became more receptive to the idea of discovering
expert witnesses, and several opinions revealed greater judicial awareness of the relationship
between pretrial discovery and effective cross-examination and rebuttal at trial. See United
States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); Franks v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 41
F.R.D. 234 (W.D. Texas 1966); United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md.
1963). The increasing judicial awareness of the positive need for expert discovery, however,
failed to rectify inconsistent treatment of the expert witness issue among jurisdictions. See
infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text.
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B. Enactment of Federal Rule 26(b)(4): Discovery of Expert
Witnesses Permitted in Federal Courts
Congress responded to increasing judicial awareness of the
need for discovery of expert witnesses by adopting rule 26(b)(4) as
part of the 1970 amendment to the Federal Rules." In addition to
liberalizing discovery of expert witnesses, rule 26(b)(4) also con-
tains provisions that prevent discovering parties from enjoying un-
fair benefits in the discovery process. For example, rule 26(b)(4)
grants courts discretion to impose limited restrictions on the scope
of discovery28 and to order the discovering party to pay the party-
opponent "a fair portion of the fees and expenses" that the party-
opponent reasonably incurs "in obtaining facts and opinions from
the expert. '2 9 The rule also limits discovery, except in special cir-
cumstances 0 to expert witnesses the party-opponent expects to
call at trial.3 1 Moreover, discovering parties may depose expert wit-
nesses only by securing a court order.32 Thus, rule 26(b)(4)'s time
limitations, which allow depositions of expert witnesses only after
the party-opponent designates such witnesses for trial, coupled
with the power it gives judges to limit the scope of disclosure and
to require the discovering party to share in paying the expert wit-
ness' fees, effectively eliminates the danger of discovering parties
benefiting unfairly from a party-opponent's trial preparation.
III. DEPOSING EXPERT WITNESSES: HIDDEN DANGER FOR
DEPOSING PARTIES IN FEDERAL RuLE 32(a)(3)
Although rulemakers drafted rule 26(b)(4) to keep parties who
sought discovery of expert witnesses from benefiting unfairly, they
ironically overlooked the possibility that courts, pursuant to rule
32(a)(3), would bestow inequitable rewards upon discovered par-
ties. Rule 32(a)(3) provides that the "deposition of a witness...
may be used by any party for any purpose. . . " if certain condi-
tions arise-primarily unavailability of a witness to testify at
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
28. FEn. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
29. Id. at 26(b)(4)(C).
30. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) permits discovery of experts that a party-opponent does not ex-
pect to call at trial as provided in rule 35(b) "or upon a showing of exceptional circum-
stances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means." Id. at 26(b)(4)(B).
31. Id. at 26(b)(4).
32. Id. at 26(b)(4)(A).
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trial." Rule 32(a)(3) does not "evince a distinction as to admissi-
bility at trial between a deposition taken solely for purposes of dis-
covery and one taken for use at trial... "; 1 nor does a review of
its legislative history reveal such a distinction." If a party deposes
a party-opponent's expert witness solely for discovery purposes in
preparation for trial, therefore, the party-opponent can submit the
deposition into evidence against the deposing party under rule
32(a) if the expert witness becomes unavailable to testify.36 Conse-
quently, the deposed party could admit into evidence the deposi-
tion of his unavailable expert's opinions and conclusions without
subjecting them to in-court cross-examination by the deposing
party.3 7
A. The Process of Discovering Expert Witnesses and the
Deposition Problem
A party who anticipates that a party-opponent plans to use an
expert witness at trial typically submits an interrogatory to that
party requiring him to identify any experts which he expects to
call at trial and to state the subject matter and summarize the sub-
stance of the expert's anticipated testimony.3 8 The responses to the
interrogatories typically are not adequate to help the requesting
party prepare an effective cross-examination. 9 Thus, the request-
ing party, by order 0 or by agreement with the party-opponent,
usually deposes the expert identified in the party-opponent's inter-
rogatory responses. Although the parties may specify whether the
deposition is for discovery purposes only, for use at trial, or for
unlimited purposes, 4 1 these designations do not seem to affect the
operation of rule 32.42 The Federal Rules do not require absolutely
that a party who identified an expert as a trial witness produce the
witness at trial because uncontrollable circumstances often prevent
33. Id. at 32(a)(3).
34. Rosenthal v. Peoples Cab Co., 26 F.R.D. 116, 117 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
35. See United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 381 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); 4A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 30.50, at 30-38 (2d ed. 1981).
36. See infra notes 39-86 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
39. Professor Graham's survey suggests that most practitioners find the interrogatory
an unsatisfactory method of providing trial preparation. Graham, Part Two, supra note 12,
at 172.
40. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
41. See, e.g., Inland Bonding Co. v. Mainland Nat'l Bank, 3 F.R.D. 438 (D.N.J. 1944).
42. See infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text.
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the expert's attendance.43 When such circumstances arise, there-
fore, the party who hired the expert can invoke rule 32(a)(3) and
introduce into evidence the deposition that opposing counsel took
for discovery purposes.
B. The Unavailability Requirement of Rule 32(a)(3)
The essential requirement under rule 32(a)(3) for admitting
the deposition of a witness into evidence is unavailability of the
deposed witness for testimony at trial. The unavailability require-
ments of rule 32(a)(3) reflect the traditional judical preference for
live testimony over recorded testimony" by permitting the admis-
sion of deposition evidence only when appearance of the witness is
impossible or impractical, or when "exceptional circumstances"
render admission of the deposition desirable.45 The unavailability
provisions of rule 32(a)(3) provide insight into the degree that the
rule emphasizes the preference for live testimony, and illustrate
the ways an expert deposition can become admissible at trial.
1. Rule 32(a)(3)(A): Death of the Deposed Witness
Rule 32(a)(3)(A) permits parties to use depositions for any
purpose if the court finds that the deposed witness is dead. Admis-
sion of depositions under this provision has provoked very little
controversy" because unavailability due to death is easy to demon-
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3).
44. See, e.g., Lamb v. Globe Seaways, Inc., 516 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir. 1975); Salsman v.
Witt, 466 F.2d 76 (10th Cir. 1972). The traditional judicial preference for live testimony
derives from the desire of courts to afford factfinders the opportunity to observe the de-
meanor of witnesses during testimony. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 470 (2d Cir.
1946) (stating that "the demeanor of witnesses is recognized as a highly useful, even if not
an infallible, method of ascertaining the truth and accuracy of their narratives."); Napier v.
Bossard, 102 F.2d 467, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1939) (in which Judge Learned Hand stated that
"[t]he deposition has always been, and still is, treated as a substitute,. . . not to be used
when the original is at hand" because the party against whom the deposition is used is
denied the advantage of having the witness appear in front of the jury.). Federal Rules
32(a)(3)(E) and 43(a) expressly recognize the importance of allowing factfinders to observe
the demeanor of witnesses. Rule 32(a)(3)(E), which governs the use of depositions in trial
proceedings, emphasizes "the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in
open court." Rule 43(a), which concerns the form and admissibility of evidence at trial,
provides that "[i]n all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court,
unless otherwise provided ... by these rules."
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E).
46. Cases in which the deposed witnesses died before the deposition was complete,
however, present a problem analogous to the principle issue in this Note. See cases cited
infra note 87. For a full discussion of these cases, see Note, supra note 4.
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strate and seldom is subject to abuse.' As with all other forms of
unavailability under rule 32(a)(3), the party seeking to admit the
deposition into evidence bears the burden of proving that the wit-
ness is dead."8
2. Rule 32(a)(3)(B): Absence of the Deposed Witness
Rule 32(a)(3)(B), which permits parties to introduce a deposi-
tion into evidence when the witness is more than one hundred
miles from the place of trial or hearing, has spawned more litiga-
tion than any other unavailability provision and probably is the
most frequently abused criteria in the area of expert testimony.
Many courts have interpreted the 100 mile rule, and most have
construed it liberally.49 The party offering the deposition into evi-
dence bears the burden of establishing that the deponent meets
the distance requirements for unavailability.50 This burden of
proof, however, is not difficult to overcome. In Ikerd v Lapworth,51
for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that the trial court could judicially notice that the wit-
ness' place of residence was more than 100 miles from the place of
trial for purposes of admitting his deposition.5 2 More recently in
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,58 however, the Federal District Court
of Connecticut adopted a narrower view of the 100 mile rule. The
court held that it would not admit a deposition into evidence if the
deposed witness either resided or regularly worked within 100
miles of the place of trial "when the deposition [was] offered [in
evidence], or at a time during the proponent's case when a trial
subpoena could have been served" upon the deposed witness.5
47. The death of deposed witness provision in rule 32(a)(3) is not subject to abuse
presumably because few parties would procure the death of a witness so that they could use
a deposition instead of live testimony.
48. See, e.g., National Screw & Mfg. Co. v. Voi-Shan Indus., Inc., 347 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1965) (holding that the lower court properly excluded a deposition from evidence when a
party offered it pursuant to former rule 26 without showing the existence of circumstances
making the rule applicable).
49. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Transcontinental Energy Corp. v. Pacific Energy Resources, 683 F.2d
326, 330 (9th Cir. 1982).
51. 435 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1970).
52. Id. at 205. See also Frederick v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1952) (court
admitted deposition upon plaintiff's representation that the witness was out of town).
53. 77 F.R.D.-16 (D. Conn. 1977).
54. Id. at 18. See Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1345 (8th Cir. 1976); Ikerd
v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d at 205. But see United States v. International Business Machs. Corp.,
90 F.R.D. 377, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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The 100 mile requirement in rule 32(a)(3)(B) contains, as the
sole means of controlling abuse, the qualification that a deposition
is inadmissible when the party offering the deposition into evi-
dence procures the witness' absence.5 5 Courts, however, have been
very reluctant to find that a party procured the absence of a de-
posed witness. Courts carefully have distinguished a party's act of
procuring a witness' absence from the failure to facilitate his pres-
ence.5 To exclude a deposition under this provision, a party ap-
parently must meet the difficult burden of showing that the party
who sought admission of the deposition actively tried to keep the
deposed witness out of the courtroom.57
Courts arguably should scrutinize attempted admissions of ex-
pert witness depositions more closely under the 100 mile require-
ment of rule 32(a)(3)(B) than attempted admissions of depositions
of nonexpert witnesses. Today, parties frequently hire expert wit-
nesses who live and work more than 100 miles from the place of
trial.5 8 These experts typically receive substantial compensation
for consulting, testifying, and travel expenses.5 9 Ordinary wit-
nesses, however, usually receive only nominal statutory compensa-
tion because they accidently observed a particular event, not be-
cause they possess any valuable expertise.60 Thus, because experts
are very costly and often live outside the 100 mile zone, parties
who hire them are more likely to abuse the 100 mile requirement
by not paying the expert to return for trial than parties who seek
attendance of nonexpert witnesses." Nevertheless, most authori-
ties treat expert and nonexpert witnesses identically under the 100
mile requirement for purposes of determining their unavailability
and whether their depositions are admissible.2
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B).
56. See Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181, 189 (D. Md. 1962); see also
United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 90 F.R.D. at 383 n.10 (citing Houser
202 F. Supp. at 189); Richmond v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1955) (court held that
party did not procure his own absence); M.S.D. Inc. v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 85, 91
n.16 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
57. Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. at 189.
58. For a nationwide list of expert witness sources, see Kirk, Locating Scientific and
Technical Experts, in 2 AM. JUR. TRIALs 293 (1964).
59. See Strodel, The Expert Witness: The Cornerstone of the Medical Negligence
Case, TRiAL No. 6, June 1982, at 37, 38.
60. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 929 (1973).
61. See supra notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
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3. Rule 32(a)(3)(C): Age, Illness, Infirmity, and Imprisonment
of the Deposed Witness
Rule 32(a)(3)(C) permits courts to admit a witness' deposition
if "the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, illness,
infirmity, or imprisonment."8 Again, the party seeking admission
of the deposition bears a relatively light burden of proving that
one of these factors prevents the witness' attendance at trial.8 4 If a
party can use this unavailability provision to admit a witness' dep-
osition into evidence, other unavailability provisions such as the
100 mile and exceptional circumstances exceptions also may be
available to the party. 5 If a witness is in prison, a party may seek
to exclude the deposition by moving the court to use its discre-
tion66 to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, which
compels the prisoner to appear and testify at trial.6 7
4. Rule 32(a)(3)(D): Inability to Procure Attendance of the
Deposed Witness by Subpoena
If a party is unable to compel a deposed witness' attendance at
trial by subpoena, the witness' deposition is admissible into evi-
dence under rule 32(a)(3)(D)6 8 This provision, together with the
100 mile provision in rule 32(a)(3)(B), presents uncertainty about
whether a party who shows that a deposed witness is outside the
100 mile zone also must prove that he unsuccessfully tried to sub-
poena the witness. Rule 45(e)69 suggests that witnesses who are
more than 100 miles from the place of trial are not subject to sub-
poena. This simple answer, however, overlooks at least two situa-
tions that possibly could arise under the Federal Rules. First, rule
45(e) subjects witnesses to service of a subpoena at any place
within the judicial district. Some judicial districts, because of their
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(C).
64. See supra notes 48 & 50 and accompanying text.
65. See Scarfarotti v. Bache & Co., 438 F. Supp. 199, 202 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (witness
was ill at time of trial, and court admitted deposition, citing 32(a)(3)(B) and (E)).
66. See Murray v. United States, 138 F.2d 94, 97 (8th Cir. 1943).
67. On the other hand, a court need not let an imprisoned plaintiff come to trial when
his deposition is available. See Ball v. Woods, 402 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd with-
out op., Ball v. Shamblin, 529 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976), aff'd
without op., Ball v. Dwye'r, 538 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1976), modified, Ball v. Woods, 541 F.2d
279 (5th Cir. 1976).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(D).
69. Rule 45(e) provides in pertinent part: "A subpoena... may be served at any
place within the district, or at any place without the district that is within 100 miles of the
place of the hearing. . . ." Id. at 45(e).
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geographical size, require witnesses to travel more than 100 miles
from their place of residence to testify.70 Second, in certain statu-
tory causes of action, federal courts have nationwide subpoena
power under rule 45(e)(1).71 In cases in which either of these two
situations has arisen parties unsuccessfully have argued that the
100 mile provision which permits admissibility of depositions is in-
applicable when the deposed witness is subject to a court's sub-
poena power. 2 Federal courts, however, currently hold that parties
may admit depositions of witnesses into evidence under the 100
mile requirement without demonstrating that they attempted to
subpoena the witness. 3 Thus, the significance of the subpoena re-
quirement in determining whether a deposed witness is unavailable
is questionable, and very few cases construing the subpoena re-
quirement have arisen.
The question whether a party can subpoena an expert witness
to testify when his only connection with the case is that he con-
sulted with one of the parties has gained considerable attention. If
a party cannot compel such testimony, then any time he wishes to
introduce the deposition of an expert witness the party simply
must motion the court to issue a subpoena and, if the witness fails
to respond, offer the deposition into evidence under rule
32(a)(3)(D). The United States Supreme Court stated in
Branzburg v. Hayes1 ' that "'the public ... has a right to every
man's evidence,' except for those persons protected by a constitu-
70. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 76 F.R.D. 214, 215 (D. Conn. 1977).
71. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 23 (1976) (nationwide subpoena power in antitrust suits when
the United States is plaintiff). The note on amendments to rule 45(e)(1), which discusses
justifications for giving federal courts nationwide subpoena power, states the following:
The last clause of the second sentence in Rule 45(e)(1) was added in 1980. Previ-
ously a person could not be subject to a subpoena served on him more than 100 miles
from the place of the hearing even though the place of service and the site of the
hearing were within the same state. It was felt, however, that state rules of service
would adequately reflect the degree of hardship in travelling more than 100 miles
within the state, and, therefore, there was no justification for greater federal
restrictions.
72. United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 379-80
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 16, 17 n.2 (D. Conn. 1977); Houser v.
Snap-On Tools, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 181, 189 (D. Md. 1962). But see United States v. Empire
Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1975), afl'd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). In Empire Gas the court, in a federal antitrust action, refused
to admit into evidence depositions that the government offered because the government did
not attempt to show unavailability of deposed witnesses. Id. at 912. The court remarked
that the government acted "in the face of its nationwide subpoena power," and, thus, sug-
gested that the government should have attempted to subpoena the witnesses. Id.
73. See supra authorities cited in note 72.
74. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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tional, common-law, or statutory privilege. '7 5 Experts under sub-
poena, however, do not enjoy a general privilege to refuse to testify
concerning their expert knowledge. 76 Rather, courts generally will
subpoena and compel an expert witness to testify concerning any
previously formed expert opinions.77 Most courts, however, proba-
bly would not force experts to testify against their will and, consid-
ering the value of an expert's time, would not subpoena an expert
unless circumstances warranted otherwise.7 8
5. Rule 32(a)(3)(E): Admissibility under Exceptional
Circumstances
Rule 32(a)(3)(E) is a catch-all provision that permits courts to
admit the deposition of a witness because of "exceptional circum-
stances.'79 Unlike other unavailability provisions of rule 32(a)(3)
which require the deposed witness to be physically unavailable to
testify at trial, the exceptional circumstances provision only re-
quires the party offering the deposition into evidence to show the
court that forcing a witness to testify at trial would be unfair. This
burden seems more difficult because proving unfairness necessi-
tates that parties satisfy more than simply factual tests which the
other provisions in rule 32(a)(3)(A)-(D) establish. 0
In United States v. Rollins,81 for example, the federal govern-
ment charged the appellee with selling heroin to an undercover
agent. The government tried to avoid producing the undercover
agent as a witness at trial. The government alleged "exceptional
circumstances" for introducing the agent's deposition into evidence
because the agent himself was under investigation, in an unrelated
case, for permitting an informant to take some heroin that the
agent had purchased.2 The government was unwilling to risk the
serious danger that cross-examination of the agent unduly would
have focused the investigation on the agent and caused harm to
75. Id. at 688 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
76. Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 820 (2d Cir. 1976).
77. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 929 (1973).
78. See Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d at 821. Parties that face the problem of having
their discovery deposition of an expert witness used against them at trial should try to com-
pel the expert to testify by moving the court to subpoena the expert.
79. Fan. R. Crv. P. 32(a)(3)(E).
80. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
81. 487 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1973).
82. Id. at 411.
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the agent's reputation.83 The Second Circuit held that the agent
was not unavailable within the meaning of rule 32(a)(3)(E)'s excep-
tional circumstances provision and thus, refused to admit the dep-
osition. 4 The Second Circuit stated that a party could not argue
"that a deposition would be usable if the witness were alive and
well within the jurisdiction and subject to subpoena, simply be-
cause the party calling him wanted to preserve his identity or
wished not to expose him to unfair cross-examination." 5 The Rol-
lins decision suggests that the exceptional circumstances provision
in rule 32(a)(3)(E) seldom will provide an avenue for parties to ad-
mit depositions of expert witnesses into evidence against the de-
posing party. Moreover, the language of rule 32(a)(3)(E), which
contains the only statement in rule 32 that articulates a clear pref-
erence for live testimony over deposition evidence,"8 supports this
suggested proposition. Thus, parties who wish to introduce deposi-
tions of witnesses into evidence probably will have to rely prima-
rily on the provisions in rule 32(a)(3)(A)-(D) to achieve this
objective.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 412.
85. Id. See also Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 319 F. Supp. 714,
716 (E.D. Pa. 1970), a patent infringement suit, in which the court denied defendant's re-
quest to use at trial depositions of experts and other witnesses who would have observed the
defendant conducting inter partes tests on certain commercial material it produced if the
court had granted the defendant permission to conduct the tests. The defendant argued,
under the exceptional circumstances provision of rule 32(a)(3)(E), that because its commer-
cial equipment was too large to bring into and test in court, it could only give the court a
present sense impression of the test procedures by taking depositions of the test witnesses
while conducting the tests and introducing the depositions into evidence at trial. Id. In de-
nying the defendant's request to use the depositions at trial, the court reasoned as follows:
Witnesses frequently, in fact almost always, testify to impressions and observations of
events which take place outside the courtroom. The court must regularly make its deci-
sion from testimony concerning technical matters based on observations of events oc-
curring outside of the courtroom. This is hardly an "exceptional circumstance". There
is therefore no need to reduce defendant's experts' testimony to depositions before
trial.
Id. But see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 76 F.R.D. 214, 216 n.2 (D. Conn. 1977) (in which the
court stated that the length of an antitrust suit was an exceptional circumstance that justi-
fied using the deposition of a witness at trial rather than compelling the witness to testify in
court about "relatively non-controversial matters as to which the opportunity to assess cred-
ibility by observing the witness is not important.")
86. Rule 32(a)(3)(E) requires courts to give "due regard to the importance of present-
ing the testimony of witnesses orally in open court. . . ." Fan. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E).
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IV. JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE WITNESS DEPOSITION PROBLEM
Courts have expressed varying degrees of sensitivity for the ar-
guments of parties who challenge the propriety of admitting depo-
sitions of witnesses into evidence against a deposing party. In sev-
eral cases parties argued that allowing party-opponents to use
depositions at trial denied them their right to cross.-examine the
unavailable witness.87 Despite such arguments, courts universally
have admitted these depositions into evidence while offering ag-
grieved deposing parties little or no protection from the inequities
that resulted from these decisions.88
In Rosenthal v. Peoples Cab Co.,89 the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania recognized the potential
unfairness of admitting depositions of witnesses into evidence. The
plaintiff in Rosenthal deposed the driver of defendant's taxicab
solely for purposes of discovery.9 0 The witness later died and de-
fendant offered the deposition into evidence at the trial under rule
26(d), the predecessor to rule 32.91 Plaintiff moved to exclude the
deposition, arguing that he deposed the taxicab driver only for dis-
covery and that his counsel had no opportunity to cross-examine
the driver with leading questions because the witness was not
"hostile or recalcitrant." 92 The court admitted the deposition de-
spite plaintiff's arguments by reasoning that it did not have the
power to read a nonexistent restriction into rule 26(d).98 In recog-
nition of defendant's inability to cross-examine the taxicab driver,
however, the court admitted the deposition subject to "cautionary
87. See infra notes 89-113. A similar problem occurs concerning the admissibility of a
deposition of a witness at trial when the witness dies before the deposition is complete. In
these cases, parties have argued that the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine the witness
before he died should foreclose admission of the deposition. See, e.g., Derewecki v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co., 353 F.2d 436, 440 (3d Cir. 1965); Continental Can Co. v. Crown Cork &
Seal, Inc., 39 F.R.D. 354, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Inland Bonding Co. v. Mainland National
Bank, 3 F.R.D. 438, 439 (D.N.J. 1944). In each case, the court admitted the deposition by
finding either that the objecting party consented to the omission of cross-examination or by
holding that the value of the evidence outweighed the value of cross-examination. See Note,
supra note 4, at 159-71.
88. See infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
89. 26 F.R.D. 116 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
90. Id. at 117.
91. As part of a general restructuring of discovery rules in 1970, the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee moved the portions of 26(d)(3) concerning use of depositions at trial to
rule 32(a)(3)(A). Note, supra note 4, at 155 n.17.
92. Rosenthal, 26 F.R.D. at 117. Ordinarily, counsel may not employ leading questions
on direct examination except when witness appears hostile. See, e.g., W. RICHARDSON, RICH-
ARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 483 (J. Prince ed. 1973).
93. Rosenthal, 26 F.R.D. at 117.
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instructions ...and such observations as the circumstance may
require . . . .", Thus, the Rosenthal court recognized the unfair-
ness inherent in admitting discovery depositions of witnesses who
have not undergone true cross-examination. 5 The court, however,
felt that the silence of the Federal Rules on this issue constrained
it and implicitly held that cautionary instructions were an ade-
quate protection against any unfairness to the discovering party.98
In Wright Root Beer Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co.,9 7 however, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed lit-
tle concern for the plaintiff's argument that the court should not
admit the deposition of an inadequately cross-examined witness.
Defendant Dr. Pepper, upon notice to plaintiff Wright, had taken
the deposition of a witness whose testimony was crucial to Dr.
Pepper's case." The witness died prior to trial and Dr. Pepper of-
fered the deposition in evidence.9 9 Plaintiff argued that although it
had cross-examined the witness during the deposition, it had not
done so vigorously because it felt that the deposition was to serve
only discovery purposes. 00 The trial court admitted the deposition,
but on several occasions told the jury that it could give less weight
to the deposition than to live testimony which a party would have
subjected to in-depth cross-examination. 11 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit held that giving such instructions was reversible error.10 2
The court stated that under rule 26(d)(3), 10 3 "as a matter of right,
a party may introduce the deposition of a deceased witness with no
94. Id. at 118.
95. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
96. Rosenthal, 26 F.R.D. at 118.
97. 414 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1969).
98. Id. at 889.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 889-90. When Dr. Pepper objected to the court's cautionary instructions,
the trial judge said:
I think it was proper to point out to the jury all of the circumstances that might be
attended at the taking of a deposition for discovery purposes, versus a deposition for
perpetuation of testimony. Even with the presence of opposing counsel, so forth, cer-
tainly at a deposition for discovery, it's not unusual that you would not go into an in
depth cross-examination that you would, where you are going to perpetuate the testi-
mony. I think the jury was sufficiently charged on the point. I may not have mentioned
specifically, I cannot remember, now, that definitely counsel for both parties were
present.
Id. at 889-90 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 890-91.
103. Old rule 26(d)(3) was the predecessor to rule 32(a)(3). See supra note 91.
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strings attached. ' 10 4 The court reasoned that Wright's counsel pur-
posefully chose to limit his cross-examination of the witness at the
deposition and should have anticipated unexpected occurrences,
"including the necessity for using depositions when the deponent
has met an untimely death before trial."10 5 The court noted that
Wright failed to show that its failure to cross-examine the witness
during the deposition, as it had a right to do, prejudiced it at
trial.106 In addition, the court stated that Wright did not prove
that it could have obtained any evidence during cross-examination
that would have impeached the witness' testimony.10 7 Thus, unlike
the district court in Rosenthal, the Fifth Circuit held that a party
who fails to cross-examine a witness completely during a discovery
deposition has no right to cautionary instructions when a party-
opponent seeks to admit the deposition at trial.108
The District Court for the Southern District of New York ren-
dered the most recent decision on the expert witness deposition
problem in United States v. International Business Machines
Corp. (IBM).'0 9 In IBM the government argued that it deposed
several prospective IBM witnesses purely for discovery purposes to
prepare for cross-examination.110 Moreover, the government argued
that the court should not permit IBM to use the depositions
against it at trial because rule 32(a)(3)(B) did not contemplate ad-
mission of discovery depositions.""" The court, however, stated that
rule 32 does not distinguish between depositions for discovery pur-
poses and those for use at trial.1 2 The court admitted the govern-
ment's deposition into evidence, reasoning that "admission of un-




108. Id. at 890-91. Eleven years later, the Fifth Circuit in Savoie v. LaFourche Boat
Rentals, Inc., 627 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1980), again demonstrated its unwillingness to go be-
yond the express language of rule 32(a)(3) by admitting the deposition of a witness against
the deposing party. In Savoie the defendant had deposed a witness who was outside the
United States during the trial and argued that admission of the deposition against it would
act as a disincentive for parties in future litigation to prepare properly for trial by taking
discovery depositions. Id. at 724. The Fifth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that the
language of rule 32(a)(3) foreclosed this type of argument, id., and admitted the deposition
under the relevant provision of rule 32(a)(3)(B). Id.
109. 90 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
110. Id. at 381.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 381. The court noted that the 1970 revisions to the Federal Rules removed
language from the Rules that distinguished between depositions purely for discovery pur-
poses and those for use at trial. The court perceived that this revision extinguished any
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favorable deposition records was a risk the government assumed
when it chose to limit its questioning."11
The courts that have addressed the witness deposition prob-
lem increasingly have been unwilling to consider seriously the po-
tential prejudice to the party against whom the court admits the
deposition. These courts apparently have embraced the idea that
parties who fail to conduct full cross-examinations during deposi-
tions assume the risk of having depositions of subsequently un-
available witnesses used against them at trial. This theory fails to
recognize the distinction between discovery and preparation of evi-
dence that exists in practice although rule 32(a)(3) fails to reflect
it. 11' The practical difference between these two procedures makes
use of expert witness depositions at trial unfair when the parties
intended to use them only for discovery.
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Expert Witness Deposition Problem: The Degree of
Unfairness
1. Absence of Proper Opportunity for Cross-Examination
Parties in the American judicial system enjoy an absolute
right to cross-examine opposing witnesses. 1 5 The purpose of cross-
examination is to give factfinders an opportunity to evaluate the
reliability of a witness' testimony by allowing the cross-examining
party to impeach the witness and elicit facts favorable to the cross-
examiner's case.11 ' The prior opportunity for cross-examination of
a witness, therefore, is the primary factor underlying the admission
of hearsay under the prior testimony exception.1 ' Similarly, this
opportunity also justifies the provisions of rule 32(a)(3) that allow
courts to admit depositions as substantive evidence when the de-
ponent subsequently becomes unavailable to testify at trial.1 8 Ad-
argument for a distinction between discovery and evidentiary depositions. Id. at 381 n.7. See
Rosenthal v. Peoples Cab Co., 26 F.R.D. at 117.
113. United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 90 F.R.D. at 381.
114. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 7.
116. 4 B. JoNEs, supra note 7, at § 25:1.
117. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. "According to Dean McCormick, 'the
premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential safeguard has been the
principle justification for the exclusion generally of hearsay statements, and for the admis-
sion as an exception to the hearsay rule of reported testimony taken at a former hearing.'"
Note, supra note 4, at 156 n.19 (citing C. MCCORMICK, McCORMIcK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 19, at 43 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972)).
118. See Note, supra note 4, at 156 n.19.
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mission of discovery depositions into evidence against deposing
parties who only directly examine the deponent, therefore, in-
fringes upon the deposing parties' right of cross-examination.
(a) Dependence of Admissibility on Prior Cross-Examination
Rule 32(a)(3) does not contain an express requirement that
cross-examination occur as a prerequisite to admissibility of a dep-
osition. The rule, however, does permit use of depositions at trial
against only parties who were "present or represented... or who
had reasonable notice" of the taking of the deposition. "1 9 This lan-
guage implies that the party against whom a party-opponent seeks
to offer the deposition into evidence must have had an opportunity
to temper the deposition's impact through cross-examination.
Depositions, however, basically remain a form of hearsay,12
and courts and commentators have agreed that the total absence of
cross-examination precludes admission of a deposition.121 The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence recognize the fundamental hearsay nature
of depositions and allow their admission only against a party who
previously "had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."12 Because
courts and commentators have read an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine requirement into rule 32(a),123 courts should admit deposi-
tions into evidence only against parties who had the opportunity to
"develop the testimony" through cross-examination. This require-
ment will ensure a deposition's reliability as evidence, and thus, its
admissibility as an exception to the hearsay rule.124
119. FFD. R. Civ. P. 32(a).
120. 3 B. JoNEs, supra note 7, § 18:26 at 498.
121. See 4A, J. MooRa, MooRE's FEDRAL PRACTiCE 30.58, at 30-133 (2d ed. 1983);
Bobb v. Modem Products, Inc., 648 F.2d 1051, 1055 (5th Cir. 1981). For example, in Du-
Beau v. Smither & Mayton, Inc., 203 F.2d 395, 396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1953), the court excluded
the deposition of a witness from evidence because the witness refused to disclose his resi-
dence or occupation when cross-examined at the deposition proceedings. The court reasoned
that the deponents refusal to reveal his place of abode or occupation substantially deprived
plaintiff of her right of cross-examination. Id. at 397.
122. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1). "Former testimony does not rely upon some set of cir-
cumstances to substitute for oath and cross-examination, since both oath and opportunity
to cross-examine were present in fact." Id. advisory committee note.
123. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
124. Dean McCormick contends that lack of any opportunity to cross-examine an ab-
sent declarant is one of the main justifications for the hearsay exclusion of evidence:
It would be generally agreed today that the third factor is the main justification for the
exclusion of hearsay. This is the lack of any opportunity for the adversary to cross-
examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is reported by the witness.
Thus as early as 1668 we find a court rejecting hearsay because "the other party could
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(b) Adequacy of Opportunity for Cross-Examination
The evaluation of whether a discovering party had an ade-
quate opportunity to cross-examine a deposed witness requires an
understanding of the practical difference between taking a deposi-
tion for discovery purposes and taking one for evidentiary pur-
poses. In choosing to depose a party-opponent's expert witness, a
party obviously does not desire to preserve the contents of the
deposition as evidence for use at trial because the expert's opinion
probably is harmful to the discovering party's position.12 Rather, a
party's primary purpose for deposing an expert witness is to ascer-
tain the crux of the expert's future testimony, which often exceeds
the scope of the deposing party's expertise, and to prepare an ef-
fective cross-examination strategy that rebuts the expert's testi-
mony.12 6 When taking evidentiary depositions, however, the depos-
ing party's counsel invariably seeks to preserve the contents of the
deposition for use at trial in the light most favorable to his cli-
ent-a task that is very difficult when examining an adverse expert
not cross-examine the party sworn." Judicial expressions stress this as a principal rea-
son for the hearsay rule. Cross-examination, as Bentham pointed out, was a distinctive
feature of the English trial system, and the one which most contributed to the prestige
of the institution of jury trial. He called it "a security for the correctness and complete-
ness of testimony." The nature of this safeguard which hearsay lacks is indicated by
Chancellor Kent: "Hearsay testimony is from the very nature of it attended with...
doubts and difficulties and it cannot clear them up. 'A person who relates a hearsay is
not obliged to enter into any particulars, to answer any questions, to solve any difficul-
ties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambigui-
ties; he entrenches himself in the simple assertion that he was told so, and leaves the
burden entirely on his dead or absent author.'. . . The plaintiff by means of this spe-
cies of evidence would be taken by surprise and be precluded from the benefit of a
cross-examination of S. as to all those material points which have been suggested as
necessary to throw full light on his information." Similarly, a Georgia judge has said
that cross-examination "is the most efficacious test which the law has devised for the
discovery of truth." Morgan analyzed the protective function of cross-examination and
concluded (1) that while the fear of exposure of falsehoods on cross-examination is a
stimulus to truth-telling by the witness, actual exposure of wilful falsehood is rarely
accomplished in actual practice and (2) that the most important service of cross-exami-
nation in present day conditions is in affording the opportunity to expose faults in the
perception and memory of the witness.
C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 116, at 583 (footnotes omitted).
125. The opponent would not hire an expert to testify at trial unless the expert's testi-
mony is favorable to his case.
126. See, e.g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 511 F.2d 192, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1975),
af'd, 426 U.S. 929 (1976); United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 72 (9th Cir. 1968); see also
Hoover v. United States Dept. of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1141-42 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing
the "entitlement of right" to discover substance of the expert's anticipated testimony under
rule 26(b)(4)(A)).
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whose area of expertise is foreign to the deposing attorney.12 7
Strategic concerns also may play an important role in defining
the scope of questioning an expert receives during a deposition.
12 8
Because attorneys sometimes are unknowledgeable in an expert's
specialty, they may choose not to question or challenge the expert
on certain matters until they can familiarize themselves with the
expert's ideas through further research or consultation with their
own experts. Similarly, counsel also may limit cross-examination of
an expert to avoid revealing information that he has gathered
while preparing his case,129 thereby forcing the opponent to elicit
this information through its own discovery measures.
By asserting that parties have an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine and rebut an expert's testimony while deposing him,
courts completely ignore the reasons that compel parties to depose
expert witnesses and the realities of the deposition process. The
judicial theory that parties waive their right to cross-examine a de-
posed expert witness who later becomes unavailable by not cross-
examining the expert with full vigor during the deposition is even
more untenable. 30 Parties often lack sufficient preparation while
taking depositions before trial to cross-examine party-opponents'
expert witnesses effectively. In fact, the desire to prepare for cross-
examination often is the key factor that motivates a party to de-
pose a witness. By admitting discovery depositions of expert wit-
nesses against discovering parties under rule 32(a)(3), therefore,
courts not only have controverted the essential information-gather-
ing and surprise-squelching purposes of pretrial discovery, but also
effectively and erroneously have eliminated the process of deposing
the witnesses of a party-opponent as a pretrial discovery tech-
nique. Instead, the courts effectively have recharacterized deposing
of witnesses as an extension of formal trial proceedings which pre-
sume that the deposing party has engaged in full pretrial prepara-
tion. This ill-founded scenario is particularly egregious when the
deposed witness is an expert whose testimony encompasses knowl-
edge of which the deposing party is ignorant.
127. An expert, by definition, is well-versed in the particular matters of his testimony.
Opposing counsel, even after availing himself of self-education, usually lacks sufficient prep-
aration to discredit the expert's testimony.
128. See Kennelly, Pretrial Discovery-The Courts and Trial Lawyers Are Finally
Discovering That Too Much of It Can Be Counterproductive, 21 TRIAL LAW. GumH 458,
474-89 (1977).
129. "Pretrial interrogation may serve only to educate the witness so that cross-exami-
nation becomes ineffectual at trial." Id. at 480.
130. See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 4, at 159-66.
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2. Practical Implications of the Expert Witness
Deposition Problem
(a) Potential for Abuse
In most cases concerning the expert witness deposition prob-
lem under rule 32(a)(3), the parties either did not expect the de-
posed witness to become unavailable or they anticipated the un-
availability and took the expert's deposition to preserve the
evidence.131 Rule 32(a)(3), however, allows a party to permit oppo-
nents to depose his witness for discovery purposes while he never
intends to compel the witness' presence at trial. Similarly, a party
could choose this strategy after a party-opponent completes the
deposition. A decision to submit the deposition into evidence and
not to produce the witness to testify, especially in the context of
expert witnesses, abuses the equitable purposes of discovery under
the Federal Rules, particularly when the party who seeks admis-
sion of the deposition has identified the expert as a trial witness.32
In this situation the deposed party effectively has placed the dis-
covering party in a trial-type situation that erroneously presumes
the discovering party has prepared fully for cross-examination of
the expert, and depositions occurring under these circumstances
generally favor the deposed party.1 "
(b) Inhibition of Discovery
As the appellant argued in Savoie v. LaFourche Boat Rentals,
Inc.,' " courts discourage parties from deposing the expert wit-
nesses of party-opponents by admitting these depositions into evi-
dence if the witnesses later become unavailable to testify at trial.135
Courts in such cases clearly have stated that parties who depose an
opponent's expert witness must anticipate the possibility of the
witness subsequently becoming unavailable, thereby necessitating
admission of the deposition against them."' These courts, how-
ever, ironically are forcing discovering parties to be fully prepared
to cross-examine the party-opponent's expert witness at a stage in
131. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
132. See supra text accompanying note 30.
133. Questioning that attempts to record the expert's opinion and the basis for it often
does not elicit any significant discrediting testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Interna-
tional Business Mach., 90 F.R.D. 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
134. 627 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1980).
135. See supra note 108.
136. See Wright Root Beer Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 414 F.2d 887, 890 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. International Business Mach., 90 F.R.D. 377, 381 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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pretrial discovery that should be producing the information neces-
sary to prepare for such cross-examination. Because parties usually
lack sufficient information to engage in meaningful cross-examina-
tion of expert witnesses before deposing them, courts in this situa-
tion effectively are discouraging parties from deposing an oppo-
nent's expert witnesses.
B. Potential Solutions to the Expert Witness
Deposition Problem
Future courts, parties, and rulemakers could employ several
strategies to reduce the chances of parties using discovery deposi-
tions of expert witnesses against discovering parties at trial and to
reduce the degree of unfairness that stems from such use. These
strategies include the following: (1) court orders limiting the use of
depositions at trial; (2) stipulation by the parties that limits the
use of depositions to discovery; (3) cautionary instructions by the
trial judge warning jurors to scrutinize deposition evidence care-
fully; (4) a stricter judicial test for determining unavailability of
expert witnesses; (5) local court rules that mitigate unfair use of
expert witness depositions; and (6) amendment to the Federal
Rules addressing the expert witness deposition problem. Courts,
legislators, and rulemakers who currently are considering the
problems with and potential reforms of the discovery process
should consider adopting one or more of these approaches to pro-
tect parties who wish to depose a party-opponent's expert witness
against unfairness. Similarly, trial counsel operating under the
Federal Rules or similar state rules should recognize the limited
protections that already exist.
1. Court Orders Limiting Use of Depositions
District courts possess broad discretionary powers to make
discovery and evidentiary rulings in the interest of conducting fair
and orderly trials.137 This discretion includes "the power to exclude
or admit expert testimony.., and to exclude testimony of wit-
nesses whose use at trial is in bad faith or would unfairly prejudice
an opposing party."13 8 This Note advocates that the unfairness in-
herent in using the discovery deposition of an expert witness
against the deposing party constitutes a colorable claim of
137. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 217-18 (D. Del. 1960);
Dipson Theatres, Inc. v. Buffalo Theatres, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 313, 314 (W.D.N.Y. 1948).
138. See cases cited supra note 137.
[Vol. 36:16151638
EXPERT WITNESSES
prejudice against which a judge could exercise his discretionary
powers by excluding the deposition from evidence. Procedurally,
parties may seek such a court order pursuant to the "protective
order" provision of rule 26(c) before deposing the expert witness.13 9
The moving party simply should show the court that it lacks suffi-
cient preparation to conduct extensive cross-examination and ac-
cordingly, that the court should limit the deposition's use to dis-
covery purposes.
Although the judicial power to issue protective orders is dis-
cretionary, at least two reasons make it unlikely that courts will
issue such orders against the use of expert witness depositions at
trial. First, past judicial treatment of expert witness discovery dep-
ositions indicates an unwillingness to recognize any distinction be-
tween discovery and evidentiary depositions. 140 Because courts tra-
ditionally have not distinguished these types of depositions and
have not acknowledged the prejudice that results from using dis-
covery depositions against deposing parties, courts probably would
refuse to order any limitations on the use of depositions. Second,
some courts might construe explicit unavailability provisions in
rule 32(a) to prohibit this type of protective order.141 Nevertheless,
discovering parties still should seek protective orders because, even
if a court denies the party's motion, the mere attempt to restrict
use of the deposition bolsters any subsequent argument of
prejudice that the discovering party can make if his opponent later
tries to offer the deposition into evidence. A discovering party
could argue that he had not waived his right to cross-examine the
unavailable witness because he had notified the court prior to tak-
ing the deposition that he was limiting his questioning to discov-
ery. A court, however, could argue that its denial of the motion put
counsel on notice of the deposition's potential use at trial and that
the party therefore had waived his opportunity to cross-examine
the expert witness. Thus, because courts issue protective orders in
only limited circumstances, they do not protect discovering parties
adequately. 142
139. Rule 26(c) provides in pertinent part- "Upon motion by a party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court ... may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense .... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
140. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 44-86 and accompanying text.
142. Another argument in favor of protective orders is that courts increasingly have
exercised control over the discovery phase of litigation. See Sherman & Kinnard, Federal
Court Discovery in the 80's-Making the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245, 247, 269 (1979). This
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2. Stipulation by the Parties
Another strategic option currently available to discovering
parties is stipulation with party-opponents limiting the use of ex-
pert witness depositions to discovery.143 To make such a stipula-
tion, discovering parties should request that party-opponents join
them in submitting a written stipulation which states that neither
party intends to introduce the deposition into evidence. The obvi-
ous problem with stipulations is that an opponent simply may re-
fuse to enter into the agreement. As a practical matter, the party
who hired the deposed expert witness should try to preserve the
right to use the deposition at trial if the expert witness subse-
quently becomes unavailable. Thus, stipulations essentially are al-
most perfect"4 protective devices that parties seldom agree to use.
If both parties seek to depose their opponents' expert witnesses,
however, the likelihood that they will reach a stipulation agree-
ment is substantially higher than if only one party deposes an ex-
pert because both parties may wish to prevent the other's use of
the deposition at trial.
3. Cautionary Instructions
Judges can use cautionary instructions to warn juries to scruti-
nize evidence from expert witness depositions more carefully than
live trial testimony because proper cross-examination of the depo-
nents was impossible. Courts theoretically can prevent any
prejudice resulting from admission of an expert witness deposition
by issuing such instructions.1'4 Two problems, however, make cau-
tionary instructions an inadequate protection against prejudice.
First, courts probably will not issue cautionary instructions con-
cerning the reliability of deposition evidence because of the hold-
development, however, does not portend necessarily increased judicial sympathy for parties
facing the expert witness deposition problem.
143. Very little authority exists concerning availability of this type of stipulation. If
parties stipulated that they would use a certain deposition only for discovery purposes, how-
ever, the court apparently would have to exclude it from evidence. See Stevens v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 157 Ky. 561, 570, 163 S.W. 747, 751 (1914). Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permits stipulations waiving the procedural requirements of depositions. FED. R.
Civ. P. 29. Parties frequently use rule 29 to make a deposition admissible despite noncom-
pliance with procedural formalities. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2091 (1970).
144. Courts have a discretionary power to set aside stipulations. See FED. R. Civ. P.
29.
145. See Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L.
Rav. 264, 264 (1966).
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ing in Wright Root Beer""6 that such cautionary instructions con-
stitute reversible error. 147 Although the Fifth Circuit cited no
authority in Wright Root Beer for the proposition that the trial
court may not issue cautionary instructions concerning admission
of an unavailable witness' deposition,14 8 no subsequent decisions
have limited the Wright Root Beer holding. Second, empirical
studies cast substantial doubt on the effectiveness of cautionary
instructions. Typically, cautionary instructions limit the jury's con-
sideration of evidence to the use for which the evidence is compe-
tent.1 49 Various studies, however, have suggested that cautionary
instructions do not influence juries significantly to limit their con-
sideration of questioned evidence. 150 In fact, one study suggests
that a judge's cautionary instructions to a jury actually sensitize
the jury to the evidence.151 Furthermore, many "learned jurists"
have concluded that limiting instructions are useless because jurors
cannot distinguish proper and improper uses of evidence, even if
they remember and fully understand the limiting instructions.1 52
Thus, parties should not rely on cautionary instructions as the sole
protection against use of discovery depositions at trial. Rather,
parties probably should request cautionary instructions only as a
last resort when they believe a court will not exclude the
deposition.
4. A Stricter Test for Unavailability of Expert Witnesses
The ease with which a party can show unavailability of a de-
posed witness under rule 32(a)(3) and then use the deposition at
trial against the deposing party is the primary cause of the expert
witness deposition problem.153 In Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte'"
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sug-
146. 414 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1969).
147. For a discussion of the Wright Root Beer decision see notes 97-108 and accompa-
nying text.
148. Wright Root Beer, 414 F.2d at 890-91. See E. DEvrrT & C. BLACKMAR, 2 FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 72.02 (2d ed. 1970). Contra Treharne v. Callahan, 426
F.2d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 1970); Rosenthal v. Peoples Cab Co., 26 F.R.D. at 117-18.
149. For example, a court may admit a hearsay statement if the party offers it for a
purpose other than proving the truth of the statement itself. See FED. R. Evm. 801(c) advi-
sory committee note.
150. See, e.g., Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. RPv. 744
(1959); Note, supra note 145, at 265-69.
151. Broeder, supra note 150, at 754.
152. See Note, supra note 145, at 267 n.18 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 44-86 and accompanying text.
154. 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973).
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gested that "there is something unusual about the use of the prior
testimony of an expert witness that calls for further scrutiny of his
unavailability." 155 The court recognized that when a party previ-
ously has hired an expert witness for various purposes, the court
should not label that expert "unavailable" because the party chose
not to arrange for the expert's presence at trial.156 The Second Cir-
cuit, therefore, was advocating implicitly a stricter test for deter-
mining unavailability of an expert witness under rule 32(a)(3).
A stricter unavilability test is sensible for two reasons. First, a
stricter test would place a heavier burden of proving unavailability
on parties seeking to use an expert witness deposition at trial and,
consequently, would reduce the chance of parties abusing the un-
availability rule. 57 Under a stricter unavailability test for expert
witnesses, courts could require parties to give more compelling rea-
sons than mere distance to justify a witness' absence. Second, by
adopting a stricter unavailability test in civil cases, courts would
not be dealing with an unfamiliar requirement because a strict un-
availability test already is operative for all witnesses in criminal
cases.
1 58
Despite the potential benefits of a stricter unavailability re-
quirement, however, courts are unlikely to adopt this standard be-
cause the Carter-Wallace decision has had only a limited impact
in this area.159 An amendment to the Federal Rules probably
would be a prerequisite to the widespread adoption of a stricter
unavailability test for expert witnesses.
5. Local Court Rules
Federal district court judges may adopt by majority action
rules governing local practice that are consistent with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.1 60 Thus, district courts potentially could
frame local rules that mitigate in a variety of ways unfair use of
155. Id. at 536. The special qualities of expert testimony augment the argument that
use of discovery deposition testimony of experts is unfair.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d
792, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Mann, 590
F.2d 361, 365-68 (1st Cir. 1978); FaD. R. Cram. P. 15(a).
159. No courts have adopted the stricter standard of unavailability that Carter-Wal-
lace implies, perhaps because that court held that the lower court's failure to impose such a
standard was harmless error. See Arrow-Hart, Inc. v. Covert Hills, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 346, 348
(E.D. Ky. 1976).
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
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expert witness discovery depositions. A rule that required parties
to designate the purpose of all expert depositions and that prohib-
ited parties from introducing "discovery" depositions into evidence
certainly would curtail the expert witness deposition problem.
Similarly, a rule requiring parties to make binding designations at
a time before completion of discovery concerning which deposi-
tions they would introduce into evidence at least would offer the
discovering party a chance to conduct a second deposition with full
cross-examination. The district courts also could adopt other strat-
egies for addressing this problem with local rules, such as caution-
ary instructions or a stricter unavailability standard.
The principle difficulty in solving the expert witness deposi-
tion problem with local rules is that they must be consistent with
the Federal Rules.161 Arguably, any locally imposed limitation on
the operation of rule 32(a) would be invalid as inconsistent with
the Federal Rules.162 District courts could avoid this problem by
making enforcement of the local rule discretionary. 6 ' A discretion-
ary local rule, however, would provide no more protection than al-
ready is available under a protective order.' The doubtful success
of local rules solving the expert witness deposition problem and
the lack of uniformity among local rules that probably would occur
throughout the district courts make local rule changes an unsatis-
factory solution to this problem.
6. Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
An amendment to the Federal Rules offers the most uniform
and effective approach for resolving the expert witness deposition
problem. Again, several possible approaches might work. The Ad-
visory Committee could recommend an amendment to rule 32 that
required courts to distinguish between discovery and evidentiary
depositions. The amendment could exclude from the current ad-
missibility provisions of rule 32 any deposition that a party takes
expressly for discovery purposes. Alternatively, a revised rule 32
could require courts to treat admissibility of expert witness and
nonexpert witness depositions differently, perhaps by providing
that courts never can consider expert witnesses unavailable for
161. Id.
162. The language of rule 32 does not imply a limitation concerning the type of depo-
sition admissible under its provisions. See supra notes 44-86.
163. Cf. Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 142, at 264 n.76 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the validity of local rules limiting the total number of interrogatories).
164. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
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trial under rule 32(a). This amendment effectively would allow
parties to introduce expert witness depositions only by agreement.
The best solution to the expert witness deposition problem is
to amend rule 26(b)(4), which already governs discovery of expert
witnesses. Rule 26(b)(4) recognizes that parties need an adequate
opportunity for discovery of expert witnesses before trial to cross-
examine and rebut their testimony at trial.'65 To achieve this end,
rule 26(b)(4)(A) permits parties to discover any expert witness that
a party-opponent expects to call as a witness at trial. An amend-
ment to rule 26(b)(4) could make the deposition process fair for
deposing and deposed parties by specifying that if a deposed ex-
pert whom a party had designated to be a trial witness subse-
quently became unavailable to testify at trial, any deposition
which a party-opponent previously took of the expert would be
inadmissible upon motion pursuant to rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) or by
agreement with the other party. This amendment simply would
make binding the designation of an expert as a trial witness and
would prevent deposed parties from using the discovery efforts of
deposing parties as evidence. An amendment of this type would
not prejudice parties who want to call expert witnesses to testify at
trial because they still would retain the option of preserving the
expert's testimony through direct examination during depositions
as protection against subsequent unavailability of the witness. If a
party should choose to preserve expert testimony in this manner,
the opponent would at least be on notice of the deposition's in-
tended use and would have an opportunity to prepare for cross-
examination of the expert through discovery.
This proposed change in rule 26 would reorder priorities by
allowing the risk of an expert witness' becoming unavailable to fall
upon the proponent of the expert's testimony. Under the current
Federal Rules, an expert's absence probably is more harmful to the
opponent of the expert's testimony, who inadvertently may have
created unfavorable evidence by deposing the expert in prepara-
tion for trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
The degree to which courts inhibit discovery and prejudice
parties by admitting expert witness depositions into evidence
under rule 32(a)(3) when the expert becomes unavailable to testify
at trial is difficult to measure. Because the subject matter of con-
165. See supra note 6.
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temporary civil litigation has become highly technical and com-
plex, parties increasingly have used expert witnesses at trial for a
variety of purposes. This phenomenon suggests that the expert
witness deposition problem should be a common problem in civil
cases in federal courts. Although only a few cases have addressed
this problem, their holdings probably discourage parties from argu-
ing against admission of expert witness depositions regardless of
how much the circumstances of a case favor inadmissibility.
The expert witness deposition problem presents a strong pos-
sibility of denying discovering parties an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine unavailable expert witnesses. During expert witness
depositions, parties usually seek information that will help them
prepare an effective strategy for cross-examining the expert at
trial. Thus, requiring deposing parties to cross-examine experts
during depositions, before they have acquired the information nec-
essary to conduct effective cross-examination, inevitably discour-
ages parties from deposing expert witnesses. The expert witness
deposition problem controverts one of the basic purposes underly-
ing the liberal system of discovery in federal courts-to "make a
trial less a game of blind man's buff [sic] and more a fair contest
with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable
extent."" 6 In addition, courts, by perpetuating this problem, erro-
neously have eliminated the process of deposing a party-oppo-
nent's designated trial witnesses as a pretrial discovery technique
by effectively treating the process as an extension of formal trial
proceedings that presume the deposing party has prepared fully to
cross-examine the expert. Thus, courts and rulemakers should take
active steps to remedy the expert witness deposition problem be-
cause it threatens to undermine the process of deposing witnesses
before trial, one of the most important pretrial discovery tech-
niques available to parties in federal courts.
STEVEN D. PARMAN
166. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
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